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Abstract 
 
This empirical thesis explores the ways some Third World States use the patent regime as set 
out in the TRIPS Agreement to effect certain development and public health goals. It also 
investigates how non-state actors in these countries participate in patent law making, thereby 
creating narratives and counter-narratives that are challenging global norms on 
pharmaceutical patent protection.  
To do this, the thesis takes the three different examples of Brazil, India, and Nigeria and tells 
the story of patent law making within each of them. Adopting a Third World Approach to 
International Law as a macro-theoretical guide and nodal governance theory as a supplement, 
the thesis maps the broad interpretations and contestations of international patent law within 
the Third World. In doing this, the thesis pays particular attention to the everyday life of 
international patent law through the examination of practices that unfold through the different 
sites and objects in which international law operates today.  
 
In unpacking the patent law making in the aforementioned countries, the thesis posits that 
there is an emerging body of IP jurisprudence from the Third World that is expanding the 
aperture on norms governing pharmaceutical patent rules and medicines access discourse. In 
other words, the politics of international law making and implementation is shifting 
dramatically due to the confluence of different actors from various sectors in different forums 
in Brazil and India that are articulating counter-hegemonic pharmaceutical patent rules. The 
concomitant effect is not only the adoption of alternative pharmaceutical patent laws that are 
pro-human rights – especially pro-public health rights – in its articulation, but are also 
hermeneutic expressions of resistance against, and reform of, the international IP regime. In 
interrogating these narratives and counter-narratives that frame the global intellectual 
property regime in Third World forums, this thesis articulates successful counter-hegemonic 
discourses on patent law making and extrapolates lessons for Nigeria. 
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1    Introduction 
1.1 Background 
In the last 20 years, intellectual property (IP) has become one of the key areas of 
conflict in the global political economy, thanks to the introduction of the Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement),1 which 
was concluded as part of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations and 
came into force in 1995. The TRIPS Agreement ‘provides minimum standard for the 
protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs).’2 As part of international law, the 
effect of the TRIPS Agreement on the development and lives of people in the Third 
World has been contentious. This is because the protection of IPRs as required by the 
TRIPS Agreement does not take into account the differences in the development 
levels and socioeconomic needs of developed and developing countries, and is usually 
implemented with no form of social security in place.  
 
This empirical thesis seeks to explore Third World attempts to use the patent regime 
as set out in the TRIPS Agreement to effect certain development and public health 
goals, and to discover the ways these countries are challenging global norms in 
pharmaceutical patent protection. To do this, the thesis takes the three different 
examples of Brazil, India, and Nigeria and tells the story of patent law making within 
each of them. Using the Third World Approach to International Law (TWAIL) as a 
macro-theoretical guide, the thesis maps out the broad interpretations and 
contestations of international patent law within the Third World. Such contestations, 
however, and their significance in law making in the Third World are regarded as 
asymmetrical. This is because the presence of influential actors capable of mobilising 
knowledge, providing expertise, and participating in various forms of patent 
governance are uneven in these countries. In this regard, the thesis explicates the role 
and participation of these actors using nodal governance theory.  
 
In unpacking the patent law making in the aforementioned countries, the thesis 
discovers the following. First, the innovative interpretation of global patent rules in 
                                                                  
1 World Trade Organization, ‘Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights’ (World Trade 
Organization 1995) <https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf> accessed 26 March 2015. 
2 Jayashree Watal, ‘Developing Countries and the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights: Current Issues in the 
WTO’, WTO Law and Developing Countries (1st edn, Cambridge University Press 2007) 129. 
 2 
the local forums of the countries under study was inspired by and made possible as a 
result of disappointment and disillusionment with the assertions of benefit and 
progress attached to instituting a particular form of patent regime. Second, the 
possibility of using patents to effect the twin goals of development and public health 
goals is likely when patent law is implemented in combination with other 
complementary policies such as public good protection strategies, enhancing local 
capacity in research and development (R&D), and healthy market competition. Third, 
the presence of local non-state actors is imperative in the cognitive shaping and 
innovative use of patent law as a tool for development and achieving public health 
objectives.  
 
The discoveries and overall findings provided in this research form an original 
contribution to the discourse on patent law in Nigeria, as there is very few research 
explicating the effect of the absence of a local pharmaceutical manufacturing sector 
and civil society organisations in patent law making and structural reform. 
Furthermore, in exclusively focusing on law making in the Third World, this thesis 
unmasks a competing narrative – a counter-narrative of sorts – to the current 
understanding of the international IP regime. Specifically – and this forms another 
contribution of this thesis – in successfully articulating and impelling a local counter-
hegemonic discourse of global patent rules, the thesis shows that patent law making in 
Brazil and India is expanding the aperture on norms governing the pharmaceutical 
patent regime and access to essential medicines discourse. This in turn provides ways 
for governments of other Third World countries to exploit the residual flexibilities 
within the TRIPS Agreement.  
 
The analyses in this thesis will appeal to law and policymakers interested in the 
intersection of contemporary IP global governance, development, socio-legal 
approaches, and critical international law. Lessons from Brazil and India as well as 
the suggestions in the conclusion could also assist Nigerian policymakers in shaping 
and instituting a patent regime that achieves the balance between IP protection, public 
health, and development. The rest of this introductory chapter orients the thesis as a 
whole by providing the context of this doctoral study, statement of the problem, aim 
and scope, methods and methodology and, finally, an overview of the thesis chapters. 
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1.2  Context of Study 
A patent is a temporary exclusive right granted to the inventor of a product or process 
which is ‘new’ (or ‘novel’), involves an ‘inventive step’ (or is ‘non-obvious’), and is 
capable of industrial application (or ‘useful’).3 In its contemporary context, a patent is 
defined as ‘a document, issued, upon application, by a government office which 
describes an invention and creates a legal situation in which the patented invention 
can normally only be exploited (manufactured, used, sold, imported) with the 
authorisation of the owner of the patent.’4 Patents are designed to reward inventors, 
encourage technical progress, and foster dissemination of information.5 According to 
May and Sell, a patent is an institutionalised bargain between the state and the 
inventor, where the ‘State agrees to establish the legal mechanisms that ensure that 
the inventor can extract payment for their idea when others use it while the inventor 
allows the State to lodge the idea in its public records where it can be accessed by 
interested parties.’6 The development of a patent system can be grouped into three 
stages – the national phase, multilateral phase, and the global phase. These phases 
will be discussed briefly. 
 
The National Phase  
In their initial stages in 15th century Europe where they originated, patent customs 
were privileges rather than property rights as such, with links to strong development 
objectives such as assisting in the development of new industries by importation or 
through native invention.7 As such, it can be argued that patents were developed out 
of the realisation that there was a societal need to both recognise and protect a 
property right in invention to encourage local manufacturing and attain economic 
development objectives. According to legal historian Edward Walterscheid, the patent 
customs that originated from Venice (1421)8 and spread to England (1449), Germany 
                                                                  
3 Frederick M Abbott, ‘Intellectual Property, International Protection’ (Florida State University - College of Law 
2009) 2 (‘Intellectual Property, International Protection’). 
4 WIPO Intellectual Property Handbook (2nd edn, WIPO 2004). 
5 Carlos M Correa, Pharmaceutical Innovation, Incremental Patenting and Compulsory Licensing (1st edn, South 
Centre 2011) 1 <http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/documents/s21395en/s21395en.pdf> accessed 20 May 2015; 
Abbott, ‘Intellectual Property, International Protection’ (n 3) 2. 
6 Christopher May and Susan K Sell, Intellectual Property Rights (Lynne Rienner Publishers 2006) 8. 
7 Edward C Walterscheid, ‘The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law: Antecedents (Part 2)’ (1994) 76 
Journal of the Patent and Trademark Office Society 850 (‘The Early Evolution of the US Patent Law: Antecedents 
(Part 2)’). 
8 Walterscheid suggests that the earliest patentee of record is Filippo Brunelleschi, who received a monopoly 
patent from the city-state of Florence in 1421, after which 11 patents were granted 75 years prior to the official 
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(1484), France (1551), and Austria (1794) arose out of the desire of European rulers 
to encourage the development of new industries within their realms.9 To achieve these 
economic plans, patent customs then took two forms: importation of knowledge into 
the realm, which involved local artisans travelling abroad to learn a new trade 
(apprenticeship), or through invention within the realm.10 However, due to the 
reluctance of artisans to teach foreigners the secrets of the trade, the latter took 
precedence as the preferred method of encouraging local manufacturing over time. 
Thus, it can be argued that patents were privileges introduced to promote economic 
development rather than private property rights that prioritised trade and seen as a 
trade tool, as they are today.11   
 
Of course, many incentives were put in place to encourage local manufacturing such 
as financial grants, favourable tax treatment, sovereign protection, and bans on the 
emigration of skilled labour.12 Ha-Joon Chang notes that many governments set up 
institutions of teaching (e.g. technical schools) and research (e.g. various non-
teaching academies). They also established museums, organised international 
expositions (‘expos’), bestowed new machinery to private firms, and set up ‘model 
factories’ using advanced technologies all in an effort to raise ‘awareness’ in 
advanced technology in a number of ways.13 In England, however, the grant of 
monopolies by the Crown became a popular practice. Known as literae parentes, the 
monopoly rights bestowed privileges upon individuals in furtherance of royal 
policies.14 The English Crown, recognising the costs and risks associated with the 
introduction of a new trade or industry, introduced patent monopoly for a limited 
period as a form of incentive to attract trade and manufacturing. Premised on the 
potential for substantial economic return to those taking such risks and incurring such 
expenses, patent monopoly provided a form of protection by eliminating competition 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
patent law enactment in 1474, and approximately 100 patents have been found in the Venetian archives, which 
were issued in the following 75 years.  
9 ibid. Many of the other European countries established their patent laws in the other half of the 19th century — 
Russia (1812), Prussia (1815), Belgium and the Netherlands (1817), Spain (1820), Bavaria (1825), Sardinia 
(1826), the Vatican State (1833), and Sweden (1834). The United States (US) introduced patents in 1793.  
10 Walterscheid, ‘The Early Evolution of the US Patent Law: Antecedents (Part 2)’ (n 7) 850; Ha-Joon Chang, 
‘Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development: Historical Lessons and Emerging Issues’ (2001) 2 
Journal of Human Development 288. 
11 Edward C Walterscheid, ‘The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law: Antecedents (Part 1)’ (1994) 76 
Journal of the Patent and Trademark Office Society 669 (‘The Early Evolution of the US Patent Law: Antecedents 
(Part 1)’); Srividhya Ragavan, Patent and Trade Disparities in Developing Countries (Oxford University Press 
2012) 16. 
12 Walterscheid, ‘The Early Evolution of the US Patent Law: Antecedents (Part 1)’ (n 11) 669; Chang (n 10) 289. 
13 Chang (n 10) 289. 
14 Ragavan (n 11) 3. 
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and plagiarism. In response to these measures preventing technology outflows from 
advanced countries, the less advanced countries deployed all sorts of ‘illegitimate’ 
means to gain access to advanced technologies. Chang notes that many entrepreneurs 
and technicians in these countries were often involved in acts of ‘industrial espionage’ 
– the practice of spying to obtain information on new industrial technology – and 
sometimes with explicit sanction from the state.15  
 
In an analysis of the evolution of the patent system, Walterscheid identified several 
parallelisms between the Venetian and English patent systems. For example, both the 
Venetians and the British used the custom of granting patent monopoly to introduce 
new art and lure artisans into their realms.16 In fact, the initial Venetian patent custom 
system was for the grant of ‘exclusive right to practice a particular art such as glass 
making, in return for its introduction into the Venetian city-state.’17 In England, on the 
other hand, the patent regime was created for the specific purpose of stimulating ‘the 
domestic production of both raw materials and a wide variety of manufactured 
goods.’18 Walterscheid contends that for the English Crown, the goal of the monopoly 
was to ‘attain economic self-sufficiency, thereby gaining in power and strength not 
only within its borders, but also relative to other states.’19 Under the reign of Queen 
Elizabeth I, the English patent custom took root and flourished. From 1561 to 1600, 
Queen Elizabeth I granted at least 51 monopoly patents for industries and 
inventions.20 The acceptance of patents was crystallised in 1623, when Britain’s 
Statute of Monopolies transferred the right of granting monopolies from King James I 
to Parliament.21 This enactment was seen as an indication of the growing importance 
of trade within the country’s economy and the willingness to foster innovation, which 
eventually allowed a step forward into industrial production.22  
 
The spurt in the grant of monopoly in England was based on the belief that the Crown 
not only had the right but also the obligation to regulate commerce and industry, and 
to do so in a manner that encourages the creation of new native industries and trades. 
                                                                  
15 Chang (n 10) 290. 
16 Walterscheid ‘The Early Evolution of the US Patent Law: Antecedents (Part 1)’ (n 11) 701-02; see also 
Walterscheid, ‘The Early Evolution of the US Patent Law: Antecedents (Part 2)’ (n 7) 864. 
17 Walterscheid, ‘The Early Evolution of the US Patent Law: Antecedents (Part 1)’ (n 11) 707. 
18 Walterscheid, ‘The Early Evolution of the US Patent Law: Antecedents (Part 2)’ (n 7) 855. 
19 ibid 856. 
20 ibid 853. 
21 Petra Moser, ‘Patents and Innovation: Evidence from Economic History’ (2013) 27 Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 25. 
22 Walterscheid, ‘The Early Evolution of the US Patent Law: Antecedents (Part 2)’ (n 7) 855. 
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As a result, English patents were primarily granted for the importation of new 
industry and the Crown granted many foreigners patent monopoly. Thus, for the 
English, the patent was seen as a tool to encourage manufacturing growth and to lure 
skilled workers to live in England. In exchange for the grant, the grantee agreed to not 
only ‘introduce the new art, trade or industry into England but also to practice or 
“work” it within the country.’23 Thus, for both the Venetian and English systems, 
patents were introduced for national objective purposes, i.e. improvement of local 
industrialisation as part of the effort to further national economic development goals.  
 
In addition to economic development policies, traditional patent policies were 
instituted to address welfare considerations. According to Srividhya Ragavan, the 
historic conception of patent rights developed amid strong notions of welfare or 
public good. Citing Thomas Jefferson’s letter that ideas should flow freely from ‘one 
to another over the globe for the moral and mutual instruction of man and 
improvement of his condition’, Ragavan contends that the welfare paradigm was one 
of the cornerstones of the American patent system, which was introduced in the 
United States (US) in 1790 based on a keen sense of national objectives and economic 
development. Like the British patent custom, the early American patent regime 
allowed the grant of ‘limited monopoly of 14 years to any applicant who invented or 
discovered any useful art’24 as long as the invention is sufficiently useful and 
important. Further, the invention should be:  
 
So particular and said invention so exact, as to not only distinguish the 
invention or discovery from other things before or known and used, 
but to enable a workman or other person skilled in the art to 
manufacture… to make, construct, or use the same, to the end that the 
public may have full benefit thereof, after the expiration.25 
 
In fact, the last line ‘…that the public may have full benefit thereof’ underscores the 
welfare objectives of patents in that monopolies are granted in exchange for ‘an 
enabled disclosure that could potentially benefit the progeny.’26 For the American 
founding fathers, especially Thomas Jefferson, patents have as an end goal the service 
of society and as a result, they made policies that allowed everyone, including 
emigrants, to benefit from monopoly policies. However, it could be argued that 
                                                                  
23 Walterscheid, ‘The Early Evolution of the US Patent Law: Antecedents (Part 2)’ (n 7) 857. 
24 Ragavan (n 11) 11. 
25 ibid.  
26 ibid. 
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Jefferson’s claim is quite rhetorical and that this welfarist concern is actually more 
parochial and nationalist and not for the loftier global circulation of ideas, in that the 
patent system reflected significant differential treatment between nationals and non-
nationals as a way to privilege the former. This difference is even more apparent in 
terms of US copyright statutes. For that matter, even European nations also adopted 
various provisions for differential treatment between nationals and non-nationals. 
These laws, according to Chang, accorded very inadequate protection of the IPRs of 
foreign citizens.27 For example, patenting of imported inventions by nationals was 
often explicitly allowed in Britain, Austria, and France, while patents were granted 
without any proof of originality in the US.28 
 
Other scholars such as Srividhya Ragavan contend that socio-economic realities and 
time shaped the evolution of early patent customs. The patent system, like all legal 
regimes, is susceptible to amendment based on national needs and requirements. 
History has shown that during adverse economic conditions, private rights tend to 
give way to government interventions to improve public rights and access to protected 
materials. So while early patents customs were engineered to be of benefit to the state, 
these monopolies were rescinded once perceived to not be of value to the realm.29 Put 
differently, patents proliferated ‘only when the economic climate remained conducive 
for research in order to appropriately channelize the early development and address 
public welfare concerns.’30 Conversely, patents were abolished where economic 
conditions became unfavourable, especially in times of economic hardship. In those 
hard times, monopoly grant becomes limited and restrictions are placed on already 
granted monopolies. For instance, during the industrial depression in England and 
during the Great Depression in the US, patent grants were suspended.31 The various 
European capitals also abolished patents during periods of socio-economic upheavals. 
The Netherlands abolished its patent system in 1869 after the rise of the free trade 
movement, which viewed patents as a form of protectionism and rejected them as a 
restriction on trade.32 Germany followed in 1817 while Switzerland had no formal 
patent system until 1907.33  This is due to, according to Srividhya Ragavan, the 
                                                                  
27 Chang (n 10) 290. 
28 Ragavan (n 11) 291. 
29 ibid. 
30 Ibid 33. 
31 ibid 19. 
32 Cicero Gontijo, ‘Changing the Patent System from the Paris Convention to the TRIPS Agreement: The Position 
of Brazil’ (2005) 26 Global Issues Paper 5; Chang (n 10) 291. 
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‘disconnect between such times and the patent system and its objectives of social 
benefits as patented products become less accessible to even fewer people during the 
abnormal economic times.’34  
 
The Multilateral Phase – The Paris Convention 
The push to harmonise IP law intensified as many countries started introducing local 
IPR laws and international commerce increased.35 The argument for this push was 
couched on the need to guarantee uniform protection and recognition across territorial 
borders. Thus, in 1873, the Austrian government sent out invitations for an 
international conference on patents during the Universal Exposition held in Vienna 
that year.36 This led to the adoption of the Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property in 1883.37 The Convention was signed by 11 countries – Belgium, 
Brazil, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Great Britain, Guatemala, Italy, The 
Netherlands, Portugal, Serbia, Spain, Switzerland, Tunisia, and the US. Importantly, 
through colonisation, the patent rules of the Convention were transplanted directly 
from the metropolitan states to the colonial territories, even though these territories 
had not signed the Convention.38 Such extension to the colonies, according to Ruth 
Okediji, was for purposes generally associated with the overarching colonial 
strategies of assimilation, incorporation, and control.39  
 
                                                                  
34 ibid 19. 
35 Ulf Anderfelt, International Patent-Legislation and Developing Countries (Martinus Nijhoff 1971) 65-75. 
36 Surendra J Patel, ‘Intellectual Property Rights in the Uruguay Round: A Disaster for the South?’ (1989) 24 
Economic and Political Weekly 981. According to Patel, the invitation for an international conference stemmed 
from a suggestion from the US and though the conference occurred in 1883, there were previous preparatory 
discussions in 1878 and 1880.  
37 World Intellectual Property Organization, ‘Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property’ (1883) 
(Paris Convention). See also Gustavo Bravo, ‘From Paris Convention to TRIPS: A Brief History’ (2000) 445 
Journal Contemporary Legal Issues; Pedro Roffe and Gina Vea, ‘The WIPO Development Agenda in an Historical 
and Political Context’, The Development Agenda: Global Intellectual Property and Developing Countries (1st edn, 
Oxford University Press 2008). The Paris Convention and the 1886 Berne Convention on copyright saw the 
creation of international bureaus (secretariats), which were merged in 1893 to form the United International 
Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual Property (BIRPI). BIRPI was superseded by a new organisation, the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), which was established by treaty in 1967. WIPO became a 
specialised agency of the United Nations (UN) in 1974. See Peter Drahos, The Universality of Intellectual 
Property Rights: Origins and Developments (1st edn, WIPO 1999) 
<http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo_unhchr_ip_pnl_98/wipo_unhchr_ip_pnl_98_1.pdf> accessed 22 
March 2014 (The Universality of Intellectual Property Rights).  
38 Anderfelt (n 35) 119; see also GHC Bodenhausen, Guide to the Application of the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property, as Revised at Stockholm in 1967 ((Colombettes 32) United International 
Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual Property 1968). 
39 Ruth L Okediji, ‘The International Relations of Intellectual Property: Narratives of Developing Country 
Participation in the Global Intellectual Property System’ (2003) 7 Singapore Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 225 (‘The International Relations of Intellectual Property’). 
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The Paris Convention established ground rules with respect to patents, trademarks, 
and unfair competition.40 Specifically, it established principles of national treatment, 
independence of patents, and patent priority rules among the signatories. The 
principle of national treatment allows for fairness and non-discrimination against 
foreign patent holders within a national territory,41 while independence of patents 
means that acts ‘taken by authorities with respect to a patent in one country will not 
affect the status of equivalent patents in other Paris Convention countries.’42 For 
example, if a judgement in one country considers an application or a patent to be 
invalid, that judgement does not have any impact on the treatment of the same 
application or patent in other member states. This rule, according to Frederick Abbott, 
reflects the fact that governments are distrustful of the possible motives of other 
governments in acting against their inventors.43 Finally, the principle of patent priority 
means that an applicant who submits an application in one member state has a priority 
period (currently 12 months) to file an application in other member states, and no 
other application will be allowed within that 12-month period.44  
 
The Paris Convention is seen by many as the first international IP agreement that 
established a comprehensive system for patent protection across territorial borders.45 
This success stems in part from the number of countries that signed up to it, the length 
of its existence without substantial change, and its specificity. According to Cicero 
Gontijo, the Paris Convention did not try to harmonise national laws or establish the 
reciprocity principle for national treatment, thereby allowing countries to implement 
patent law to suit their specific interest and needs.46 In a similar vein, Abbott notes 
that the fact the Paris Convention is non-specific helped in its longevity.47 For 
example, it does not define a patent or the criteria used for granting a patent. Neither 
does it prescribe subject matter coverage nor set minimum or maximum terms of 
                                                                  
40 Abbott, ‘Intellectual Property, International Protection’ (n 3) 5; Bravo (n 37) 445; Fredrick M Abbott, Carlos M 
Correa, and Peter Drahos, ‘Emerging Markets and the World Patent Order – The Forces of Change’, Emerging 
Markets and the World Patent Order (1st edn, Edward Elgar 2013) 6. 
41 Abbott, ‘Intellectual Property, International Protection’ (n 3) 5. 
42 ibid. 
43 ibid. 
44 ibid; Gontijo (n 32) 6. 
45Abbott, ‘Intellectual Property, International Protection’ (n 3) 5; Gontijo (n 32) 6; Bravo (n 37) 445; Margrit 
Seckelmann, ‘From the Paris Convention (1883) to the TRIPS Agreement (1994): The History of the International 
Patent Agreements as a History of Propertisation?’ (2013) 14 Journal der Juristischen Zeitgeschichte; 
Bodenhausen (n 38). 
46 Gontijo (n 32) 7. 
47 Abbott, ‘Intellectual Property, International Protection’ (n 3) 5. 
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protection.48 This allows for individuality of patent rules where countries adopt 
different standards of industrial property protection.49   
 
However, certain scholars view the Paris Convention otherwise. Surendra Patel, for 
example, contends that the Paris Convention serves the monopolistic interest of patent 
holders usually located in the West.50 These misgivings were also voiced by Brazil 
(see Chapter 3) over a century later. In spite of its numerous revisions (1900, 1911, 
1925, 1934, 1958, and 1967), the Paris Convention, according to Patel, remained ‘a 
rich man’s club’ that further strengthened the monopolistic rights of the patent 
holder.51 In a similar vein, Ruth Okediji notes that the patent law under the Paris 
Convention was merely for securing national economic interests against other 
European countries in colonial territories.52 Other scholars such as Dhavan et al. 
contend that the Paris Convention was engineered by the industrialised countries in 
order to secure import monopolies for the producer nations of the West so as to satisfy 
the needs of expanding capitalism.53 This is because article 5quater under the Paris 
Convention prohibits countries from revoking patents on the ground that the patented 
articles are being imported rather than locally manufactured.54 As a result, a foreigner 
could obtain a patent monopoly with absolutely no associated obligation to produce 
the patented article or ensure its supply in the patent-granting country. This practice, 
Dhavan et al. argue, has the effect of retarding the industrial development of the 
importing country, since foreign monopoly grant blocks domestic producers.55   
In fact, this issue of patent monopoly was the main point of contention between 
developed and developing countries. This simmering discontent also explains why 
developing countries have sought the adjustment of the global patent regime at 
                                                                  
48 ibid.  
49 See Peter Drahos, ‘Developing Countries and International Intellectual Property Standard-Setting' (2002) 5 The 
Journal of World Intellectual Property 768 (‘Developing Countries and International Intellectual Property 
Standard-Setting’). 
50 Patel (n 36) 981. 
51 ibid. 
52 Okediji, ‘The International Relations of Intellectual Property’ (n 39) 224-25. 
53 Rajeev Dhavan, Lindsay Harris, and Gopal Jain, ‘Conquest by Patent: The Paris Convention Revisited’ (1990) 
32 Journal of Indian Law Institute 131. 
54 Article 5quater states: ‘When a product is imported into a country of the Union where there exists a patent 
protecting a process of manufacture of the said product, the patentee shall have all the rights, with regard to the 
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process patent, with respect to products manufactured in that country.’ 
55 Dhavan, Harris, and Jain (n 53) 132. See also Edith Penrose, ‘International Patenting and the Less-Developed 
Countries’ (1973) 83 The Economic Journal; Constantine Vaitsos, ‘Patents Revisited: Their Function in 
Developing Countries’ (1972) 9 The Journal of Development Studies; Owen T Adikibi, ‘The Multinational 
Corporation and Monopoly of Patents in Nigeria’ (1988) 16 World Development; AK Menescal, ‘Changing 
WIPO’s Ways? The 2004 Development Agenda in Historical Perspective’ (2005) Journal of World Intellectual 
Property; Peter K Yu, ‘A Tale of Two Development Agendas’ (2009) 35 Ohio Northern University Law Review. 
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various international and local forums. For example, Brazil pushed for a revision of 
the Paris Convention to reduce incidents of patent monopoly abuse of pharmaceutical 
patents by foreign multinational companies operating in the country at that time.56 The 
push for patent reform in India was also borne out of the fact that many foreign 
pharmaceutical companies operating in the country at that time did not locally 
manufacture their patented invention or work their patent locally, but relied instead on 
the importation of the patented article whilst blocking indigenous companies that 
would normally manufacture locally.57 Analyses of the patent regime in Nigeria also 
revealed that majority of the patents in the country were owned by foreigners who did 
not locally work the patented article.58 This shows that developing countries have 
always been cognisant and wary of the asymmetrical effect of global patent rules and 
their tendency to favour the more economically powerful nations. It is this reservation 
about the impact on economic development that has animated (and continues to 
animate) contemporary discussion about patents in particular and IP in general. 
Despite the fact that the Paris Convention was tilted in favour of developed countries, 
it was still regarded by certain countries, such as the US, as insufficient. Specifically, 
corporate interests in the US regarded the Paris Convention as ‘toothless’ due to the 
lack of enforcement mechanisms that led to, among other things, the frequent 
‘disregard for the protection of non-nationals intellectual property outside most of 
developed countries and sometimes even between them.’59 Moreover, the fact that the 
Paris Convention allowed countries to implement patent rules specific to them and 
created a patchwork system of disparate norms, rules, and levels of protection was 
also seen as problematic.60 As a result, those who considered the Paris Convention 
unsuitable expended considerable resources in establishing patent rules at another 
point in time.  
The 1960s to the 1970s is known as the decolonisation period for many former 
colonies located in Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean. As these countries gained their 
independence, they ‘became more assertive of their rights and aware of their 
international obligations.’61 Peter Yu writes that these countries were torn between 
                                                                  
56 See Ch 3, part 1. 
57 See Ch 4, part 1. 
58 See Ch 5, part 1. 
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affirming and denouncing international obligations into which their former colonial 
rulers had entered on their behalf.62 Significantly, those willing to affirm their 
international obligation consider the extant standards to be too high and did not take 
into account specific economic conditions and technological gaps. For example, these 
countries found that the issue of patent monopoly under the Paris Convention 
hampered efforts to catch up with other developed countries.63 As a result, many of 
these countries set about joining different multilateral organisations to suit their 
interests and where they can adjust international standards to favour them. According 
to Drahos, this process of forum shifting – of joining various multilateral agreements 
and international organisations – was adopted by many developing countries after 
mostly unsuccessful attempts in changing the rules against abuses of patent 
monopolies with the Paris Convention.64 
Many newly independent countries shifted the discussion of IP-related issues to other 
international forums like the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the 
United Nations (UN), and the UN Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD). Developing countries found these forums neutral due to the large 
presence of new decolonised countries and also because of the bloc voting and one-
country-one-vote employed for consensus rule-making.65 By shifting to these forums, 
these countries actively sought to recalibrate, revise, or reinterpret the Paris 
Convention to satisfy their needs.66 According to Andrea Menescal, an intense and 
critical debate concerning abuses of patent monopolies by the Paris Union system and 
the prevalence of right-holders’ interests in the Paris Convention was tabled at the 
UN.67 As a result, Brazil (co-sponsored by Bolivia) submitted to the UN General 
Assembly (UNGA) in October 1961 a resolution entitled The Role of Patents in the 
Transfer of Technology to Under-Developed Countries.68 The resolution highlighted, 
among other things, abuses and misuses of patent monopolies, the importance of co-
operation in the field of applied science and technology for promoting the exchange 
of knowledge via transfer of technology from developed to developing countries, and 
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the need for a ‘Development Agenda’ in the international patent system.69 Though the 
final resolution presented to and adopted by the UNGA in December 1961 differed 
‘considerably from the original Draft submitted’, as the initial resolution was 
vehemently opposed by developed countries,70 it nonetheless showed emergent 
reformist narratives adopted by developing countries to change the multilateral 
architecture and to remedy colonial inequities.71  
Certain scholars have linked the countermovement towards an equitable global IP 
regime and the demands made by Third World countries in the form of a New 
International Economic Order (NIEO) that also emerged around that time.72 The 
NIEO was spearheaded through UNCTAD and highlighted efforts by developing 
countries to assert greater control over technology transfer, multinational enterprises, 
and other economic activities related to economic development goals.73 Menescal, for 
example, writes that the policy demands made by less developed countries, especially 
with regard to transfer of technology, is reminiscent of the draft resolution Brazil 
introduced before the UNGA.74 Likewise, Susan Sell notes that the Development 
Agenda raised by developing countries animated the NIEO approach to patents.75 
Similarly, Okediji observes that the political similarities between the NIEO and the 
Development Agenda are powerful reflections of a deeply pathological process in the 
construction of IP relations between developed and developing countries.76 Yet, 
decades later, the issue of an inequitable international patent regime still contours 
discussions on patents and their impact on development. As subsequent chapters will 
show, this countermovement and the reformist ideas have continued even within the 
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new IP regime – the TRIPS Agreement – that replaced the Paris Convention.77  
 
The Global Phase – TRIPS Agreement  
As developing countries shifted to other forums outside the Paris Convention in order 
to recalibrate the agreement, the US employed the same method to increase global IP 
rules and norms. For the US, bilateral agreements seemed to be the preferred 
approach in achieving high IP norms and standards outside of the WIPO and the Paris 
Convention. Furthermore, the US moved the issue of IP negotiations to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)78 – a forum in which it was the single most 
influential player – and it was this move that annihilated the dominance and reformist 
aspirations of developing countries.   
 
Unlike the WIPO, the GATT was a negotiating forum where trade deals were not 
openly and freely negotiated.79 This allowed some countries to drive a hard bargain in 
areas where they stood to benefit. Developed countries with their vast expertise had 
an unfair advantage over many developing countries that were dealing with 
substantial IP law making for the first time. Drahos points out that most developing 
countries did not have prior knowledge of IP or proposals to the TRIPS Agreement 
and were ill prepared for the negotiations.80 He argued that many developing countries 
signed the TRIPS Agreement without prior knowledge of IP, thus reflecting ‘a high 
degree of ignorance amongst technology-importing countries as to the costs of 
increasing intellectual property protection.’81 This view is supported by Chakravarthi 
Raghavan, who writes that the reason the US chose the GATT as the location for 
introducing new issue areas to international trade is because Third World countries 
are at their weakest inside the GATT in terms of collective organisation and 
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bargaining.82 Sell, on the other hand, writes that the US ‘favoured GATT because it 
would permit them to link intellectual property protection to trade.’83 The US 
negotiators anticipated better results owing to the large and attractive US market that 
could be used as negotiating leverage (see part II of Chapter 2 regarding the politics 
of the TRIPS Agreement negotiations).84 At GATT, the US was able to push forward 
a higher IP standard than those contained in the Paris Convention. 
 
The TRIPS Agreement is among the foremost international law frameworks that deal 
specifically with the aegis and utilisation of IPRs. It provides for a high global 
minimum standard for the protection of IPRs. According to May and Sell, even 
though the TRIPS Agreement does not determine national legislation, World Trade 
Organization (WTO) members should ensure that their national IP legislation adheres 
to the minimum level of protection for IPRs laid out in the TRIPS Agreement, thanks 
to the surveillance of adherence to various mechanisms and provisions such as the 
Trade Policy Review process.85 With the aim of reducing distortions and impediments 
to international trade, the TRIPS Agreement was anticipated to not only promote 
effective and adequate protection of IPRs, but to also engender positive development 
goals through the transfer of technology from developed to developing countries, 
spurring local industrialisation in the latter.86 Contracting developing country 
members also hoped that the TRIPS Agreement would increase much needed foreign 
direct investment (FDI) due to harmonised IP laws. Further, it was believed that a 
stronger global IP regime would not only ensure certainty and predictability, but 
would also stimulate more local research and development devoted to the special 
needs of developing countries that are not felt in technology exporting countries.87  
 
The TRIPS Agreement is currently the most comprehensive international agreement 
on IP matters as it introduced a strong compliance mechanism by judicialising dispute 
settlement among members88 and by introducing the concept of non-discrimination in 
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all fields of technology for patent application.89 In order to limit abuse and monopoly, 
it codified certain exceptions90 and incorporated a set of procedural rules for issuing 
compulsory licences (CLs) for patents.91 To ensure that countries with different levels 
of IP effectively comply with the new regime and to support developing countries, the 
TRIPS Agreement allowed for tiered transition periods for gradual implementation of 
the agreement,92 and promised technical assistance93 and technology transfer for least 
developed countries.94 The TRIPS Agreement also allowed the use of CLs in many 
instances including public interest, abuse or anti-competitive conduct, or for non-
commercial government use,95 among others.  
 
However, by limiting the use of CLs ‘predominantly for the supply of the domestic 
market of the Member authorising such use’96 in Article 31(f), the TRIPS Agreement 
has come under considerable criticism. Compulsory licencing refers to the granting of 
patent without the consent of the patent owner.97 Article 31(f) of the TRIPS 
Agreement is seen as problematic because it created situations of ambiguity and 
confusion. Certain countries could face difficulties when trying to utilise CLs as they 
do not have the local manufacturing capability, thereby creating significant 
restrictions on the quantities of drugs that can be imported.98 This poses huge 
problems for developing or least developed countries that have little or no 
manufacturing capability, and severely limits access to medicines for the majority in 
poor countries.99  
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History Repeating Itself? The Outcome of Negotiations on Access to Medicines, The HIV/AIDS Pandemic and 
Intellectual Property Rights in the World Trade Organisation’ (2004) 1 Law, Social Justice and Global 
Development Journal <http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/global/04-1/matthews.html> accessed 4 February 2015 (‘Is History 
Repeating Itself?’). 
96 TRIPS Agreement, art 31(f). 
97 ibid, art 31; see also Watal (n 2) 134. 
98 Frederick M Abbott, ‘The TRIPS Agreement, Access to Medicines, and the WTO Doha Ministerial Conference’ 
(2005) 5 The Journal of World Intellectual Property (‘The TRIPS Agreement, Access to Medicines, and the WTO 
Doha Ministerial Conference’). See also Mathews, ‘Is History Repeating Itself?’ (n 95). 
99 FM Scherer and Jayashree Watal, ‘Post-TRIPS Options for Access to Patented Medicines in Developing 
Nations’ (2002) 5 Journal of International Economic Law 925.  
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This situation would be further exacerbated by the HIV/AIDS epidemic that 
significantly affected many developing and least developed countries. To restore 
balance, WTO member states adopted the Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health 
(Doha Declaration) in 2001.100 The Doha Declaration reaffirmed the rights of 
developing countries to protect the health of their populations as well as the right to 
interpret the TRIPS Agreement in a manner supportive to access to medicines for 
all.101 Significantly, the Doha Declaration states that ‘IP protection, as mandated by 
TRIPS, can be temporarily overridden to address public health issues and concerns as 
defined by States’ government.’102 The Doha Declaration also recognised the gravity 
of health issues facing many developing and least developed countries, especially 
those resulting in HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis and reaffirmed that the TRIPS 
Agreement does not (and should not) prevent Members from taking measures to 
protect public health and promote access to medicines. Considering that many 
developing member states with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the 
pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in effectively using CL, delegates to the 
Doha Ministerial Conference ‘instructed the Council for TRIPS to find an expeditious 
solution to this problem and report to the General Council by the end of 2002.’103 The 
solution later came in the form of the August 2003 Decision on the Implementation of 
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health.104  
 
Despite these flexibility clauses, the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement, 
especially in Third World countries, has been contentious. This is because, as aptly 
pointed out by Joseph Stiglitz105 and Thomas Pogge,106 the protection of IPRs as 
required by the TRIPS Agreement does not take into account the differences in the 
development levels and socioeconomic needs of developed and developing countries, 
                                                                  
100 World Trade Organization, ‘The Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health’ (2001) WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 
<https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm> accessed 26 September 2016 
(Doha Declaration); see also Duncan Mathews, ‘From the August 30, 2003 WTO Decision to the December 6, 
2005 Agreement on an Amendment to TRIPS Improving Access to Medicines in Developing Countries’ (2006) 
Intellectual Property Quarterly (‘From the August 30, 2003 WTO Decision’). 
101 Doha Declaration, para 4. 
102 Valbona Muzaka, ‘Developing Countries and the Struggle on the Access to Medicines Front: Victories Won 
and Lost’ (2009) 30 Third World Quarterly 1344. 
103 Doha Declaration. 
104 ‘Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health’ (2003) 
WT/L/540 and Corr 1 <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm> accessed 26 
September 2016. 
105 Giovanni Dosi and Joseph E Stiglitz, ‘The Role of Intellectual Property in the Development Process, with some 
Lessons from Developed Countries: An Introduction', Intellectual Property Rights: Legal and Economic 
Challenges for Development (1st edn, Oxford University Press 2014) 5; Joseph E Stiglitz, ‘Economic Foundations 
of Intellectual Property Rights’ (2008) 57 Duke Law Journal 1694. 
106 Thomas W Pogge, ‘Human Rights and Global Health: A Research Program’ (2005) 36 Metaphilosophy.  
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and are usually implemented with no form of social security in place. This severely 
unjust agreement, they contend, imposes human rights violations on account of the 
avoidable mortality and morbidity it foreseeably produces. The resultant effects on 
developing countries currently confronted with numerous health issues such as 
HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis include but are not limited to the unaffordability 
and unavailability of basic essential medicines for the majority who need it, as well as 
premature deaths and extreme poverty.  
 
Apart from criticism from experts located in the Global North, many developing 
countries have often criticised the TRIPS Agreement even during the negotiating 
phase for many reasons. First, before the creation of the WTO, many developing 
countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean did not recognise IPR, 
most especially patents on pharmaceutical products. This is because on one hand, 
many of these countries have a common history of owning knowledge collectively, 
and the idea of profiting from an idea or invention to the exclusion of others for a 
specified period of time was new. According to Drahos, many of these developing 
countries were not culturally predisposed to accept higher IP norms due to their 
particular legal regime.107  
 
On the other hand, many of these countries did not recognise IPR, especially 
pharmaceutical patents, to ensure domestic accessibility and affordability of drugs. As 
will be seen in coming chapters, this welfare and developmental reason particularly 
orients the Indian and Brazilian patent regimes post-independence. Further, many of 
the countries in the Global South saw IP rules as a form of re-colonisation or 
economic imperialism,108 especially as the IP regime under the TRIPS Agreement 
impairs their development by not only failing to give them access to knowledge but 
also by failing to protect their IPRs, especially in traditional knowledge and 
biodiversity.109 This leads to asymmetric rent payments whereby developing countries 
pay IP rents to Western firms for their IP, but not receiving in return rents from 
Western firms on IPRs developing countries view as theirs.  
 
                                                                  
107 Peter Drahos, ‘Global Intellectual Property Rights in Information: The Story of TRIPS at the GATT’ (1995) 13 
Prometheus 9 (‘Global Intellectual Property Rights in Information’). 
108 Raghavan (n 82).  
109 Dosi and Stiglitz (n 105) 2. 
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The implication of the above analysis can be summarised thus: IP regimes, 
specifically patents, are social constructs whose obligation is the promotion of the 
well-being of society, and thus should be tailored to the circumstances, history, and 
development objectives of each country in order to reap full benefits. Anything other 
than this skews this objective and impairs the utility of the IP regime. 
 
 
1.3 Terminology 
 
For purposes of this thesis, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of certain terms and 
explain the context for their use in this thesis.  
Developed Countries 
There are no definitions of ‘developed’ countries within the WTO. However, there are 
large and easily discernible differences in the size and state of economies, and the 
standard of living enjoyed by citizens of different countries. It is generally assumed 
that countries within the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) are considered to be developed countries. This is because each of these 
countries has completed the development process. In this thesis, the term is used to 
apply to certain countries possessing strong pharmaceutical industries such as the US, 
Japan, Canada, Switzerland, Germany, France, Sweden, and others. Other terms such 
as ‘the West’, ‘First World’, and ‘the Global North’ will also be used interchangeably 
to mean developed countries. 
Developing Countries 
The term ‘developing’ countries refers to those that have yet to achieve a significant 
degree of industrialisation even though the WTO provides no definition of the term. It 
uses the definition of ‘least developed countries’ provided by the UN to explicate the 
levels of development among ‘developing countries’. In this thesis, the terms ‘Third 
World’, ‘Global South’, and ‘subaltern’ are used interchangeably.  
It is worth mentioning that the term ‘Third World’ has become controversial in recent 
times. Certain scholars posit that this term is defunct due to the collapse of the former 
Soviet Union and the Cold War politics that demanded that international systems be 
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divided into categories.110 However, such is not the view in this thesis. As B.S. 
Chimni aptly points out, too much is often made of numbers, variations, and 
differences in the presence of structures and process of global capitalism that continue 
to bind and unite.111 He continues that even international law recognises the diverse 
set of countries with differences in patterns of their economies despite its practice of 
prescribing uniform global standards. This therefore validates the existence of the 
category ‘Third World’.112 For this research, the term is used in the sense of the 
analogy put forward by Karin Mickleson to define Third World as ‘a chorus of 
distinctive voices that blend, though not harmoniously, in attempting to make heard a 
common set of concerns.’113 Due to the post-colonial lens adopted in the critical 
inquiry this thesis seeks to undertake, distinguishing between ‘Third World’ and ‘First 
World’ captures the oppositional dialectic between the European and the non-
European, and identifies the plunder of the latter by the former.114 
Local Pharmaceutical Industry  
In this thesis, the term ‘local pharmaceutical industry’ refers to indigenous 
pharmaceutical manufacturing companies in developing countries. These companies 
are able to meet a certain percentage of the local demand for drugs within each 
country and contribute to the local economy to a certain extent. These companies 
usually focus their activities on the production and distribution of generic drugs.  
Multinational Pharmaceutical Companies  
The term ‘multinational pharmaceutical companies’ refers to pharmaceutical 
manufacturing companies in developed countries. These companies have strong 
research capabilities and engage in the advanced development of innovative 
medicines.  
Non-State Actors  
These are individuals and organisations that are not states and that participate in 
governance and law making at the global, regional, sub-regional, and local levels. 
                                                                  
110 See RBJ Walker, ‘Space/Time/Sovereignty’, Perspectives on Third World Sovereignty: The Postmodern 
Paradox (St Martin's Press 1996) 15. 
111 See BS Chimni, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto’ (2006) 8 International 
Community Law Review 5. 
112 ibid. 
113 See Karin Mickelson, ‘Rhetoric and Rage: Third World Voices in International Legal Discourse’ (1998) 18 
Wisconsin International Law Journal 360.  
114 See Mukua Muthua, ‘What Is TWAIL?’, The American Society of International Law Proceedings (2000) 35. 
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They include individuals, private firms, civil society groups, social movements, trade 
associations, terrorist groups, and transnational corporations.  
 
1.4 Statement of the Problem  
Nigeria and many sub-Saharan African countries are presently confronted with 
numerous health burdens due to HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis. Yet these 
countries face heavy financial and other complex burdens in meeting and tackling 
these health challenges. Although multiple factors affect affordability and adequate 
supply of medicines, this thesis seeks to focus on IP protection and how it affects 
socio-economic development. 
 
In a world with increasing economic globalisation and interconnectedness, IPRs are 
wide-reaching, permeating virtually all areas of life, particularly in health, knowledge, 
agriculture, and human development. The result is ‘ever-increasing expansions on 
laws and customs protecting intellectual property.’115 However, Nigeria and other 
developing countries feel short-changed with the current IP regime. There is a general 
sense that the TRIPS Agreement has failed to deliver on many of its promises such as 
increased foreign investment, economic development, and technology transfer.116 
Therefore, now more than ever, there is a need to carefully scrutinise the TRIPS 
framework and to think of new ways to make the IP system work.  
 
Indeed, a lot has been written on the intersections within the TRIPS regime, 
specifically the patent system and access to medicines in Africa117 generally and in 
Nigeria118 specifically. While the TRIPS Agreement does pose a peculiar challenge 
                                                                  
115 Edwin Hettinger, ‘Justifying Intellectual Property’ (1989) 18 Philosophy and Public Affairs 32. 
116 Rochelle C Dreyfuss, ‘Intellectual Property Lawmaking, Global Governance, and Emerging Economies’, 
Patent Law in Global Perspective (1st edn, Oxford University Press 2014) 4. 
117 Sisule F Musungu and Cecilia Oh, The Use of Flexibilities in TRIPS by Developing Countries: Can They 
Promote Access to Medicines (1st edn, 2006) <http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/studies/TRIPSFLEXI.pdf> 
accessed 15 March 2015; Gabriela Chaves, Marcela Vieira, and Renata Reis, Access to Medicines and Intellectual 
Property in Brazil: Reflections and Strategies of Civil Society (1st edn, 2008) 
<http://www.scielo.br/pdf/sur/v5n8/en_v5n8a09.pdf> accessed 21 May 2015; Chan Park and Arjun Jayadev, 
‘Access to Medicines in India: A Review of Recent Concerns’, Access to Knowledge in India: New Research on 
Intellectual Property, Innovation & Development (1st edn, Bloomsbury Academic 2011); James Thuo Gathii, 
‘Approaches to Accessing Essential Medicines and the TRIPS Agreement’, Intellectual Property and Information 
Wealth (1st edn, Greenwood Publishing Group 2006) (‘Approaches to Accessing Essential Medicines’); Rochelle 
Dreyfuss and Cesar Rodriguez-Garavito, Balancing Wealth and Health: The Battle over Intellectual Property and 
Access to Medicines in Latin America (2014); Pedro Roffe, Geoff Tansey, and David Vivas-Eugui, Negotiating 
Health: Intellectual Property and Access to Medicines (2006); Scherer and Watal (n 99). 
118 See AO Oyewunmi, ‘Health Access to Medicines and Intellectual Property Options for African Countries in 
Light of the WTO TRIPS Agreement’ (2013) 1 Journal of International Law and Diplomacy; Adebambo 
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for the Nigerian context, especially for the manufacture and importation of 
pharmaceutical goods, these noted scholars all agree that the level of patenting within 
Nigeria is low compared to other countries of somewhat similar socio-economic 
status. Therefore, patents alone cannot be held responsible for inadequate access to 
medicines.  
 
Yet due to the intricacies of global trade, Nigeria and other developing countries 
cannot opt out of this multilateral trade regime without dire consequences. This raises 
important questions of what to do with the existing regime. This thesis addresses 
these issues and asks the following research questions: 
  
1. How are patents conceptualised into law and policy vis-à-vis the TRIPS 
Agreement in Brazil, India, and Nigeria?  
 
2. How do ideas regarding patents circulate? That is, what influences the way in 
which particular policy options get constructed – and, as an extension, how 
others get extinguished with regard to patent law and policy in the 
aforementioned countries? 
 
3. How do non-state actors – private sector and civil society groups – challenge 
and/or influence this understanding and conceptualisation of patents into law 
and policy?  
 
1.5 Research Aim and Scope  
The aim of this thesis is to discover whether Nigeria could learn from Brazil and/or 
India on how to create and implement an IP framework, especially a patent regime 
that encourages, instead of hinders, development and public health management. It 
also aims to identify the key issues relevant to the implementation of development-
oriented patent law and policy in the post-TRIPS period. As such, it employs a critical 
reading of the daily operationalization of international law in the subaltern forums of 
India and Brazil. That is, it provides a careful examination and extensive analysis of 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Adewopo, ‘Public Health, Access to Medicines and Role of Patent System In Nigeria’ (2011) Nigerian Journal of 
Intellectual Property Law; Okechukwu Timothy Umahi, ‘Access to Medicines: The Colonial Impacts on Patent 
Law of Nigeria’ <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1975928> accessed 15 March 2015. 
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Brazilian and Indian pharmaceutical patent laws, even though Nigeria is ultimately its 
central focus.   
 
Over the years, subaltern jurisdictions have become the battleground for the 
promotion of global ideals of human, social, economic, and environmental 
development. The struggles on access to medicines (A2M) have somewhat shifted 
from WTO forum disputes to local or national courts in the Third World. This is due 
to a prevailing perception in contemporary international legal discourse where the 
Third World has often been seen as the ‘other’. In this view, the Third World is 
usually the importer of international regulations, from the European civilising 
missions, International Monetary Fund (IMF) fiscal conditionalities, and the World 
Bank development programs, to many other such stipulations by donor states and 
organisations usually located in the Global North.  
 
Within this narrative, international law discourses have the tendency to reduce the 
Third World to what Upendra Baxi calls the ‘geographies of injustice.’119 That is, the 
use of international law – be it in human rights, investment, trade, or others – as an 
instrument for social change, with its applications based on Eurocentric ideals to 
provide solutions to the needs and concerns of the Third World. One of the 
consequences of this is a reproduction of patterns of silence and the erasure of 
significant legal, institutional, and socio-political development and law making in the 
Third World.  
 
This thesis, therefore, is an exercise in the quest for legal re-ordering of patent law in 
the Third World – a sort of unmasking of alternative approaches to patent law making 
and un-making. Such approaches are alternative in the sense that the IP law making 
engaged in this thesis moves away from the dominant European-US models to a 
development-oriented IP regime. Through an empirical study of the Brazilian and 
Indian patent regimes, this thesis maps out the broad interpretations and 
domestication of international law in the Third World, widening the aperture on 
international norms and rules governing IP whilst also being ‘TRIPS compliant’ in 
that challenges at the WTO have failed to materialise. 
                                                                  
119 Upendra Baxi, ‘Geographies of Injustice: Human Rights at the Altar of Convenience’, Torture as Tort: 
Comparative Perspectives on the Development of Transnational Human Rights Litigation (Hart Publishing 2001) 
197. 
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It also reveals how Third World countries such as Brazil and India are ascertaining 
how different IP regimes affect developing countries on one hand, and are adapting 
their patent law to fit their own unique environments on the other. In so doing, this 
thesis pays particular attention to how the local politics between the subaltern state, 
non-state actors, and transnational capital, as well as the fractions within subaltern 
states – often ignored in debates surrounding IPRs and their relation to access to 
health – are involved in the recalibration of global IP norms and discourses. In the 
discussions in coming chapters, the thesis also exposes some of the contradictions 
involved in this emerging subaltern jurisprudence on IP law. These contradictions are 
not surprising. While both Brazil and India are making huge strides in designing 
patent regime systems that best meet their needs, their respective regimes are still 
flawed as certain policies and actors inadvertently promote IP practices that impede 
development and public health management. These actions also do not mean failure 
of these regimes. Instead, it shows that the IP ecosystem is complex, does not exist in 
isolation, and the presence of various actors means it will continue to calibrate and 
recalibrate global IP regime.  
 
Although Nigeria is ultimately the central focus of this thesis, Brazil and India play a 
very important role in the study for many reasons (see Table 1). First, both countries 
are similar to Nigeria in that they both have large populations and are 
demographically multi-ethnic with rich cultures. Secondly, these countries are 
important regional powers with the ability to influence the legal, political, and social 
cultures of neighbouring states. On the international scene, Brazil and India played 
very important roles at the Uruguay Round of negotiations and both countries have 
always been at the forefront of a development-oriented WTO, the fight for access to 
medicines, and South-South collaboration. Brazil and India are also hotbeds of social 
movements. This is apparent in the grassroots mobilisation for AIDS and treatment 
access movements. For socio-legal purposes, these countries provide useful fodder for 
competing theoretical ideas about social movements – identities, concerns, and 
emotional underpinnings. As will be the seen in coming chapters, both the Brazilian 
AIDS program and the Indian patent regime are testaments to the strategic effort and 
coalition of social movements in these countries, especially in funnelling information 
and in producing knowledge. 
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 Brazil India Nigeria 
Capital Brasilia Delhi Abuja 
Government Type Republic Republic Republic 
Population 204,369,000 1,267,401,849 178,516,904 
Size of Economy USD2.52 trillion USD5.1 trillion USD510 billion 
GNI per capita USD11,690 USD1,570 USD2,710 
Gross Domestic Product USD2.246 trillion USD1.875 trillion USD521.8 billion  
No of Living With HIV 730,000 2,100,000 3,200,000 
No of People on HIV 
Treatment 
650,000 500,000 217,000  
 
Net worth of 
Pharmaceutical sector 
USD26.892 billion  
 
USD12 billion USD 1.28 billion 
Table 1: Brazil, India, Nigeria: A Snapshot. Taken from the World Bank Open Data (http://data.worldbank.org), Joint United 
Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) (http://www.unaids.org/en/dataanalysis) and the 2014 PricewaterhouseCoopers 
Report titled ‘The Investment Opportunities in the Pharmaceutical Sector - Nigeria/Pakistan’. 
 
1.6 Methodology 
This thesis approaches its subject matter from the critical international legal theory 
(CLT) perspective. CLT challenges and overturns accepted norms and standards in 
legal theory and practice.120 According to this school of thought, the failings in the 
international law project are not marginal or exceptional, but are endemic, consistent, 
and structural.121 As a result, this school of thought uses broad arrays of techniques to 
address separate but interrelated failings perceived in the international legal project to 
show the cruelty of the current systems of law.122 Though CLT constitutes various 
strands, its unifying stance is the need to rethink the foundations of international law 
and create space for an emancipatory and inclusive international legal project.123 It is 
                                                                  
120 The critical international legal theory (CLT) is sometimes known as critical legal studies (CLS) or new 
approaches to international law (NAIL). CLS draws from different philosophical traditions such as Marxism, the 
critical theory of the Frankfurt School, and Post-Structuralism.  See Roberto Mangabeira Unger, ‘The Critical 
Legal Studies Movement’ (1983) 96 Harvard Law Review; Nigel Purvis, ‘Critical Legal Studies in Public 
International Law’ (1991) 32 Harvard International Law Journal; Mark Tushnet, ‘Critical Legal Studies: A 
Political History’ (1991) 100 The Yale Law Journal; Anthony Carty, ‘Critical International Law: Recent Trends in 
the Theory of International Law’ (1991) 2 European Journal of International Law; Matthew Stone and others, New 
Critical Legal Thinking (Birkbeck Law Press – Routledge 2012); Alan Hunt, ‘The Theory of Critical Legal 
Studies’ (1986) 6 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies; Jason Beckett, 'Critical International Legal Theory' (2012) 
Oxford Bibliographies Online Datasets. 
121 Hunt (n 120) 30-32. 
122 Beckett (n 120). 
123 Hunt (n 120) 43; Beckett (n 120). 
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this rationale and its philosophical assumptions that underlie this research project. 
Hence, the thesis employs a reading and understanding of international law that is 
culturally constitutive and historically contingent. This form of engagement therefore 
enables the assessment of the adequacy of modern international law, which WTO 
laws is part of, for Third World countries. 
 
Within CLT, this thesis specifically builds on the works of TWAIL. As will be seen in 
the next chapter, TWAIL is an intellectual movement devoted to providing an 
alternative narrative of international law that has developed to perpetuate the 
domination and subordination of the Third World. Within this oppositional space, 
TWAIL performs both deconstructive and reformative functions.124 As a 
deconstructive tool, TWAIL identifies, unpacks, and challenges the history, 
oppressive structures, and processes of international law.125 As a reformative tool, it 
reconstructs international law to be cognisant and responsive to the needs and 
aspirations of peoples of the Third World.126  
 
It is this particular understanding of twailian theory – the gradual unpacking, 
deconstruction, and inclusion of legal projects operating at the margins of the 
mainstream discipline – that underpins the critical engagement of this research with 
the IP regime and the access to medicine discourse.127 Therefore, this research seeks 
to extrapolate a ‘Third World approach to IP law’ via a consideration of emerging 
counter-hegemonic rule-making in Brazil and India to deduce lessons for Nigeria. 
These successful domestic interventions, this research posits, are inadvertently 
changing the global IP regime by widening the aperture on norms as they relate to 
pharmaceutical patent laws, trade policies, and trade rules governing access to 
essential medicines. Therefore, by focusing on domestic jurisprudential experiences in 
detail, this research examines the ways international law ‘unfolds on the mundane and 
quotidian plane through sites and objects which appear unrelated to the 
international.’128 That is, by focusing on domestic phenomenon that are not ostensibly 
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international but in actuality is, the research expands twailian materiality by delving 
into ‘the everyday life of international [IP] law’129 through the examination of 
practices that occur, not only through typical international legal IP practices, but also 
through many other sites and objects in which international law operates today. 
 
Further, because this thesis reflects on the emergence of various narratives and 
counter-narratives on patent law making, a supplementary approach known as the 
nodal governance theory is adopted. This methodology is employed to delve into 
‘deeper levels of understanding of the legal disconnect and discontinuities at play in 
[these] local spaces.’130 Here, nodal governance analysis provides the lens to 
understand how ideas circulate among the complex web of actors in the local spaces 
of Brazil, India, and Nigeria. The identification of such networks is the first step 
towards developing an understanding of the strategies adopted by local actors to 
mobilise state government and address local problems.  
 
1.7 Notes on Method  
Much of the research for this thesis entails theoretical and contextual analysis of 
existing reports and documentation of the TRIPS Agreement, patents, and right to 
health laws in Brazil, India, and Nigeria. Thus, data collection for this dissertation 
included policy documents, news reports, statistics, archival materials, and 
ethnographic techniques. Policy documents were obtained from websites of 
governments and international organisations such as the WTO, WIPO, UN, UN 
Development Program (UNDP), UNAIDS, and others. Statistical data were obtained 
from Ministries of Health, especially the National AIDS Program websites, donor 
organisations such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, 
World Bank, US Agency for International Development (USAID), and United 
Kingdom (UK) Department for International Development (DFID). News reports 
were sourced from leading press such as IP Watch, the Economist, Spicy IP, BRIC 
News, Economic and Political Weekly (EPW), and other online websites specialising 
in reporting access to medicines such as Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF). Other 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
people think of as places, subjects, and modalities of administration. This can be achieved by exploring the way 
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128 ibid 109. 
129 ibid. 
130 Scott Burris, Peter Drahos, and Clifford Shearing, ‘Nodal Governance’ (Temple University 2005); Scott Burris, 
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materials used include secondary literature on TRIPS Agreement implementation in 
different jurisdictions, WTO dispute reports, health reports (such as the reports of the 
World Health Organisation’s (WHO) Committee on Intellectual Property Rights, 
Innovation and Public Health and the UK Commission Reports on Intellectual 
Property Rights), case laws, and archive materials such as submissions to minutes of 
TRIPS Council meetings which can be easily accessed online.   
 
Ethnography, specifically multi-sited ethnography, is the main research technique 
used to acquire new empirical material in the natural social setting. Multi-sited 
ethnography can be traced most notably to the works of anthropologist George 
Marcus. According to Marcus, social realities are created at multiple local sites and 
modern interlocking institutions.131 In this view, the global does not exist as an 
autonomous entity that is discursively bereft from the local.132 This is the allure of 
multi-sited ethnography as it allows the researcher to be involved in ‘spatially 
dispersed fields through which the ethnographer moves – actually, via sojourns in two 
or more places, or conceptually, by means of techniques of juxtaposition of data’133 
Within this purview, the modality of multi-sited ethnography utilised for this thesis is 
partly about description and cultural differences of the Brazilian, Indian, and Nigerian 
patent cultures and partly in site in the sense of following people, connections, 
associations, and relationships across space. For this thesis, eight months were spent 
in the field: Brazil (May – June 2014), India (August – October 2014), and Nigeria 
(November 2014 – February 2015, and July 2016). A total of 58 interviews were 
conducted – 19 in Brazil, 17 in India, and 22 in Nigeria. Though exhausting and 
costly in terms of resources, this particular research method was used because it 
allowed for the ‘objective study of social phenomena that cannot be accounted for by 
focusing on a single site.’134  
Key informant interviews were the main vehicle for obtaining in-depth knowledge of 
actors especially in policymaking circles and in understanding the social ties across 
the state-society interface. These key informants included policymakers, activists, 
government officials, academics, judges, and key players in the pharmaceutical 
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industry. However, the sampling was not random as some actors have already been 
identified from the background preparation prior to going into the field. Nevertheless, 
the snowball sampling method was employed in some cases.  
The snowball method is a form of non-probability sampling technique for gathering 
research subjects through the identification of an initial subject who is used to provide 
the names of other actors.135 In this method, existing respondents recruit future 
respondents from among their acquaintances and contacts.136 This particular approach 
was used to contact exclusive groups such as top government officials and judges. 
Appendices 1 to 3 list all of the interviews conducted. Most of the interviews were 
conducted in English; however, 2 interviews in Brasilia (Brazil) necessitated the use 
of an interpreter. In those instances, a student interpreter from the University of 
Brasilia with background knowledge on the issues discussed was used. In most cases, 
the interviews were tape-recorded; a few interviews conducted with government 
officials in Nigeria were not recorded and notes were taken by hand. Interviewees in 
Brazil and India were generally more open to having their interviews taped. Due to 
institutional affiliations, some respondents have asked to remain anonymous.  
Semi-structured interviews were used to interrogate the range of different respondents 
polled. In semi-structured interviews, the questions are not standardised, though an 
interview ‘guide’, which was later used as a code point for data analysis, was used as 
pointer towards topics that will be covered per interview (see Appendix 4). The utility 
of this interviewing technique is that it allows the use of conversation and discussion 
to gain insight and expert knowledge on [the research themes].137 This is crucial as the 
exploratory and conversational nature of the interviews allowed for an understanding 
of the respondents’ views on issues of access to medicine and tracked the mix of ideas 
that circulated among these key actors, thus enabling the generation of significant 
data.  
There are many advantages to using this particular interview approach. For instance, 
the non-standardised nature of the questions allows interviewees to describe 
perceptions they would otherwise think irrelevant or that they usually feel inhibited 
                                                                  
135 Michael Lewis-Beck, Alan Bryman, and Tim Liao, ‘Encyclopedia of Social Science Research Methods’. 
136 ibid. 
137 Nigel Newton, ‘The Use of Semi-Structured Interviews in Qualitative Research: Strengths and Weaknesses’ 
(Academia.edu) <https://www.academia.edu/1561689/The_use_of_semi-
structured_interviews_in_qualitative_research_strengths_and_weaknesses> accessed 28 January 2014. 
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from mentioning in their normal social context.138 This is because the face-to-face 
nature of the interview process helps in developing intimate, trusting, and empathetic 
relationships, which in most cases make respondents feel able to disclose the truth. Of 
course, there are weaknesses to this particular research approach, which include 
reduction in comparability,139 perception of the interviewer by the interviewees,140 and 
the validity of facts, i.e. interviewees may say what they think the interviewer wants 
to hear. In situations of questionable fact, clarification was made using data drawn 
from the aforementioned literatures.  
In addition to qualitative interviews, specific local organisations dealing with issues 
on patent and its impact on health were utilised in order to gain inside knowledge, to 
understand the ideas circulating among key actors and the manner in which particular 
policy options get constructed – and, as an extension, how others get extinguished 
with regard to the patent regime and access to medicine. In Brazil, for instance, 
working with the Working Group of Intellectual Property of the Brazilian Network 
for the Integration of Peoples (GTPI/REBRIP) was of great help to the thesis. The 
same was true for working at the WTO office in Nigeria’s Federal Ministry of Trade, 
Industry and Commerce, and being a research fellow at India’s Centre for Study of 
Law and Governance at Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi.  
Working at GTPI undoubtedly influenced the thesis’ views about Brazil’s health 
policies and patent regime. Nonetheless, an inquisitive disposition and a range of 
techniques were employed during interviews, including empathy towards 
understanding the concerns of AIDS patient groups or the realities faced by 
executives operating in a capitalist economic system. Furthermore, the data from the 
interviews were analysed using NVivo. NVivo is a comprehensive qualitative data 
analysis software package which can be used to organise and analyse interviews, field 
notes, textual sources, and other types of qualitative data including image, audio, and 
video files. Interview guides prepared prior to the fieldwork were used as codes to 
develop themes and demographic details.  
Finally, not all of the target interviewees were interviewed, as some top government 
officials and executives denied interview requests out of lack of interest, or interviews 
                                                                  
138 ibid. 
139 Michael Quinn Patton and Michael Quinn Patton, Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods (Sage 
Publications 2002) 40-41. 
140 Martyn Denscombe, The Good Research Guide (Open University Press 2007). 
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were cancelled due to busy schedules. For instance, the interview with the Indian 
Minister of Health and Commerce was cancelled as the date of the interview 
coincided with the visit of US President Barack Obama to India and the Minister’s 
presence was requested in all meetings and related activities.  
Other obstacles were also encountered. First, interviews in Nigeria had to be 
discontinued until an exemption certificate was received from the National Health 
Research Ethic Committee Nigeria (NHREC). The NHREC is tasked with advising 
the Federal Ministry of Health on ethical issues concerning research. It is also 
responsible for setting norms and standards for the conduct of human and animal 
research. Due to the fact that aspects of this research touched on issues such as 
antiretrovirals (ARVs), HIV/AIDS, and pharmaceutical procedures, official approval 
had to be obtained from the NHERC before continuing with the research. As a result, 
interviews had to be stopped for two weeks to complete the bureaucratic process. 
Second, initial interview requests sent to pharmaceutical companies during the 
Nigerian leg of the fieldwork were ignored. However, a pharmaceutical company 
executive responded to the 2014 interview request in May 2016 and agreed to be 
interviewed. This necessitated travelling back to Nigeria for a second round of 
interviews in July 2016. Fortunately, the pharmaceutical executive subsequently 
referred to three other pharmaceutical company executives who were subsequently 
successfully interviewed for the thesis. 
 
1. 8 Thesis Structure 
This dissertation is divided into three sections – methodology, case studies, and 
insights or conclusions. The first section concerns the introduction and methodology 
(or the conceptual framework) employed in this study. Indeed, this introductory 
chapter, as already seen, performs a few initial but critical functions with respect to 
situating this study, the research questions, and the methods employed in the process 
of this research.  
Chapter 2 maps out the terrain of the TWAIL and nodal governance theory. In doing 
so, it situates the harmonised regime of the TRIPS Agreement within the cultural 
context and historical contingency of international law as it relates to themes of 
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development and economic prosperity of Third World states. Nodal governance 
provides the lens for understanding and exploring local actor participation in patent 
law making and governance. Establishing the theoretical frame of reference for this 
thesis, this chapter employs a critical reading of the global IP framework and 
examines how the TRIPS framework has been inserted into the post-colonial 
development agenda and its continued use as a hegemonic political tool.  
 
Chapter 3 begins the series of case study analyses. Focusing on Brazil, the chapter 
specifically centres on the intersection of Brazil’s HIV/AIDS program and its patent 
law policies. It tells the story of how patent law and policies have been applied at the 
domestic level and how the A2M discourse has evolved in the wake of TRIPS 
implementation. The focus, then, is how local political dynamics and actors play into 
issues related to IPRs and medicine access. Though Brazil’s overall application of IP 
standards has been comparatively mixed and uneven, the thesis argues that the prosaic 
implementation of pro-right to health policies even after the country phased fully into 
the TRIPS Agreement is a hermeneutic expression of resistance and reform of 
international law norms on patent law and medicine access discourse(s).  
 
Chapter 4 continues with the series of case study analyses by critically investigating 
the Indian patent regime. India is often cited as an example of an ‘innovative 
developing country’ with a robust pharmaceutical sector and the capacity to carry out 
health innovations. This chapter analyses the government intervention policies that 
made these structural changes possible and examines how the growth of the sector is 
strongly linked to a wide range of factors which propelled Indian pharmaceutical 
firms on a path that spurred the growth of highly sophisticated generic drugs. 
 
Chapter 5 focuses on Nigeria and maps the historical evolution of patent law in the 
country. After a schematic representation of the excruciating health burdens in 
Nigeria to help understand the critical situation and urgent actions required to tackle 
these multiple health emergencies, the chapter proceeds to examine the current patent 
law in Nigeria vis-à-vis the TRIPS Agreement to show how the latter interacts with 
laws, institutions, and actors at the domestic level. This chapter seeks to understand 
how issues of access to medicine are framed locally and the cognisance of 
policymakers of patent law as a development tool.  
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Chapter 6 concludes the thesis and focuses on the insights derived from the case 
studies. The individual and collective significance of the findings of the case studies 
are summarised and their benefits to the thesis are restated. The hope of this work is 
that the reader will understand that adroitly marketing the TRIPS Agreement as a 
trade tool inherently makes it unsuitable for development objectives, despite the 
inclusion of certain flexibilities. This necessitates the need for a conceptual recasting 
of the TRIPS-harmonised regime not based on the dominant European-US models but 
on a development-oriented IP regime embraced by both India and Brazil. 
 34 
 
2.   Theoretical Frameworks 
Introduction 
This chapter outlines the theoretical framework that underpins the thesis; that is, the 
relevant thinking that grounds this research. Within the context of this research, a 
theoretical frame helps connect the struggles of the jurisdictions under study, and 
provides insights into the various inequities inherent in the global patent system as 
they relate to the protection of pharmaceutical products and processes. Therefore, this 
chapter provides a particular perspective or lens within which this work is conducted.  
 
This study was inspired by the desire to understand the interplay of the patent regimes 
in the Third World, specifically in Brazil, India, and Nigeria. That is, to excavate the 
history, origins, and impact of the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement vis-à-vis 
local actors and institutions in the Global South. To do this, the history of the TRIPS 
Agreement, its broad interpretations in the local forums of the Global South, and the 
ways in which such interpretations are changing international norms on patent law 
and medicine access discourse were explored. The belief was that unearthing these 
emerging critical legal trends within the Third World would serve as inspiration for 
Nigeria, and to a larger extent, other emerging economies in sub-Saharan Africa that 
are not only struggling with HIV/AIDS, but are also seeking to increase access to and 
the availability of essential medicines for their citizens. This goal informed the 
study’s engagement with critical legal studies, specifically the TWAIL.  
 
TWAIL argues that the current international legal framework is an imperial project.1 
That is, the colonial confrontation, which birthed international law and subsequently 
saw the subordination of non-European peoples and societies to the European 
imperial conquests, animates the current international law project.2 As such, 
international regimes such as the TRIPS Agreement are nothing but a modern-day 
extension of this colonial engagement. Thus, the relevance of TWAIL to this thesis 
lies in its provision of the methodological and analytical lens for historicising and 
critiquing global patent law. More importantly, by engaging in the historiography of 
                                                                  
1 Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (New York, Cambridge 
University Press 2005) (Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law). 
2 ibid. 
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international law, TWAIL provides the analytics for recognising the various on-going 
reform projects in the local jurisdictions of the subaltern which are expanding the 
aperture on patent norms and medicine access discourse.3 Sundhuya Pahuja and Luis 
Eslava note that TWAIL ‘expands its emphasis on materiality to think of international 
law as not only an ideological project located in a particular material context, and 
with material consequences but also as a material project itself.’4 As such, it is 
pertinent to examine the way international law operates, including its daily 
functioning on the mundane quotidian level ‘by delving into the everyday life of 
international law, at domestic phenomena that is not ostensibly international.’5 By 
looking at the ‘material’ plane, TWAIL generates not only a form of new universality 
but also reveals ‘the numerous forms of resistance already at play in the struggle 
against the (post)colonial normative order now being institutionalised and 
administered across the world.’6   
 
It is this call to delve to the mundane quotidian level that frames the study’s analyses 
of pharmaceutical patent regimes in Brazil, India, and Nigeria to find out how global 
patent law as it relates to medicine access is conceptualised, resisted, and reformed in 
legal and policy discourse within the confines of the TRIPS Agreement. Thus, it is in 
the historicising of international law and looking beyond the international to map the 
analytics of change happening within and without that TWAIL benefits this research. 
In other words, TWAIL provides the perspective to look at daily engagement and 
contestation of patent regimes in local forums of the Global South as not distinct from 
international law making but as part of it. It is only when the everyday engagement of 
international law in domestic forums of the Global South is placed in a historical 
context that these everyday actions are imbued with meaning and function.  
 
In spite of the above benefits, TWAIL scholarship is methodologically and 
analytically insufficient for this thesis in two important dimensions. First, the 
erroneous assumption that Third World states have local actors to participate in the 
reform and resistance of international legal scholarship. In this context, ‘actor’ refers 
                                                                  
3 See generally Luis Eslava and Sundhya Pahuja, ‘Between Resistance and Reform: TWAIL and the Universality 
of International Law’ (2011) 3 Trade, Law and Development (‘Between Resistance and Reform’); Luis Eslava and 
Sundhya Pahuja, ‘Beyond the (Post)Colonial: TWAIL and the Everyday Life of International Law’ (2012) 45(2), 
Journal of Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America - Verfassung und Recht in Übersee (VRÜ) 
(‘Beyond the (Post)Colonial’). 
4 Eslava and Pahuja, ‘Beyond the (Post)Colonial’ (n 3). 
5 Eslava and Pahuja, ‘Between Resistance and Reform’ (n 3) 103. 
6 Eslava and Pahuja, ‘Beyond the (Post)Colonial’ (n 3). 
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to participants in local forums other than the state. This includes private sector 
interests such as pharmaceutical companies (transnational and indigenous firms), civil 
society groups, social movements, and donor organisations. By not exploring actor 
presence and agency, TWAIL ignores the impetus of actor politics and the politics of 
knowledge that govern actor involvement within and between Third World states. 
That is, who participates in this reform of and resistance against international (patent) 
law in the local forums of the Global South? what informs this participation? and how 
the knowledge about participation is produced? In fact, as shown in the analyses of 
patent law making as part of TRIPS implementation in the local forums of Brazil 
(Chapter 3), India (Chapter 4), and Nigeria (Chapter 5), there exists a vast difference 
in actor presence and participation among and within Third World states. Therefore, if 
Eslava and Pahuja’s call to delve into the local is taken up, attention should be paid 
not only to the actor network, but also to the various roles played by – or contestation 
– between these local networks and the politics of knowledge, which structure 
engagement in reform and resistance vis-à-vis international law and scholarship in 
local forums.  
 
The second limitation is that the twailian scholarship suffers from the notion that 
Third World states are automatically endowed with emancipatory capabilities because 
of their post-colonial status.7 That is, due to the ‘problem space’ they occupy – in this 
case, post-colonialism — TWAIL assumes that Third World states have the 
competency to engage in counter-hegemonic international law making. In other 
words, in calling for the refocus of attention to the local levels, TWAIL scholarship 
assumes the competency of such actors, where they exist, to participate in local 
counter-hegemonic international law making.  
 
By ‘competency’, the thesis means the ability of actors to enrol support 
simultaneously at a number of different sites of law making and law enforcement 
(national, international, and transnational), and their ability to mobilise leading 
sources of expertise to reform, reconstruct, or dismantle patent regimes. An example 
of this is the ability of generic pharmaceutical companies in India to mobilise the 
government on patent issues and to collaborate with civil society groups to generate 
                                                                  
7 Antonius R Hippolyte, ‘Correcting TWAIL’s Blind Spots' (2016) 18 International Community Law Review; 
Jayan Nayer, ‘Between Hope and Despair: The Iraq War and International Law Futures?’, The Iraq War and 
International Law (1st edn, Hart Publishing 2008) 320. 
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and produce expertise on key IP issues. As will be seen in Chapter 5 on Nigeria, not 
only is competency imperative in ensuring effective engagement, the willingness of 
such actors to engage in the long and arduous task of reforming and resisting 
international law is equally essential. As analyses in this thesis will show, Brazilian 
and Indian actors are willing and competent to engage in the reform of local patent 
law, whereas their Nigerian counterparts are generally unwilling to engage and are not 
unable to do so due to lack of capacity. In failing to acknowledge that not all 
developing countries are participating in the same way in international law making, 
TWAIL overlooks the asymmetries between and within the Third World. 
  
Thus, by overlooking these important dimensions (actor presence, competency, and 
willingness), TWAIL ignores not only local histories and identities between and 
within the Third World but also how these asymmetries define which Third World 
state engages in reform and resistance vis-à-vis international law and scholarship, and 
who is excluded. In not addressing the local ecosystem of actor-participation, which 
includes looking into local presence, willingness, competence, and the politics of 
knowledge governance which frames this participation, TWAIL weakens its critical 
scholarship premise to connect to ‘the concrete experiences and claims found in local 
spaces’ that is central to its mission.8 In as much as TWAIL scholarship suggests 
focusing on the reform of and resistance against international law at the local forums, 
attention should also be paid to the presence and competence of local actors, their 
willingness to engage, and the politics of ‘knowledge’ that informs participation in 
order to bring about the desired change.9 In focusing in the ecosystem of non-state 
actor involvement, what is uncovered is not only the way such internal dynamics 
unfolds but also how it informs which Third World country’s participation in counter-
hegemonic law making in local forums, as suggested by Eslava and Pahuja, as well as 
who is excluded.   
 
Thus, while TWAIL benefits this research by providing the analytics for historicising 
and mapping change, it provides only a partial engagement. Understanding Third 
World engagement should also include exploring the local actor participation 
ecosystem. It is in exploring this ecosystem that the manner in how knowledge is 
                                                                  
8 Asad G Kiyani, ‘Third World Approaches to International Criminal Law’ (2016) 109 AJIL Unbound.  
9 Scott Burris, Peter Drahos, and Clifford Shearing, ‘Nodal Governance’ (2005) 30 Australian Journal of Legal 
Philosophy 31 (‘Nodal Governance’). 
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captured and repurposed by actors as they attempt to reform, reconstruct, or 
dismantle10 the patent regime is uncovered and understood. In addition, it reveals how 
actors coordinate actions in a variety of different sites at different ‘levels’ of the 
global regime and mobilise forms of counter-expertise from within and without the 
established legal regimes. This is important because it illuminates how and why actors 
mobilise in a particular locality and not in others. It is for this reason that this thesis 
draws from the nodal governance theory to supplement the twailian contribution and 
address the actor/knowledge gap.11 Therefore, nodal governance is articulated here to 
not only emphasise the local capacity, but also how actors (nodes) in the local forums 
employ and deploy knowledge in ways that would promote their respective agenda 
while strengthening their collective capital.  
 
Nodal governance puts forward the proposition that the dynamic interaction of key 
stakeholders in the patent regime relentlessly expands global IP systems by 
controlling the choice of words, meaning, and subsequent standard-setting 
processes.12 Thus, it enables the understanding of microscopic processes that produce 
general outcomes by identifying actors involved in processes such as knowledge 
creation, capacity building, and resource mobilisation to manage a course of events.13 
Nodal governance addresses the problem concerning the production, appropriateness, 
diffusion, exclusion, interpretation, and governance of knowledge that inform actor 
participation and competency, and subsequently, legitimacy. In other words, it 
illuminates how the participation of these actors shape this area of law by 
investigating the way they frame their ideas to theorise their interests and justify the 
change they seek. In applying nodal governance theory, this research shows the 
internal and messy mechanics of the local patent ecosystem – how knowledge and 
expertise is produced and framed, which actors intervene in policy debates and 
processes, what allowed such interventions, as well as what happens in the absence of 
these actors (Chapter 5). Therefore, nodal governance not only looks at local 
institutional arrangements but also the workings within and between actors engaged in 
the standard-setting processes in the local forums of the Global South.  
                                                                  
10 ibid 47-48. 
11 See Clifford Shearing and Jennifer Wood, ‘Nodal Governance, Democracy, and the New “Denizens”’ (2003) 30 
Journal of Law and Society 400 (‘Nodal Governance, Democracy and New “Denizens”’ (n 11) Governance, 
Democracy, and the New “Denizens”’), on the shift from a purely Westphalian state-centred governance of 
security and justice to one in which the state constitutes one of many actors.  
12 ibid. 
13 Burris, Drahos, and Shearing, ‘Nodal Governance’ (n 9) 37. 
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The thesis draws upon Peter Drahos’ study of the regulation of multi-national 
companies (MNCs) to understand how complex systems construct order, produce 
knowledge, and design governance systems that mimic or complement the ordering 
work of systems themselves.14 That is, nodal governance theory illuminates actors’ 
mentalities, methods for exerting and mobilising influence, modes of governance 
employed, structure, as well as the dialectic relationships between and among actors.15 
In addition, nodal governance enables the identification of actors involved in 
governance and the informal dynamics of power usually at play. Of particular 
significance to this thesis, nodal governance helps explain why pharmaceutical 
patents are relevant and used in legal and policy discourse in the local forums of 
Brazil and India but are absent in Nigeria. However, for all its benefit for this thesis, 
especially in understanding the nuts and bolts of patent ecosystems in local forums, 
the limitation of nodal governance lies in its inability to probe the structure, history, 
and processes of the (global) legal system within which it exists. Thus, in combining 
TWAIL and nodal governance theory to illuminate the materialisation of the 
international in the local, the thesis shows the gamut of legal, historical, political, and 
economic developments that bring about the internationalisation of pharmaceutical 
patent law in the local forums of Brazil, India, and Nigeria.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is divided as follows: Part I focuses on TWAIL. Here, 
TWAIL is used as a resource to uncover the historical origins of international IP law 
and its continuities in the post-colonial. Thus, this section begins by identifying 
TWAIL as a theoretical position seeking to build a genealogy of the present through a 
careful analysis of the ways international IP law reproduces a renewed colonial order 
in the 20th century. In this section, the thesis shows how TWAIL informs and benefits 
the research. To do this, the thesis shows how the ‘colonial hierarchy’ is reproduced 
and reinforced in the politics of the Uruguay Round negotiations, the language on 
patents in the TRIPS Agreement, and the corollary medicine access debates. The third 
section concludes by exploring the methodological limit of TWAIL as it pertains to 
this thesis.  
                                                                  
14 Peter Drahos, ‘Intellectual Property and Pharmaceutical Markets: A Nodal Governance Approach’ (2004) 77 
Temple Law Review (‘IP Nodal Governance Approach’); Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite, Information 
Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowledge Economy? (2002) (Information Feudalism); John Braithwaite and Peter 
Drahos, Global Business Regulation (1st edn, 2000) (Global Business Regulation). 
15 Burris, Drahos, and Shearing, ‘Nodal Governance’ (n 9) 34. 
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Part II focuses on nodal governance theory. Here, nodal governance is used to 
generate insight into the dynamic power and influence of certain non-state actors to 
relentlessly expand global IP systems by exerting influence on the state structure to 
achieve their objectives. The section begins by unpacking the meaning of nodal 
theory – how nodes work, their principal categories, and the ways in which they 
influence changes in governance. In this respect, nodal governance is seen as a form 
of governance in which nodal networks are constantly reconstituting themselves to 
bring changes to a power relationship, either with the state or fellow nodal network.  
 
This theory is then applied to the research to show its relevance in understanding 
actor participation in local ecosystems and how such participation generates new 
regulatory frameworks. Specifically, the thesis shows how a distinctive kind of nodal 
governance of big corporations (in this case, multinational biotechnology companies) 
emerged to push for greater global patent regulation by inserting the patent regime 
into the US’ foreign policy. In so doing, the thesis shows how resources are mobilised 
and knowledge is captured and repurposed by corporate actors as they attempt to 
reform and reconstruct the patent regime to suit their collective objectives. 
Consequently, the thesis contributes to the understanding of the importance of local 
actor network and of complex interrelationships involved in the way patent 
knowledge is produced, contested, commercialised, and employed in the policy 
framework, and what happens in their absence. Therefore, the importance of this 
exercise is to show that participation in counter-hegemonic (international) patent law 
hinges not only on the presence of relevant actors, but also on the competency of such 
actors to mobilise in multiple sites and bring about compliance and changes in 
governance.  
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Part I: Third World Approaches to International Law 
 
2.1.1 Theorising and Understanding TWAIL  
TWAIL attempts to understand the history, structure, and processes of international 
law from the perspective of Third World states.16 This is grounded in the belief that 
international law is an imperial project.17 The colonial confrontation, which birthed 
international law and saw the subordination of non-European peoples and societies 
through European imperial conquests, still frames and influences international legal 
regimes as well as international economic governance (IEG) structures and 
institutions that operate within it.18 Overtime, international law has come to displace 
several national legal systems in importance and is having an unprecedented effect on 
the lives of ordinary people.19 That is, international law now plays roles that extend 
beyond adjudicating relations between states to adjudicating in local jurisdictions the 
global ideals of human, economic, political, and environmental development. As 
such, international law – its history, processes, and structures – cannot be neglected at 
a time when it is slowly becoming domestic law.20 Therefore, a well-rounded study 
that fully incorporates the lived experiences of the global subaltern is imperative to 
make international law truly international and to animate its democratic emancipatory 
potentials.21 
In response to and in dialectical opposition to this, TWAIL arose as a legal 
scholarship that furthers and includes the interests of the Global South in international 
law discourse. It aspires to ‘address the material and ethical concerns of Third World 
                                                                  
16 BS Chimni, ‘The Past, Present and Future of International Law: A Critical Third World Approach’ (2007) 8 
Melbourne Journal of International Law 1 (‘The Past, Present and Future of International Law’). 
17 Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (n 1). 
18 Hippolyte (n 7) 3. 
19 BS Chimni, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto’ (2006) 8 International Community 
Law Review (‘TWAIL: A Manifesto’). 
20 Chimni, ‘The Past, Present and Future of International Law’ (n 16). 
21 Though not a twailian per se but obviously sympathetic to TWAIL analysis, Martti Koskenniemi has pointed out 
that the international law project was initially created to be a force of good. The law was seen as a stabiliser of 
politics, a positive force meant to add something to politics. International law was created as a law of worldwide 
cooperation to further a shared end. This stems from the belief that if law takes over, things become better. 
However, this ideal was lost due to the expansion and specialisation within international law, what Koskenniemi 
calls the fragmentation of international law. This fragmentation has led to the reversal of established hierarchies in 
favour of structural bias in the relevant functional expertise. This is seen as a stumbling block to promoting a 
peaceful and just world. See Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and 
Politics (2007) 70(1) The Modern Law Review 1 (‘The Fate of Public International Law’). See also Martti 
Koskenniemi and Paivi Leino, ‘Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties’ (2002) 15 Leiden 
Journal of International Law 554. However, other scholars writing on public international law adopt a different 
hope for fragmentation. See also Gunther Teubner, ‘Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society’ in 
Gunther Teubner (ed), Global Law Without a State (Dartmouth, Aldershot 1997) 3. 
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peoples’22 by generating debate around questions of colonial history, power, identity, 
and the extent of the inclusion of Third World peoples in international law.23 In doing 
this, it seeks to expose the messy and conflicting nature of international law – the 
power of international law to be both transformative as well as regressive.24 This 
dialectical power tension has worked for or against the interests of Third World states 
as they seek to shape international rule-making processes.25  
 
TWAIL scholarship is far from uniform and has in no way followed a single line of 
enquiry.26 The mission to question, unearth, and reform unites its smorgasbord of 
scholars who seek to reform or, where necessary, to retrench the rules of international 
law that are unjust to Third World people.27 In so doing, they are unpacking the 
hypocrisies inherent in the international legal system, challenging its selective 
application, and offering crucial clues for its democratic reshaping.28 As a result, 
TWAIL scholarship has included discussions on concepts of statehood,29 international 
criminal law,30 taxation,31 international criminal court,32 the role of social movement,33 
human rights,34 the war on terror,35 feminism,36 international humanitarian law,37 
                                                                  
22 Chimni, ‘TWAIL: A Manifesto’ (n 19) 4. 
23 David Scott, Refashioning Futures: Criticism after Postcoloniality (Princeton University Press 1999) 
(Refashioning Futures); see also David Scott, Conscripts of Modernity (Duke University Press 2004) (Conscripts 
of Modernity). 
24 James Thuo Gathii, ‘TWAIL: A Brief History of its Origins, its Decentralized Network, and a Tentative 
Bibliography’ (2011) 26 Trade, Law and Development 37 (‘TWAIL: A Brief History of its Origins’). 
25 Antony Anghie and BS Chimni, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law and Individual Responsibility in 
Internal Conflicts’ (2003) 2 Chinese Journal of International Law 2 (1) 78; see also Antony Anghie, ‘The 
Evolution of International Law: Colonial and Postcolonial Realities’ (2006) 27 Third World Quarterly (‘The 
Evolution of International Law’). 
26 See Richard Falk, Balakrishnan Rajagopal and Jacqueline Stevens (eds), International Law and the Third 
World: Reshaping Justice (New York, Routledge 2008). 
27 Chimni, ‘TWAIL: A Manifesto’ (n 19) 468. 
28 Gathii, ‘TWAIL: A Brief History of its Origins’ (n 24) 37. 
29 Makau Muthua, ‘Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Inquiry’ (1995) 16 Michigan Journal of 
International Law (‘Why Redraw the Map of Africa’). 
30 Kiyani (n 8). 
31 Jalia Kangave, ‘”Taxing” TWAIL: A Preliminary Inquiry into TWAIL’s Application to the Taxation of Foreign 
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urban law,38 and Islamic contributions to the shared history of public international 
law,39 to mention a few.  
 
It is worth noting that the diversity found within TWAIL stems from certain distinct 
phases of scholarship, and each phase is characterised by a differing focus of TWAIL 
oppositions. The phases can be divided into TWAIL I, which focused on the 
decolonisation process and the role of powerful nations to use international law as a 
hegemonic force. Thus, the key feature of TWAIL I is the focus on statehood and the 
view that colonialism is a ‘system of totalizing degradation’40 premised on a negative 
relationship between the coloniser and the colonised.41 This sentiment is echoed by 
Anghie and Chimni, who note that TWAIL I scholarship was closely aligned with the 
diplomatic initiatives undertaken by the newly independent Third World states who 
placed immense faith in the UN to cause the changes necessary to usher in a just 
world order.42  
TWAIL II, on the other, focuses on the roles and powers of international 
organisations in perpetuating Third World domination and marginalisation.43 Thus, 
the distinct feature of TWAIL II lies in the examination of the global political 
economy by looking into the extent to which colonial relations shaped the 
fundamentals of international law.44 The wide array of TWAIL scholarship on varying 
issues shows it has not only garnered a level of sophistication and complexity since its 
emergence in the decolonisation discourse, but it is also cognisant of contemporary 
concerns and contexts. This sophistication in its analyses of issues and recognition of 
contemporary context stems from an understanding of the manifold ways 
international economic relations are shaping Third World localities.45 Nonetheless, in 
spite of this assortment of voices within, TWAIL scholarship remains committed to a 
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reading of international laws that historicises the ‘structure of modern colonial power’ 
as well as its reformation that incorporates the views and experiences of the often-
ignored subaltern to recreate a just world order.46  
The TWAIL movement understands and recognises that international law privileges 
Europe and European knowledge and ideals.47 It also recognises the trajectory of 
international law, from its colonial usage and how it was extended over time to the 
non-European world, which existed outside the realm of European international law,48 
as well as the exclusion of the rich body of doctrine and principle that originated from 
Third World legal systems in the larger body of international law.49 Corri Zoli, for 
example, provides a persuasive argument regarding the role and contribution of Islam 
in the making of international law, especially the contributions of Islamic norms to 
international humanitarian law and the role of Muslim states in the early Geneva and 
Hague diplomatic conferences.50 Thus, for TWAIL, dismantling the one-sided 
hegemonic Eurocentric narratives of international law involves teasing out encounters 
of difference along many axis – race, religion, class, gender, ethnicity, and 
economics, among others – and in interdisciplinary ways – social, theoretical, 
epistemological, and ontological.51 
 
For this critical scholarship, historicising the relationship between the Third World 
and international law, and mapping the consequences of this relationship, is very 
crucial for two reasons. First, the Eurocentric story of international law is incomplete. 
To transform the present and future of international law from a state of subjection to 
emancipation, one should first understand the ‘problem-space’ in which the system 
occupies.52 Thus, an understanding that entails engaging in a reconstructed past and 
anti-colonial imagining to include often ignored experiences and forms of legal 
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relations between autonomous communities is paramount.53 An honest mapping of the 
origins and influences of the international legal system not only broadens one’s 
perspective, but also has the potential to stimulate informed curiosity about the future 
of international law.54  
 
Second, a well-rounded re-interrogation and re-characterisation of the colonial past 
embedded in the international legal system is not only imperative but allows for the 
animation of its democratic emancipatory potentials.55 This is especially pertinent as 
international law now plays roles that extend beyond adjudicating relations between 
states to within states. Overtime, international law has come to displace several 
national legal systems in their importance and is having an unprecedented effect on 
the lives of ordinary people.56 For example, IPRs as encapsulated in the TRIPS 
Agreement can be seen as a direct regulation of property rights by international law 
or, in the words of Chimni, ‘internationalization of property rights.’57 That is, the 
specification, articulation, and enforcement of property rights through international 
law.58 Therefore, the history of international law cannot be neglected at a time when it 
is slowly becoming domestic law manifesting itself in debates on health,59 access to 
knowledge, 60  food security, 61  environment, 62  services, 63  and socio-economic 
development.64 In essence, contemporary TWAIL scholars seek a ‘kind of 
international legal scholarship that takes legal historiography seriously particularly in 
its relations between formerly colonial countries and their colonial overlord.’65  
 
It is this call for a historiographical engagement with international law that informs 
the chronological mapping of patent law in the countries under study in the coming 
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chapters. As will be seen, each chapter of the case study countries begins by 
genealogically tracing patent law in these countries. In doing so, it is then 
unsurprising to find that patent law was introduced in these countries via colonial 
conquests with negative implications. The reason for undertaking this 
historiographical exercise is to locate the particular kind of narrative which gave birth 
to patent discourse in these countries. This location helps in not only identifying what 
constitutes the conditions of possibility of the present, but provides a starting point 
from which to begin the process of revolutionary re-imagination and re-ordering. As 
will be seen, India presents a fitting example of where a post-colonial state engaged 
with and challenged the place of the past,66 resulting in a re-imagined and re-ordered 
local patent regime reflective of its realities and need. Thus, in this instance, the past 
became the source of present obligations.67  
 
2.1.2 A Twailian Reading of the Global Patent Regime  
 
Theorising the TRIPS Agreement and IP regime in general using TWAIL 
demonstrates that this critical scholarship is concerned about the effect of the 
inclusion of the Third World in the global IP framework. Particularly, twailian 
scholars are suspicious of how the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement have worked 
to further the hierarchy created by international law. In their view, the global IP 
regime is a post-colonial extension of the international legal framework that had 
legitimised colonialism. This is because the TRIPS Agreement is seen as a tool 
beyond the meaning of ‘international trade’ but is about the rights of foreigners and 
foreign enterprises and the derogation of national sovereignty to assure IP privileges 
and demands of the rich Global North while neglecting those of the poor Global 
South. In this sense, TWAIL benefits this research by using history to develop and 
map analytics of change occurring within international patent law. 
 
TWAIL scholars show how current IP structures promoted under the veneer of 
‘development paradigm’ and ‘technological transfer objectives’ enshrined in the 
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TRIPS Agreement perpetuate North-South relations.68 This is because the TRIPS 
Agreement is seen as an ideological project; ideological in the sense that it consists of 
a set of ‘complexes of ideas which tend to generate activities toward maintenance of 
ideas of the existing order.’69 In this view, the complex ideas become the various 
components of IPR such as patents, trade secrets, geographical indications, industrial 
designs, copyrights, and layout designs, while the maintenance of ideas of the existing 
order becomes the universalization of the IP regime via its inclusion in bilateral, 
plurilateral, and investment agreements which lead to worldwide convergence on IP 
standards.70 In this view, the concept of IPRs becomes an ideology coined to justify 
access to and control of Third World property rights, while the TRIPS Agreement is 
the legal conduit in which a particular idea of IP is restructured, protected, and 
operationalized.71 
 
Reading the TRIPS Agreement with an unsuspecting eye would suggest a beneficial 
package or assistance to recipients mostly located in the South. However, the 
insidious aspect of the operationalization of this ‘ideology’ lies in its neutered 
language that masks the patterns of power inherent in the TRIPS Agreement. 
Commenting on this, Ngugi notes: 
 
Whether the motive of the person is to maintain the existing order or to 
structure an impending change or evolution, the choice made is 
packaged as ‘universal’ and ‘scientific’ so that the claim that is 
applicable across board can be made. In other words, both discretion 
and indeterminacy is denied so as to mask the real motive of the 
person making the choice – which may be either to maintain an 
existing order that the person prefers or to change it in a particular 
direction. In other words, what enables the ideology to “reign” is the 
fact of manipulable interpretation as a result of indeterminacy. The 
complexes of ideas are “ideological” by denying or masking both the 
motive and the fact that the interpretation represents only a choice of 
interpretation.72  
 
In this sense, the ideological rendering of IP is the internationalisation of property 
rights where change in the form and substance of property rights is brought about 
through the intervention of international law.  
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Further, the fact that the original ideas for a global patent protection framework 
historically came from the Global North, with minimal contributions from the Third 
World, also accentuates the twailian cynicism and scepticism.73 In most cases, the 
transplant of IP laws to developing countries has been the outcome of empire building 
and colonisation. In fact, Okediji notes, Third World societies, principally in Africa 
and Asia, were swept under the aegis of the international IP system (under the Paris 
Convention) through the agency of colonial rule.74 Under the Paris Convention 
framework, the modern global system was firmly secured and the Eurocentric notion 
and ‘definition’ of private property rights is regarded as the acceptable, legitimate, 
and relevant standard of protection. This legitimacy and relevance is then applied as 
‘universal’ and extended to the Third World, thereby ignoring the inappropriateness 
of the TRIPS-specific notion of private property in those parts.  
 
For many TWAIL scholars, the universalization of IP rules parallels the European 
colonial expansion and foregrounds a fundamental issue: the imposition on different 
contexts and realities of Eurocentric ‘ideals.’75 It was during the colonial period in 
which the Western ways of life – religion, legal culture, neoliberal governance 
systems, and civilisation – were foisted on the colonies.76 This is especially true in the 
realm of patent law as will be seen in the coming chapters.77 The colonies were 
exposed to Western cultural-intellectual values, especially legal rules, which were 
represented as universally valid regardless of fit and relevance to local realities, and in 
so doing, denied, erased, or suppressed non-European subjectivity.  
 
Of course, for some TWAIL scholars, the decolonisation processes of the 1950s and 
1960s represented a ‘historical rupture’ that allowed the colonised to gain ‘freedom’ 
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from the hold of colonial politics and exploitation.78 However, less obvious is the 
continued influence of colonialism even in the post-colonial. This is because, as 
Gathii notes, decolonisation did not imply complete self-determination, as even the 
process of decolonisation occurred within the Eurocentric notion of statehood – a 
concept on which the very regime of international law is built upon.79 He further 
asserts that this Eurocentric idea of ‘statehood’ ignored the pre-colonial African 
concept of statehood that was based on the kingdoms.80 Even upon independence, 
former colonies had no choice but to be ‘states’ in the Western tradition and thereby 
part of the existing international system. Today, international law’s key concepts such 
as ‘development’, ‘political economy’, ‘sovereignty’, and ‘nationhood’, which were 
formed in the imperial project, are continually reiterated and redeployed in the 
contexts and languages of contemporary legal and investment agreements.81 Indeed, 
international law in the 21st century has found its way home in a universal teleology of 
progressive humanitarianism82 and reflects the continuity of colonial law in the post-
colonial. Put differently, key concepts developed and used to perpetuate colonial 
expansion have been assimilated in international state relations that decolonisation 
could not dismantle them. 
 
Also, the fact that many of today’s advanced economies did not allow patents on 
chemical and pharmaceutical substances afforded them the opportunity to develop 
their technological process via imitation or otherwise. For example, chemical 
substances remained un-patentable until 1967 in West Germany, 1968 in the Nordic 
countries, 1976 in Japan, 1978 in Switzerland, and 1992 in Spain.83 Pharmaceutical 
products remained un-patentable until 1967 in West Germany and France, 1979 in 
Italy, and 1992 in Spain,84  while pharmaceutical products were also un-patentable in 
Canada into the 1990s.85 This transplanting of  Western legal regimes on countries in 
the Global South not only robbed them of opportunities which Western countries had, 
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but also hampered access to the information, knowledge, and technology needed for 
competitiveness, internal growth, and development.  
 
The implication of this ‘universalization’ of IPR rules outside the West is important in 
many respects. First, as part of the WTO ‘single undertaking’, many countries that did 
not have a codified IP system accepted and harmonised a West-constructed IP regime. 
This harmonisation alters the local self-understanding by excluding and/or disrupting 
the rich body of legal doctrine and principle already in existence in the Third World. 
For example, many Third World countries have an IP system that supports openness, 
communal access, and custodianship in areas such as folklore, biodiversity, and 
indigenous prints and signs.86 The IPR regime that the TRIPS Agreement advocates 
alters this crucial aspect of Third World culture by not only insisting on limited 
monopoly and secrecy via the institutionalisation of a system of corporate property 
rights, but also reduced the ability of Third World states to make autonomous policy 
choices regarding appropriate levels of IP.87 These attempts to fit non-Western 
cultural forms into Western legal regimes in turn distort, disfigure, and destroy 
particular material context with material consequences.  
 
Second – and this builds from the previous point – the nature and language of the 
‘universalization’ process found in many international economic governance regimes 
obfuscates the real causes of poverty and underdevelopment. For example, many 
Third World countries argue that the IPR regime impairs development by not only 
failing to give them access to knowledge but also failing to protect their IP, especially 
in the area of traditional medicines.88 Commenting on this, Dosi and Stiglitz note that 
the US has, on one hand, granted patents for traditional knowledge, which many 
countries in the Global South assert should not be patentable.89 This protection 
therefore necessitates these countries paying large rents to Western firms for what 
they view as their own property.90 The neem tree case provides a pertinent example.91  
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On the other, the US has not ratified the Convention on Biological Diversity due to 
pressure from pharmaceutical companies that fear it would provide ‘excessive’ 
protection for the IPRs for plants and animals found in the Third World.92 This is 
because many of the materials used in pharmaceutical manufacturing are derived from 
plants or animals in developing countries. Evidently, while companies should be 
rewarded for ‘discovery’, countries should not be punished for protecting their 
biodiversity – without which the discovery would not have been possible. This 
inconsistency leads to an asymmetric redistribution of property rights between the 
First and the Third Worlds. This redistribution generates widespread debt and 
poverty, and because it is not as explicit as, say, debt repayments, it disguises the real 
instances where IEG structures instigate poverty and ‘underdevelopment.’93 This 
reveals, according to Dosi and Stiglitz, the double standards of the US in that it seeks 
an IPR regime that maximises the rents for its companies and minimises the rents that 
its companies might pay to others.94  
 
For TWAIL scholars, the TRIPS negotiations represent the globalisation of US-
engineered IP rules and the forced inclusion of the subaltern into this US-led IP 
expansionism.95 It is this narrative that problematizes the TRIPS Agreement and the 
global governance of IP for TWAIL. The reality of the Uruguay Round is that the 
negotiations were dominated by the US, European Union (EU), Canada, and Japan 
(known as the Quad).96 This is in addition to instances of reluctance of many Third 
World countries to sign on to an international agreement with an IP strand.97 For 
example, the Indian delegate pointed out the country’s concern regarding the IP 
component of the negotiations, particularly in the area of patents and the scope of 
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patentability.98 In a similar vein, the Brazilian contestation was on the ground that the 
inclusion of IP would negatively affect the country’s technological transfer and 
industrialisation goals.99 Meanwhile, the Nigerian delegate commented on the 
unsuitability of IP inclusion and the possible negative impact on Third World 
economies.100 These examples demonstrate the twailian argument of unfair and 
unequal political structure, characterised by the dominance of the Global North over 
the Global South.  
 
Added to this is the aggressive unilateralism of the US via threat of Section 301 and 
loss of market access, which proved effective in forcing many developing countries to 
accept the unfavourable terms of the TRIPS Agreement, especially in the area of 
pharmaceutical patents (Articles 27 to 31). The US Section 301 is a trade policy used 
by the US to initiate unilateral trade sanctions against countries it deems to not have 
sufficient IPR protection.101 Consequently, Section 301 allows the US to withdraw 
trade benefits or impose duties on goods from foreign countries with IP laws deemed 
insufficient by the US or countries that refused to amend their IP laws to reflect the 
US’ domestic legal standards. According to Drahos, the US’ use of Section 301 
contributed to its insertion of IP matters into the GATT talks.102  
 
Thus, for TWAIL, the pressure exerted upon the Global South during the Uruguay 
Round to adopt legal rules fashioned by powerful states is intimately linked to ‘the 
pressure exerted upon peripheral states during the nineteenth century to introduce 
reforms that would render them “civilised” and, hence, equal to Western state.’103 
Hence, TWAIL scholars are convinced that the TRIPS Agreement is a continuation 
and a renewal of colonial order in the post-colonial, and curbs the right of 
governments to intervene in the economy for the benefit of their people while 
expanding the ‘space’ for MNCs and governments of the Global North.104 
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Nonetheless, there are limits to these twailian anxieties. By solely focusing on the 
dialectics of North versus South and associated histories, TWAIL ignores the 
capability and psychology of states to determine and pursue actions for self-interest 
purposes. This is especially true if calculations of benefits seemingly outweigh the 
risk involved in engaging in IEG. For example, in analysing the politics and 
psychology of modern investment agreements, Lauge Poulsen finds that governments 
in developing countries typically overestimate the economic benefits of international 
agreements and practically ignore the risks.105 Specifically, he notes that not only did 
developing countries’ policymakers rely on inferential shortcuts when assessing the 
implications of agreements, such as those on access to Western markets, many saw 
them as little more than diplomatic tokens of goodwill which would be important 
signals for foreign investors but entailed no real liabilities or legal significance.106 He 
cited an interview with a Ghanaian diplomat who mentioned that his country signed a 
bilateral trade agreement ‘to push forward reform, keep politicians on their toes, to 
tell politicians to refrain from doing things, and to assure foreign investors.’107 At the 
end of the day, as long as a reasonable case can be made that the treaty will provide 
economic or political benefits, many Third World countries will sign on to 
agreements even without the influence of more powerful countries.  
 
Also closely related to the above point is the critical preference theory as put forward 
by Olu Fasan.108 According to Fasan, ex ante preference plays a role in why countries 
sign up and voluntarily consent to international agreements, as opposed to being 
coerced into consenting.109 Thus, a country is willing and open to engage with 
international legal rules if the rules reflect its economic and political preference(s). 
Citing South Africa as an example, Fasan notes that the country was broadly 
supportive of most of the Uruguay Round negotiations, including those on the TRIPS 
Agreement because the country saw TRIPS as ‘a mechanism to lock in its unilateral 
domestic reforms that began in the early 1980s.’110 This is interesting as South Africa 
is currently not only a TRIPS opponent but is a counter-hegemonic actor in the 
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implementation of its TRIPS obligation. For example, South Africa was one of the 
first African countries to use the public health safeguards in the TRIPS Agreement to 
respond to the HIV/AIDS crisis when the South African government introduced the 
Medicines and Related Substances Act Amendment of 1997,111 aimed at designing a 
new drug policy and making more affordable HIV/AIDS medicines available to the 
masses.112  
 
Of course, many factors can be attributed to the switch in the behaviour and 
psychology of South Africa. First, the country’s participation at the Uruguay Round 
was by the then apartheid government that was actively involved in maintaining the 
colonial order. Secondly, the devastation caused by HIV/AIDS and the corollary 
tuberculosis demanded a change in the South Africa-TRIPS relationship.113 
Particularly, it was the damage caused by HIV/AIDS-related deaths in South Africa 
that triggered the worldwide campaign and conversation about the impact of the 
TRIPS Agreement on medicine access.114 Nonetheless, Fasan provides a potent 
argument on the psychology of state engagement with international law – a context 
lacking in TWAIL discourse. This is because most twailian analyses tend to ignore 
domestic policy preference and priorities, which appear to have more significant roles 
in influencing the behaviour and engagement of states with international economic 
governance.  
 
One of TWAIL’s core criticisms is that the very inclusion of areas traditionally 
thought to be beyond the ambit of trade is akin to the re-colonisation of the Global 
South by Western international institutions.115 Pertinent in this narrative is the 
argument that the overall legal and institutional rules of WTO are in essence a process 
of freeing transnational capital from spatial and temporal constraints and obligations 
through an effective system of cross-retaliation.116 Correspondingly, this sentiment 
reinforces the argument that the GATT/WTO rules are designed to serve mercantilist 
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purposes that sustain the linkage between colonialism and international trade rules.117 
By virtue of this, IEG regimes and corresponding institutions represent the coloniser 
while ostensibly claiming the virtues of neutrality, objectivity, and working towards 
the development of the Third World.118  
 
Another associated insight of this critical scholarship is the perceived hypocrisy and 
double standard apparent not only within the TRIPS Agreement but in the politico-
economic pressure that bear on Third World countries in the way they interpret their 
TRIPS obligations locally.119 Many scholars note that many prominent economic 
powers allowed the IP sector within their various countries to flourish by having weak 
IP laws.120 It was only when these countries began to achieve technological 
breakthroughs that their preference for weak IP laws changed.121 Moreover, the calls 
to make IP protection global became stronger and more urgent with the rise of the 
emerging economies in Asia. Sell and May observe that it was only when owners and 
manufacturers of innovations saw the considerable advantages in IP monopolistic 
potentials that states increased support for stronger international protection.122 
Therefore, the TRIPS Agreement was drafted and ratified to maintain the interests of 
Western powers, particularly the US. For this reason, the TWAIL movement believes 
that the global IP regime of protection and enforcement is a Western construct created 
to gain competitive advantage over emerging rival manufacturing centres in newly 
developing economies of the developing world.123 As expounded by Sell and May, ‘IP 
[is] an instrument of power and, once captured, the basis of further accumulation of 
power.’124  
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Other scholars note the coercion exerted by the US under its Trade Act of 1974 on 
countries whose IP laws are deemed to be unfriendly to US interests.125 The Special 
301 Report, prepared annually by the Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR), 
classifies specific countries based on the appropriateness of their IP laws vis-à-vis the 
US standard.126 Countries found to have insufficient laws are put on the ‘priority 
watch list’ and are possible targets of US trade and investment sanctions. Since its 
existence, key Third World countries such as Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, and 
India have featured on the list.127 India, for instance, has featured on this list since 
1974 because of its Patent Act of 1970 and recently because of its Section 3(d).128 
Trade sanctions were initiated against Brazil over its informatics policy in 1985.129 By 
placing countries on the Special 301 Report, the US creates pressure on these 
countries to increase IP protection beyond the TRIPS Agreement. 
 
For TWAIL scholars, this unilateral and retaliatory measure by the US is reminiscent 
of the racism and cultural superiority that accompanied colonial conquests.130 
Importantly, it demonstrates the way powerful countries continue to deny the agency 
and legal innovations of non-Europeans, through a totalising discourse such as ‘best 
IPR practices’131 that seeks not only the total economic, political, and social 
transformation of ‘the other’ but also ignores the insights or advancement of ‘the 
other’. In most instances, the ‘best practices’ are ill-fitted to their domestic needs. 
 
 
2.1.3  Limitations of TWAIL   
 
Notwithstanding TWAIL’s utility as a relevant critical scholarship for unpacking the 
idiosyncrasies of modern international law and associated governance regimes, some 
structural shortcomings do remain. In fact, the empirical work that forms the core of 
this thesis sheds valuable light on the way things actually work on the ground and 
underscores even more of TWAIL’s limitations. 
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TWAIL’s dominant focus on unequal international legal structures and critique of 
colonial manifestation blinds it to the way Third World states ‘play’ the game of 
international law.132 Like Western states, many Third World states have become 
complicit in exploiting and playing the game of international law at the expense of 
both their citizens and IEG regimes. For example, Shalini Randeria has shown how 
certain Third World states, usually seen as weak against the forces of globalisation 
and international law, transpose the processes of globalisation into the national arena 
by capitalising on their perceived weakness.133 The state is not merely a victim of neo-
liberal economic structures and the constituting international legal framework but is 
an active participant, manoeuvring it nationally and locally. Thus, in playing this 
‘cunning’ politics, they render themselves unaccountable both to their citizens and to 
international institutions.134  
 
In a similar vein, Parvathi Menon has shown how African states use international law 
and institutions to legitimise their actions and de-legitimise internal political ‘others’ 
(political opposition and rebel groups, in particular).135 By employing the rhetoric of 
international humanitarian law, these states elevate internal issues to the status of 
‘international crisis’, thereby opening up such issues to investigation and/or 
prosecution by the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.136 
Thus, these states do not only exploit international criminal law for their own political 
games, the law itself provides a legal cover for such exploitation.137  
 
The point here is this: the engagement of the Third World in the doctrinal and 
institutional terrains of international law is not one-sided. International law, as with 
all types of law, is a double-edged reality that can be advantageous to both the weak 
and the strong. However, by lacking awareness in the intelligent ways countries of the 
Global South ‘play’ the system, TWAIL scholarship not only denies them agency but 
also problematizes them in a way that resituates their engagement without 
contemporary resonance. Thus, the failure of TWAIL to recognise this substantive 
engagement with international law impinges on its self-proclamations as a 
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‘transformative theory.’138  In other words, Third World states are not merely passive 
objects in international law. By focusing on the historic exploitation and ‘othering’ of 
the Third World, TWAIL ignores the way seemingly powerless Third World 
countries exploit, to their benefit, the structural biases within international law. And in 
this exploitation, they repeat characteristics previously attributed to Western states.  
 
Others have questioned TWAIL’s excessive focus on international law shortcomings. 
Rémi Bachand, for example, contends that the TWAIL discourse is incomplete and 
exhibits a number of gaps, which should be overcome to elevate TWAIL from a 
solely critical theory to a problem-solving one.139 Jayan Nayer also questions 
TWAIL’s quest for renewal of international law, especially as such renewals have 
since dissipated.140 He asserts that while it is understandable that TWAIL scholars 
strive to renew the vestiges of Third World ideological resistance in the early periods 
of post-independence international legal scholarship, ‘the experience of the past and 
the reasons for previous failures to realise the substantive transformation of 
international law impinges constantly on present imaginings, thus making the 
continued reliance on international law for the transformatory project less 
understandable.’141  
 
However, Sundhuya Pahuja rejects the criticisms and instead notes the relevance of 
current TWAIL scholarship as a strategic engagement – an ambitious act of re-
description – with international law in a way that rejects the violently transformative 
urge of the logic within which it is embedded.142 According to her, by adopting a 
neutered and totalising discourse such as ‘human rights’ and ‘development’, these 
concepts manage to locate themselves outside the realm of historical contingency and 
political decisions and are thus not open to questions and critique.143 Thus, by delving 
into these concepts, TWAIL not only exposes the progressive narratives that usually 
accompany these descriptions to scepticism but reveals the power dynamics that 
render each of these of dubious benefit to ‘the wretched of the earth.’144 
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Furthermore, Luis Eslava and Sundhuya Pahuja reject the nihilistic critique by noting 
the various forms of resistance and reform occurring daily as a material project.145 
They contend that TWAIL ‘expands its emphasis on materiality to think of 
international law as not only an ideological project located in a particular material 
context, and with material consequences but also as material project itself.’146 It is 
therefore important to examine the way that international law operates, including its 
daily functioning on the mundane quotidian level.147 Thus, the various forms of 
resistance and reform occurring daily at sub-national levels – spaces not normally 
associated with at international law making but ‘are in themselves part of the political 
economy, of international law’148 are recognised. To this end, Eslava and Pahuja 
suggest that TWAIL delves into the everyday life of international law at domestic 
spaces that are not ostensibly international but in actuality are such, i.e. local 
governments, courts, and other grassroots engagements. In so doing, this thesis shifts 
the focus away from international law as the only and legitimate site of 
reconstruction, as international law has the ‘tendency to draw our gaze to exceptional 
events and sites, often leaving aside what they consider ordinary or every day.’149  
 
Therefore, focusing on international law in this way serves to create technologies of 
en-framing, wherein international law acts as a ‘mechanism[…] through which the 
world is viewed, apprehended and constructed, according to parameters that are 
superimposed upon our surrounding realities.’150 Consequently, understanding 
international law only in these terms – as an ideological project located in a particular 
material context and removed from local realities – only confirms its authority ‘to 
enframe certain events as superior and extraordinary, and therefore in need of 
international attention, while enframing many other events as daily, domestic, or 
lower level occurrences.’151  
 
As a result, they argue for a different mode of approaching international law that 
focuses on its everyday operations in and through national and local norms, 
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administrative and spatial practices, and ordinary artefacts.152 That is, a mode of 
understanding international law in places that usually escape attention and yet 
regulate lives – the local forums, spaces, or jurisdictions.153 This is because the 
language and tools of international law are felt in the daily lives of people. The spatial 
divide that previously existed between activities of nation-states in international 
forums and in the lives of ordinary people in local forums is increasingly getting 
blurred. In these blurred spaces, mass peoples’ movements across the world are 
employing the language of human rights, or in the case of this research, the ‘right to 
health’ and ‘access to medicines’, to voice their dissatisfaction against the post-
colonial state, international institutions, and MNCs, as will be seen in Chapters 3 and 
4. 
 
Moreover, local municipalities and courts are also playing insurgent roles. They do 
this by calibrating their geographical realities ‘to ensure the inflow of international 
investment or compliance with an increasingly large set of development 
prescriptions.’154 Patent application oppositions and radical legal actions against Third 
World states and pharmaceutical corporations in India and Brazil demonstrate this.155 
Thus, focusing on the everyday interpretation and application of international in these 
local spaces makes it possible ‘to delineate the (post)colonial character of 
international law, and to work actively toward a meaningfully plural international 
normative order.’156 Evaluating these multiple ways in which international law is 
crossing spatial divides and scales of governance shows that ‘international law cannot 
be conceptualised today simply in terms of a restricted body of norms, or situated 
only in bureaucratic and institutional environments beyond daily life.’157 Thus, in 
redirecting focus, it is easier to see the myriad ways the international unfolds in 
people’s everyday lives and in domestic phenomena, which is not ostensibly 
international but in actuality is. This, according to Eslava and Pahuja, may be 
understood hermeneutically as expressions of resistance against and reform of 
colonialism within international law.158  
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2.1.4  Application of TWAIL to the Thesis 
Having delved into TWAIL – understanding what it is about, its readings of global 
patent regime, and its weaknesses – the thesis now turns to explain how TWAIL is 
applicable in this instance. TWAIL is integrated in this thesis in two distinct ways.   
 
First, it provides the historical lens to analyse and recognise the engagement of 
colonial patent laws in Brazil, India, and Nigeria. In this perspective, the imposition 
of colonial patent laws is seen as what it is – imperial conquest reflective of the needs 
of the European powers and devoid of any significant benefit for these countries.159 
This dynamic is further reproduced via the TRIPS system, which has created a new 
patent law universality and implementation despite principle objections of Third 
World countries to the inclusion of IP in the remit of international trade.160 
‘Universality’ means that the TRIPS Agreement has not only established a uniform 
global IP regime and norms, but it also brought under international surveillance its 
implementation and enforcement. In juxtaposing these, TWAIL provides this thesis – 
and even the study of patent law in the Global South – with a new analytical 
framework that illuminates the ways in which imperialism has always underpinned 
patent law regime. Thus, engaging in a historiographic analysis of patent law as 
suggested by TWAIL is a start to seeing how, through the process of imperialism, 
non-European states were incorporated into a system of law that was essentially 
European.161  
 
Second, TWAIL provides the analytical framework to understand the contestation of 
international law at the local forums of the Global South as part of the global project 
of reforming international law. As Eslava and Pahuja rightly note, the on-going 
resistance and contestation of international law at the local levels, especially in the 
Global South, are often overlooked as part of international law making. This is 
because international law and practices are usually understood to operate only in 
extraordinary places and through exceptional events. As a result, Third World 
engagement is seen as peripheral to the making of international law. It is in taking up 
Pahuja and Eslava’s call to delve beyond the international and recognise the various 
forms of resistance and reform occurring daily, especially in the Global South, that 
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TWAIL structures the thesis’ analyses of pharmaceutical patent regime law making in 
the local forums of Brazil and India – and by extension, its absence in Nigeria.  
 
In this perspective, local realities such as the inclusion of Section 3(d) in India’s 
patent law, Brazil’s Agência Nacional de Vigilância Sanitária (ANVISA) prior 
consent mechanism, right to health litigation, and even the use of CLs to ensure 
medicine access is then understood as part and parcel of the international legal order. 
These successful domestic interventions are inadvertently changing the global IP 
regime by widening the aperture on norms governing pharmaceutical patent laws and 
the discourse on access to essential medicines. Viewed in this light, the gradual and 
subtle reform of international legal regimes and norms as suggested by TWAIL is 
beginning to be seen in real examples, but it also imbues the ‘ethos of “the 
international” in norms, administrative process, spatial arrangements, artefacts of 
governance, and forms of subjectivity often considered in purely municipal terms.’162 
 
However, in as much as TWAIL provides the lens to understand the engagement of 
international law in local forums of the Third World as acts of hermeneutical 
resistance against the structures of modern colonial structures, the theory is 
particularly inadequate as an encompassing framework for this thesis in two ways. 
First, TWAIL suffers from the assumption that Third World countries have local 
actors to participate in the reform of and resistance against international legal 
scholarship.163 Third World states are not created equal and the mere fact of existing 
in the ‘problem space’ of post-colonialism does not mean presence of actors within 
the Third World states that would engage in the process of destabilisation and renewal 
of international law’s history and operation. Actor presence here means the active 
participation of non-state actors such as the private sector (or in the case of this 
research, the local pharmaceutical manufacturing sector) or active civil society groups 
– actors that enable and promote counterhegemonic (international) law making in 
legal, public, and policy discourse. Thus, while there are Third World states endowed 
with the aforementioned actor presence, such as India with its robust pharmaceutical 
sector and Brazil’s social welfare services and its politically active and informed 
citizens, there are also Third World states that, due to various factors, do not have 
these important capacities. As a consequence, these countries (such as Nigeria) are 
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unable to engage in the resistance and reform of (international) patent law making, as 
will be seen in Chapter 5.    
 
Further, in instances where Third World states are endowed with emancipatory 
capabilities, TWAIL assumes that such capabilities are competent. ‘Competency’ 
means the ability of these actors to enrol support simultaneously at a number of 
different sites of law making and law enforcement (national, international, and 
transnational), as well as their ability to mobilise leading sources of expertise to 
reform, reconstruct, or dismantle the patent regime. Therefore, not only should actors 
create and govern knowledge to allow for engagement, such actors should be 
competent enough to produce or create knowledge in the first place, as well as engage 
in its renewal. Using the case of Nigeria – as will be seen in Chapter 5 – while the 
country lacks some actors, i.e. pharmaceutical companies, the other relevant actors – 
civil society groups – have not been competent enough to produce expertise on 
patents nor cognitively shape legal and policy discourse on the patent issue. This is in 
stark contrast to Brazil (Chapter 3) and India (Chapter 4), where actors have managed 
to do this. This also explains the on-going legal innovations and contestations on 
patent issues in these forums.  
 
In not recognising the competency of actors, TWAIL silences local experiences and 
history. Thus, while the thesis takes seriously this task of re-imagining and reforming 
the international patent regime, it is also cautious against any attempt to do so without 
seriously considering the questions of Third World actor-agency and competency to 
engage in the everyday operation of international law. It is this inability to reflect 
actor-agency and competency for effective and sustainable local engagement in 
reform and resistance vis-à-vis international law and scholarship that TWAIL is found 
to be limiting for the purposes of this thesis. The quest for a supplement will now be 
considered. 
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Part 2: Nodal Governance  
 
2.2.1 Understanding Nodal Governance 
The theory of nodal governance explains how a variety of actors operating within 
social systems interact along networks to govern the systems they inhabit.164 It posits 
that governance in such systems is instituted ‘in nodes that mobilise the knowledge 
and capacity of members to manage the course of events.’165 In this respect, nodal 
governance is a theory that focuses on the role of nodes in governance, especially the 
way such nodal links create concentrations of power for the purposes of exercising 
and/or influencing governance.  
The idea of nodal governance was initially developed by Clifford Shearing and 
Jennifer Wood by building on the work of Friedrich von Hayek to explain multiple 
modes of governance in the changing governance landscape, wherein state 
governments constitute but one set of nodes.166 According to Shearing and Wood, 
nodal governance theory recognises the interaction between state and non-state actors 
(node) as well as between nodes, and how these interactions extend ‘the existing 
activities of non-state agencies as well as the emergence of new forms of 
governmental activity outside of the State.’167 In other words, the nodal framework 
provides an account of how a governing order emerges from the operation of highly 
complex systems.  
A node can either be an actor within a network or a combination of one or two 
networks united for a common goal. Nodes take a variety of forms, from formalised 
institutional expressions (business corporations), voluntary groupings (non-
governmental organisations or NGOs), to super-structures, i.e. combinations of 
representatives from different nodal organisations such as the Pharmaceutical 
Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) or Indian Drug Manufacturers’ 
Association (IDMA).168 A super-structural node, in other words, brings together one 
or more networks for the purpose of producing various kinds of action, such as 
lobbying the state for a favourable law or policy. Other examples of such super-
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structural nodes include the Brazilian Association of Fine Chemical Industry 
(Associação Brasileira das Indústrias de Química Fina, Biotecnologia e Suas 
Especialidades or ABIFINA) and the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Group of 
Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (PMG-MAN). The role and influence of these 
nodes in relation to patent law making will be discussed in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, 
respectively.  
Regardless of type, a node has four essential characteristics: first, it should have a 
way of thinking (mentalities) that cognitively shapes how individuals and 
organisations see the world and act accordingly.169 It is in these mentalities and 
purposes that nodes differ greatly from each other in terms of goals and legal conduct. 
Second, it should have a set of processes (technologies) for applying and exercising 
influence over the course of events at issue.170 Third, it should also have resources to 
support and mobilise the operation of the node and fuel its influence.171 Fourth, there 
should be a system (institutions) that enables the directed mobilisation of resources, 
mentalities, and technologies over time.172  
Thus, to be a governing node, according to this theory, a node should have some 
institutional form, even if temporary. It need not be a formally constituted or legally 
recognised entity, but it should have sufficient stability and structure to enable the 
mobilisation of resources, mentalities, and technologies over time. The lobbying 
tactics of the IDMA in India in the wake of the amendment of the Indian Patent Act 
provides an example of a successful governing node, as the group had the stability 
and structure to mobilise its mentalities, resources, and technologies over time to 
achieve a tempered patent regime for India. Conversely, in Brazil and Nigeria, the 
super-structural nodes of ABIFINA and PMG-MAN were not able to participate in 
patent law-making because both groups, though formally recognised by the state, did 
not have sufficient stability and structure to enable the mobilisation of resources, 
mentalities, and technologies over patent-related matters due to various domestic 
economic factors.  
All nodes are not created equal, and the grouping and structure of each node affects 
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its arrangement or interface with the state.173 For example, the relation of the state 
with big corporations, voluntary groups, or a super-structural node, though non-linear 
in nature, is often one of cooperative arrangement and sometimes contestation. For 
example, IDMA’s lobby of the Indian Parliament, urging them to oppose an IP 
dimension to GATT in order to protect public health and the pharmaceutical sector, 
highlights a corporative nodal relationship. On the other hand, the civil society 
protests in Brazil on access to HIV medicines are an example of contested nodal 
engagement with the state.  
Notwithstanding which side of the interface prevails, the capacity of a node to exert 
influence and the potency of its influence depends on the resources available for 
exerting influence, technologies in use, as well as the institutional structure.174 In other 
words, the ability of the nodal network to enrol such resources and governing 
technologies at a number of different sites to mobilise the state and others to comply 
with its direction also affects the effectiveness of its influence. For example, a small 
NGO can mobilise resources to exert influence at one site such as the local, 
municipal, or national levels of governance. The ability of social movements in India 
to petition government by writing amicus curiae briefs is an example. However, 
because these groups are usually limited by financial capacity, they are unable to 
exact influence simultaneously and at multiple sites.  
A business corporation could simultaneously exert influence at a national and local 
level. For example, 12 US corporations, according to Susan Sell, were primarily 
responsible for the lobbying that brought the TRIPS Agreement into being.175 It was 
intense lobbying activity from these companies, particularly in the US, that laid the 
foundations of linking IP protection to trade in the multilateral context.176  
Super-structural nodes, on the other hand, can channel their resources to exert 
simultaneous influence at the local, national, and international levels. An example of 
this is the role of the PhRMA in influencing the USTR to include IP as part of the US 
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foreign policy as well as its presence during the Uruguay Round negotiations.177 It is 
this ability of the super-structural node to engage simultaneously at multiple sites that 
makes it powerful compared to the NGO or business corporation. 
While the relationship between the state and a node differ, relationships between and 
among nodes also differ. This intra-node relationship takes different forms such as 
dialogue, democratic bargaining, or contestation of ideas.178 As a result, nodes are 
constantly reconstituting themselves by regulating other nodes that are accessible to 
them through networks.179 According to Burris, Drahos, and Shearing, the 
pervasiveness of nodes not only influences the way knowledge is produced and 
diffused in a given system, but also informs how resources relevant to regulation are 
focused to bring about social action.180 In other words, nodal governance facilitates 
understanding of how nodal networks produce the results they have by providing 
insight into who is able to participate and who is excluded, how knowledge is 
produced and disseminated, as well as the resources available for mobilisation 
purposes.181 In the next section, a case study of the TRIPS Agreement is presented to 
show how the nodal governance theory helps explain how a nodal network played a 
larger role in the formation of US trade policy and led to the globalisation of the 
private interests of its member corporations.  
 
 
2.2.2  Nodal Governance and the Pharmaceutical Patent 
Regime 
The inclusion of IPR in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations did not 
happen by chance. It involved the dynamic influence and participation of American 
MNCs, especially pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies, that first actively 
shaped the national legislation on IP and, by corollary, the foreign trade policy of the 
US government.182 This raises the question of how and why did a group of private 
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sector actors succeed in establishing, locally and internationally, a maximalist IP 
agenda. Nodal governance theory proffers insight on how these private companies 
were able to secure US government compliance with emerging global IPR standards 
that, in turn, constitute today’s international patent law regime.  
Having developed a large portfolio of R&D for innovation in the chemical, power 
machinery, electrical, petroleum, and rubber industries, thanks to the massive 
corporate research laboratories, these companies needed IPRs and licences to protect 
their investment.183 This is because the owners and manufacturers of innovations saw 
the considerable advantages in IP monopolistic potentials of patents such as exclusive 
foreign market access, sustained competitive advantages, and economic rents from 
patents.184 These companies sought to institute locally as well as within all significant 
markets a regulatory agenda for largely uniform patent rules that made it cheap to 
obtain patents, maximise the scope of patentable subject matter, and minimise state 
control over the use of patented technology.185 
In fact, the need for IP protection was especially important in the pharmaceutical 
sector as these companies saw countries like India and Brazil – with ‘weak’ IP laws 
but budding pharmaceutical sectors – as threats to their revenue and market access. 
Understandably, these companies saw the considerable advantages in IP monopolistic 
potentials of patents such as exclusive foreign market access and sustained 
competitive advantages as a way to protect their R&D investment. The very nature of 
IP, specifically patents and its ensuing monopoly, gives its owner strong protection 
over the exploitation of a patented invention. This temporary monopoly allows the 
inventor to set the terms of use and the price for access to the invented product. Thus, 
with the increase in the value of knowledge relative to other assets, companies are 
bound to protect not only this asset but also laws that may impact the value of and 
access to this asset.186 With this goal in mind, new tactics were needed to develop a 
global network of universal patent standards while solving the problem of free riding 
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– a situation where those who benefit from a good or service do not pay for them.  
The process of linking IP with trade policy was spearheaded by Pfizer, a global 
pharmaceutical company with interest and investments in Third World countries such 
as India.187 Pfizer’s investment in many developing countries had ‘sensitized it to the 
threat to international markets that generics posed for the pharmaceutical research-
and-development industry’.188 According to Drahos, Pfizer cognitively shaped and 
influenced fellow pharmaceutical manufacturers regarding the value of trade-based IP 
through lobbying, giving talks, and delivering white paper presentations at business 
forums like the National Foreign Trade Council and the Business Round Table.189 In 
these processes, Ed Pratt – CEO of Pfizer at that time – was able to delineate the links 
between trade, IP, and investment as well as the importance of linking the IP regime 
to the GATT and making it enforceable under the GATT dispute resolution 
procedures.190  
In this context, Pfizer plays the role of a quintessential node with a foreknowledge 
and particular mind-set of thinking of IP (mentalities); it employed a set of 
technologies in the form of giving speeches and white paper presentations to apply 
and exert influence over the course of events at issue. All these were possible due to 
the resources and institutional structure of the company, which allowed it to mobilise 
support in the media and industry and resulted in policy from the government. In 
other words, Pfizer was able to extract support within the nodal network of fellow 
pharmaceutical companies and influence other networks of biochemical and 
technology companies to create ever-widening circles of influence that brought more 
networks (software, film, and music sectors) into the cause of exporting the US IP 
standard to the wider world.191 The combined influence of these nodes developed 
governmental support for strengthening the global protection of IP.192 
Furthermore, Pfizer was able to achieve compliance from the US through the creation 
of the Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations (ACTN).193 The ACTN was set up 
by the US Congress in 1974 as a unique public-private forum to ensure that the 
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private sector was represented in US trade policies.194 Simply put, the ACTN was 
structured to allow direct engagement of the US business sector during trade 
negotiations. The ACTN was not only an open access interaction between business 
and the bureaucratic centre of trade policy, it also played a strategic role in the design 
of US policy on IP issues.195 In 1972, Pfizer’s CEO Ed Pratt became the chairman of 
the ACTN.196 With Pratt as chairman, the ACTN began constructing a new trade and 
investment agenda.197 He also represented the private sector and was an adviser to the 
US official delegation at the Uruguay Round trade talks in his capacity as chairman of 
the ACTN.198 By bringing foreknowledge on IP to the table, Pratt was able to frame 
the contours of national IP legislation as well as add it into the already existing US 
foreign trade template.199 As far as the ACTN was concerned, folding IP standards 
into US foreign trade policy, first in bilateral agreements and then in multilateral 
agreements like the GATT, was the single best way in which to spread those 
standards.200 
During this period, the ACTN worked closely with the USTR to shape the services, 
investment, and IP trade agenda of the US.201 Crucially, the ACTN established a Task 
Force on Intellectual Property whose recommendation formed the backbone of the US 
strategy for IP. It advised the US to have a long-term objective of placing IP into the 
GATT as well as in unilateral and bilateral agreements.202 In doing this, the ACTN 
signified it would pull every lever at its disposal in order to obtain the right result for 
the US on IP.203 Consequently, the US amended its trade laws to reflect this new IP 
universalization goal. Particularly, it revised Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 to 
address unfair practices on IPRs in various countries.204 This provision allowed the 
US to withdraw trade benefits or impose duties on goods from foreign countries with 
poor IP laws or countries that refused to amend their IP laws to standards that are 
acceptable to the US.205 For example, the USTR initiated Section 301 of the Trade Act 
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against Brazil in 1988.206 This imposed a 100 per cent tariff on imports of Brazilian 
products such as paper, consumer electronics, and agricultural products.207 In fact, the 
effective use of Section 301 gave the US the needed leverage in dealing with the 
problem of poor IP laws and could be credited for the successful inclusion of IP rules 
at the GATT.208 In another example, the US included the protection of IP as an 
investment activity in the Bilateral Investment Treaty program that it signed with 
many developing countries in the 1980s.209 If anything, the significance of including 
IP as part of the US foreign policy and successfully pushing forward legislative 
changes show how a node (Pfizer) mobilised the government to achieve its goal. The 
levers of a very personal self-interest thus shaped a macro outcome.210  
To successfully include IP into the multilateral framework of the GATT, the ACTN 
had to move beyond the perimeters of US governance to bring in other possible like-
minded stakeholders into its mentality of a trade-related IP regime. To do this, the 
USTR set up the Quadrilateral Group (Quad) of countries consisting of the US, EU, 
Japan, and Canada with the purpose of developing a consensus for the Uruguay 
Round of multilateral trade negotiations.211 In the nodal governance context, the Quad 
is a super-structural node of like-minded countries which sought to promote their 
interests in IP at the global forum. Pertinently, it summoned combined resources of 
the Quad countries and nodal network access of business organisations within each to 
pressure their governments to include IP in the next round of trade negotiations.212 
During the Uruguay Round, the Quad developed the impetus for particular decisions 
and the negotiating positions of developed states. 
In addition to setting up the Quad, Pratt – together with John Opel, the then Chairman 
of IBM – also created the Intellectual Property Committee (IPC). Like the Quad, the 
IPC was another super-structural node and consisted of a coalition of 13 major US 
corporations, namely Bristol-Myers, DuPont, FMC Corporation, General Electric, 
General Motors, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Johnson & Johnson, Merck, Monsanto, 
Pfizer, Rockwell International, and Warner Communications. 213 According to Burris, 
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Drahos, and Shearing, the IPC was dedicated to the inclusion of a comprehensive 
agreement on IP in the GATT negotiations with the stated objective of activating its 
nodal networks in Europe in order to achieve a European buy-in of a trade-linked 
globally enforceable IP regime.214 These objectives were achieved in 1988 when the 
Quad released a suggested draft text of an agreement on IP, which eventually formed 
the backbone of the TRIPS Agreement.215  
The above analysis illustrates how and why IP language was conceptualised and 
included in the US trade policy discourse. The technical design of American IP 
strategy also underscores the power of nodal governance (pharmaceutical companies 
and big corporations) in reforming the global IP regime to suit collective objectives. 
In cognitive terms, by bringing foreknowledge on IP to the table, mobilising resources 
at multiple sites, and utilising institutional networks, these companies became a super-
structural node that no government could ignore. These companies conceived the idea 
of linking the IP regime to the trade regime and successfully marshalled government 
support to bring it to pass, consequently enrolling and activating a strong global IP 
regime in the TRIPS Agreement.  
 
2.2.3  Application of Nodal Governance to the Thesis 
The story of global IP law, which was formalised in the TRIPS Agreement, shows 
how owners of large IP portfolios achieved the goal of IP globalisation by deploying 
and enrolling multiple nodal networks to produce action. The TRIPS Agreement case 
study and the empirical findings216 underpin the critical observations of nodal 
governance and its relevance for this thesis. 
First, nodal governance brings insight to the inner workings of local law making and 
governance – the actors, governance, knowledge capacity, and resource availability. 
Explicitly, it shows the ‘circuitry of power in societies where information networks 
have become a dominant organisational form’.217 This is shown in the role and 
activities of Pfizer in mobilising support among like-minded organisations (nodal 
network). It was the concentration of power from these networks that successfully 
gave rise to the ACTN and the IPC – super-nodes that ‘give their constituent nodes 
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highly effective regulatory access to the people and governmental nodes that had to be 
regulated.’218 Those super-structural nodes in turn activated other private and public 
assemblages in the US, Europe, Canada, and Japan at the Uruguay Round 
negotiations. This shows not only the presence of actors but also the power dynamics 
between actors to channel available resources and bring about the desired outcome.219 
Thus, all actor(s) should first be present for such actors to be able to access people 
and governmental nodes that had to be regulated. If actors were not present, there 
would not have been a nodal network to activate and access. As will be seen in 
coming chapters, the presence of actor networks in the form of pharmaceutical 
manufacturers and dynamic NGO networks has been key in advancing a particular 
agenda on patents in Brazil and India. Employing the nodal governance theory in 
analysing the actions of these non-state actors reveals how these groups embedded 
themselves in a spirit of resistance against a new global IP regime. In the process, 
they demanded and achieved a public interest and human rights-oriented IP regime in 
their respective jurisdictions.  
Second, it shows the importance of decentred (i.e. between state and local 
governance) but competent performance in activating both private and public 
assemblages within the state structure. Pratt, as head of the ACTN, was able to bring 
and activate other nodal networks.220 In doing so, he was able to enlist not only the 
influence of CEOs of fellow companies with large portfolios but more financial 
resources.221 Knowledge, capacity, and resources thus became focused and 
concentrated. While NGOs in Brazil and India lack the economic muscle of big 
corporations in the US, they have been able to adroitly market their activism by 
employing human rights principles (right to health in Brazil and right to life in India) 
to mobilise government action and contest transnational corporate power. Generic 
pharmaceutical companies were able to use similar tactics in the run up to India’s 
Patent Act amendment to facilitate efforts with a similar result from the Indian 
government.  
Third, mentalities matter. Big corporations in the US were able to frame their way of 
thinking to cognitively shape how the US government approached its foreign trade 
policy. According to Susan Sell, the big corporations displayed impressive framing 
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skills in presenting their case to the government and their foreign counterparts, not 
merely by making the link between IP and trade, but also by the very terms they used 
to describe their position.222 As Chapters 3 and 4 will demonstrate, on-going 
contestations in Brazil and India over IP rights have been framed as ‘right to health’ 
and ‘right to life’, respectively. These have proved to be effective counter-framing to 
the highly protectionist IP maximalist agenda.  
 
2.3 Summarising the Theoretical Frameworks  
The aim of this chapter was to show the conceptual theoretical framework that 
underpins the thesis. The assessment of the TRIPS Agreement illustrates the extent to 
which the international economic law framework has continued to ascribe 
universalism borne out of Western philosophical persuasions. Particularly, in using 
TWAIL, the thesis has been able to delve into and critique the Eurocentric 
foundations of modern IEG to show that the system has continued to perpetuate a 
world of deep injustice characterised by violence, exploitation, and inequality.  
In order to rectify international law injustices, TWAIL has suggested looking instead 
at the prosaic life of international law manifesting in the local forums. This is because 
processes of reforming and resisting are on-going in these forums that ostensibly 
might not look as being part of the international legal system but in actuality is. In 
calling to focus on the local as part of the international, TWAIL theory envisions a 
new ‘praxis’ of (the new) universality by mapping the numerous forms of resistance 
already at play in the struggle against the (post)colonial normative order now being 
institutionalised and administered across the world. 
However, the suggestion of focusing on the various forms of reform and resistance 
vis-à-vis international law at the local forums falls afoul of the assumption that Third 
World states automatically have the requisites needed. Particularly, TWAIL ignores 
the questions of who, why, and how to participate in reform and resistance vis- à-vis 
international law and scholarship. To rectify this lacuna, the thesis drew from the 
nodal governance theory to show how non-state actors engage in governance through 
nodal networks to produce change. In highlighting how governance processes are 
facilitated, it shows how power and participation is constituted and who is excluded in 
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the process. Thus, in combining TWAIL and nodal governance theory to illuminate 
the materialisation of the international in the local, the thesis shows the gamut of 
legal, historical, political, and economic developments that demonstrate the 
internationalisation of pharmaceutical patent law in the local forums of Brazil, India, 
and Nigeria.  
In the subsequent chapters, these theoretical frameworks will be put in context to 
show their practical relevance. Starting with Brazil, the next chapter examines the 
structure and implementation of patent law. This is important because it shows that 
the country is not strictly adhering to the patent regime of Western countries, but is 
instead adapting patent law to its own unique environment. Thus, it provides a real 
life example of Third World resistance and reformation of global patent law.  It also 
focuses on the actors involved in counter-hegemonic law making, bringing attention 
to the nodal governance of civil society activism and the very nature of these 
networks themselves.   
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3.    Brazil  
Introduction 
Brazil represents the first, and so far, exemplary model in the implementation of a 
programme of universal and free access to ARV drugs. The country is often cited1 as 
an exemplary model of a developing country that has successfully tackled and 
contained the HIV/AIDS epidemic. The importance of Brazil’s AIDS treatment 
programme extends far beyond the Brazilians that have received ARV treatment, 
which – according to the Director of the National AIDS Programme Fabio Mesquita – 
is estimated at around 350,000 recipients.2 It has shown that it is possible to offer free 
and universal access to ARV in a resource-limited country. In doing so, Brazil 
changed the narrative on health, human rights, and access to medicines discourse.   
 
The success of the Brazilian government’s HIV/AIDS programme, as this chapter 
explains, did not happen in a vacuum. It was the result of domestic and international 
political processes that emerged from the re-democratisation process of the 1980s. 
This re-democratisation process that included the emergence of new political parties, 
the creation of a new Constitution, a freer press, active social movements, the on-
going Uruguay Round negotiations, and the explosion of the HIV/AIDS epidemic at 
the time provided the recipe that produced Brazil’s contemporary AIDS treatment 
institutions.  
 
This chapter focuses on the intersection of Brazil’s HIV/AIDS programme and 
pharmaceutical patent regime. It traces the development and implementation of a 
socially conscious patent law and pharmaceutical policies. It also maps the roles of 
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various actors in the making of the AIDS programme – their motivations, challenges, 
and how they influenced these policies. That is, the way key actors – particularly civil 
society – captured and framed the state’s understanding and application of patents for 
health and economic development purposes. In examining the Brazilian context, the 
thesis finds that patents are not just seen strictly as private rights, but also as legal 
rights with a social function that should be balanced with public interests. This stems 
from the constitutionalization of a universal right to health and the subsequent 
institutionalisation of a universal public health system. In doing so, patents are jointly 
understood and conceptualised by both the state and non-state actors as not only an 
impediment to the legal commitment to universal health care, but also a tool for 
achieving this social function embedded within the constitutional framework. It is this 
understanding that shapes the interests of policymakers, drives them to implement a 
socially-conscious patent regulatory system, and informs civil society activism and 
engagement with patent law. Likewise, the country also demonstrates that the 
significance of the active presence of domestic political actors and institutions are the 
most important determinant in the understanding, conceptualization, and direction of 
law and policy. 		
The analysis on Brazil puts the TWAIL theory in perspective by establishing links 
between the past and the present in the development of a patent regime and why the 
country took certain positions and supported certain arguments at different times. In 
examining the genesis, character, and dynamics of patent law in Brazil, the twailian 
perspective provides the analytics for recognising the materialization of patent law 
and access to medicines litigation in the local jurisdictions of Brazil as part of 
ongoing wider reform projects in the subaltern, which are expanding the aperture on 
norms governing patent and medicine access discourse. In this light, the post-colonial 
political behaviour is not only an ideological project located in a particular material 
context with material consequences, but also a material project itself.3 In other words, 
the politics and activism surrounding the development of the AIDS programme and 
subsequent reform in patent law are not an isolated incidents happening in a local 
space but is part of a larger network of resistance already at play in the struggle 
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against the colonial normative order now being institutionalised and administered 
across the world.4  	
As the chapter develops, the dynamic activism of social movement and civil society 
groups, which originated during the authoritarian military regime, becomes 
prominent. The success of the AIDS programme is largely due to the involvement of 
these social movement groups in producing expertise and knowledge regarding AIDS 
as well as in employing human rights principles in treatment campaigns. It was this 
human rights-based approach that produced cumulative and long-term effects on law 
and policy. Employing nodal governance insights, the thesis shows how social 
movements, in collaboration with the government, secured pharmaceutical autonomy 
for the Brazilian population. By strategically using ideas and networks, these groups 
were able to form strong domestic coalitions that exploited critical junctures in 
domestic politics to produce positive impacts on health, law, and the economy. Thus, 
the nodal governance perspective shows how nodes (social movement) activate their 
nodal network to interpret their interests, recruit allies, and convince the state of not 
only the justness of their cause but also of its constitutionality.  	
The remainder of this chapter is therefore structured as follows: the first section looks 
at the development of the patent regime in Brazil from the colonial period to the 
present. In doing so, the section shows how patent laws, originally intended by the 
colonial powers to be exploitative in practice, was changed by the Brazilian state to 
make them work for the country’s welfare and developmental needs. The second 
section examines Brazil’s industrial property law and delineates the roles of – and 
sometimes dialectic relationship between – the Brazilian Patent Office (Instituto 
Nacional da Propriedade Industrial or INPI) and the Brazilian National Health 
Surveillance Agency or ANVISA. This is important as it demonstrates that the 
creation of ANVISA is an attempt by the Brazilian state to recapture the discourse on 
patents from a strictly exclusive private right point of view, without regard to 
consumers and the public, to one that balances private rights with social 
responsibility. It is argued in this chapter that these everyday intimacies across spatial 
divides and scales of governance show how international law – in this case, Brazil’s 
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obligation under the TRIPS Agreement – can be reconceptualised beyond a ‘restricted 
body of norms, or situated only in bureaucratic and institutional environments.’5  
 
The third section focuses on the right to health by analysing three inter-related 
incidents, namely the generic drugs policy, the HIV/AIDS programme, and the CL for 
the ARV drug Efavirenz. Tracing these incidents help to cognitively map the local 
politics of the construction of particular policy options. Importantly, it exemplifies the 
tension faced by developing country governments as they seek to balance social 
justice with economic issues. The third section deals with local actors influencing 
law, policies, and institutional agenda. Though some scholars contend that the 
confluence of various actors ‘renders the Brazilian state weak on a fundamental level 
as it is captive to a wide array of distributional coalitions,’6 it is posited in this chapter 
that such confluence has played an important role in shaping public policy responses 
to the AIDS epidemic and in articulating a counter-hegemonic patent discourse. As a 
result, these actors have concomitantly influenced the government in adopting 
alternative policy norms and IP rules that are advocacy-orientated and pro-human 
rights in their articulation. The fourth section assesses how local actors participate in 
patent law making while the fifth section looks at Brazil’s norm and agenda-setting at 
the international level by linking IP discourse with a development-related approach. 
In doing so, the country linked public interests, socio-economic needs, and changing 
realities at the local level to the international IP framework, concomitantly providing 
an alternative to existing IP framework and unwittingly furthering a twailian agenda 
in the reform of the global IP regime. The sixth section summarises the Brazilian 
context. 	
By and large, this chapter explores how Brazil developed a health-oriented patent 
examination system. Specifically, by predicating the engagement of the 
pharmaceutical patent regime to a right to health frame, the Brazilian state 
implemented a specific normative approach in which patent rights are balanced with 
socio-economic and technological development and the public interest. The 
participation of civil society enhanced the synergy between the drug sector and the 
patent system. This contributed to the development of a wider policy framework 
reflective of local social and economic conditions and priorities. As such, it provides 
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an example of how Nigeria can recalibrate its own patent policy in a manner 
compliant with the TRIPS Agreement while being responsive to its own socio-
economic realities. 
 
 
3.1 Historical Evolution of the Patent Regime in Brazil 
Colonial Encounters 
Brazil has always had an extensive engagement with the patent regime. The 
Portuguese Crown first introduced patent law in the country in 1809 through a royal 
decree by King Joao VI, thereby making Brazil the fourth country in the world to 
have a patent regime. It was also a founding member of the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property in 1883, which established the three pillars of the 
current patent system, i.e. independence of patents and trademarks, equal treatment of 
nationals and foreigners, and priority rights.7 The imperial Constitution of 1824 
provided inventors exclusive rights of ownership over their discoveries or products 
and guaranteed a temporary exclusive privilege or compensation for any loss from 
popularization.8 That is, it allowed for compensation of the inventor in case of 
proliferation without the inventor’s permission.  
 
Other laws such as the Law of 28 August 1830 provided for patents only for Brazilian 
nationals and allowed for the exhaustion of patents that have not yet been locally 
exploited after a period of two years.9 The aim of these colonial IP laws was not to 
encourage innovation, as there was not only little to no local industrial activity 
ongoing at that time but also little scientific progress in the fields of chemistry and 
physics.10 Rather, these laws were based on the experiences of early 19th century 
Europe, which was dominated by the principle of territoriality or the belief that 
protection does not extend beyond the territory of the sovereign that granted the rights 
                                                                  
7 Maria Auxiliadora Oliveira, Gabriela Costa Chaves, and Ruth Epsztejn, ‘Brazilian Intellectual Property 
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in the first place.11 This principle is largely grounded on protecting colonial interests 
and territorial sovereignty.12 Thus, the patent law at that time was not enacted to 
enhance indigenous innovation, as it was of little industrial importance. Rather, it was 
enacted to protect the interest of the Portuguese monarchy in exploiting Brazilian 
natural resources and to prevent any activity in the colony that might hinder or 
jeopardise such exploitation.13  
 
Post-Colonial Interventions 
In the beginning of the 20th century, Brazil enacted various industrial property 
statutes, notably Decree 16.264/23 of 1923 Law, which created the Industrial Property 
Office and regulated both patents and trademarks.14 However, socio-economic 
structural anomalies and the deepening economic crisis at the time shifted public 
sentiments regarding the utility of an IP system, and created local resistance over the 
international patent system. This ‘wind of change’ against the support for an IP 
system that secured the protection of patent holders’ rights can be attributed to the 
Brazilian dissatisfaction with the Paris Union as well as to the development ideas 
circulating among the government and policymakers at that time, such as the import 
substitution industrialisation (ISI) policy15  – an economic and trade policy that 
advocates the local manufacturing of goods to spur domestic industrialisation and 
reduce dependency on foreign imports.  
 
The Brazilian dissatisfaction with the Paris Union stemmed from the high incidence 
of patent monopoly abuse, especially by multinational pharmaceutical companies 
operating in Brazil.16 According to Menescal, foreigners dominated Brazilian 
applications without locally working any of the patent particles. This is not surprising 
                                                                  
11 This principle was embedded in the Paris Convention. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property, as amended (1979) 828 UNTS 305, art 4bis.  
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as this was the practice adopted by many pharmaceutical foreign firms in the Global 
South to dominate the market and control local competition. To resolve the issue of 
patent abuse, the country set up a special ‘inquiry commission’ (Comissao 
Parlamentar de Inquerito) in 1961 to analyse the domestic abuses of patent 
monopolies by foreign pharmaceutical corporations. The Commission found incidents 
of abuse in the form of ‘restrictive practices in licensing agreements and the payment 
of high royalties including royalties for expired patents, which led to the high cost of 
medicines in Brazil.’17 The culmination of the Brazilian frustration with the existing 
international patent system pushed the country to denounce at the UNGA in October 
1961 the ‘imbalance between the national and the foreign sector of his country’s 
economy due to patents and royalties.’18 As a result, Brazil and Bolivia submitted a 
draft resolution on the need for a ‘Development Agenda’ for the international patent 
system. The resolution stated, inter alia, the importance of cooperation in the field of 
applied science and technology for promoting the exchange of knowledge,19 the 
application of international patent rules in ways that are cognizant of the legitimate 
claims of patentees and the economic development needs and requirements of 
underdeveloped countries,20 the effects of patents on the economies of 
underdeveloped countries, and the characteristics of the patent legislation of 
underdeveloped countries in light of economic development objectives.21 By 
presenting the issue of patent abuses at an international forum such as the UN, Brazil 
and other countries from the South were not only seeking to revise domestic law but 
were also seeking to forcibly change multilateral trade rules. 
 
While the local discontent with the international patent system was gaining 
momentum, the ISI policy was also circulating among government circles in Brazil 
and in most parts of the developing world. The ISI is an economic policy adopted by 
economically less developed countries to stimulate local industrialisation by 
establishing domestic production facilities to manufacture goods which were formerly 
imported.22 ISI stems from the dependency theory, which viewed global economic 
structures as antithetical to Brazilian (and most areas of the less developed world) 
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economic advancement aspirations. The weakness of the Brazilian export markets, 
coupled with the global depression of the 1930s and the disruption of world trade 
during the war, gave impetus to the wave of local populist movements that demanded 
a policy of reducing dependency on the world market. Baer, for example, notes that 
the interruption of shipping and the decline of non-military production in Europe and 
the US during the First World War created severe shortages of imported 
manufactured goods in Latin America and raised the relative prices of goods such as 
textile, medicines, food products, and other light consumables.23 Continued 
importation of finished goods and exportation of raw material through the 1940s, 
which became especially precarious during the Second World War, led to the local 
realisation that the economic structure would not be conducive to long-term 
development of the Brazilian economy.24 Thus, it was after the Second World War in 
1945 that ISI became a deliberate economic policy of the Brazilian government.  
 
In fact, the situation of dependency was more pronounced in the pharmaceutical 
sector due to the penetration of foreign capital, unsuccessful policy interventions, as 
well as the absence of a strong local chemical industry.25 Flynn, for example, recounts 
the growth and development of Brazilian pharmaceutical research laboratories, which 
were established in the 1920s and 1930s and resembled their European and US 
counterparts.26 However, these local firms started to decline ‘as the government began 
providing incentives to attract foreign investors.’27 To rectify this, the government 
introduced from 1945 to the 1980s a series of ISI policies to boost not only the sector 
but local industrialisation as a whole. These policies included cheap loans from the 
government, high import tariffs to discourage importation, and construction by the 
government of infrastructure especially designed to complement industries, including 
the development of an upstream petrochemical industry, on which the production of 
medicines is dependent.28 The government believed that implementing these policies 
would not only shield the pharmaceutical sector from international competition, but 
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would also increase industrialisation by forcing international firms to locally 
manufacture as importation is forbidden. This would lead to transfer of technology to 
the Brazilian economy in the long run.  The government also believed that it would 
lead to local production, including production of intermediates and active principles, 
which would make the country self-sufficient.  
 
The impact of these policies was mixed and, it has been argued, insufficient. On one 
hand, it resulted in the development of the Brazilian pharmaceutical industry by 
enhancing industrial and technological capabilities, particularly the production of 
intermediates and active principles as well as the development of an upstream 
petrochemical industry.29 However, the period also saw the increased involvement of 
foreign capital in the sector. For example, foreign investment in the pharmaceutical 
sector rose from USD113 million in 1971 to USD646 million in 1979 despite the ban 
on importation.30 In analysing this phenomenon, Elize Massard da Fonseca suggests 
that the monetary policies adopted during that time opened up the pharmaceutical 
sector to foreign capital. This policy, she contends, provided favourable exchange 
rates for firms importing capital goods to establish new factories in Brazil.31 For the 
purpose of this study, it is important to note at this point that ISI should be seen as 
part of a wider transformation in development theory – another expression of 
Southern thinking that included the intermingling of concepts such as unequal 
exchange, centre-periphery, development of underdevelopment, delinking, and 
others.32 This change in discourse and politics reflects – at the time – emergent 
concerns of a post-colonial predicament of many developing countries, both in terms 
of industrialisation and global trade policy.  	
Thus, it was the combination of global IP discontent and circulating ISI ideas that 
provided the impetus for Brazil to first enact Law Number 7.903/1945 in 1945, which 
included the novelty concept and removed product patent protection for medicines, 
food, and chemicals.33 In addition, the country enacted Law Number 1.005/1971 in 
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1969 and Law Number 5.772/71 in 1971, both dealing with patents.34 The former, 
which enacted the new Industrial Property Code, removed food, chemical, and 
pharmaceutical substances, materials, products, and medicines from the list of 
patentable materials, while the latter prohibited the patenting of processes for food, 
chemicals, and medicines.35 	
According to Orsi et al., these laws allowed local pharmaceutical companies to 
engage in large-scale reverse engineering of drugs without any legal restriction or 
repercussions, thus allowing a number of firms and laboratories to acquire synthetic 
capability formulae.36 The ideas underpinning these laws – similar to those 
underpinning the Indian Patent Act of 1970 (as will be seen in the next chapter) – 
would spur the development of the industrial sector, as the government believed that 
the elimination of patent protection would create stronger domestic industries.37 
Reducing the incidence of high poverty and the high cost of medicines were some of 
the compelling reasons for implementing patent policies suitable for the country’s 
needs at that time. Within a decade after the removal of patent products and 
processes, the 10 largest national pharmaceutical companies increased their market 
share by 10 per cent.38 However, it is also arguable that the lack of patent protection 
discouraged foreign companies from further increasing their presence in the market. 
 
Further, the military regime created the Central Medicines Agency (Central de 
Medicamentos or CEME) under the Office of the President in 1971 to regulate the 
production and distribution of drugs by pharmaceutical laboratories subsumed or 
linked to various government ministries.39 The CEME was tasked with the 
responsibility of developing policies for the sector and of leading the public 
procurement of medicines from public and private laboratories in order to develop the 
country’s pharmaceutical and technology base. To complement the CEME mandate, 
the government also enacted policies to attract investments so as to build up the fine 
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chemical industry that produces specialised chemicals for active pharmaceutical 
ingredients (APIs) and their intermediates, as well as for fertilizers in order to reduce 
dependency on imported APIs for pharmaceutical and chemical production.  	
This historical reflection of Brazil’s engagement with the patent regime at the local 
and international level – leading the Global South in seeking to transform global IP 
rules – illustrates the country’s comprehension of the patent system as a policy tool 
for the development of the state. This should also be viewed within the larger context 
of the development aspirations percolating at that time. While the reform in patent 
law did have a direct link to the pharmaceutical sector, the legislative change is 
indicative of a more general transformation of the development aspirations of post-
colonial societies that lent to looking at things differently, some of which pertained to 
particular policy interventions for certain industrial sectors such as pharmaceuticals.  
 
It is this view – of balancing private rights and pursing development goals – that 
underpinned Brazil’s participation at the Uruguay Round, which was launched at that 
time. This explains why the country opposed the inclusion of IP in the global trade 
mechanism (with India, as discussed in the next chapter) in the Group of Ten. 
According to Piragibe dos Santos Tarragô, Brazil’s chief TRIPS negotiator during the 
Uruguay Round from 1987 to 1993, the country considered the protection afforded by 
the Paris Convention sufficient and thus did not see the reason for a new agreement 
on IP.40  
 
Crucially, Brazil (along with a number of developing countries including India and 
Nigeria) insisted on the inadequacy of the GATT to host negotiations on IPRs and 
maintained that the treaties on IP were fundamentally about the protection of rights, 
whereas the GATT essentially concerned trade in goods.41 On patent, dos Santos 
Tarragô notes that Brazil was not only concerned about patent protection in the area 
of pharmaceuticals and biotechnology, but was also concerned about the ability ‘to 
grant compulsory licences to acquire manufacturing capacity whenever the patent 
owner made use of its monopolistic rights to serve the market only by importation.’42 
This is because, for the country, the ability to develop structures and institutions in 
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order to promote and foster technological and scientific development was of utmost 
importance.  
 
Thus, during the negotiations, the Brazilian delegation endeavoured to keep for the 
government the maximum flexibility to apply CLs, should it be needed, to meet its 
requirements of public health, combat abusive practices, and encourage local 
manufacturing. However, various factors (discussed in the next section) – which 
included change in the domestic government – changed the Brazilian staunch 
opposition against the inclusion of IP. Brazil became more amenable to accepting 
patents for pharmaceuticals and adopted a tactical approach at the Uruguay Round.43 
Though the country did not succeed in opposing the inclusion of IP into the 
jurisdiction of the WTO, it succeeded in including considerable flexibilities to 
safeguard its national interest and give governments some latitude of policy space in 
implementing development policies and in defending the public interest. As will be 
seen in coming sections, it appears that this idea – of balancing patent right with 
development goals – still circulates among its policy circles. 		
Global Experience 
With its accession to the WTO in 1995 and the attendant implementation of the 
TRIPS Agreement, Brazil began – as part of its obligation to the TRIPS Agreement 
and the Single Undertaking – to recognise IP protection for all pharmaceutical 
products and processes. This period also coincided with the neoliberal efforts of the 
government at that time, which aimed to open up the Brazilian economy, stem 
hyperinflation, and jumpstart the country’s sluggish economic growth. Thus Law 
9.279/96 (Industrial Property Law of Brazil or IPLB), which came into effect in 1996, 
not only changed key aspects of previous industrial property law but implemented 
higher standards than those required by the TRIPS Agreement. However, even though 
the IPLB is protected by the Brazilian Constitution, it is secondary to Brazil’s social 
interests and technological and economic development. Specifically, Article 5, XXIX 
of the Constitution reads, ‘the law shall ensure the authors of industrial inventions of a 
temporary privilege for their use, as well as protection of industrial creations, property 
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of trademarks, names of companies and other distinctive signs, viewing the social 
interest and the technological and economic development of the country.’44  
   
The new industrial property law as it relates to the TRIPS Agreement and the politics 
surrounding its implementation is interesting in many ways as it points to, in the 
words of Chimni, the integral role played by the ruling elites in Third World states 
that ‘seek to establish the global rule of transnational capital on the pretext of 
pursuing “national interests.”’45 Though Brazil had the option of waiting until January 
2005 to phase-in fully into the TRIPS regime, it did not use this transition period. 
Instead, it not only changed its industrial property code eight years earlier but also 
implemented some TRIPS-plus provisions. This raises important questions, chiefly: 
why did Brazil not utilise the full transition period like India and China? Further, why 
did it include TRIPS-plus provisions in its industrial property code? The answers 
hinge on the internal and external dynamics at play during this period.  
 
Internally, various local compulsions were at play. Brazil was going through neo-
liberalization policies under the leadership of Fernando Collor de Mello (1990-1992), 
which aimed at improving the Brazilian economy. Stressing the need for 
‘modernization’, Collor de Mello rapidly liberalised the economy by drastically 
reducing tariffs, privatising public assets, removing price controls on medicines, and 
abandoning industrial policies.46 The implementation of these neoliberal reforms 
officially ended the ISI economic policy. As a result, tariffs on APIs and fine 
chemicals fell from 65 per cent to 20 per cent, while the privatisation of State 
petrochemical firms led to the closure of several upstream plants that had been 
established to produce APIs.47  
 
The neoliberal structural reforms continued with the subsequent presidencies of 
Itamar Franco, who replaced Mello after the latter’s impeachment, and Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso, who won by popular vote in 1995 and was a self-proclaimed 
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advocate of the aforementioned development theory.48 The period under the Cardoso 
government was also the period that the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (Partido 
da Social Democracia Brasileira or PSDB), centrist in its political and economic 
stance, was in power. Under a PSDB government, Brazil continued to move away 
from the dirigiste policies of the developmentalist period, embracing many of the 
neoliberal prescriptions favoured by the Washington Consensus.49 Under the Cardoso 
government, there was a shift in the consciousness of Brazil’s ability to be a global 
player on one hand, and a general idea circulating among policymakers that the 
implementation of the TRIPS Agreement earlier than planned would bring in FDI.50 
That is, a new thinking where Brazil positions as a regional leader, a respected 
spokesman for the developing world, and an increasingly important partner for the US 
and the EU. Thus, policymakers believed that embracing IPR internally would not 
only be a positive step towards Brazil’s economic liberalization but would also 
improve the image of Brazil as a modern economy. This, it was hoped, would attract 
foreign companies that would set up manufacturing plants in Brazil and reduce the 
country’s dependence on technology imports.51  	
Another internal factor that allowed Brazil to phase into the TRIPS Agreement earlier 
was the weakened position of local generics at the time the IPLB was passed. With 
trade liberalization and the removal of the ISI policy that protected local 
manufacturers, many petrochemical raw material firms were privatised while the local 
firms that remained could not compete with their foreign counterparts that flooded the 
market.52 In the view of Reinaldo Guimarães, Vice President of the association 
representing the indigenous pharma-chemical industry (ABIFINA), over 1,500 
production lines of local generic pharma-chemical companies were shut down due to 
the commercial opening of the Brazilian economy.53 This view is reinforced by Orsi et 
al., who observed that the trade liberalization of the 1990s negatively affected the 
Brazilian pharmaceutical sector as the ‘privatisation of petrochemical raw material 
firms reinforced the phasing out of the production of synthetics intermediates in 
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which the sector has competitive edge.’54 The few drug manufacturers that remained 
in the market moved to less competitive areas, subsequently concentrating their 
production on low value-added commodities. In this environment, Brazilian firms 
could not compete in scale and technology with imported drugs distributed locally by 
specialised international traders.  
 
The weakened position of local manufacturers meant that the sector could not mount 
any concerted sensitization campaign against the possible adverse impact of the 
TRIPS Agreement on Brazil’s indigenous generic pharmaceutical sector. 
Commenting on this, Reinaldo Guimarães notes: 	
The growth of neo-liberal ideologies such as Thatcher and Regan 
influenced Brazil in the 1990s. We had in Brazil a huge commercial 
opening without any kind of protection of our pharmaceutical 
companies. It was difficult for our members because many closed down 
and laid off workers. We were too weak to influence the government on 
TRIPS. In India, by contrast, trade liberalisation proceeded at a slower 
pace with policies in place to support local pharmaceutical sector. India 
also used the 10-year transition period, within the 2 years of signed of 
TRIPS, Brazil passed the Patent Law which simply ignored the 
domestic industrial policy and domestic companies. Our current VP 
who incidentally was the VP in 1996 was an important actor in the 
discussion of patent law at that time. His name is Nelson Brasil and was 
an important negotiator for local drug manufacturers in the national 
congress but him, his friends and allies were totally defeated in the final 
forum of the law. The impact of that decision can be seen even till 
present time. Today, India is a player in the international 
pharmaceutical market while Brazil is not.55 
 
This domestic economic configuration explains the muted role of Brazilian drug 
manufacturers in the lead-up to the country’s harmonisation with the TRIPS regime.  
 
In addition, the inaction of various civil society groups, particularly the health and 
AIDS activists, also explains why Brazil phased into the TRIPS regime quickly. 
Brazilian civil society groups were focused on internal politics and the re-
democratisation process especially after the corruption scandal that led to the 
impeachment of President Collor. The crisis was that Collor, a conservative populist, 
implemented an incredibly corrupt government that carried out graft and 
embezzlement. In this crisis situation, it appeared that the young democracy (and the 
                                                                  
54 Cassier and Correa (n 36) 123. 
55 Fieldwork interview with Guimarães (n 47). 
 91 
re-democratisation) process was going to come apart. This led to protests by civil 
society groups that were active in the democratic transition and had fought for the 
democratic process in previous years. In an interview with Richard Parker, the current 
president of the Brazilian Interdisciplinary AIDS Association (Associação Brasileira 
Interdisciplinar De AIDS or ABIA) who was in Brazil at the time, he notes:  	
A lot was going on internally at time. It was also the period in Brazil 
that the internal political process and the threat to re-democratisation 
was so important and so central at that point in time. The crisis that was 
opened up by fact that Collor’s, a populist conservative man was 
elected president, and then implemented this incredibly corrupt 
government left all Brazilians who defended democracy in a crisis 
situation because it appeared that the democracy and re-democratisation 
process was going to come apart. And so everybody, including activists 
in the AIDS world such as Herbert D’Souza who was the founder of 
ABIA and a major figure in the movement were all preoccupied with 
the corruption of Collor government. Specifically, they were focused in 
creating a social movement and civil protest asking for the 
impeachment of Collor. It was Herbert D’Souza who walked up to the 
Congress to deliver the letter asking the Congress to open impeachment 
proceedings against Fernando Collor when civil society groups marched 
in Brasilia. So the point is that our leadership and organisations like 
ABIA was totally focused on what needed to be done to try to save 
democracy and the re-democratisation process in Brazil. In another time 
without that focus, we might have been thinking about things like 
TRIPS Agreement but at that time, that was the furthest thing from our 
mind.56  
 
This view is supported by Amy Nunn, who writes that IP regulations on access to 
AIDS medicines were largely unaddressed by the AIDS movement and treatment 
activists as they had not recognised the importance of the law for access to treatment 
because they were more focused on ‘federal AIDS bureaucracies and moving trials 
through the judiciary rather than working with Congress.’57 This preoccupation of 
both the civil society groups and the pharmaceutical sector explains why the new IP 
legislation – with very little TRIPS flexibilities designed to protect consumers and 
curtail industry abuses – was implemented.58 As will be seen in the next sections, 
Brazilian civil society groups and AIDS activists have tried to rectify this by actively 
engaging with the law. 
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Externally, international politics brought to bear on Brazil. The country was under 
pressure from the US to change its IP laws since the early 1980s. Specifically, the US 
adopted trade restrictive measures towards Brazil, combining multilateral pressure in 
the GATT and Uruguay Round negotiations and bilateral actions.59 In 1988, for 
example, the US initiated the Section 301 of the Trade Act – a unilateral action and 
contradictory to the ethics of the GATT/WTO – after the USTR found the 
pharmaceutical patent law ‘unreasonable’.60 In initiating this trade sanction, the US 
imposed a 100 per cent tariff on imports of Brazilian products such as paper, 
consumer electronics, and agricultural products – about USD40 million worth of 
annual imports from Brazil.61  
 
The use of Section 301 was indeed an extremely timely threat as the Brazilian 
economy was vulnerable and was going through economic upheavals, such that the 
loss of millions of dollars’ worth of export revenues hit home.62 This is especially so 
as many of Brazil’s political elite had interests in the agriculture export industry and 
with the US being one of the main destination markets, they were therefore 
particularly susceptible to US trade threats.63 Consequently, many senators and 
deputies believed that implementing the TRIPS Agreement would not only improve 
trade with the US but would also ease trade sanctions. In fact, Piragibe dos Santos 
Tarragô notes that the threat to Brazil’s agricultural exports was very influential in 
breaking down Brazil’s opposition to IP negotiations.64  
 
Although these sanctions were suspended in 1990 after a visit from US President 
George Bush, the message was clear that the US would not tolerate any form of 
opposition to its foreign trade policy objectives. Importantly, the use of trade threats 
against Brazil explains the latter’s capitulation at the Uruguay Round after leading the 
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Southern resistance (with India, see next chapter) against the inclusion of IP rules in 
the global trade regime.  
 
It was these externalities that prepared the ground for the full implementation of the 
TRIPS Agreement when it was finally introduced to the Brazilian Congress the 
following year.65 Mapping the politics surrounding the implantation of the TRIPS 
Agreement has indeed shown how the interests of a transnational ruling elite have 
come to influence the shaping of global policies and law on one hand, and the obvious 
dialectic between struggles in Third World countries and the external forum on the 
other hand.66  	
 
3.2 Unpacking the Industrial Property Law of Brazil  
As mentioned earlier, the IPLB allows for patents on all pharmaceutical processes and 
products, consistent with Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement. Section 1 of Chapter 2 
provides conditions for patentability and patentable objects in Brazil. Though the 
IPLB does not provide an explicit list of patentable matters, the INPI Guidelines for 
the Examination of Patent Filings in the areas of Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals, 
as well as the ANVISA Subject Matter Guideline on what is held patentable in Brazil, 
provide the parameter for patentable objects.67  
 
According to the INPI guidelines, the INPI authorises the following: synthetic 
processes of preparation of chemical compounds,68 biological or enzymes 
processes,69 natural biological processes,70 new uses, and subsequent pharmaceutical 
uses.71 This means that the new law allows the patenting of chemical products (as 
processes were already patentable) and all sorts of food and pharmaceutical 
inventions. Article 8 stipulates that an object is patentable only when it meets ‘the 
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requirements of novelty, inventive activity and industrial application.’72 INPI 
authorises applications that involve first use, i.e. new use of products already known 
outside the medical field as medicine and second use (i.e. claims involving a 
subsequent medical use for a product already known as a medicine). Specifically, 
novelty is determined by comparing the invention to be patented with the existing 
‘state of the art’ that comprises material accessible to the public by means of written 
or oral description, use, or any other means in Brazil or abroad.73 Article 10 lists non-
patentable objects, which include but are not limited to discoveries, scientific theories, 
mathematical methods, abstract concepts, surgical methods, all or parts of living 
beings, and biological material found in nature, to mention a few.74  These non-
patentable items are generally in conformity with European standards and those in 
other developing countries such as India.  
 
The IPLB includes certain flexibilities intended to mitigate the adverse effect of rights 
conferred to patent holders with a view of restoring balance between private rights 
(IP) and social justice (economic and social rights.) These flexibilities include CLs, 
Bolar exceptions, experimental use, parallel imports, and health sector participation in 
examining pharmaceutical patent applications. Specifically, Articles 68 to 74 allow 
for the issuance of a CL if the ‘rights resulting are exercised in an abusive manner or 
if the patent is used in abuse of economic power.’75 The abuse should be determined 
in a court or administrative court decision. The provisions further provide instances 
for the grant of a CL, which include failure to exploit the patented product within 
Brazil (local working requirement),76 failure to satisfy the needs of the local market,77 
dependent patents,78 and in situations of national emergency or public interest.79 
Compulsory licencing is also possible in case of dependent patents, that is, when a 
new invention that amounted to a substantial technical progress as compared to a prior 
one cannot be worked by reason of the prior patent’s scope of claims.80 In cases of 
national emergency or public interest, the President of Brazil may grant a CL via an 
Executive Order. Paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article 68 specify conditions for parallel 
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importation, which allows for the importation of patented products by third parties 
provided it has been introduced in the market directly by the patent holder or with his 
consent.81  
 
The IPLB also allows for the participation of the health sector in the examination of 
pharmaceutical patents. To interpret this rule, Law 10196/2001 was added as Article 
299c to Brazil’s IP legislation, which instituted the ‘prior consent’ (Anuência Prévia) 
mechanism.82 The inclusion of the prior consent mechanism altered Brazil’s IP 
regime; whereas INPI was previously solely responsible for patent examination and 
approval, the new law divided this competence between INPI and ANVISA.83 To 
carry out this role, ANVISA – located at the Ministry of Health and responsible for 
the sanitary safety and quality assurance of pharmaceutical drugs – is empowered to 
grant patents for pharmaceutical products and processes on public health security 
grounds.84 Under this arrangement, when an application for a pharmaceutical patent is 
filed, INPI first analyses whether it meets patentability and formal requirements, as 
determined by the IPLB. The application is then forwarded to ANVISA for a separate 
examination that the patent will not negatively affect public health. It is only after this 
rigorous examination that ANVISA grants its ‘prior consent’ for the issuance of a 
patent certificate.85 Each examination is determined on a case-by-case basis, as 
ANVISA does not have a codified guideline on when to grant the prior consent.86 
However, ANVISA examiners refer to INPI regulatory guidelines to test whether the 
patent is new (novelty) and inventive in its applicability even though it is a lot stricter 
than INPI in its examinations. In this light, ANVISA aims to balance private rights 
(patent applications) with the state’s social contract of ensuring security, well-being, 
development, and equality.87  
 
In addition, ANVISA considers the decisions of various patent offices in the US, 
Europe, and developing countries on similar issues. But most importantly, each 
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technical evaluation and final decision is based on how such patent application would 
affect the public health interest.88 So while INPI is responsible for examining the 
legal sufficiency of patent applications, ANVISA is dedicated to protecting and 
promoting ‘public health’ in Brazil, similar to the US Food and Drug Agency.89 Once 
an application is given the ANVISA consent, it is then sent to INPI for approval. On 
occasions when ANVISA does not grant its consent, the patent application is not 
authorised even with input from INPI.90 This effectively means that ANVISA has 
veto power in the grant of pharmaceutical patents.91  
 
Given the importance of medicine access, this particular role of ANVISA is a 
measure to protect patients as it prevents the granting of frivolous patent rights (ever-
greening). It has been suggested that the ‘prior consent’ prerogative of ANVISA 
provides the Ministry of Health with an instrument to influence patent examination, 
making it difficult to get private rights of exclusion over knowledge for 
pharmaceuticals.92 In fact, according to Peter Drahos, the Brazilian model of double 
examination of pharmaceutical patents presents, from a social welfare point of view, 
one way in which developing countries can improve the quality of examination in a 
sector of vital national importance.93 Therefore, by preventing patent abuse through 
the set-up of a rigorous process of examination, ANVISA becomes the ‘gate-keeper’ 
that not only serves to restrain term extension but also halts the grant of patent rights 
to inventions that are neither new nor inventive but are instead revised versions of 
known molecules. Importantly, the prior consent law reflects a novel use of its 
bureaucratic framework to roll back rights to the minimum required under the TRIPS 
Agreement and serves as a means for the Brazilian government to take control of the 
sensitive field of pharmaceuticals.94  
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There have been some controversies regarding ANVISA’s competence to examine 
and approve patent applications, and this contestation of ANVISA’s role is divided 
between health activists and academics on one hand and pharmaceutical companies 
on the other. From the point of view of the former, the participation of ANVISA in 
the examination of pharmaceutical patents is consistent with Article 8 of the TRIPS 
Agreement, which stipulates that states may formulate or amend laws or adopt 
regulations necessary to protect public health.95 In this view, the interests of the 
public, usually ignored in IP decisions, are represented and protected. Further, it has 
also been argued that the role of ANVISA promotes the development of new 
technologies that will allow the national industry to also develop, thus benefiting 
Brazil’s social needs.96  
 
Many pharmaceutical patent-holding companies – usually led by foreign 
pharmaceutical firms – on the other hand, argue that ANVISA’s role should be 
limited to evaluating the quality and safety of medicines. In 2004, for example, INPI 
rejected Roche’s patent application for an ARV Valcyte (valganciclovir 
hydrochloride), citing ANVISA’s prior consent refusal. Roche subsequently sued 
INPI on the ground that ANVISA is not competent to examine the requirement of 
inventive activity, novelty, and industrial application due to lack of legal knowledge. 
In light of this, Roche averred the role of ANVISA is inconsistent with the TRIPS 
Agreement.97 The court ruled that the second substantive examination by ANVISA is 
unconstitutional and violates Brazil’s TRIPS obligation. The court agreed ANVISA 
was not competent to examine the requirements of inventive activity, novelty, and 
industrial application on pharmaceutical patents due to lack of specific legal foresight 
on the matter. 
 
Also, in Aventis Pharma SA v INPI/ANVISA, the French pharmaceutical company 
Aventis sued INPI after it rejected the former’s patent application for its anti-cancer 
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drug Taxotere, due to ANVISA’s denial of the prior consent.98 In this case, the court 
ruled that patent rights are not absolute and should meet a certain set of social 
requirements in order to be granted. The court decided that access to medicines is a 
constitutionally recognised right in Brazil and as a result, sustained the prior consent 
mechanism.99  However, in spite of the presence of ANVISA, a study by Carlos 
Correa found that six per cent of pharmaceutical patents were granted by INPI 
without being analysed by ANVISA.100 This raises concerns on whether all 
pharmaceuticals applications are really going through examination by both bodies.  
 
3.3 The Constitutional Right to Health  
One of the most important and significant structural reforms occurred in the health 
sector in the form of the inclusion of the right to health in the new Brazilian 
Constitution of 1988. The new Brazilian Constitution established health as a human 
right for all Brazilian citizens. Specifically, Article 6 lists various rights, including 
right to health, as social rights,101 while Article 196 explicitly provides for the scope 
of the health rights, stating:  
 
The health is the right of all and the responsibility of the State, to be 
guaranteed by means of social and economic policies aimed at reducing 
the risk of illness and other hazards, and at the universal and equal 
access to actions and services for its promotion, protection and 
recovery.102  
 
The right to health law as articulated in the Constitution has both tangible and 
intangible characteristics. Intangibly, it provides for individual and trans-collective 
rights. Individually, the right to health gives a person the right to demand a given 
provision (in this case, health care) from the state. The Rosa Vieira v Municipality of 
Porto Alegre case103 provides a good example. In this case, Dina Rosa Vieira – HIV-
positive, poor, destitute, and unable to afford the cost of ARV treatment – brought a 
case against the Municipality of Porto Alegre for failing to provide medication for the 
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treatment of AIDS. The first instance court ruled in favour of Vieira on the grounds of 
right to health and life enshrined in the Constitution. The Municipality of Porto 
Alegre appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court upheld the 
decision of the first instance court, specifically noting:  
 
The subjective right to health represents the undeniable judicial 
prerogative guaranteed to the general public by the Constitution of the 
Republic (article 196). This translates as a constitutionally mandated 
right, and … proscribes that, the Public Authority, whomever 
constitutes such position and has the power to implement appropriate 
social and economic policies must provide and guarantee its citizens, 
including those carrying the HIV virus, universal and equal access to 
pharmaceutical assistance and medical-hospital access.104 
 
This means that the right to health is an individual entitlement which the state is 
mandated to satisfy and not a mere declaration. It is not just a formal recognition from 
the Brazilian state or a consumer right as provided for in many Latin American 
Constitutions such as in Argentina. Rather, it is an essential right that should be 
integrally respected and fully guaranteed. Importantly, the case shows that the right to 
health is an inalienable consequence of the right to life, and the state should ensure 
that social and economic policies are implemented to guarantee universal and equal 
access to health services to its citizens.105 This right therefore qualifies as a ‘judicial 
prerogative that involves a citizen’s power to demand that the State implement 
positive obligations imposed on it by the constitutional order.’106  	
Trans-individual right, on the other hand, can be either collective or diffusive in 
nature. It is a collective right, in the sense that members of a particular group with an 
established legal relationship can obtain protection on behalf of the entire group, such 
as when a group of HIV-positive soldiers obtain a legal ruling that prevents 
discrimination based on their HIV status. This collective right thus covers not only 
defendants in this particular case, but all future persons that might be HIV-positive 
from being discriminated against. In this way, there can be ‘no satisfaction or loss in 
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the group’s representation except such as affects all members.’107 On the other hand, 
the right to health is diffusive in nature when a group with undetermined membership 
but whose membership is derived from de facto circumstances share benefits from 
said right.108 For example, it can be argued that the Rosa Vieira case is diffusive in 
nature in the sense that other destitute HIV-positive individuals also benefit from free 
HIV treatment. This ruling therefore provides not just a singular protection but also a 
collective jurisdictional protection for other persons in similar circumstances. 
 
Analysis of right to health cases by Rosina et al. found that even though consequences 
of court decisions apply to all, most judges consider the right to health on a case-by-
case basis and not collectively, and interpret the right to health and the principles of 
the Unified Health System (Sistema Unico de Saude or SUS) as the individual’s 
right to any health-related expense.109 This has led to tensions between universal 
access to health care and limited state resources. Octavio Ferraz contends that the 
right to health litigation is worsening Brazil’s already pronounced health inequities 
and is thus detrimental to health equity. This is because ‘the criterion for privileging 
litigants over the rest of the population is not based on any conception of need or 
justice but purely on their ability to access the judiciary, something that only a 
minority of citizens possess.’110 Many health activists disagree with this view. In an 
interview, Marcela Viera, the coordinator of the GTPI/REBRIP, argues that ensuring 
right to life is justice in itself because allowing people to die when there is a cure for 
an illness is unjust.111 In a similar vein, Renata Reis points out that the idea behind the 
right to health is the bridging of income disparities in Brazilian society by extending 
preventive measures as well as basic services to the poor.112 However, a recent study 
of court decisions has shown signs that judges are rethinking this approach, as the 
financial impact of high drug costs has become increasingly unsustainable. According 
to Rosina et al., there is a shift in judicial thinking, as the ‘court started to deny some 
petitions for access, in light of public budgetary considerations.’113  
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Tangibly, the right to health requires the state to provide free health care – medicines, 
medical technology, and medical treatments – for all who need it. In response to this 
new law mandating free health care for all, the Congress passed the Health Act of 
1990 which created the SUS, to offer free comprehensive health care to the entire 
population, irrespective of employment, status, or access to other forms of health 
insurance.114 Regulated by Law 8080/90 and 8142/90, the SUS aims to provide 
comprehensive, universal, and preventive health services to all Brazilians.  
 
The creation of the SUS is based on three important principles of integrality, 
universality, and equality.115 Universality means that no citizen can be excluded from 
SUS coverage and each citizen is entitled to the satisfaction of one’s health needs 
with the most advanced treatment available, irrespective of costs.116 This principle of 
universality enables equality of access by ensuring that there is no discrimination in 
the provision of public health services and products to Brazilian citizens, whilst 
integrality provides for full health care coverage, from the most basic to the most 
complex health care needs. These three principles define the Brazilian state’s 
promotion of health as a fundamental social right,117 such that at least 80 per cent of 
the population depend solely on the public health care system.118 It provides health 
care free of charge with universal access, based on the principle of equity and 
community participation, to 200 million inhabitants. There is no other country that 
provides free health care to that many users, and even in the few where there is a 
universal health system, the population is fewer. In line with constitutional 
obligations, Ordinance 3.916/98 created the National Policy on Medicines and 
directed the Ministry of Health to issue a list of essential medicines – the Relação 
Nacional de Medicamentos Essenciais (RENAME). Importantly, the ordinance was 
aimed at guaranteeing access to affordable, safe, and quality medicines.  
 
The impact of the codification of the right to health is especially prominent in the 
government’s response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic. The first case of AIDS in Brazil 
was reported in 1982 and over time, São Paulo has become the epicentre of the 
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epidemic due to the concentration of key gay movements. As a result, São Paulo 
emerged as the key constituent that capably handled the AIDS epidemic, having set 
up the official response programme as early as 1984.119 In an interview with Veriano 
Terto Jr. – one of the founders of ABIA – it was stated that the initiative of São Paulo 
in starting non-discriminatory universal access programmes not only convinced the 
Brazilian government that AIDS can be treated and contained, but gave impetus to the 
demand of health activists for the national implementation of a similar programme.120 
As a result, other state governments and even the federal government borrowed 
heavily from the response to the epidemic developed in São Paulo. In fact, the first 
nationwide programme was established in 1986 in the form of the Brazilian National 
STD and AIDS Programme (Programa Nacional de Doenças Sexualmente 
Transmissíveis e AIDS or NAP) two years before the constitutionalization of the right 
to health in 1988. 
  
The NAP initially focused on epidemiological surveillance, medical assistance, 
release of non-discriminating and prevention messages to patients and to the general 
public, as well as limited dispensation of drugs to treat opportunistic infections.121 It 
created awareness of the new infection whilst monitoring its spread among the 
population, but not treatment of the disease itself. This particular response by the 
government – of monitoring and creating awareness instead of treatment and 
prevention – meant that the disease exploded especially in the urban areas and among 
vulnerable groups such as sex workers and injecting drug users. The proliferation of 
HIV/AIDS from a few cases in 1983 to a full blown epidemic in 1993 triggered 
protests from civil society organisations (CSOs) made up of HIV/AIDS patients 
groups, academics, human right groups, health professionals, lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
and transgender (LGBT) groups, and religious organisations. Anchoring their 
agitation on anti-discrimination practices and the constitutional right to life and 
health, these protests pressured the government to adopt progressive AIDS policies 
and provide free ARV to all those in need. These AIDS activists voiced their 
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frustration by petitioning the judiciary, mobilising street campaigns, and using mass 
media.122 According to Terto Jr., these social movements played a critical role in 
producing knowledge and expertise by conceptualising AIDS-related policies such as 
treatment programmes, providing templates on how the state should manage AIDS 
treatments, using rights-based discourse to establish novel conceptions of citizenship 
and social solidarity, and pursing legal action against insurance companies which 
refused to fund azidothymidine (AZT) treatment.123 It was the ability of these diverse 
social groups – with very real differences in class and economic status – to develop a 
countervailing response to the stigma surrounding homosexuality and HIV that made 
the movement powerful and forced the government to take notice. 	
In 1996, the government enacted Law 9313/96 – also known as the Sarney Law, 
named after the Congressman Jose Sarney who introduced the bill. Law 9313/96 
guarantees free access to ARVs for AIDS treatment for all people in Brazil living 
with HIV/AIDS.124 Specifically, Article 1 thereof stipulates: 
 
HIV-infected people and/or people living with AIDS are entitled to 
receive, at no cost, all medicines necessary for their treatment, from the 
Unified Health System and the Executive Branch of the Government 
through the Ministry of Health will standardize which drugs are be used 
for each stage of the disease and will procure the drugs through the 
SUS.125  
 
The law therefore formalised and centralised ARV drug policy at the Ministry of 
Health. It also placed no restriction on the expenditure of the treatment to be borne by 
the government.126 The NAP is self-funded by the Brazilian government as it gets its 
funds from the national, state, and municipal budgets. According to Amy Nunn, by 
deliberately excluding means test and regulatory clauses and including the words ‘free 
of charge’, the Congress via the Sarney Law signed a blank cheque for the AIDS 
treatment.127 The law also helped structure the purchase of ARV medicines for the 
NAP by decentralising the procurement and distribution of HIV and other essential 
medicines. This legislation has been suggested to be the most important health reform 
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implemented for the NAP as it helped scale up generic production of pharmaceutical 
products in Brazil.128  	
The provision of free ARV turned the tide in favour of Brazil in the fight against 
HIV/AIDS.129 For example, the free distribution of ARV led to a 50 per cent decline 
in AIDS mortality from 1996 to 2002.130 There were also substantial reductions of 
around 80 per cent in hospitalisation and treatment associated with opportunistic 
infections within that time frame.131 This, according to estimates, resulted in cost 
savings close to USD1 billion for the Brazilian government.132 Other scholars note 
that the free distribution of ARV changed public perception of the disease as those 
who have not yet been diagnosed decided to get tested on the basis of information 
about the effectiveness of the drugs and their availability free of charge.133 As of 
December 2013, of the 718,000 people with HIV/AIDS in Brazil, 350,000 are on 
ART.134 Thus, it can be argued that this particular policy of universal access led to the 
stabilization of the number of new cases, and the enhancement in quality of life of 
people living with AIDS.135 At the time of writing, the budget of the NAP from the 
federal government is estimated at BRL1.4 billion (USD600 million), which is 
exclusive of the state and municipal contribution to the AIDS programme.136  
 
The approval of Law 9313/96 occurred at an interesting junction in Brazilian politics. 
Parallel to the enactment of the Sarney Law, the Congress approved Law 9.279/96, 
changing the industrial property law and allowing for patents on pharmaceutical 
processes and products. Thus, the government approved a bill that mandated the 
national health system’s provision of free ARV to HIV/AIDS patients on one hand, 
and implemented a new TRIPS-compliant industrial property law on the other. The 
introduction of the new industrial property law raised prices of the same drugs the 
government was now obliged to purchase for thousands of patients. Until 1996, these 
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medicines were in the Brazilian public domain and could be reproduced by 
indigenous pharmaceutical companies without licences. The cumulative impact of 
these two laws profoundly changed the AIDS treatment programme. In addition, it 
brought the issue of availability of drugs to the HIV and medicine access discourse in 
Brazil.137  
Many informants interviewed for this study contend that the ratification of two 
different and conflicting laws is emblematic of trying to implement international law 
in local spaces, thereby leading to insurmountable social fractions.138 This is not 
surprising as attempts at institutional transfer of legal rules from one production 
regime to another often produce a legal irritation in the new context.139 Thus, within 
the context of this study, the combined effect of implementing a law that allows for 
free medicines for all and another law allowing for the legal protection of previously 
unprotected pharmaceutical products and inventions was an increase of government 
expenditure in the AIDS programme. For example, federal spending on AIDS 
increased from USD330 million to USD600 million from 1997 to 2002.140 This 
increase in cost threatened the sustainability of the government’s HIV/AIDS 
programme. The rise in cost, as suggested by some scholars, is due to three factors. 
First, the number of people on ARV treatment increased due to new infections. 
Second, because ARVs do not cure the HIV virus and due to the improved efficacy of 
ARVs, many HIV patients are living longer which means the treatment will be 
administered indefinitely. Third, patients need to change treatment to newer lines of 
ARV as immunities develop. These newer costs are expensive and under patent, 
meaning the patent owner has the sole right to sell and dictate the price of the drugs. 
These combined factors meant that the government was spending more on ARV 
provision and for longer periods – a threat to the sustainability and universality of the 
health programme.  
In response to the rising costs and to mitigate the effect on the AIDS programme, the 
Brazilian government passed Law 9787/99, known as the Law of Generic Medicines, 
in 1999. This law defines a generic medicine to mean a product similar to the 
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reference or innovator drug and is expected to be interchangeable with the latter.141 
With this definition, the law classified the Brazilian pharmaceutical markets into 
‘reference medicines’ (brand or innovator medicines), ‘generics’ and ‘similar 
medicines.’142 It also dealt with various facets of licencing and inspection of 
pharmaceutical products and services as well as technical standards and norms for 
reference, innovative, generic, and similar drugs.143 Significantly, the law required 
that under the government system, all purchasing contracts are to be generic while all 
prescriptions are to be written using the generic name, essentially introducing 
generics into the Brazilian market.144 This means that whereas private medical 
practices can prescribe any suitable drug, regardless of whether it is patented or 
generic, this law mandates all government prescriptions to exclusively refer to generic 
versions of drugs.  
 
The Law of Generic Medicines also made the use of CLs more flexible and simpler, 
while regulatory reforms were introduced to accelerate the market entry of generics 
after the expiration of its on-patent version. In so doing, this law fundamentally 
helped promote competition between medicines and reduced the cost of medicines for 
chronic diseases such as HIV. For instance, ARV treatment expenditure for 
consumers was reduced from a yearly cost of USD4,860 per person in 1997 to 
USD1,000 per person in 2001.145 This is because generics are 40-45 per cent cheaper 
than their on-patent counterpart.146 Thanks to these price reductions, the government 
managed to save approximately USD1.2 billion on AIDS treatment costs.147  
 
In addition, the law helped spur growth in the local pharmaceutical sector. A study by 
Cohen and Lybecker demonstrates that this law benefitted local producers and 
increased the market for generics by 40 per cent.148 Other scholars such as Homedes 
and Ugalde point out that this law facilitated healthy competition among local 
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manufacturers, spurring innovation and consolidation of the local pharmaceutical 
industry.149 Former Brazilian Minister of Health Jose Serra contends that the incentive 
created by the Law of Generic Medicines helped build Brazil’s capacity to internally 
produce eight of the 13 components of first line anti-AIDS drugs, thereby boosting 
local manufacturing capacity.150 Brazil currently has the largest pharmaceutical sector 
and market in Latin America and has one of the top 10 globally. At the time of this 
research, the sector locally produces 80 per cent of medicine units marketed in the 
country, which totals to 74.6 per cent of market value sales.151 Of course, foreign 
firms based in Brazil lobbied heavily against this law, as they feared for loss of 
market access. The Brazilian transnational pharmaceutical companies association 
(ABIFERMA) launched campaigns aimed at consumers and physicians questioning 
the quality and safety of generic medicines.152  
 
However, in spite of the efforts by the government to mitigate the growing cost of 
ARV because of the NAP and its constitutional obligations, the federal expenditure on 
health still remained high. Though the Brazilian state’s ability to locally produce 
majority of its pharmaceutical needs contributed significantly to the improvement of 
access to highly active antiretroviral therapy (HAART) treatments, it was still not 
enough to stem the rising costs of new-line HAART treatments that are more efficient 
but expensive and patent-protected. This inevitably called for expedient political and 
legal action. In response, the federal government threatened to issue CLs to coax 
foreign pharmaceutical companies that have patents in Brazil to reduce the cost of 
ARVs sold. In 2001, the Brazilian government started price negotiations with foreign 
companies to reduce the local cost of certain ARVs. In most cases, these negotiations 
were successful due to the threat of CLs. For instance, according to Cohen and 
Lybecker, Roche reduced the price of nelfinavir in Brazil by 40 per cent after the 
Ministry of Health threatened to issue a CL.153 Merck – another foreign 
pharmaceutical company – offered a 60 per cent discount on its ARV drug Efavirenz, 
which was still under patent in Brazil despite being in the public domain due to the 
pipeline mechanism.154 Abbott was also able to offer considerable discounts after the 
Brazilian government threatened to break its patent.  
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However, it has been argued that the threat of CLs without their actual use has grown 
futile. Chaves et al. assert that the threat of CLs has become ineffective as the prices 
agreed in later rounds of negotiations in 2004 and 2005 were unsatisfactory. They 
posit a need for the Brazilian state to invoke compulsory licencing as it is within its 
sovereign right and its TRIPS obligation to do so. For instance, the government was 
only able to secure one per cent cut for the ARV drugs lopinavir/ritonavir.155 The 
discounts secured for other new-line ARV drugs tenofovir and atazanavir were 5.2 
per cent and 7.7 per cent respectively.156 Yet, even with the reductions, the price of the 
NAP remained high, threatening its sustainability. In fact, a study by Chaves and Reis 
showed that the generic versions of the ARV supplied by Indian manufacturers such 
as Cipla, Ranbaxy, and Aurobindo were much cheaper, with an annual cost of 
USD164 per patient compared to Merck’s version that costs USD580 per patient per 
year.157 Moreover, even though the government was able to secure a 60 per cent 
discount for the price of Merck’s Efavirenz, Merck was still selling the drugs at 
cheaper prices in countries at the same development level as Brazil and with still 
fewer HIV patients.158  
 
In May 2007, Brazil granted a CL for Efavirenz which is patented by Merck under the 
pipeline mechanism.159 It is important to note at this point that the Brazilian 
government attempted for the second time to negotiate with Merck for its ARV 
Efavirenz. Specifically, Carlos Correa notes that prior to the issuance of the CL, 
Merck offered USD1.59 to USD1.10 per dose, which the Brazilian government 
deemed unsatisfactory.160 Merck, however, did not provide a counteroffer to the 
Brazilian government, ignoring the size of the Brazilian market as it was 
predominantly used by 77,000 patients (or 45 per cent) under the HIV programme as 
one of the medications for first line treatment.161 This explains why the government 
issued the CL. In fact, the study by Staffen et al. showed that the government reported 
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a reduction of 72.2 per cent in the cost of supplying this drug.162 Reis, Terto, and 
Pimenta, on the other hand, found that for 2007 alone, the acquisition of a cheaper 
version of Efavirenz from India saved the Brazilian government USD30 million.163 
Nevertheless, one cannot discount the impact of the threat and use of CLs to the 
sustainability of the government policy of free HIV/AIDS treatment. This is 
especially so in the context that these drugs are sold at exorbitant prices in other parts 
of the developing world. Indeed, the Brazilian approach, which consists of local 
production of majority of its pharmaceutical needs as well as its ability to utilise the 
flexibilities embedded in its IPLB, increased its bargaining position with foreign 
multinational pharmaceutical companies. This has contributed significantly in 
improving domestic access to essential life-saving ARV treatments and has so far 
ensured that the government’s ARV programme remains sustainable. 
 
 
3.4  Local Actors, Engagement with Patent Law, and Impact 
of HIV/AIDS in Brazil 
As stated earlier, Brazil is one of the few countries in the world that offers free 
universal ARV drugs to its HIV-positive citizens. The Brazilian response to the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic challenges the perception that it is economically impossible to 
intervene and reverse the tragic HIV trends in low-income countries.164 Additionally, 
it calls attention to the way law and public policy can be integrated towards legal, 
political, and human advancement.165 Importantly, the successful development and 
implementation of Brazil’s HIV/AIDS programme underscores the importance of a 
cordial relationship between the State, private sector, and civil society. Thus, any 
analysis of the ‘Brazilian Model’ should be discussed in light of the roles played by 
these various actors, particularly the activism of CSOs, and within the context of the 
‘social mobilisation of Brazilians confronting the military dictatorship and demanding 
democracy and a return to civilian rule.’166 
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CSOs first rose to prominence in Brazil in the early 1980s – a period characterised by 
slow transition from 20 years of authoritarian military rule to a gradual return to 
democratic rule. This transition to democracy spurred the re-emergence of political 
parties and trade unions as well as the formation of NGOs, which eventually gave rise 
to strong waves of social activism that changed the course of events in Brazil. These 
new non-state actors challenged the old military ways such as corruption, cronyism, 
and dilapidated public systems. They called for better infrastructure,167 a new 
constitution, election, and free congress, among other things.168 One of the prominent 
groups in this national mobilisation for democratic transition was the Sanitary Reform 
Movement (Sanitarista).  
Formed in the early 1980s, the Sanitarista – a coalition of health care professionals, 
academics, and student groups – was part of the resistance to the dictatorship and its 
privatisation of social security health services. In its activist heydays, the Sanitarista 
demanded a health system responsive to not only the needs of the people but also 
controlled by the public.169 Additionally, the group argued for and defended the right 
to health as a fundamental human right to be guaranteed by the Constitution.170 The 
concomitant effect of this demand was the inclusion of right to health in the Brazilian 
Constitution and the creation of the Unified Health System, which spurred the 
development of the Brazilian public health system.171  
At the local level, the Sanitarista was most active in São Paulo, which subsequently 
was also the epicentre of the AIDS epidemic.172 The group led the first response to the 
initial AIDS cases reported in the city in 1983 partly due to its active involvement at 
the São Paulo State Health Department.173 The same year, the first HIV/AIDS 
organisation HIV Prevention Action Group (Grupo de Apoio à Prevenção à AIDS or 
GAPA) was founded in São Paulo. It helped develop a strong human rights-oriented 
perspective in the municipal government’s conception of its health-related 
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responsibilities.174 They also helped develop São Paulo’s first AIDS programme that 
included the free distribution of ART – Zidovudine (AZT) – to patients in the state. 
This jumpstarted public policy dialogue on the epidemic and prompted the federal 
government to expand the programme nationally in the form of the NAP.  
According to Kelly Safreed-Harmon, the limited AIDS response programme in place 
in São Paulo, with the active involvement of the Sanitarista, embodied a sophisticated 
understanding of the relationship between health and human rights.175 This 
relationship had significant bearing on other issues such as stigma and discrimination, 
and on access to medicines. The theoretical basis that motivates the Sanitaristas as 
well as other HIV NGOs can be found in the revision of the Marxist conception of the 
state and a critical reading of the collective health. That is, a belief that the 
contemporary role of the state lies beyond the social contract of guardianship and 
includes the pedagogical function of construction, consolidation, and reproduction of 
the cultural direction of the hegemonic class.176 Sonia Fleury notes that the 
Sanitarista’s agitation for the collective health was framed by a critical interpretation 
of commercialised medicines, the crisis of its inefficiency, and a hope of organising a 
health system which is capable of responding to prevailing demands and is 
democratically organised and managed based on rational planning.177 The result of 
this theoretical-political construction was the creation of the SUS as well as the 
National Health Assembly. The latter encouraged and spurred the direct participation 
of citizens and patients in the management, control, and monitoring of health actions 
and service delivery.  
Acting on the Sanitarista’s preference for more local governance, the federal 
government embarked on a series of decentralising programmes, first, by the transfer 
of resources to the state and municipal government.178 Thus, though the Ministry of 
Health, on behalf of the federal government, is the lead public organisation for health 
services delivery, the state and municipal governments as well as citizen councils play 
crucial roles in the sub-national and grassroots delivery of health programmes.179 The 
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concomitant effect of this is that it allowed state and municipal governments to tailor 
health programmes to the particular needs of the local population. Further, it gave 
state and municipal governments the power on specific tax and expenditure functions, 
and the flexibility to ‘opt-out’ of managing health services and let the federal 
government take the responsibility of providing them. This is usually applied to 
poorer municipalities and/or states, especially in the supply of basic medicines.180 This 
flexibility allowed the state and municipal governments to take on roles they are 
capable of seeing through, thereby increasing efficiency and ensuring that tangible 
goals are met. 
The renaissance of the civil society movement in the democratisation process spurred 
the formation of numerous health-related NGOs throughout the country focusing on 
the issues of AIDS, access, and anti-discrimination on all fronts. Health professionals 
and activists such as Dr. Alan Berkman and Richard Parker contend: 
 
The explosion of health-related civil society groups sprang out of social 
solidarity built up out of common suffering and struggle for democracy 
and citizenship became a countervailing force to the stigma surrounding 
the emergence of HIV.181 
 
Indeed, this vibrant rebirth of civil society groups – especially in the late 1980s to 
early 1990s when the reported cases of HIV/AIDS were at an all-time high – saw a 
rapid growth in the formation of CSOs to included LGBT groups, human rights 
organisations, policy activists, medical professionals, and academics. Encouraged by 
the prior successful activities of the Sanitarista, the newly formed civil society groups 
made right to health a central demand by co-opting ‘galvanized actions aimed at 
securing civil and human rights mandated by the new progressive constitution of 
1988.’182 They pressured the national government to create a national AIDS 
programme and demanded that the government and fellow citizens respect the rights 
of people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA). Within this context, these civil 
movements framed the public discourse regarding health services, access to medical 
care, medicines, and medical innovation from a re-democratisation agitation to a legal 
process backed by the Constitution.  
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It is important to note that this period was also characterised by protest against the 
Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) of the IMF and the World Bank, which 
prioritised currency devaluation and reduced governmental expenditure on social 
services, such as a reduction in public health financing and privatisation of health 
services.  Thus, though relatively independent of each other, these two issues – the 
effect of SAP on public services including health care and the emergence of 
HIV/AIDS with fatal consequences – came together to produce a new discourse in the 
field of social policy. This new field of social policy, according to Joanildo Burity, 
was fleshed out against the backdrop of programmes of state reforms that ‘ranged 
from redefining the State’s role in the economy to reconsidering how it should 
function in relation to society in the field of public policy and advocating the adoption 
of new management models.’183 This new social policy, therefore, reconsiders the role 
and duties of the state from other functions that, though still public in nature, do not 
explicitly require the direct engagement of the state such as the formulation of social 
programmes. It was within the formulation of social programmes that the civil society 
groups established a collective agenda to tackle the problem produced by the AIDS 
epidemic. To do this, these civil society movements focused on issues of health rights 
and access to medicine, which blossomed to take on new life within the Brazilian 
public sphere.  
 
Methods Employed by Civil Society 
As mentioned earlier, civil society groups played a key role in producing knowledge, 
expertise, and awareness regarding HIV. To effect the required change and response, 
these groups adopted several tactics such as policy advocacy, HIV/AIDS de-
stigmatization campaigns, and legal suits against government policies that negate the 
health care responsibilities of the government.  
 
Legal Suits  
Couching their activism on the principle of freedom from discrimination as provided 
for under the Brazilian Constitution, these civil society groups brought class action 
suits against the state and municipal governments. In these struggles, the judiciary 
became an insurgent actor ruling against the state (both federal and municipal) and 
proved to be a supportive important ally by ruling favourably for citizens and social 
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activists. The courts argued that in most instances, the Brazilian Constitution creates a 
legal obligation on the part of the government to take steps to actualise the rights 
therein. For instance, activist groups filed lawsuits seeking to defend the rights of 
PLWHA from discrimination in housing, education, the workplace, and elsewhere.   
 
When AIDS was newly emerged in Brazil, it was associated with heavy stigma and 
discrimination. Several people living with HIV were turned away from care services, 
lost their jobs, and were abandoned by their families. Observing how HIV-positive 
status is historically represented as a deviation in sexual and social behaviours, and 
HIV-positive individuals perceived as the ‘other’, these AIDS advocacy groups – in 
petitioning the courts – argued that these ‘descriptions restrict the adoption of public 
health policies in relation to HIV as well as establishing punitive measures for HIV-
positive individuals.’184 According to Roger Raupp Rios, these lawsuits – in addition 
to improving the lot of the PLWHA – also helped in strengthening a less 
discriminatory understanding of the legal person concept185 and a better definition of 
collective right. Therefore, these lawsuits aimed at simultaneously improving tangible 
rights (such as health care) and intangible rights (such as social inclusion and 
representation). In a similar vein, Miriam Ventura (lawyer, founder, and executive 
director of Advocaci-Citizen for Human Rights) believes that the lawsuits against all 
forms of unjustifiable and unconstitutional attitudes against HIV-positive individuals 
was decisive because ‘it led to the social inclusion of PLWHA, the introduction of the 
language of human rights in [Brazilian] daily practices, and to stimulate the fight for 
social efficacy of legal standards for all.’186 As a result, these lawsuits not only 
influenced how the AIDS epidemic is understood and addressed but also influenced 
AIDS-related policies and the broader conceptualization of public health.  
  
Similarly, AIDS activist organisations used lawsuits to challenge insurance policies 
that did not cover HIV patients as well discriminatory policies that required people to 
undergo HIV tests in order to qualify for jobs and be admitted to public exams.187 For 
instance, in 2000, CSOs in São Paulo filed a suit requesting that genotype laboratory 
tests be performed by a public health network. Previously, the Ministry of Health 
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limited genotype testing to patients with primary therapeutic failure and are already 
on ARV treatment, whereas AIDS CSOs petitioned for this examination to be made 
available to all patients with repeated therapeutic failure and regardless if they are on 
ARV treatment.188 In this case, the court ruled in favour of the petitioners and 
determined that the three levels of SUS ‘should implement genotype test of the HIV 
virus with the scope of the SUS, for all bearers of virus.’189 AIDS advocacy groups 
were successful in this because they focused ‘on specific programmatic issues that 
have operationalized the constitutional right to health.’190 One can therefore argue that 
though the awareness of human rights is already in the public discourse in Brazil, the 
lawsuits and legal activism of AIDS NGOs fine-tuned it to represent changing times. 
For this reason, the legal conflicts helped overcome the exclusionist mentalities and 
broke down legal categories and the mechanism of inequality which has spread 
throughout law and society.  
 
In the same vein, civil society groups played a key role in knowledge and expertise 
production regarding the adverse effect of patents on medicine access. In this role, the 
activism of the GTPI/REBRIP was most prominent. Created in 2001, REBRIP is a 
network of NGOs, patient groups, unions, and professional groups engaged in ‘the 
process of regional integration and trade, and committed to the construction of a 
democratic society grounded in economic, social, cultural, ethical and sustainable 
development.’191 GTPI specifically deals with IP-related issues and its repercussions 
on Brazilian society. In 2005, the Brazilian government declared ARV drugs 
lopinavir and ritonavir (marketed under the brand name Kaletra) as public interest, 
which would have enabled the government to issue a CL, allowed for the local 
manufacture of the drug at a lower price, and enabled the transfer of technology to 
local firms. Instead, the government signed a contract with the pharmaceutical 
company Abbott – the makers of Kaletra. Though the contract lowered the price of 
the drug, it contained clauses that were in conflict with public interest. Specifically, 
the government guaranteed to Abbott that it will not issue a CL for Kaletra, agreed 
that Abbott will not have any responsibility for technology transfer or FDI to 
manufacture the drug locally, and accepted a fixed price of USD1,380 per patient per 
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year until 2011 when the patent expires, regardless of the increase in demand or 
variations in international prices.192 In reaction, GTPI filed a public civil action suit 
against the Brazilian government and Abbott – the first of its kind – demanding that a 
CL be issued.193 The suit received negative preliminary hearing on the grounds that 
not only would a CL possibly trigger trade retaliation, which would lead to drug 
stock-outs, but also that Brazilian pharmaceutical companies do not have the 
technological capacity to locally produce the drug.194 The GTPI appealed the 
preliminary decision and the appeal is still pending.  
 
In addition, the GTPI/REBRIP and the MSF conducted an independent study on the 
feasibility of local Brazilian laboratories to locally manufacture the 
lopinavir/ritonavir combination. The study found that four Brazilian pharmaceutical 
firms (two public and two private) could produce antiretroviral medicines at an even 
cheaper price offered by Abbott, i.e. USD0.41.195 The report was simultaneously 
corroborated by another independent report conducted by the Clinton Foundation and 
the UNDP in the same year. 
 
Policy Advocacy and Patent Opposition 
Many HIV/AIDS scholars in Brazil have argued that the mobilisation by civil society 
groups can singlehandedly be credited in shaping and framing Brazil’s HIV/AIDS 
discourse.196 This is because the activism of CSOs framed the discourse as a human 
rights issue rather than a solely medical or social awareness issue. The mobilisation 
for improved actualisation of health rights, such as access to essential medicines, 
medical innovation, and technology, brought to the fore the issue of IP – specifically 
patents – on medicine access. This was the case especially after the 1996 International 
AIDS Conference in Vancouver made public the news that ARV ‘when used in 
combination, could effectively control HIV progression in the human body.’197 This 
completely transformed the context of the response to control HIV and changed the 
notion of AIDS from being a fatal disease to one that could be treatable and 
considered chronic.198 In fact, according to Veriano Terto Jr., the Vancouver 
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Conference positively affected HIV and treatment activism in Brazil. He described 
the AIDS movement and treatment campaign in Brazil post-Vancouver Conference 
thus:   
 
Vancouver [conference] changed our conception of people living with 
AIDS. From it being a death sentence, it became a person would live 
and be treated. This helped to finally break that stigma that linked AIDS 
to death. And then so treatment became something very, very important 
for Brazilian activism to engage in the AIDS. It changed us completely. 
So, because of that, and because we knew about the difficulties, but also 
we had the experiences of the right to life and the right to health, we 
immediately linked the treatment as a human right and the ARV as a 
human right. And so our strategy became to file lawsuits against the 
government, and second, to reinforce our legal claims with the 
Constitution that had been approved in 1988. 
 
It was the intense civil society campaigns after the 1996 AIDS conference that 
prompted the government to approve the Sarney Law, guaranteeing the free 
distribution of HIV/AIDS medicine.199  
 
Civil society activism was notable once more in 1999 when the Ministry of Health 
revealed the need to supplement the budget to ‘correct the lag of resources caused by 
the devaluation of Brazilian Real vis-à-vis the United States Dollars in purchasing 
these medicines.’200 That is, the cost of purchasing the new combination ARV as well 
as the economic effect of devaluating the Brazilian real meant that the government 
was spending more on drug purchasing than was financially practical. This issue 
brought to the fore questions of sustainability of the AIDS programme, specifically 
the free dispensation of ARV. This watershed moment changed the dynamic of the 
health right discourse in Brazil, and it was within this new context that the CSOs in 
Brazil (and elsewhere) adopted a patent-based definition of the HIV crisis. This social 
construction of patent-based interpretation of the HIV crisis contends that the broad 
protection provided by the new global IP regime, particularly patent protection on 
pharmaceutical product and process, has an adverse effect on access to essential 
HIV/AIDS medicines. It also illuminates patent-based methods of deepened 
protection (e.g. ever-greening), among others. The AIDS civil society argued that by 
placing a high price tag on medicine, pharmaceutical companies are making important 
drugs unavailable to the millions of people desperately in need of the drugs. The 
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effect is that these pharmaceutical companies therefore ‘determine[…] those who can 
benefit from new, improved ARVs and those that will die due to lack of the same 
medications, most likely the millions of patients from poorer countries.’201   
 
In response to this, many AIDS advocacy groups forged partnerships amongst 
themselves as well as with international organisations such as Oxfam and MSF to 
publicise the negative impacts of the TRIPS Agreement and bilateral trade treaties on 
medicine. The aim of these alliances is to lend visibility to the social impact of IP 
trade agreements, monitor international forums that discuss IP issues and access to 
medicines, and influence government decision on patent applications while 
developing alternatives that can widen access to medicines. The success of these 
initiatives lies in the fact that the problem of IP was made accessible and 
understandable to everyone.202 For instance, Parasselli and Terto note that it was the 
advocacy operations of AIDS civil groups that brought awareness to ‘the need for 
budget supplement in the Ministry of Health so that drugs and other health materials 
can be purchased and distributed without interruption.’203 By raising awareness of the 
cost of purchasing these drugs thanks to patent monopolies, these activist groups 
brought public knowledge regarding the influence of IP and patents on drug access. In 
this way, IP was no longer seen as an arcane subject for the highly educated selected 
few. Further, this awareness enabled ordinary Brazilians to petition his/her municipal 
and state – and to a larger extent, national government – to implement or consider 
pro-public health polices when processing patent applications and in trade or 
investment agreements.  
 
In another notable instance of civil society mobilisation, ABIA204 and GTPI filed a 
pre-grant opposition in 2006 in an attempt to stop the INPI from granting patents for 
essential medicines. The pre-grant opposition was filed against Gilead’s ARV 
medication Viread (tenoforvir disoproxil fumarate). ABIA and GTPI presented 
technical grounds against the grant of patent by calling into question the 
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‘inventiveness’ of the drug and argued that the synthesis of the key substance 
tenoforvir as described in the patent application is known in the state of art before the 
filing date.205 It is also cited in the US Patent and Trademark Office’s rejection of 
Gilead’s patent application for the drug. In 2008, the INPI rejected Gilead’s 
application. The appeal by Gilead is still pending.  
 
Similarly, civil society groups are involved in writing position papers and in 
presenting research studies to Congress on IP-related issues and their impact on 
public health. Commenting on this, GTPI Coordinator Marcela Viera concludes that 
various forces within Brazil have been trying to narrow the discourse and 
understanding of the right to health and GTPI has been pushing for a broader concept 
of the right to health.206 In this vein, GTPI continues to participate in public hearings 
at the request of Congress, acts as amicus curiae on cases involving IP rights for 
medicines in Brazil, and generally pushes the counter-narrative of broadening the 
right to health and access to medicines discourse within Brazil.207  
 
De-stigmatization Campaigns 
In addition to legal suits and policy advocacy, AIDS NGOs also used de-
stigmatization campaigns to raise awareness on health rights and the dignity of 
seropositive patients. These campaigns included but were not limited to rallies, 
demonstrations, and distribution of condoms, as well as vigils in some cities to 
remember those lost to the disease. Significantly, ABIA played an active role in 
addressing governmental omission and disseminating information on the virus, which 
at that time was lacking. These actions translated to ABIA adding a political focus to 
civil society activism whilst playing significant social roles in setting priorities for the 
SUS. As a result, according to Berkman et al., AIDS CSOs were elected into Public 
Health Councils to participate in the discussion and implementation of public health 
programmes.208 The Public Health Councils meet every four years to deliberate on 
issues about national health planning at the local and state levels. The SUS then uses 
input from these deliberations to plan the national health conference. This allows the 
proactive involvement of PLWHA in HIV/AIDS response within the SUS. It is clear 
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that these CSOs are influential in not only shaping policy and generating a common 
discourse on right to health, medicine access, and the HIV epidemic, but have also 
been successful in establishing lines between seemingly distinct realms of ‘science’, 
‘politics’, and ‘law’ by entering in the process policy debates and contesting 
interpretations that are particularly restrictive of policy space. 
 
 
3.5 Brazil in the International Arena 
As stated earlier, Brazil quickly implemented the full trade agreement package 
without using the transition period when it joined the WTO. Since the transition into 
the TRIPS regime, the constitutional obligations of the government has led to the 
implementation of innovative regulatory policies, and the consequent export of these 
policies to international forums such as the WTO and the WIPO, especially given 
Brazil’s growing willingness to challenge WTO-based restrictions. Thus, David 
Trubek et al. observe that as the Brazilian state began to play a more robust role in the 
promotion of economic growth and social protection, successive administrations 
protected domestic policy space by challenging restrictive interpretations of global 
trade rules.209 In this new environment, trade policymaking became more closely 
included in the overall development strategy, and Brazil invested in the legal and 
related skills needed for success in trade disputes.  
 
Brazil was one of the most active countries in the Uruguay Round negotiations, but 
this did not mean much as it subsequently capitulated to pressures from developed 
countries.210 Many scholars have explained the reasons for this, which include but are 
not limited to the following: (a) the acceptance of the GATT trade package was the 
sine qua non for receiving aid from the US and Europe; (b) several countries in the 
Global South lacked the technical expertise and human resources to fully engage in 
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trade negotiations; and (c) many of the countries in the Global South were either 
going through economic turmoil in the late 1980s and 1990s or were undergoing the 
structural adjustment programmes enforced by the IMF and World Bank, which 
required these countries to sign on the global trade regime.211 However, as have been 
shown, Brazil has been able to roll back some of the adverse effects of TRIPS 
internalization through concerted effort in law, politics, and various administrative 
frameworks. In doing so, the country has been able to recapture the discourse by 
balancing public interest and social responsibility with private rights.  
 
At the international level, Brazil faced aggressive responses because of its policies at 
home. The first was the WTO dispute between Brazil and the US, i.e. Brazil — 
Measures Affecting Patent Protection.212 In this case, the US complained that the 
Brazilian industrial property law (Law Number 9.279/96) and the ‘local working’ 
requirement for the grant of patent is discriminatory and therefore violates Articles 
27.1 and 28.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. The US also questioned Article 68(4) of the 
IPLB regarding parallel importation. Analogous to this event was the growing 
collaboration and sympathetic alliance among countries of the Global South regarding 
public health flexibilities due to the growing ravages of HIV/AIDS in these 
countries.213 The US later withdrew the case before the Dispute Settlement Body 
panel after Brazil threatened to file a counter-dispute. However, Brazil agreed to 
inform the US whenever it wished to apply this legal provision against a US 
company. Nevertheless, the symbolism of this case cannot be ignored. On one hand, 
the Brazilian condition for CLs creates a legal ambiguity and pushes, in a sense, what 
is generally understood as the liberal reading of TRIPS flexibilities. Conversely, the 
US action appeared to be an attempt to send a signal to developing countries not to 
adopt measures that are not in line with the US pharmaceutical industry’s strategy and 
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interests.214 Specifically, Shanker observes that the US did not have a strong case 
against Brazil; rather, its action is part of the American strategy to test the provisions 
of the TRIPS Agreement through case law and the dispute settlement mechanism.215  
 
Outside the WTO, Brazil continues to be to an active advocate of a human rights-
based approach to trade, development, and IP rules in other forums such as the 
Mercosur, WHO, and WIPO. Together with Argentina, it launched the WIPO 
Development Agenda (WIPO/DA) in 2004.216 The proposal argued for the 
incorporation of UN Millennium Development Goals to promote a development-
centred approach to the global IP regime. Specifically, the WIPO/DA aimed at 
blocking new advancement in the protection of IPR while integrating substantive 
proposals on how to combine public policy interest with the private sector’s role on 
innovation and protection of rights.217 Indeed, the introduction of this agenda by 
Brazil and Argentina was a reaction to the growing discourse on certain TRIPS-plus 
narratives, especially the Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT). The SPLT raises 
patent protection standards substantially including initiatives that only consider the 
rights of patent holders. Michelle Badin notes that for Brazil, the WIPO/DA was 
influenced by shifting dynamics at home, especially the interventionist actions of the 
Brazilian state in fostering national development, particularly in the health sector, as 
well as institutional changes such as the creation of an IP division within the 
Itamaraty.218 In the case of the latter, the IP unit benefitted from an uncommon 
capacity-building to meet the highly technical approach required by WTO issues. This 
unit is also actively involved in the Inter-Ministerial Group on Intellectual Property 
(GIPI), which consists of 11 ministries such as the Ministries of Health, Science and 
Technology, Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, and others. Additionally, the 
emergent anxiety among Brazilian policy circles of another Uruguay Round with the 
growing acceptance of SPLT and its TRIPS-plus clauses, as well as the ever-
increasing knowledge gap still separating rich and poor countries, are some of the 
Brazilian motives behind the WIPO/DA.  
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The proposal by Brazil and Argentina were supported by other developing countries 
and at the 2007 General Assembly of WIPO, member states adopted 45 
recommendations that constitute the ‘WIPO Development Agenda’. Scholars such as 
Laurence Helfer champion this regime-shifting strategy as an opportunity for states 
dissatisfied with several provisions of particular international agreements to 
recalibrate them in a different forum to satisfy their need.219 Others posit that 
discussing the same issue in various forums weakens a state’s position and could lead 
to concessions, which may be reflected in future WTO negotiations.220 Nonetheless, 
the Brazilian contribution to the operation of new policies and procedures in 
international circles cannot be ignored or downplayed. In defending its domestic 
policies while actively engaging at the international level, Brazil has established a 
norm of constructive engagement with the TRIPS framework and demonstrated that it 
is comfortable with ‘asserting claims that preserve its discretion over the appropriate 
balance between access and protection of knowledge assets.’221  
 
3.6 Summarising the Brazilian Context  
Globally, there is growing recognition of the need for a more balanced IP regime, 
especially as high prices – an attendant result of market monopoly due to patent 
protection – affect the availability of life-saving medicines. However, the 
pharmaceutical industry has been pushing for an ever stronger and more imbalanced 
IP regime in trying to consolidate its gains.  
 
Analysis of the Brazilian context has shown ways to balance IP rights with 
socioeconomic development goals and the public interest. Though the country quickly 
implemented the TRIPS Agreement due to external pressures and as part of its trade 
liberalization policies without using the transition period, internal circumstances such 
as the HIV/AIDS crisis, budgetary constraints, and the government’s constitutional 
obligation to provide health care for all Brazilians has influenced the evolving role of 
patent law in Brazilian society. 
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Furthermore, the confluence of local non-state actors’ cultural disposition towards 
litigation and the technical expertise regarding important patent law issues has helped 
Brazil substantially adopt innovative regulatory policies. Exploring history as well as 
local politics shows that the country is not interested in a patent system that does not 
support health policies. In this sense, health policies underpin and frame Brazil’s 
engagement with patent law. 
 
In fact, at the time of the fieldwork in Brazil, there are bills currently at the Brazilian 
House of Representatives proposing changes to the patent law. If implemented, the 
bills would include the participation of health professionals in the analysis of 
pharmaceutical patents,222 allow third parties to challenge patent application before or 
after grant,223 allow the exploitation of patented products for the purpose of public 
non-commercial use without the consent of patent holder,224 and further increase 
access to medicines.225  
 
By linking its patent regime to the health sector, Brazil has developed a health-
oriented patent examination system. Even though opinion remains divided on the 
ANVISA prior consent system, the fact remains that public health and the right to 
health perspective are taken into account in patent discourse – an area in which 
private rights that are contrary to the majority’s interest usually prevail. In fact, in 
recent years, Brazil has adopted the notion of health within the context of national 
development and industrial policy. Known as health-industrial complex,226 the 
government has sought to improve access to medicines and advanced medical 
technology through partnerships with private companies. It is hoped that public-
private partnership (PPP) agreements would increase transfer of technology and the 
production of higher value-added drugs.  
 
The next chapter will demonstrate how India, in contrast, linked its patent regime to 
the development of its pharmaceutical sector. In this regard, India employed a 
strategy to protect its robust generic pharmaceutical sector and achieve 
pharmaceutical autonomy. As will be seen, the Indian government’s extensive 
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interventions in the drug production sector, in turn, catalysed actions to promote a 
patent regime that protects the pharmaceutical sector. For India, industrial 
development (especially for its ‘sunshine’ sector, i.e. pharmaceuticals) underpins and 
contours its participation in the IP system.  
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4.    India 
Introduction  
India’s economic journey from being an impoverished country to an emerging global 
economy is an inspiring example for many developing nations. After almost two 
centuries of British rule, India gained independence in 1947. In gaining its 
independence, the new government inherited an impoverished economy that was 
largely agrarian, a population with minimal literacy and high poverty rate, as well as 
abysmal infrastructures. As part of the nation-building effort, India adopted a Five-
Year Development Plan in the first few years after its independence, which has 
continued to this day. The Plan took stock of the state of the nation at that time and 
sought to ‘initiate a process of development [to] raise living standards and open out to 
the people new opportunities for a richer and more varied life.’1 Due importance was 
given to the establishment of modern industries, modern scientific and technological 
institutes, and the development of the space and industrial sectors. However, this did 
not result in significant improvement except in the pharmaceutical sector.  
 
This chapter focuses on India – a country characterised as the ‘pharmacy of the 
developing world’2 – due to the important role of Indian generic manufacturers in 
supplying affordable medicines throughout the developing world. According to MSF, 
approximately 50 per cent of drugs distributed by the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) 
and 70 per cent of ARV drugs dispensed by the International Dispensary Association 
(IDA), The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM), and the 
Clinton Foundation since July 2005 are from Indian suppliers.3 Further, due to the 
shrinking markets of developed countries, many Western pharmaceutical companies 
are looking to the developing country markets of China, Brazil, and India, among 
others, to compensate for lacklustre drug sales in the US and Europe. As a result, the 
country has become a key battleground on contentious patent issues relating to the 
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limits of flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement. By focusing on the Indian 
pharmaceutical sector, this chapter critically explores the understanding of patents by 
the Indian state based on how the notion of patent is conceptualised in policy and in 
law. Second, this chapter looks into the policy options and priorities embraced by 
Indian policymakers in the wake of the Patent (Amendment) Act of 2005 (IPAA) and 
how current policy landscape in the post-TRIPS world affects, if at all, the ability of 
the state to accomplish the development goals of a world-class pharmaceutical sector. 
Finally, this chapter unpacks the alliances, patterns, and schisms among key actors to 
understand how they challenge and/or influence the state’s understanding and 
application of patents.  
 
Patent laws do not operate in a social, cultural, political, and policy vacuum, and the 
mere implementation of IPRs under the TRIPS Agreement will not necessarily spur 
local development nor lead to transfer of technology. Rather, patent policies that are 
twinned with a specific goal within the larger context of the national economic 
development plan can be instrumental in achieving the objectives of the TRIPS 
Agreement. In observing these prosaic mechanics of law, institutional interactions, 
and globalisation, the central argument of this chapter is that patent laws work better 
in furthering the developmental agenda when implemented to reflect local realities 
and tied to larger policies, be it industrial, health, or otherwise. As this chapter shows, 
India leveraged on this to achieve its economic and technological goals.  
 
It is this linking of patents with industrial development that enabled local 
pharmaceutical industrialists to play a key role in the patent discourse. Unlike in 
Brazil where civil society groups spearheaded and framed patent regime change and 
discourse, generic pharmaceutical companies took the lead in knowledge and 
expertise production in India’s patent regime. It is this interaction of industrialists and 
the changing narratives or circulation of ideas over time that produces interesting 
legal regimes for patents and medicines that fulfil the needs of the local population. In 
fact, it is said that Mahatma Gandhi asked or encouraged Khwaja Abdul Hamied, 
founder of the Chemical, Industrial and Chemical Laboratories in Mumbai (now 
Cipla) to manufacture essential medicines for India in 1939. It is this drive for 
pharmaceutical autonomy and self-sufficiency that underpinned the initial indigenous 
industrialists’ engagement with the patent regime.  
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To be sure, it is not to say that civil society actors did not play any role in the 
development of India’s patents. They did and continue to do so. But they only came to 
the scene due to a series of separate but interconnected actions such as the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa and other parts of the developing world, the challenge 
of South Africa’s Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act of 1997 
(which was launched in 1998 by 38 pharmaceutical companies and the corollary 
publicity campaign launched by transnational civil society), and the aborted US-
Brazil WTO dispute. All these came to a head at the Doha Development Round. One 
of the takeaways from this chapter, therefore, is the significant role of the 
pharmaceutical sector in patent compliance and governance in India – something that 
was absent in Brazil. Importantly, the Brazil and India case studies underscore three 
key factors that need to be in place in terms of narrative, actors, and politics for a 
successful patent regime to evolve out of the interaction of all those forces – active 
law, strong private sector engagement, and informed and active civil society 
movement. 
 
Finally, as this chapter will show, the battle is not over as the dialectical relationship 
between the state and key actors, and among actors, continues. If anything, the Indian 
experience could be understood as a local reproduction of the international. That is, a 
symptomatic reflection of the ongoing battle over ‘new’ capital knowledge – its 
access and control – between the developed economies of the North and the new 
geopolitical constellation called BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South 
Africa. The battle is also currently symbolised in many forms, from the proliferation 
of bilateral and plurilateral agreements, the creation of the BRICS Development Bank 
as a possible competitor to the World Bank, to the recent wave of hacks of sensitive 
information online.  
 
The remainder of the chapter is divided as follows: the first section maps the 
historical development of patent law in India from its colonial, post-colonial, and 
global phases. The objective of this exercise is to provide a broad context for 
understanding how the development of the Indian generic pharmaceutical sector is 
tied to the ideas circulating at that time – that domestic interests are best served by a 
certain kind of IP law. It is these ideas, buttressed by existing socio-economic factors, 
which shaped the Indian Patent Act of 1970 (IPA). The second section looks at 
India’s interaction with the TRIPS Agreement at the local level, focusing on how 
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ideas circulate, the manner in which particular policy options get constructed, and – as 
an extension – how others get extinguished, with regard to patent law jurisprudence 
among various state and non-state actors in India. Focusing largely on domestic 
compulsions, it examines how India’s national development gets conceptualised and 
counted within the national IP policy establishment. It also highlights the roles played 
by industrial alliances created in previous years and by transnational civil society 
groups which helped in knowledge and expertise production regarding the possible 
impact of the TRIPS Agreement on India’s pharmaceutical sectors and overall 
development framework. The third section provides an analysis and critique of the 
IPAA by looking at key aspects of the law, specifically novelty, inventive step, CL, 
and the opposition system. Attendant to this, key jurisprudential cases, decisions, and 
the role of the courts will also be examined to extrapolate an emerging Indian patent 
jurisprudence that recognises the need to balance patent obligations with the 
constitutional right to life and health (framed in this context as access to medicines). 
In the fourth section, the focus is on how key actors are coping and adapting since 
India phased fully into the TRIPS regime. Specifically, the strategies used by civil 
society groups to further the specific access to medicines agenda as well as those 
adopted by the pharmaceutical industry in patent law making are highlighted. The 
fifth section concludes this chapter.  
 
 
4.1 Historical Evolution of Patent Law in India 
Colonial Encounters  
The first piece of legislation in India relating to patents was Act VI of 1856, which 
granted ‘certain exclusive privileges to inventors of new manufacture for a period of 
14 years.’4 The law was intended to replicate the successes of the British industrial 
revolution in India by giving impetus to local industries. It remains to be an important 
improvement on patent law at that time because it ‘embodied the most progressive 
and innovative idea of inventor being given exclusive privilege through the operation 
of the Act rather than by the Act of the Crown.’5 That is, instead of an inventor 
obtaining exclusive privilege or monopoly for his invention from the Crown, he was 
                                                                  
4 P Narayanan, Patent Law (4th edn, Eastern Law House 2013) 6. 
5  Rajesh Sagar, ‘Introduction of Exclusive Privileges/Patents in Colonial India: Why and for Whose Benefit?’ 
(2007) Intellectual Property Quarterly 324. 
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made entitled to it by operation of law, subject to certain restrictions and upon the 
fulfilment of certain conditions.  
 
Another interesting aspect of Act VI of 1856 is its definition of the term ‘inventor’, 
which included not only the actual and genuine creator of an original product, but also 
a person who brings or imports an invention into India.6 The idea behind this, 
according to legal historian Rajesh Sagar, is to provide an incentive for the 
importation of inventions by ‘[encouraging] capitalists of India and abroad to import 
and commercialise the technologies in India, thereby increasing India's technological 
capacity.’7 The ‘inventor’ could, under this Act, also authorise others to make, sell, or 
use the invention for a term of 14 years from the time of filing of such specification.8 
This ties into the historical reasoning of granting exclusive privilege to encourage the 
introduction of knowledge and inventions within the importing country and for 
increasing diffusion and aggregation of technology.  
 
A major drawback of Act VI of 1856 was the high cost for obtaining exclusive 
privileges in India, which was set at INR100. According to Sagar, the amount then 
was equivalent to almost 16 months’ wages of an average Indian. This, he asserts, 
made the system ‘not conducive to encourage local inventors to take advantage of the 
system due to a very high cost-prohibitive factor.’9 However, it was repealed after one 
year because it was enacted without the sanction of Her Majesty.10 According to V. K. 
Unni as well as Rajesh Sagar, the Legislative Council of India consequently did not 
have the authority to pass Act VI of 1856.11 This is because India, as a subject of the 
British Crown, should have the prior permission of the Crown or Representative 
before any law is passed by the Indian legislature.12 As a result, Act VI of 1856 was 
replaced by Act V of 1859, which was founded on the provisions of the English 
Patent Act of 1852. The new Act of 1859 retained the original scheme for the grant, 
refusal, and enforcement of exclusive privileges, but significantly departed from the 
concepts of ‘inventor’ and ‘novelty’ in Act VI of 1856. Among the significant aspects 
                                                                  
6 ibid 6. 
7 ibid. 
8 Narayanan (n 4). 
9 Sagar (n 5) 9. 
10 ibid 7. 
11 Sagar (n 5) 7; see also VK Unni, Indian Patent Law and TRIPS: Redrawing the Flexibility Framework in the 
Context of Public Policy and Health (2011) 324 
<http://www.mcgeorge.edu/documents/conferences/globejune2012_indianpatentlaw.pdf.> accessed 3 March 2015. 
12 Unni (n 11). 
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of this new Act is its extension of the right of the British patent holder to 12 months in 
India instead of the open six months stipulated by Act VI of 1856.  
 
Section XVII of Act V of 1859 also provided that an importer of an invention within 
India ‘shall not be deemed to be an inventor’ within the meaning of the Act.13  This is 
a significant departure from Act VI of 1856, which included an importer of an 
invention within the meaning of the term ‘inventor’. This provision discouraged the 
diffusion of technology by making the importation of technology less attractive. This 
is because under Act V of 1859, an imported invention is not protected, which made 
the imported product an easy target for free riders. Thus, the only route for an 
importer of an invention to obtain exclusive privilege is through an application for 
and the approval of letters of patent in Britain, and subsequently applying for an 
exclusive privilege in India under Section XX of Act V of 1859 as a British patentee 
claiming priority rights.  
 
Act V of 1859 also considerably expanded the ‘priority rights’ of British patentees, 
much to the detriment of Indian interests, by broadening the ‘assessment of novelty of 
an invention for granting exclusive privilege to include both India and the United 
Kingdom, which Act of 1856 was limited only to India.’14 Even though granting 
exclusive privileges to importers of inventions and having limited novelty assessment 
in Act VI of 1856 were in the best interests of India, Act V of 1859 completely 
reversed the legislative policy based on a ‘model already used at that time by the 
United Kingdom and other countries and was found to be extremely useful in gaining 
technological advantage, while India, being a colony was deprived of this benefit.’15 
In fact, P. Narayanan argues that the purpose of this legislation was ‘to enable the 
English Patent holders to acquire control over Indian markets.’16 This is not surprising 
as Act VI of 1856, Act V of 1859, and subsequent laws enacted by the British during 
the colonial period produced a considerable impediment for the direct transfer or 
importation of technology by creating a time-consuming and costly process to the 
detriment of India. Later amendments and refinements of the patent laws in India did 
not ameliorate the situation. Instead, these laws further burdened the colony and 
benefited the imperial power.  
                                                                  
13 Sagar (n 5) 9. 
14 ibid. 
15 ibid. 
16 Narayanan (n 4). 
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The Patents and Designs Protection Act, which introduced legislation for the 
protection of industrial designs, was enacted in 1872, while the Protection of 
Inventions Act was enacted in 1883. Both laws were consolidated in the Inventions 
and Designs Act in 1888. In 1911, the British government enacted the Indian Patent 
and Designs Act, which created ‘a system of patent administration in India under the 
administration of Controller of Patents.’17 It allowed for a patent term of 16 years, 
which can be extended for an additional seven to 10 years if the working of the patent 
has not been sufficiently remunerative to the patentee.18 
 
The Indian Patent and Designs Act of 1911 continued with the imperial legacy of 
exploitation by establishing a ‘form of intra-British Empire priority system such that 
an applicant for an Indian patent who had within the previous twelve months filed an 
application for the same invention in the United Kingdom was entitled to the benefit 
of the earlier United Kingdom filing date.’19 In addition, it did not categorically state 
what was patentable, and widely worded claims were permitted. As such, new and old 
products and processes were described in a patent. This was specifically used by 
foreign MNCs to prevent indigenous research laboratories and pharmaceutical 
companies from concentrating on developing the manufacturing process. According 
to Sudip Chaudhuri, the MNCs did this by describing all the known, possible, and 
even old processes in patent applications, and because the Indian Patent and Designs 
Act of 1911 did not categorically state what was patentable, indigenous companies 
were forbidden by the patent office to use it.20  
 
This severely affected indigenous pharmaceutical companies that were already locally 
manufacturing modern drugs. In fact, several eminent chemists such as Prafulla 
Chandra Ray, T. K. Gajjar, and A. S. Kottibhasker were already producing drugs as 
early as 1905.21 Consequently, under the Indian Patent and Designs Act of 1911, 
indigenous companies were forbidden from processing a patented drug into 
                                                                  
17 Unni (n 11) 325; Narayanan (n 4) 6. 
18 Sudip Chaudhuri, citing ss 14 and 15 of the Patent and Designs Act of 1911. See Sudip Chaudhuri, The WTO 
and India’s Pharmaceuticals Industry: Patent Protection, TRIPS, and Developing Countries (2006) 129. 
19 Janice Mueller, ‘The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of India’s Patent System and the Rise of 
Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation’ (2007) 68 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 507. 
20 ibid. 
21 Chaudhuri (n 18) 21-22. According to Chaudhuri, the evolution of the indigenous drug companies can be traced 
back to a series of public research laboratories set up by provincial governments. These public sector laboratories 
set up as early as 1899 produced vaccines for local plagues, cholera, typhoid, and rabies. By the early 1940s, these 
laboratories started synthesising new drugs and finding new uses for existing drugs. See Chaudhuri (n 18) 29-36. 
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formulations or from importing it, and MNCs asserted their patent right to proceed 
legally against firms that tried to manufacture or import the patented drug.22 For 
example, an MNC importing a drug for INR2 would sue an indigenous company 
importing a similar drug for INR2.23 The effect of the colonial patent system was a 
stunted industrial sector, especially as regards pharmaceuticals, and led to sky-high 
prices for basic drugs in India. This was confirmed by the Kefauver Committee24 
Report, which found that India was one of the nations with the highest priced drugs in 
the world at that time (cited in the Ayyangar Committee Report, discussed in the next 
section). Critical essential medicines such as penicillin and antibiotics were wholly 
imported.25 Estimates suggest that foreign firms controlled 68 to 70 per cent of the 
Indian market,26 and essential drugs such as insulin and penicillin were not 
manufactured locally.27   
 
In a similar vein, Dhavan et al. assert that though MNCs were present in the 
pharmaceutical sector, they mainly engaged in processing imported bulk drugs into 
formulations.28 This is because the patent system, they argue, provided foreign patent 
holders with too little responsibility and too much power such that ‘multinational[s] 
could make onerous technical collaborative deals.’29 Drug formulation does not 
involve any technical knowledge or skill. In this regard, importation was widely 
practised by many foreign MNCs as a way of controlling competition from generic 
drug makers and preventing the transfer of technological knowledge to India. As a 
result, foreign companies did not establish any production units in India, but engaged 
in assembling bulk drugs into formulation.30 Colonial laws in force at that time helped 
these foreign firms calcify their position within the Indian market even though they 
were not keen on manufacturing.  
 
In fact, Sagar contends that, contrary to the popularly accepted opinion that the TRIPS 
Agreement is the first harmonisation effort for establishing uniform patent systems 
across different nations, it was in fact ‘British imperialistic aspirations that had 
                                                                  
22 Chaudhuri (n 18) 21-22.  
23 ibid 130. 
24 The US Senate Committee headed by Senator Estes Kefauver. 
25 Planning Commission (n 1), ch 32. 
26 Amy Kapczynski, ‘Harmonization and its Discontent’ (2009) 97 California Law Review 1577 (‘Harmonization 
and its Discontent’). 
27 Planning Commission (n 1), ch 32. 
28 Rajeev Dhavan, Lindsay Harris and Gopal Jain, ‘Whose Interest? Independent India’s Patent Law and Policy’ 
(1990) 32 Journal of the Indian Law Institute 473.  
29 ibid. 
30 Chaudhuri (n 18) 28. 
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achieved such harmonization’31 prior to the TRIPS Agreement. In his review of patent 
law modelled after the British system, Sagar observes that by 1935, about one-half 
(63/140) of the world’s total number of patent territories had their patent law either as 
an extension or a close modification of British patent law.32 Similarly, Ragavan 
asserts that the various IP statutes in colonial India lacked ‘a clear policy direction to 
pave way for industrial development through patents’33 for the colony. Instead, it 
prioritised wealth extraction and exploitation of Indian conditions to the benefit of the 
metropolis. In this view, the introduction and transplantation of the alien concept of 
exclusive privileges, which was hardly of any utility to a larger cross-section of the 
Indian populace due to systemic bias in the form of high fees and an exclusionary 
legislative policy, made colonial patent law disadvantageous to colonial India. 
 
The colonial patent regime structure, in limiting competition from indigenous 
manufacturers, also led to the underdevelopment of the pharmaceutical sector. MNCs 
were more interested in process importing instead of undertaking basic drug 
manufacturing. This strategy is not surprising as the same tactics were also employed 
by foreign drug makers in Nigeria, as will be seen in the next chapter. However, the 
Indian government rectified this imbalance by not only changing its patent law, but 
also by developing public sector laboratories to encourage the improvement of 
indigenous technological capacity in partnership with private companies. The 
following section will focus on these post-colonial interventions and their impact on 
the pharmaceutical sector. 
 
Post-Colonial Interventions  
When India gained its independence from Great Britain in 1947, the newly 
independent Indian government wasted no time in crafting an indigenous patent law.  
Cognizant of its dire socio-economic realities, especially the tragedy of the partition 
war, and in the spirit of nationalism and economic development circulating among the 
political and capitalist class,34 the new government set up committees to look into 
ways to make the patent system work for the newly democratic India. In this regard, 
the government set up two key committees: the Patents Enquiry Committee I (1950) 
                                                                  
31 Sagar (n 5) 12. 
32 ibid. See also J Vojacek, A Survey of the Principal National Patent Systems (Prentice-Hall Inc. 1936) 42. 
33 Srividhya Ragavan, Patent and Trade Disparities in Developing Countries (Oxford University Press 2012) 31 
(Patent and Trade Disparities in Developing Countries). 
34 In 1994, a small group of influential business leaders in Bombay drew up and published a plan for the economic 
development of India. The Bombay Plan will be discussed further in coming sections. 
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under the chairmanship of Dr. Bakshi Tek Chand35 and the Patent Enquiry Report II 
headed by Rajagopala Ayyangar (1959).36 The Committees were tasked to review the 
patent law in India with a view to ‘ensure that the patent system is more conducive to 
the national interest and welfare.’37  
 
The Tek Chand Report criticised the failure of India’s patent system to stimulate 
invention and encourage exploitation of new inventions for industrial purposes. 
Consequently, it recommended the use of CLs to prevent abuse of the patent process 
and curb patent abuse and working of inventions (licences of right).38 The 
recommendation of the Tek Chand Report led to the amendment of Sections 22, 23, 
and 23A to 23G of the Indian Patents and Designs Act of 1911 (vide Act 32 of 
1950).39 The Tek Chand Report is primarily viewed as more of a plea for 
improvement rather than a radical overhaul of the colonial patent system. According 
to Dhavan et al., it was concerned more with the ‘management of already existing 
patent regime rather than a reassessment of the then current law and its impact on the 
political economy as a whole.’40 This is not to say that the task of the Tek Chand 
enquiry was futile, but rather it did no more than emulate, even copy, the provisions 
pending in the legislation before the UK parliament at that time. In spite of this 
cosmopolitan imitation, the Tek Chand Report, if anything, did instigate national 
discourse on the importance of developing a national patent regime that prioritises 
national issues and paves the way for national industrialisation.    
 
The Ayyangar Report, on the other hand, suggested a new patent regime for India 
cognizant of the following: the level of industrial development of the country at that 
time, with special reference to its economic conditions, and the level of its scientific 
and technological advancement and its future needs so as to minimise, if not to 
eliminate, the abuses to which a system of patent monopoly is capable of being 
subjected to.41 More aware of economic issues than its predecessor, the Ayyangar 
Report is significant in many respects. First, it forms the backbone of the current 
                                                                  
35 Report of the Patent Enquiry I (1950) (Tek Chand Report). 
36 Shri Justice N Rajagopala Ayyangar, ‘Report on the Revision of the Patent Laws’ (Government of India 1959) 
<http://spicyip.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/ayyangar_committee_report.pdf> accessed 10 March 2015 
(Ayyangar Report). 
37 Narayanan (n 4) 6. 
38 Dhavan, Harris, and Jain (n 28) 511. 
39 ibid 432-42. 
40 ibid 431. 
41 Ayyangar Report (n 36), para 44. 
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Indian patent regime.42 Second, the Ayyangar Report is significant in its inquiry into 
the adaptability of foreign patent laws to meet the needs of the Indian state.43 
Specifically, it examined ‘whether and how IP regime can be used effectively to 
achieve national ambitions, and investigates the history of several foreign patent 
regimes.’44 In fact, the Ayyangar Report observed that 90 per cent of patents were 
owned by MNCs, and that they worked only 10 per cent of these.  
 
Based on the comparative analysis of foreign patent regimes, the Ayyangar Report 
proposed the amendment of sections of the patent law antithetical to the present needs 
and development aspirations of India.45 In order to make patent law work for India, 
the Ayyangar Report suggested a classification of inventions to which patent 
protection should be made available. It did this by precisely defining patentable and 
non-patentable inventions and by removing process patents for food, medicines, and 
chemicals.46 The Ayyangar Report also suggested the inclusion of a local working 
requirement so as to establish in India a ‘new industry or an improvement of an 
existing industry, which would profitably employ the labo[u]r and capital of the 
country and thus increase the national wealth[.]’47 The Ayyangar Report likewise 
proposed for the inclusion of a disclosure clause that allows the inventor to make 
public the invention and the manner of its working so that ‘on the expiry of the life of 
the patent the public are enabled to work the invention themselves and in competition 
with each other[.]’48 Finally, the Ayyangar Report suggested the inclusion of a 
provision preventing India from joining other international patent regimes such as the 
Paris Convention.49  
 
Opinions vary regarding the legacy of the Ayyangar Report. The debate seems to be 
divided between those who herald the report as radically changing the patent 
discourse in India. Narayanan, for example, calls the Ayyangar Report ‘the backbone 
of Indian patent law’50 while Chaudhuri and Kapczynski laud it as a breakthrough in 
                                                                  
42 Srividhya Ragavan, ‘Of the Inequals of Uruguay Rounds’ (2006) 10 Marquette Intellectual Property Law 
Review 301 (‘Of the Inequals of Uruguay Rounds’). 
43 ibid 281. 
44 Ayyangar Report (n 36), para 2. 
45 ibid, para 29; see also Ragavan, Patent and Trade Disparities in Developing Countries (n 33) 34. 
46 Ayyangar Report (n 36), para 45(1). 
47 ibid, para 38. 
48 ibid. 
49 Ayyangar Report (n 36), para 57; see also Unni (n 11) 327. 
50 Narayanan (n 4); see also Unni (n 11) 327 and Ragavan, Patent and Trade Disparities in Developing Countries 
(n 33) 33. 
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indigenous post-colonial law making.51 However, certain scholars think otherwise. 
Dhavan et al. point out that the Ayyangar Report ‘did not seriously consider whether 
the patent system was actually suited for India.’52 Consequently, the report curtailed 
the opportunity for a nationwide discourse on alternatives to the patent system.53 Not 
only that, it inadvertently provided unmitigated assurances to foreign patent holders 
that India’s patent system was not going to be fundamentally changed.54  
 
Nevertheless, the suggestions from both the Tek Chand and Ayyangar Committees 
show the importance of studying the economic situation of a country and tailoring a 
patent system that works for the newly democratic India, thereby spurring domestic 
inventions and industries. In deliberately seeking to understand the economic realities 
of recent independence while planning for the future, India understood that patents are 
not just private rights but also tools that – when used appropriately and at the right 
time – foster development. The Ayyangar Report, in particular, remains noteworthy in 
its analysis of patent regimes and the importance of creating a patent regime 
cognizant of a nation’s socio-economic realities. It highlighted the developmental and 
nationalistic aspirations and ideas circulating among the domestic capitalist class at 
that time. It is this understanding that underpins the discourse on the patent regime in 
India as will be seen 35 years later, and should serve as a lesson for other countries 
which are similarly placed. 
 
Though the Ayyangar Report was submitted in 1959, it would take a decade before 
legislative changes were undertaken. This is not surprising, as it is well known that 
laws are shaped by a multiplicity of influences. In the case of the Ayyangar Report, 
multinational lobbyists, analyses by Joint Committees set up by the government, as 
well as parliamentary debates influenced consequent legislative changes.55 In the end, 
the IPA incorporated most of the recommendations of the Ayyangar Report even 
though some believe that the new law deviated significantly from the ethos of the 
report.56  
 
                                                                  
51 Chaudhuri (n 18); Kapczynski, ‘Harmonization and its Discontent’ (n 26) 1576. 
52 Dhavan, Harris, and Jain (n 28) 445-74. 
53 ibid. 
54 Dhavan, Harris, and Jain (n 28) 474. 
55 ibid; Mueller (n 19) 512. 
56 Dhavan, Harris, and Jain (n 28) 474. 
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The IPA57 introduced salient features to Indian patent jurisprudence. First, it abolished 
product patents for pharmaceuticals and agrochemicals and only allowed process 
patents. That is, it allowed an inventor to only claim protection for the best processes 
known to him/her for the manufacture of pharmaceutical products. Secondly, it 
reduced the term of drug and food patents from ‘at least sixteen years to five years 
from the date of sealing or seven years from the date of filing complete 
specifications’,58 whichever is shorter. For other patents, the duration was 14 years. 
The philosophy behind this change was to encourage the access of Indian society to 
foreign technologies, especially in pharmaceuticals, that otherwise might be 
unavailable due to cost and pricing structures under a strong proprietary IP protection 
system.59 In addition, Indian policymakers believed it was a matter of ‘national 
security that India provides medicines and treatment at prices its people could afford 
for diseases and illnesses that were specific to the Indian subcontinent.’60 In this 
regard, the patent law was used as a vehicle to foster pharmaceutical autonomy.  
 
The IPA resuscitated an almost dying Indian pharmaceutical sector, including public 
and private research laboratories. The prohibition of product patents for 
pharmaceuticals, it has been argued, led indigenous pharmaceutical firms to focus on 
generic manufacturing of drugs by copying patented drugs through reverse 
engineering. It was under the umbrella of the IPA that the Indian pharmaceutical 
industry grew at the fastest possible rate. Within a decade after its introduction, 
indigenous pharmaceutical firms were able to domestically reverse-engineer known 
drugs patented elsewhere. Reverse engineering helped lower the cost of drugs sold to 
both domestic and international consumers. The sector also exported to many 
countries that could not afford the original product made in the developed countries.  
 
From a TWAIL perspective, the abolition of product patent protection in 
pharmaceuticals speaks directly as a response to the colonial ethos of international 
law to bring about greater material equality. The non-patenting of pharmaceutical 
processes allowed for technology acquisition, transfer, development, diffusion, and 
                                                                  
57 Patent Act (1970) (which came into force in 1972) and subsequent amendments, Ipindia.nic.in, ‘History of 
Indian Patent System’ (2015) <http://ipindia.nic.in/ipr/PatentHistory.htm> accessed 2 September 2015. 
58 Chaudhuri (n 18) 37. 
59 Amiya Kumar Bagchi, Parthasarathi Banerjee, and Uttam Kumar Bhattacharya, ‘Indian Patents Act and its 
Relation to Technological Development in India – A Preliminary Investigation’ (1984) 19 Economic and Political 
Weekly 294. 
60 Luigi Palombi, ‘The Role of Patent Law in Regulating and Restricting Access to Medicines’ (2009) 6 SCRIPTed 
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incremental innovation in the shortest of time.61 This is because reverse engineering, 
subsequent development, and production of patented drugs required only a fraction of 
time and money compared to the original drug discovery process, thus allowing 
Indian pharmaceutical firms to produce drugs cheaper and faster than their foreign 
counterparts.62 Further, the IPA eliminated the monopoly status enjoyed by many 
foreign MNCs as it only allowed new process patents.63 This is a drastic shift from 
previous colonial laws that allowed the patenting of all known processes, whether 
new or otherwise, including importation. Under the IPA, only one method or process 
– the best known to the applicant – could be patented for a particular drug. The effect 
of this new law was a drop in foreign patent applications in India, as foreign MNCs 
could no longer engage in frivolous patenting, and consequently increased the share 
of patents granted to indigenous Indian firms by the US patents office from 0.02 per 
cent from 1977 to 1987 to 0.06 per cent from 1996 to 2000.64 That is, the drop in 
frivolous patenting in India started allowing the development of the Indian 
pharmaceutical industry, which was then able to increase its own patent filings in the 
US. 
 
The IPA resulted in making the Indian pharmaceutical sector more diverse and 
technically competitive. Since the end of the 1980s, India has been exporting more 
and importing less pharmaceuticals. The sector has grown to be one of the biggest 
GDP generators for the country. For example, while only two indigenous companies 
were amongst the top 10 firms in terms of retail sales in 1970, by 1996 this rose to 
six, and by 2001 it was up to eight.65 By 1991, domestic firms accounted for 70 per 
cent of the bulk drugs production while 80 per cent of formulations were produced in 
the country.66 Between 1998 to 2008, the export surplus widened from EUR370 
million to EUR2 billion.67 Basic manufacturing by MNCs also accelerated after the 
abolition of product patents because of the removal of the industrial policy restriction 
on the expansion into formulation unless bulk drugs are produced in specified 
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amounts. Thus, it is also not surprising that the post-independence period saw a shift 
in drug therapy from treating symptoms to treating the disease itself.  Within the next 
three decades, India emerged as the leading manufacturer and exporter of generic 
drugs to developing countries in Asia, Latin America, and Africa.  
 
In addition to the amendment of its patent law, the government of India also 
introduced other policies that worked in tandem with patent laws. Specifically, the 
government introduced some form of control on drug prices to ensure access to 
medicines. The Drugs (Display of Prices) Order of 1962 and the Drugs Control of 
Prices Order (DPCO) had the effect of freezing the price of drugs. The DPCO set the 
price of drugs sold within India and put a ceiling on overall prices set by 
pharmaceutical companies, thus providing affordable medicines for the masses. In 
essence, the DPCO divided bulk drugs, which are usually basic raw materials or APIs, 
into essential and ‘other’ bulk drugs. Prices of essential drugs would be allowed to 
rise with the prior approval of the government (or the relevant agency in charge). The 
prices of ‘other’ bulk drugs were then frozen ‘at the level prevailing immediately 
before the announcement of the DPCO.’68 It is important to note at this juncture that 
the DPCO is strictly an executive decision with no mandate in the statute. Over the 
years, the DPCO has been reviewed and amended by the government to reflect the 
socio-economic needs of the Indian population. 
 
Moreover, to enhance local production of drugs, the government initiated investment 
in local manufacturing firms and education especially in the area of chemistry, 
pharmaceutical research and biotechnology, and building sophisticated research 
institutions. Scholars such as Gehl Padmashree writes that to encourage local 
technological knowledge, the government developed extensive skill in chemistry-
based reverse engineering which formed the core of their processes and product 
development skills.69 Specifically, government created an ‘extensive scientific 
infrastructure and skilled human capital that would be absorbed into the 
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pharmaceutical sector.’70 This encouraged innovation and meant that Indian firms 
thrived and invested into several kinds of generic activities. An example of Indian 
drug innovation was the release in 2001 of the HIV drug Triomune – the world’s first 
fixed-dose antiretroviral drug. It was produced by Cipla, and sold at USD600 per 
year, but reduced to USD1 per day for MSF. Luigi Palombi asserts that the low price 
of Triomune encouraged Merck – a US pharmaceutical company – to reduce the price 
of Crixivan, a highly active ARV therapy to roughly the same price, which in turn 
caused Bristol Myers Squibb and Glaxo SmithKline to follow suit.71 
 
The importance of the IPA became obvious during the HIV/AIDS crisis of the 1990s 
and early 2000s when Cipla, an Indian generic company, offered to sell the triple 
therapy ARV drugs of stavudine+lamivudine+nevirapine for USD350 per year – a 
stark reduction from the USD10,000 which the originator company charged.72 The 
introduction of cheaper versions of the expensive ARV treatment not only crashed the 
market price but also helped in scaling up treatment worldwide. Since then, other 
generic companies from India have entered the ARV market, which further reduced 
the price.73 Currently, India is 3rd in global volume terms and 14th in global value 
terms. It also meets 70 per cent of in-country needs for bulk drugs, formulations, dry 
intermediaries, and others.74 India is the top drug exporter into the US.75 In fact, some 
estimates suggest that India’s pharmaceutical industry supplies 40 per cent of over-
the-counter and generic prescription drugs consumed in the US.76 However, even 
though the drug industry is one of the country’s most important economic engines, 
exporting USD10-15 billion in products annually,77 the sector is hugely dependent on 
imports of APIs from China, with cumulative imports going up from USD2.5 billion 
in 1996 to USD15 billion in 2010.78 
 
Global Struggle 
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Prior to phasing fully into the TRIPS regime in 2005, India used the TRIPS 
Agreement’s transitional provisions under Article 65 thereof, which gave developing 
countries a 10-year window from 1995 to 2005 to make necessary changes to their IP 
regimes. It shows how a large developing country has played the TRIPS Agreement 
implementation game and underscores the importance for less developed countries to 
utilise the flexibilities available in the TRIPS Agreement.79 According to Peter Yu, by 
experimenting with different policy options and delaying the introduction of TRIPS 
standards, India successfully maintained an IP system that was tailored to its local 
needs, interests, conditions, and priorities.80 Although Article 65 of the TRIPS 
Agreement allowed for a transition period, only 13 countries used this provision. Of 
these 13, only six used up the complete period.81 
Despite using the transition clause, the period leading up to the 2005 deadline was not 
easy or smooth. This is not surprising as even though India accepted the TRIPS 
Agreement as part of the single undertaking, it was one of the countries from the 
Global South (along with Argentina, Brazil, Nigeria, and Thailand) that opposed the 
inclusion of IP rules in the wider body of global trade rules. India has always taken 
the position that substantive matters relating to IP are outside the purview of global 
trade rules. It viewed the inclusion of an IP regime in the international trade 
framework as a tool by which wealthy nations could impose strong IPRs as the cost of 
much-needed access to Western markets.82 Specifically, the inclusion of both process 
and product patents in all areas of technology, including pharmaceuticals, was heavily 
criticised as it meant the country should now provide for patent protection in areas 
where it previously did not do so.83 Thus for India, any IP regime should strike a 
balance between the rights of patentees and the public interest, and between the 
promotion of industrialisation and securing the transfer of technology. It is this 
understanding of IP (and patents in particular) that formed the lynchpin of 
amendment-related politics and discourse during the transition period, and the 
subsequent revisions to India’s patent law.  
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The contentious politics of India’s compliance with its obligations under the TRIPS 
Agreement led to three implementation stages. The first amendment added Chapter 
IVA, titled ‘exclusive marketing rights’, to the IPA and provided for mechanisms for 
receiving pharmaceutical product patent applications – the so-called ‘mailbox’ filing 
– as stipulated by Articles 70(8) and 70(9) of the TRIPS Agreement, which required 
countries to have adequate infrastructure for receiving and filing patent applications 
from the date of enforcement of the TRIPS Agreement.  The second amendment, the 
Patent Amendment Bill of 1999, introduced over 70 changes such as CLs, working 
requirements, and non-patentable inventions. This second amendment was in 
accordance with Article 65(2) of the TRIPS Agreement, which entitles a developing 
country member ‘to delay for a further period of four years the date of application, as 
defined in paragraph 1, of the provisions of this Agreement other than Articles 3, 4 
and 5.’84 The third amendment included new criteria for patentability. The intricacies 
of this amendment will be discussed in the ensuing sections. 
 
 
4.2 Everyday Resistance: International Law in Local Spaces  
Analysing the interaction of the TRIPS Agreement at the local levels in India – i.e. 
how the TRIPS Agreement interfaced with local institutions, non-state actors, and 
laws – requires a historical and economic backstory on how India conceptualised the 
idea of development, and thus patents, post-independence. This backstory maps the 
circulation of ideas among the key actors – from the influence of the capitalist class in 
the methods and strategies of aggregate planning in India, the rise of reformist 
agitation among Third World states that informed India’s negotiations and dialogues 
in international forums, to the informed resistance of civil society groups in shaping 
public discourse. The multiplicity of these influences provide a lens through which to 
understand India’s engagement at the negotiations in the run-up to the creation of the 
WTO, the heated public debates in the lead-up to the 2005 patent law amendment, as 
well as the on-going national engagement on patent jurisprudence within India today. 
Understanding these varied influences may clarify the impact of the divergent pulls 
and pressures, both global and local in nature, on IP law making in a vocally 
democratic country like India. 
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As stated earlier, the newly independent Indian state inherited an impoverished 
economy from the British government. Life expectancy and literacy levels were low, 
poverty levels were high, communicable diseases were rife, and the country was 
capital-deficient due to its proxy involvement in the Second World War. Except for a 
few pockets of items within the manufacturing sector, the sector itself was 
underperforming. Based on these conditions, the Indian government set out to 
promote a rapid rise in the standard of living of the people and to improve the 
country’s overall economic performance. One of the targeted sectors was health and 
drug technology due to the magnitude and significance of health issues, which 
included non-existent to limited access to and availability of medicines as local prices 
of drugs were one of the highest in the world.85 This price anomaly could be attributed 
to numerous factors, but the most glaring was that drug availability was significantly 
controlled by foreign companies operating a ‘small number of plants that formulated a 
limited range of medicines while importing the balance.’86 This caused, in addition to 
high prices, market manipulation of drugs by MNCs. Citing the case of Parke Davis’ 
promotion of choloramphenicol – an antibiotic usually prescribed for typhoid but 
marketed as a common cure for infections such as cough and common cold, thus 
leading to the build-up of resistance and which proved to be fatal during the typhoid 
outbreak – Rangnekar contends that it was this scenario that augmented the need for 
reform of the patent law, the local drug system, and the development of local 
technological and research capacity to enable India to become self-sufficient.87 In fact, 
this need for self-sufficiency underscored the Ayyangar Report, which sought to make 
patents work for the Indian nation, thereby reversing the negative impact of colonial 
law.  
 
The planned economic development in India in the form of the Five-Year Plans 
(FYPs) and the review of relevant laws to complement the development process had 
already begun prior to independence. The Bombay Plan, for example, provided for a 
15-year economic plan for India in January 1944.88 It was authored by leading Indian 
industrialists and technocrats at that time, including J. R. D. Tata (son of a cousin of 
Jamsedji Tata, one of India’s pioneer industrialists), G. D. Birla (founder of the Birla 
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group of industries), Sir Ardeshir Dalal (administrator and technocrat), Lala Shriram 
(industrialist, Delhi Cloth Mills), Kasturbhai Lalbhai (textile and shipping magnate), 
D. Shroff, and Purushottamdas Thakurdas (businessmen). It specified clear objectives 
to be kept in mind in the economic planning of India as well as the general lines on 
which development should proceed. Significantly, the Bombay Plan foreshadowed the 
first FYP launched in 1951, just three years after independence. According to Amal 
Sanyal, one of the purposes of the Bombay Plan was to initiate some form of planned 
domestic industrialisation after independence and attain in 15 years’ time ‘a general 
standard of living which would leave a reasonable margin over the minimum 
requirements of human life.’89 Other commentators such as P. S. Lokanathan consider 
the Bombay Plan to be a concrete statement of ‘the objectives to be kept in mind in 
economic planning in India, the general lines on which development should proceed 
and the demands which planning is likely to make on the country's resources.’90 The 
Bombay Plan was therefore, in a sense, a compass in the way development and 
economic growth should proceed.  
 
The Bombay Plan emphasised the importance of developing basic industries for the 
exploitation of India’s large industrial potentials. It is no wonder that key sectors such 
as power, mining and metallurgy, engineering, agriculture, chemicals, armaments, 
transport, and cement were among the industries listed to be developed within the 15-
year period of the Bombay Plan.91 What is interesting about the Bombay Plan, apart 
from its admirable objectives, was the group of gentlemen who authored it. It 
highlights the role of industrialists in pushing forward a particular agenda, which 
included but was not limited to an indigenous technology sector with a strong 
research development base. As a result, the Bombay Plan came to be very much seen 
as a nationalistic aspiration of the domestic capitalist class.92  
 
Although the Bombay Plan was not officially adopted, it has been considered a 
reflection of the interests and ideas circulating among the capitalist class and, by 
extension, the policymakers of the time as some of the initial authors of the Bombay 
Plan went on to become practitioners in government. For example, Purushottamdas 
Thakurdas and G. D. Birla were involved in building business associations such as the 
                                                                  
89 Sanyal (n 88) 6-10. 
90 Lokanathan (n 88), s II. 
91 ibid. 
92 Vivek Chibber, Locked in Place: State-Building and Late Industrialization in India (Princeton University Press 
2003) 88. 
 146 
India Chamber of Commerce and the Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry. D. Shroff became the founder-director of the Investment Corporation of 
India as well as chairman of the Bank of India. In a 2004 speech, the then prime 
minister of India Dr. Manmohan Singh extolled the significance of the Bombay Plan 
in the making of modern India. Commenting on the Bombay Plan, he remarked: 
 
The Bombay Plan laid great emphasis on public investment in the 
social and economic infrastructure, in both rural and urban areas, it 
emphasized the importance of agrarian reform and agricultural 
research, in setting up educational institutions and a modern financial 
system. Above all, it defined the framework for India's transition from 
agrarian feudalism to industrial capitalism, but capitalism that is 
humane, that invests in the welfare and skills of the working people. In 
many ways, it encapsulated what all subsequent Plans have tried to 
achieve.93 
 
The Bombay Plan was also important in shaping many government policies 
afterwards, especially the FYPs. In his analysis of the history of Indian businesses, 
Dwijendra Tripathi noted that the Bombay Plan helped shift government attention that 
previously exclusively focused on commercial trade to manufacturing.94 Specifically, 
he states: 
 
The authors of [the Plan] recognised the need for planned 
development, emphasised state ownership and control of key 
industries, and concurred with the idea of a centrally directed authority 
to ensure successful implementation of the economic plans. Although 
they assigned a legitimate role for the private sector in the future 
economic set-up, they candidly conceded that it would have to 
function under tight state direction.95 
 
Of course, opinions differ regarding the reasons for state failure in spite of the 
development efforts of the business class in India. On one hand, it has been argued 
that such failure is due to the inability of the state to take advantage of the enthusiasm 
of the business class. Instead, the state instituted a system that stifled business 
initiative, overextended administrative capacity, and lost coherence in a dense web of 
bureaucratic tape.96 On the other hand, the argument is that the Indian capitalist class 
did not support the developmental state in any relevant sense and opposed 
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disciplinary planning that would allow the government to regulate the flow of 
investment and punish non-compliance.97 
 
Irrespective of this, the striking similarities between the Bombay Plan and the 
government’s FYPs cannot be denied. Noting the resemblance between the Bombay 
Plan and the first three FYPs, M. Naidu argues that it is an example of the muddled 
relationship between law makers and the Indian bourgeoisie and how easy it is for one 
to influence the other and vice versa.98 Others observe that the similarity between the 
Bombay Plan and the FYPs is an example of the impact of capitalist preferences on 
state-building.99 If anything, the resemblance between both documents shows how 
ideas circulate, the manner in which particular policy options get constructed, and, as 
an extension, how others get extinguished vis-à-vis the capitalist and political class. 
 
India has come a long way since the time of the Bombay Plan, but the ethos of the 
Plan – the need for planned development and economic independence, building 
indigenous technological and scientific competency, and improving standard of living 
– still echoes in government policy and public discourse. These same sentiments 
permeated the contours of India’s involvement in the negotiations leading up to the 
creation of the WTO as well as in local discussion regarding joining a new world 
organisation.  
 
As mentioned earlier, India has always maintained a position at the Uruguay Round 
negotiations based on the principle that any IP matter was outside the purview of the 
GATT. Focusing on patents, the Indian representative at the Uruguay Round 
specifically stated that ‘India is not in favour of raising the levels of patent protection 
unduly, particularly in the area of pharmaceuticals, because of its adverse implications 
for the growth of indigenous industry as well as research and development efforts.’100 
This is not surprising because India has made it increasingly clear through its IPA that 
it will pursue laws that will work for the nation. It believed that ‘IPRs are not trade-
                                                                  
97 Chibber (n 94) 30. 
98  M Naidu, ‘The Bombay Plan’ (Workers’ International News, 1944) 
<https://www.marxists.org/history/etol/newspape/win/vol05a/no07a/naidu.htm> accessed 16 June 2015. 
99 Chibber (n 94) 85. 
100 ‘Statement by Dr Subramanian Swamy, Union Minister of Commerce, Law and Justice’ (1990) Multilateral 
Trade Negotiation: Uruguay Round (MTN/TNC/MIN(90)/ST/46). See also Economic and Political Weekly, ‘The 
Geneva Surrender’ 1201. 
 148 
related and instead, the WIPO is the appropriate forum to deal with IP issues.’101 For 
India, bringing IP issues to the WTO through the TRIPS Agreement was a mistake, as 
the WIPO exists to deal with global IP-related mandates. According to A.V. Ganesan, 
chief negotiator of India at the Uruguay Round, India was firmly opposed to the 
inclusion of substantive norms and standards for the protection of IPRs within the 
negotiating mandate.102 This is because it believed that the inclusion of IP rules in 
GATT is inimical to its national interest as it ‘intrudes into domestic policy space and 
would constrain their freedom to pursue economic and social policies best suited to 
their individual needs.’103 These attitudes framed not only the perception of the 
legitimacy of, but also interaction with and consequent resistance to, the TRIPS 
Agreement in the local spaces in India.  
 
About the time when the Uruguay Round negotiation activities began, there was an 
ongoing paradigm shift among the developing countries at the international level – an 
NIEO. This shift in thinking based on the belief of a just and equitable international 
economic order influenced India’s stance at the Ministerial negotiations and diffused 
into the debates at the home front. The NIEO thinking adopted a ‘reformist approach’ 
in transnational governance and international law making. Promulgated by the UN 
Declaration in 1974, it sought to restructure and reform the asymmetry in 
international economic relations and systems, and transfer economic benefits from 
developed to developing states.104  
 
The NIEO, it has been argued, was the ‘most important international law initiative 
taken by the developing world in attempting to remedy colonial inequities.’105 It was 
not a single entity but rather a political brand holding together a set of loosely 
compatible agendas with interrelated agendas.106 In particular, the NIEO sought for 
control of the extraction and marketing of domestic natural resources by Third World 
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states,107 the regulation of transnational corporations,108 a no-strings-attached transfer 
of technology from the rich to the poor countries of the Global South,109 the 
cancellation of debts,110 and the right of every country to adopt the economic and 
social system that it deems the most appropriate for its own development and not to 
be subjected to discrimination of any kind as a result.111 If anything, the NIEO 
discourse represents an attempt by many formerly colonised nations to enter global 
debate – once the purview of an old boys’ European network – as equal members, if 
not partners.  
 
Although the NIEO failed112 to achieve many of its stated objectives, it underscored 
India’s participation at the Uruguay Round as well as that of many post-colonial 
countries, including Brazil. Viewed from this conjuncture, the NIEO explains the 
political and economic thought in India – international cooperation based on 
improving the economic position of the Global South in relation to the Global North. 
For the country, any international agreement that did not further this agenda did not 
warrant signing up to.  
 
Furthermore, India’s domestic economic policy at that time also influenced its 
resistance to the TRIPS Agreement. On the home front, it pursued statist economic 
policies which saw excessive government control over the economy and the ‘Licence 
Permit Raj’ – a vast system of national and state-level quotas and licences113 – were in 
force. This led to a balance of payment crisis. Although liberalization had already 
begun, there existed among policymakers and the general public a protectionist stance 
which saw the opening up of the economy to FDI as well as to international trade as 
either unnecessary or anti-self-reliance. These left-leaning policies and philosophies 
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created considerable opposition to globalisation and India’s integration into the global 
economy. Significantly this anti-globalisation stance allowed for the fusion of 
expertise and allegiance between indigenous pharmaceutical companies and civil 
society groups. At home, various civil society groups spearheaded the campaign 
against the TRIPS Agreement and played an important role in knowledge formation 
and expertise production on its possible impact on the country’s robust generic sector 
because they understood the likely negative effects on health rights, knowledge 
access, and food security.114  
 
The IDMA, the largest and best-known association that represents the domestic 
Indian pharmaceutical industry, was one of the most outspoken industry bodies on 
this issue. Working towards this end, the IDMA heavily lobbied the government and 
prepared draft letters to various members of the Parliament, urging them to protect the 
health rights of citizens and the pharmaceutical sector. Together with CSOs, 
professional bodies, and student groups, the IDMA pushed for public resistance 
thereby generating a negative image of the TRIPS Agreement, the Dunkel Draft, and 
the GATT in public media.  
 
Among the CSOs, the National Working Group on Patent Laws (NWGPL), which 
was headed by B. K. Keayla, specifically played an active role in providing studies 
for informed debate in the Parliament and in the public regarding the Uruguay Round 
agenda and the effect of the new international body on the availability and 
affordability of medicines. A former bureaucrat in the Finance Ministry, Keayla 
joined Ranbaxy between the late 1980s and early 1990s where he was influential in 
the counter-hegemonic resistance by organising national and international seminars or 
conferences and facilitating research on the constitutional issue of the implementation 
of the TRIPS Agreement. Keayla’s dual role as head of NWGPL and executive at 
Ranbaxy underscores the ability of big corporations to mobilise leading sources of 
expertise to elaborate, interpret, and defend their agendas and influence standard-
setting. Ranbaxy also financed the work of NWGPL to develop research and build 
public opinion, and even provided office space in a prime location for the NWGPL.115  
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Ranbaxy was not the only Indian generic company working in collaboration with civil 
society groups. Other companies such as Cipla and Dr. Reddy’s funded research 
activities on the potential impact of the proposed IP regime on the country’s 
pharmaceutical sector and public health.116 Since the amendments were bringing in 
monopoly protection for pharmaceutical inventions for the very first time, they were 
obviously a concern for the IDMA. The association was most interested in ensuring 
the protection of the interests of its members and was the most vocal in opposing the 
TRIPS Agreement at home and abroad.  
 
The pharmaceutical sector continued to play a vocal role in the lead-up to the 2005 
amendments to the IPA. The IDMA was also active during the Doha Round as some 
of its members were present during the negotiations. In the lead-up to the 2005 IPA 
amendments, it was the IDMA which provided the language of the important Section 
3(d) (discussed infra). According to Amit Sengupta, the Left parties had asked for a 
more stringent definition of patentability, and the IDMA provided the text, which 
limited patents for pharmaceutical substances to ‘new chemical entities’ or to ‘new 
medical entities involving one or more inventive steps.’117 This particular clause 
protects not only public health interests in ensuring that only genuine patent 
applications are approved, but also protects the generic sector by preventing patent 
‘ever-greening’. Ever-greening refers to the patenting strategy of seeking and securing 
multiple patents around a single invention and is not exclusive to pharmaceuticals. In 
an interview, Biswajit Dhar commented that Section 3(d) was ‘included for 
innovation purposes as [India] cannot allow minor innovations to be treated at par 
with something, which we consider a breakthrough.’118 Thus, by successfully 
including the limiting and clearer language of only new chemical entities (NCEs) in 
patent application, the IDMA was able to achieve a more tempered patent regime for 
India, thereby reducing the space for frivolous patenting. 
 
In opposition to the IDMA is the Organisation of Pharmaceutical Producers in India 
(OPPI), which is primarily an association of foreign pharmaceutical MNCs operating 
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117 Fieldwork interview with Sengupta (n 83). It is worth mentioning that besides IDMA, the other major player 
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in India. The OPPI pushed a pro-Dunkel Draft agenda in a very quiet manner at the 
top government level119 and lobbied for the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement, which 
it argued ‘would encourage genuine scientific and technological research, reverse 
years of brain drain in the science and technology sector and spur foreign direct 
investment.’120 The OPPI also opposed the pre-grant patent opposition clause in the 
IPA, believing that it unduly prolonged the patent application process. In so doing, the 
OPPI opposed several of the policy provisions pushed for by both the NWGPL and 
the IDMA by hedging its argument on the potential economic and innovation benefit 
to India by joining the global economy.  
 
If anything, the dichotomy between the IDMA and the OPPI shows how fragmented 
the Indian pharmaceutical sector is. The interaction between the IDMA and the OPPI 
indicates how a reform preferred by one sectorial player might be seen as damaging 
by another as well as the predictable bipolarity among actors with divergent interests. 
In fact, the formation of a third group, the Indian Pharmaceutical Alliance,121 
heightens this fragmentation. Founded in 1999, the Indian Pharmaceutical Alliance 
consists of the biggest generic companies, namely Cipla, Dr. Reddy’s, Ranbanxy, 
Lupin Laboratories, Alembic Limited, Primal India, Sun Pharmaceutical, and 
Wockhadt Limited. Together, these companies account for 30 per cent of domestic 
production and 33 per cent of domestic export. In the lead-up to the 2005 IPA 
amendments, the Indian Pharmaceutical Alliance lobbied for the inclusion of a 
specific limitation on patentability preventing the patenting of new uses of known 
substances, as well as the patenting of many new forms of known substances.122  
 
Paradoxically, the OPPI found support from the Indian Pharmaceutical Alliance in the 
lead-up to the 2005 IPA amendments in areas including but not limited to licences of 
rights and CLs. This is not surprising as most members of the Indian Pharmaceutical 
Alliance engage in significant independent R&D, a move away from reverse 
engineering of branded drugs which is still employed by a majority of the members of 
the IDMA.123 In a 2002 letter from the Indian Pharmaceutical Alliance to the Minister 
of Commerce and Industry, Shri Murasali Maran notes that the Indian Pharmaceutical 
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Alliance supports patent protection for pharmaceutical products provided such 
protection is balanced by public health requirements.124 Working towards this end, the 
Indian Pharmaceutical Alliance made a strong pitch for strengthening CLs, licences of 
rights, and the Bolar provisions125 – the latter being a form of legal exemption from 
the right conferred by patent for the purposes of obtaining regulatory approval or 
other commercial purposes. The fragmentation within domestic manufacturers 
provides significant complexity when explaining the multiplicity of factors in the way 
the TRIPS regime interacts in local spaces. The sector’s diversity, according to Janice 
Mueller, also illustrates the fallacy of viewing the patent debate in India as a purely 
two-sided argument between foreign and domestic drug companies.126 As will be seen 
below, the lack of homogeneity is significantly changing the landscape many years 
post-TRIPS Agreement.  
 
Indian civil society groups played an integral role in the Uruguay Round negotiations 
by keeping up the public discourse on GATT in mass media. This is vastly different 
from the Brazilian example as discussed in the previous chapter. In India, these actors 
that included academics, patient groups, as well as professional groups such as 
journalists and health workers played crucial roles in knowledge, expertise 
production, and framing policy discourse on IP-related issues vis-à-vis India’s 
economic needs and development aspirations. They successfully influenced the 
agenda of government by ensuring that adequate flexibilities and public interest 
protections were included in the TRIPS Agreement. Indeed, India is credited for the 
inclusion of the TRIPS Agreement flexibilities.127 
 
The interregnum period from 1995 to 2005, especially the lead-up to the final 
amendment to the IPA in 2005, saw active local civil society demonstrations. 
Significantly, the second wave of activism saw increased participation of and 
partnership between transnational civil society groups and local NGOs. The MSF, the 
South African Treatment Action Congress, and the ABIA organised protests in their 
home countries in solidarity with their counterparts in India. Locally, NGOs and 
health groups such as the Delhi Network of Positive People (DNP+), the People’s 
Health Movement, the Lawyers Collective, and the Human Rights Network, among 
                                                                  
124 Letter from DG Shah (Secretary General of the Indian Pharmaceutical Alliance) to Shri Murasali Muran 
(Honourable Minister of Commerce and Industry) dated 23 March 2000 (document on file with the author). 
125 ibid. 
126 ibid. 
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others, organised protests against the implementation of a sweeping interpretation of 
the TRIPS Agreement into local law that does not consider the nuances of Indian 
realities and without including the broadest flexibilities in place.128 In 2001, for 
example, the Lawyers Collective HIV/AIDS Unit launched the Affordable Medicines 
and Treatment Campaign (AMTC) – a coalition of networks of PLWHA, NGOs, and 
individuals – to campaign for the inclusion of public health safeguards in the IPAA 
and the exclusion of TRIPS-plus provisions.129 The objective of the AMTC was to 
demand and create an environment that will ensure sustained accessibility and 
affordability of all medicines and treatment for every individual in India, including 
access to affordable medicines for PLWHA.130 The Lawyers Collective, together with 
national and international civil society actors, engaged in extensive advocacy in the 
form of dialogues, seminars, and white papers. According to Julia George, the 
advocacy campaigns of CSOs in India successfully led to the retention and inclusion 
of key public health safeguards in the IPA when Parliament finally amended the law 
in 2005. These safeguards include the retention of the pre-grant opposition provided 
in the IPA, the inclusion of post-grant opposition proceedings, and the amendment of 
provisions relating to compulsory licencing.131 The latter, according to Gopakumar 
and Tahir Amin, underscores India’s role as a generic drug supplier to developing 
countries.132  
 
Civil society groups have continued their activism post-TRIPS implementation 
through the submission of amicus curiae briefs in legal cases and through civil 
protests. The Lawyers Collective, NWGPL, Drug Action Forum, and MSF all 
provided submissions to the Technical Expert Group on Patent Law Issues 
(Mashelkar Committee Report).133 The Mashelkar Committee was set up following 
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the introduction in Parliament of the Patents (Amendment) Bill of 2005. It was 
specifically tasked to examine two important questions, i.e. whether it would be 
TRIPS-compatible to limit the grant of patents for pharmaceutical substances to NCEs 
or to new medical entities (NMEs) involving one or more inventive steps,134 and 
whether it would be TRIPS-compatible to exclude microorganisms from patenting.135 
 
In this respect, the mandate of the Mashelkar Committee was restricted to TRIPS 
analysis and not the broader policy consideration of how best to balance public health 
goals with pharmaceutical innovation goals. In its submission, the NWGPL argued 
that patents should be made available ‘for basic novel inventions including 
pharmaceutical substances as defined in Section 2 and 3 whether products or 
processes in all fields of technologies excluding invention of the Indian Patent Act 
provided they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial 
application.’136 The Lawyers Collective, for its part, argued that it would be TRIPS-
compatible to limit the grant of patent to NCEs.137 The Mashelkar Committee Report 
concluded that it would not be TRIPS-compliant to limit the granting of patents for 
pharmaceutical substances to NCEs only and excluding microorganisms from 
patents.138 However, it reiterated the importance of providing drugs to the people of 
India at affordable prices. It also reaffirmed the importance of preventing the grant of 
frivolous patents. In doing so, the Mashelkar Committee Report reaffirmed the 
government’s understanding that patent rights should be balanced and calibrated with 
public health, national security, and public interest concerns.  
 
Nevertheless, these acts of counter-hegemonic resistance, especially among local 
actors within India, are important in spearheading instances of dialogue, scrutiny, and 
education. Civil society groups, through their activism, have been able to shape the 
contours of national dialogue and international law norms and exemplify the twailian 
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tenet of resistance. If anything, their persistent opposition to the TRIPS Agreement 
shows that they never ceded to its domination. 
 
 
4.3 Indian Patents (Amendment) Act of 2005: Unpacking 
Key Issues  
As mentioned above, in order to come into full compliance with its obligations under 
the TRIPS Agreement, India amended the IPA three times, with the third and final 
amendment coming into force on the 4 April 2005.139 This section examines and 
critiques the IPAA, focusing on significant provisions that touch on public health and 
innovation – the latter being imperative for continued development of the 
pharmaceutical sector. The thesis specifically focuses on the following areas – 
patentable subject matters (i.e. what can and cannot be patented), criterion for 
patentability, CL provisions, opposition systems, and the limitation on exclusive right, 
along with analyses of their interpretation by judicial authorities. The analysis in this 
section shows that while India was able to exploit the residual flexibility and legal 
ambiguity in the TRIPS Agreement, it did not go far enough to deepen the space for 
law making and regulatory diversity. That is, while it determined what works best 
from a national policy perspective and included certain clauses to that effect, it did not 
tighten up the patent provisions, as will be seen. Yet, it provides a learning tool for 
Nigeria and many other developing countries to emulate. The thesis concludes the 
section by arguing that the mantle falls on the courts to close the legal loopholes that 
still exist in the IPAA through progressive judgments.  
 
a) Patentable Subject Matters 
Section 2 defines key terms used throughout the IPAA. Importantly, it explains the 
definition of terms such as invention, inventive step, new inventions,140 and 
pharmaceutical substance. Specifically, Section 2(j) defines an invention to mean ‘a 
new product or process involving an inventive step’141 while an inventive step is 
explained to mean ‘a feature of an invention that involves technical advance as 
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compared to the existing knowledge or having economic significance or both that 
makes the invention not obvious to the person skilled in the art.’142 It broadens the 
definition of pharmaceutical substance to mean ‘any new entity involving one or more 
inventive steps.’143 Thus a patent is granted only to a new product or process involving 
an inventive step and capable of industrial application. The inclusion of the 
patentability of pharmaceutical products and processes is the cornerstone of bringing 
Indian patent law into full compliance with the TRIPS Agreement and the major point 
of advocacy of the generic industry and civil society.  
 
In their review of the IPAA, Gopakumar and Amin point out that the provision is too 
broad and allows for the patenting of all types of pharmaceutical substances.144 To 
rectify this lacuna, they suggest the addition of the term ‘chemical’, i.e. new chemical 
entity, to limit pharmaceutical patents to just chemical entities and not any 
pharmaceutical entity. Gopakumar and Amin also believe that economic significance 
should not be the sole criterion for evaluating the inventive step of an invention. In 
their estimation, ‘it is not the purpose of patents to recognise economic significance of 
an invention as economic significance of an invention depends on many other 
factors.’145   
 
b) Exceptions to Patentability 
Like the Brazilian Patent Act, the IPAA includes an extensive list of exclusions from 
patentability. Found in Sections 3 and 4, some of these include frivolous inventions, 
traditional knowledge, methods of agriculture or horticulture, inventions against 
public order or morality, and others. However, the most significant exclusion from 
patentability is the derivatives of known substances enshrined in Section 3(d), which 
reads: 
 
The mere discovery of a new form of a known substance which does 
not result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance 
or the mere discovery of any new property or new use for a known 
substance or of the mere use of a known process, machine or apparatus 
unless such known process results in a new product or employs at least 
a new reactant.146 
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What is significant about Section 3(d) is the scope and extensive list of non-patentable 
items, with the aim of preventing ever-greening,147 thereby limiting the negative 
impact of such frivolous patenting on medicine access. It is well known that obtaining 
patents on new uses of known substances as well as use of a compound in a particular 
way is a regular practice in the US and is employed by pharmaceutical companies to 
extend the life of their patent rights. According to the National Institute for Health 
Care Management, of the 1,035 new drug applications approved by the US Food and 
Drug Administration from 1989 to 2000, majority (65 per cent) were for 
incrementally modified drugs.148 Also, a recent study by Kapczynski et al. on 
secondary patents in the pharmaceutical industry found that secondary claims are 
common, thereby technically providing substantial additional patent life.149 This 
negates the time limit of patent terms as new patents continue to keep the subject 
matter under protection.150 Thus, when placed within the wider context of national IP 
laws and pharmaceutical patent practice, the importance of Section 3(d) becomes 
significant.  
 
By stipulating that only new and more efficacious forms are patentable, Section 3(d) –
in contrast to the rhetoric often peddled by the US – encourages innovation, thereby 
creating substantial scope for competition in the pharmaceutical sector. Section 3(d) 
was recently tested in the Novartis case.151 Basel-headquartered Novartis contested the 
rejection of its patent application for anti-cancer drug Glivec by the Indian Patent 
Office and subsequently by the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB) and had 
challenged the IPAB’s interpretation of Section 3(d). Novartis argued that its 
betacrystal form of Imatinib Mesylate is more ‘efficacious’ than the base compound 
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imatinib (which was discovered prior to 1995 and is therefore not patentable) as it is 
easier to store and process, and is also 30 per cent more bioavailable than imatinib.152  
 
The Indian Supreme Court ruled that the ‘new form of a drug must demonstrate an 
improvement in its therapeutic effect or curative property as compared to the old form 
to secure a patent and the beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate, fails the test of 
section 3(d).’153 The Court also discussed at length the meaning of therapeutic 
efficacy with respect to pharmaceutical products, and observed that there are different 
possible meanings. The definition may be limited only to action resulting in a curative 
effect, or it might be more broadly extended to cover improved safety or reduced 
toxicity. In the end, the Court decided to leave open what is the appropriate definition 
of enhanced (therapeutic) efficacy – the narrower or broader interpretation – because 
it did not need to reach that conclusion in this particular case.154  
 
Furthermore, noting the claim made by Novartis regarding increased ‘bioavailability’, 
the Supreme Court observed that ‘bioavailability’ measures the level at which the 
drug is made available in the human body and may or may not have an influence on 
the therapeutic or curative effect of the drug.155 As a result, the Court held that such 
effect was not demonstrated.  
 
While the Novartis judgment is seen as a vindication of not just India’s legislative 
process but also a triumph of human rights over profit,156 some scholars contend that 
the ruling was not far-reaching enough, as it did not explain the meaning of 
‘therapeutic efficacy.’ Dinesh Abrol, Convener of the NWGPL, commented on the 
definition of therapeutic efficacy in the Novartis case: 
 
The Court could have even strengthened the therapeutic efficacy 
concept by clarifying and defining so that some more things would 
happen. It could have actually gone to the level of saying, okay, 
therapeutic efficacy will now be defined in this manner and it would 
include concrete terms we can work with. It could have actually said, 
okay, fine, polymorphs, salt, crystals, derivatives unless shown to be 
doing this, this, this, will not be granted patents and so on, etc. And it 
could have actually dealt with the issue of how to deal with if a drug 
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improves contraindications, second toxicity is reduced…how would it 
be treated? It could have even directed the government to actually, 
let’s say, evolve patent guidelines in a better manner, how the patent 
authorities should actually be enforcing them, how the patent office 
manual can be changed, how the examiners should be examining etc. 
we would have created jurisprudence on that.157 
 
This view is supported by K. M. Gopakumar of the Third World Network (TWN), 
who agrees that because the court did not clarify the meaning of ‘therapeutic 
efficacy’, i.e. whether it meant ‘technological efficacy’ or ‘economic efficacy’, India 
opened itself up to future contestation.158  Commenting on the case, he notes: 
 
By insisting on therapeutic efficacy, the courts opened door for the 
patenting of known substances when they are efficacious. This means 
anybody can claim patents on a drug that is known but it has more 
bioavailability. And does bioavailability mean efficacious? So does it 
satisfy therapeutic efficacy? We don’t know because the courts did not 
clarify. Does that mean fixable combinations are patentable? Again we 
don’t know. The court missed a very useful opportunity to stop the 
patenting of known substances and do away with this discretionary 
element. And because [courts] didn’t spell it out, this issue will come 
back again.159 
 
From his perspective, this leaves the country and millions of people that depend on 
generic drugs vulnerable, as there is a threat of diluting policy concerns regarding the 
patenting of known substances through subsequent judicial interpretation or the 
practices of patent offices.160  
 
In contrast, Justice Prabha Sridevan, the judge who ruled on the Novartis case at the 
Chennai High Court, believes that the fact that the court left out the definition of 
‘therapeutic efficacy’ is a good thing. Addressing the reasoning behind the non-
definition of ‘therapeutic efficacy’, she states:  
 
There is a reason for the open-ended quality to [not defining 
therapeutic efficacy]. And that’s because that as far as pharma patents 
for sure and other patents too maybe, you really don’t know…there is 
really no horizon. It keeps extending. And so it would be foolhardy for 
us to limit it today because we really don’t know. It is better to leave it 
to the wisdom of a future court to decide whether what we said was 
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therapeutic efficacy would include this new quality that is now being 
argued.161  
 
It can be argued therefore that by leaving open the definition, the court is protecting 
the interest of not only the public but of the manufacturers as well. In not capping 
what is termed ‘therapeutic efficacy’, the court leaves the room open for future 
innovations and circumstances. If anything, the Novartis case has shown the 
importance of Section 3(d) in limiting practices that might result in the grant of 
patents for insubstantial technological contributions. It also provides an intelligent 
balance for India’s obligations under the international treaty and its commitment to 
protect and promote public health considerations, not only of its own people but also 
in many other parts of the world.162 
 
In spite of considerable focus on the jurisdictional decision on ‘therapeutic efficacy’, 
other scholars have pointed out that the discourse on Section 3(d) needs to focus on 
the interpretation by patent offices. According to Sakhtivel Selvaraj, the issue should 
be on the number of patent officers with skills and expertise to examine patents using 
the 3(d) provision.163 Patent officers are the first point of contact on any patent issue 
and therefore should be thoroughly informed about what this provision means and 
how to interpret it, what is and is not a frivolous patent, and what is a real objective 
blockbuster drug.164 In a similar vein, IP lawyer and academic Shamnad Basheer 
asserts that the ‘Indian Patent Office suffers from a chronic shortage of adequately 
trained and specialised personnel. As a result, they lack access to leading prior art 
databases to undertake a thorough and comprehensive examination of complex patent 
applications.’165  
 
Section 3(d) is currently seen as an example of judicial innovation tool166 – a form of 
counter-hegemonic resistance from a developing country in recalibrating a seemingly 
inequitable global IP rule.167 But none of this matters if the first point of call of a 
patent application is not well-trained in the technical and complex text of patent 
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examinations. Thus, having a well-trained patent officer is tantamount to strengthened 
and effective patent jurisprudence. It is therefore not surprising that many patent 
examiners are now being sponsored by foreign pharmaceutical associations to train in 
the US. While this training has the potential of improving the technical skills of 
India’s patent examiners, it would also likely compromise the policy under Section 
3(d) as the examiners imbibe standards of evaluation not relevant to India. In so 
doing, orienting them to the narrative of (foreign) pharmaceutical companies appears 
to be detrimental to the public interest.   
 
c) Opposition Systems 
Another important aspect of the IPAA is the inclusion of pre-grant and post-grant 
patent opposition. Section 25 on pre-grant opposition allows any person to file an 
opposition at any time before the grant of a patent on certain specified grounds.168 The 
section delineates 11 specified grounds in which interested parties can oppose a patent 
application. These include ‘prior publication of a patent application but a patent has 
not been granted’,169 ‘lack of inventive step, non-invention under Section 3 of the 
Patents Act’,170 insufficient or unclear description of the invention in the 
specification,171 and failure to disclose the source of biological material used for the 
invention.172 The pre-grant opposition is noteworthy as it signifies the first instance 
when a challenge can be made before the grant of a patent. In addition, it conserves 
administrative time otherwise spent on examining a patent application that could later 
be invalidated.173 It is important to note that pre-grant opposition is not a new 
inclusion via the IPA amendment. It was carried from the Patent Act of 1911 and was 
retained in the IPA and its subsequent amendments.  
 
The IPAA also requires the Patent Office to grant the person a hearing.174 Ragavan 
points out that the pre-grant opposition provision was retained because it was felt that 
the approximately 6,000 applications pending in the mailbox protection system would 
escape scrutiny. Retaining the pre-grant opposition was intended to weed out 
frivolous patent applications.175 In this instance, the pre-grant opposition works as a 
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mechanism to check the genuineness of the patent application and allows any third 
party to contest the application before it is granted.176   
 
Furthermore, the IPAA added a post-grant opposition system to the patent law. Post-
grant opposition allows an interested person to oppose a patent within one year after 
the application has been granted.177 Many Indian generic pharmaceutical companies, 
CSOs, as well as patient groups keenly knowledgeable of the esoteric IPAA have 
often invoked this law. Indeed, both the pre- and post-grant opposition clauses are 
seen by many as a key victory for health activists and civil society groups alike, and 
these groups have often invoked these provisions in recent times. It shows how non-
state actors actively participating in the judicial setting are shaping emerging patent 
jurisprudence in India. Importantly, it represents a mechanism uniquely used to get 
around one of India’s debilitating constraints, particularly backlog, and reduces the 
time taken to resolve disputes in India.178 Key cases are discussed in the subsequent 
section.  
 
d) Compulsory Licence 
The IPAA provides for four grounds for the issuance of a CL, which many contend is 
‘the broadest and most comprehensive of all the world’s patent systems.’179 These 
grounds are broadly divided into (a) abuse of patent, (b) government use for public 
interest, (c) national health emergency, and (d) dealing with the licencing of related 
patents. These will be elaborated below. Chapter XVI of the IPAA comprising of 
Sections 82 to 94 and titled ‘Working of Patents, Compulsory Licences and 
Revocation’ deals with the broad principles and context for the issuance of CLs. 
 
Abuse of Patent 
Section 84 specifically refers to abuse of patent as a basis for the granting of a CL. In 
this instance, the patentee is culpable for the issuance of a CL on the ground that 
reasonable requirements of the public with respect to the patented invention have not 
been satisfied180 because of the non-availability of the patented invention to the public 
at a reasonable affordable price,181 and due to the non-working of the patented 
                                                                  
176 ibid. 
177 IPAA, s 25(2). 
178 Fieldwork interview with Sridevan (n 161).  
179 Mueller (n 19) 580. 
180 IPAA, ss 84(1)(a) and (7)(a-e).  
181 ibid, s 84(1)(b).  
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invention within India.182 Section 84(7)(a-e) provides the definition for ‘reasonable 
requirement of the public’, which includes the following: refusal of the patentee to 
grant licence on reasonable terms;183 prejudiced conditions imposed by the patentee 
for the grant of licence;184 if the patent is not worked in India on a commercial scale to 
an adequate extent or not worked to the fullest extent that is reasonably practicable;185 
and if the working of the patented invention in India on a commercial scale is being 
prevented or hindered by the importation from abroad of the patented article.186 It thus 
appears that Section 84(7) seeks to cover possible impediments such as anti-
competitive practices. 
 
On reasonable price, the IPAA did not define or explain what it deems to be such, but 
commentators including Basheer and Kochupillai suggest that the context for 
reasonable price of a patented article will depend upon the circumstances of each 
case.187 Using a case of HIV medicines, they contend that if the price being charged in 
the US and EU is the same as that charged in India, this could raise a prima facie 
case.188  
 
It is important to note at this junction that Section 84 allows for a lapse of three years 
from the date of grant of a patent and allows any person, despite being already a 
holder of a licence under the patent,189 to apply for a CL. However, the applicant 
should make out a prima facie case in order to be granted a CL. This means that the 
onus to prove the conditions for the grant of a CL is on the applicant and not on the 
patent holder.  
 
Under Section 84, the Controller – with a view to securing certain purposes – should 
review a CL application by making sure that the patented invention is worked on a 
‘commercial scale within India without undue delay and to the fullest extent that is 
reasonably practicable’190 and to safeguard that the ‘interests of any person working or 
developing an invention in India under the protection of patent are not prejudiced.’191  
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The licensee also has the right to enforce the patent against infringers if the patentee 
refuses or neglects to do so within two months after being called upon. In such 
instances, the licensee ‘may institute proceedings for the infringement in his own 
name as though he were the patentee, making the patentee a defendant.’192  
 
So far, there has been only one successful case of CL application in India. In 2011, 
Natco, an indigenous generic pharmaceutical company, applied for a CL under 
Section 84(1) to manufacture and sell a generic version of Nexavar (the generic name 
is sorafenib tosylate) used in the treatment of primary kidney cancer and advanced 
primary liver cancer. Bayer Pharmaceutical Corporation (Bayer) currently holds the 
patent for Nexavar.193 Couching its application on the ‘reasonable price’ requirement, 
Natco argued that Nexavar has a limited availability in India, as it is only available in 
pharmacies attached to large hospitals in select cities of Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, and 
Chennai.194 The company pointed out that the price of Nexavar (sold at INR280,428  
per month or INR33,65,136 per year) makes the drug out of reach for over a million 
Indians diagnosed with the disease.195 Specifically, when Bayer sells the product, it 
reaches less than one per cent of patients while almost 99 per cent of patients who are 
unable to afford the drug are left to die every year.196  
 
Furthermore, Natco underscored the ‘non-working’ requirement provision, stating 
that the patentee Bayer imports and sells the drug sorafenib instead of locally 
manufacturing in India.197 The applicant also mentioned the inherent difficulty in 
obtaining a licence to manufacture and sell the product sorafenib in India and the 
subsequent refusal of the patentee to grant a licence (refusal to grant licence on 
reasonable term clause). Finally, Natco argued that it will not only manufacture the 
drug in India but that it will be sold at a fraction of the current price at INR8,880 per 
month.198 It will also donate the tablets to patients who cannot afford even the 
proposed price. Noting the aforementioned points, the Controller found that Natco 
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met all the requirements for a CL application and thus granted the applicant the 
licence to produce Nexavar in India. However, he ruled that Natco should pay Bayer 
6 per cent royalty.  
 
One area in the Natco v Bayer case which has garnered the attention of experts is the 
‘non-working’ requirement. The requirement of ‘non-working’, usually used as a tool 
for domestic economic enhancement, raises an important question of compatibility 
with the TRIPS Agreement. While Section 83(b) of the IPA explicitly states that 
importation does not mean ‘work’ (it reads patents are not ‘granted merely to enable 
patentees to enjoy monopolies for the importation of the patented article’),199 the 
TRIPS Agreement, on the other hand, mandates the grant and enjoyment of patent 
rights regardless if the products are manufactured locally or imported.200 Taken on 
face value, provisions of ‘non-working’ which are also present in the Indian patent 
law is not compatible with the TRIPS Agreement. Janice Mueller, in her extensive 
analysis of Indian patent law, believes that India and many other developing countries 
with the ‘non-working’ requirement will undoubtedly be challenged by MNCs that 
‘strongly prefer to consolidate production facilities in order to achieve economies of 
scale and related efficiencies.’201 Rangnekar, on the other hand, argues that in 
maintaining the non-working requirement, India demonstrates its intent to explore 
space left open by legal ambiguity.202 In a similar vein, Basheer and Kochupillai 
firmly believe that ‘non-working’ does not contravene the TRIPS Agreement. 
Specifically, they note: 
 
The Paris Convention clearly stated that ‘importation’ would not 
amount to working of a patent, and that if a patent wasn’t worked, this 
could be treated as an ‘abuse’. Secondly, TRIPS is premised on the 
promise of technology transfer to developing countries. And a local 
working provision is geared towards encouraging such technology 
transfer. By forcing patentees to ‘work’ their patents in India, the 
regime encourages local use/transfer of the said technology.203 
 
                                                                  
199 IPAA, s 83(b). 
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In the Natco v Bayer case, the Controller found that the mere importation of Bayer’s 
drug into India did not amount to ‘working’ and is convinced that ‘worked in the 
territory of India’ means manufactured to a reasonable extent in India.204 It held that 
Bayer could not give reasons as to why working (i.e. manufacture) of the patented 
drug was not possible in India. This decision therefore makes it distinctly clear that 
‘working’ as used in the IPA cannot include ‘importation’. Bayer challenged the 
decision at both the IPAB and the Bombay High Court. Both petitions were 
dismissed.   
 
Apart from the Natco case, there have only been two other instances of CL 
application in India. BDR Pharmaceutical filed a CL application for an anti-cancer 
drug Dasatinib, which is sold under the trade name Sprycel and patented by Bristol-
Myers Squibb. The application was rejected.205 Lee Pharmaceutical Company also 
filed a CL application for AstraZeneca’s diabetes management drug Saxagliptin. The 
decision was rejected in January 2016.206 Opinions vary on why there has been a low 
number of CL applications in India. Gopakumar Nair, former president of IDMA, 
attributes the lack of data to support CL applications as one of the reasons.207 India, 
according to him, suffers from a dearth of accurate or even up-to-date data on 
diseases, patient usage, production of generics, or drug consumption. In instances 
where data is available, their authenticity is questioned.208 This hampers CL 
application and is the reason for the high incidence of prima facie rejection. However, 
D. G. Shah, the secretary general of the Indian Pharmaceutical Alliance, posits that 
the pressure exerted by the USTR and the US International Trade Commission on the 
government of India is the reason why the government is reluctant to grant another 
CL.209  In fact, at a recent conference, D. G. Shah stated that the industry does not see 
CLs as a viable business model, as there are bigger profits to be made outside India.210   
 
Government Use for Public Interest 
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Section 92(1) deals with the instances for which a CL may be issued for public 
interest purposes by notification in the Patent Office journal, regardless of the time 
that has elapsed since the grant of the patent. These instances include national 
emergency, extreme urgency, or public non-commercial use. It further mandates the 
Controller to grant a licence to ‘any private entity’ that applies on such terms and 
conditions he thinks fit211 while ensuring that the articles manufactured under the 
patent will be available to the public at the lowest prices consistent with the patentees 
deriving a reasonable advantage from their patent rights.212   
 
The difference between Sections 84 and 92 is that the patent holder is culpable for the 
grant of a CL in the former while the CL is granted irrespective of the patent holder in 
the latter. Further, Section 84 allows for a time lapse of three years while the applicant 
need not wait for such period to apply for a CL under Section 92. Also, the Controller 
has discretionary powers regarding the terms and procedure of a CL application 
within the context of Section 92, which many believe makes the procedure long and 
cumbersome, as ‘both the Act and Rules do not prescribe any time limit for the 
conclusion of the proceeding.’213 The possible effect is an indefinite delay on the grant 
of a CL. Further, according to IP and health economist Shaktivel Selvaraj, Section 92 
allows the government to make medicines available for public health facilities.214 
However, due to political pressure from foreign pharmaceutical companies, the Indian 
government is yet to avail itself of this provision despite the constant stock-out of 
drugs in public health facilities.  
 
National Health Emergency 
Added in the IPAA, Section 92(A) allows for the grant of a CL for the export of 
patented pharmaceutical products in certain exceptional circumstances, such as to 
countries with insufficient or no manufacturing capacity for the concerned product to 
address public health, and provided that a CL has been granted by such a country.215 
These exceptional circumstances include situations relating to HIV/AIDS, 
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tuberculosis, malaria, or other epidemics.216 Section 92(A) fits into the Doha 
Declaration, which emphasised that flexibilities were available in the TRIPS 
Agreement to address public health needs.217 Many commentators contend that it was 
the position of India and other developing countries at the beginning of the 
negotiations that the Doha Declaration should cover their current and future health 
needs, which led to the inclusion of pharmaceutical manufacturing capability in the 
Doha Declaration and in the subsequent August 2003 Decision on the Implementation 
of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration.218 Where a CL is applied for export, the 
Controller ‘shall grant a compulsory licence solely for manufacture and export of the 
concerned pharmaceutical product to such country under such terms and conditions as 
may be specified and published by him.’219 This will be without prejudice to the 
extent to which pharmaceutical products are produced under CLs.  
 
Licencing of Related Patents 
Section 91 deals with the licencing of related rights. In this instance, a CL is granted 
to alleviate the situation where a patentee or licensee is hindered or prevented from 
his right to work any other patented invention without infringing on another’s pre-
existing ‘basic’ or ‘dominant’ patent.220 The provision also specifies two conditions 
for the grant of a Section 91 CL. First, the CL applicant should show that it is in a 
position to grant to the first patentee a cross-licence under the second patent on 
‘reasonable terms’221 and second, that the other invention has ‘made substantial 
contribution to the establishment and development of commercial or industrial 
activities in India.’222  
 
Part of the reason that a patent regime has flourished in India is because it has been 
able to carve out a regime that reflects its socio-economic realities and development 
needs. Like Brazil, India has shown that harmonising with the TRIPS Agreement 
                                                                  
216 IPAA, s 92A(3). 
217 ‘WTO | Ministerial Conferences - Doha 4th Ministerial - Ministerial Declaration’ (2001) WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 
<https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_implementation_e.htm> accessed 4 March 
2015.  
218 ‘WTO | Ministerial Conferences - Doha 4th Ministerial - Ministerial Declarations and Decisions’ (2001) 
WT/MIN(01)/17 <http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_implementation_e.htm> 
accessed 27 April 2015. See also Duncan Mathews, ‘From the August 30, 2003 WTO Decision to the December 6, 
2005 Agreement on an Amendment to TRIPS: Improving Access to Medicines in Developing Countries?’ (2006) 
10 Intellectual Property Quarterly, which discusses the 2005 amendment to article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement, 
which intended to improve access to medicines in developing countries by waiving pharmaceutical licencing 
requirements. 
219 IPAA, s 92A(2). 
220 ibid, s 91; Mueller (n 19) 605. 
221 ibid, s 91(2)(i); Mueller (n 19) 605. 
222 ibid, s 91(2)(ii).  
 170 
works when ample flexibilities are embedded and embraced. The next section 
explores how actors are adapting and utilising the new TRIPS-compliant patent 
regime.  
 
4.4 Medicine Access and the Nation-State as Site of Global 
Struggles 
How are key stakeholders adjusting to post-TRIPS India? How are policies, 
jurisprudence, norms, and counter-norms relating to patent rights and access to 
medicines shaped (and continues to be shaped) post-TRIPS? This section focuses on 
these issues by looking into the performative strategies adopted by key actors in the 
dense configurations and reconfigurations of patent jurisprudence, justice, and 
medicine access discourse in post-TRIPS India. While India has fully phased into the 
TRIPS Agreement, it is demonstrated herein that the battle is by no means over as 
various actors have developed strategies to expand their autonomy within the Indian 
legal space. Focusing on the use of pre-emptive injunctions by foreign pharmaceutical 
companies, pre- and post-patent opposition by CSOs and indigenous pharmaceutical 
firms alike, as well as legal tie-ups via voluntary licences (VLs), the thesis 
demonstrates emerging alliances, patterns, and schisms among key actors to highlight 
how they challenge and/or influence the state’s understanding and application of 
patents. 
 
Pre-emptive Injunctions 
According to the Oxford Law Dictionary, an injunction is a court order by ‘which an 
individual is required to perform, or is restrained from performing, a particular act.’223 
There are two types of injunction. A temporary injunction is a temporary stay pending 
a trial and is ‘predicated on the assumption that if the patentee were to ultimately win 
at trial, the non-grant of a temporary injunction would detrimentally impact the 
patentee and her rights in the interim.’224 A permanent injunction, on the other hand, is 
awarded only after the conclusion of a trial and the patent is found to be valid and 
infringed.  
 
                                                                  
223 Jonathan Law and EA Martin, A Dictionary of Law (Oxford University Press 2009).  
224 Shamnad Basheer, Jay Sanklecha, and Prakruthi Gowda, ‘Pharmaceutical Patent Enforcement’, Patent Law in 
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In India, the law governing the grant of injunctions is set down in the Civil Procedure 
Code, and is conditioned upon the following pre-requisites: (a) there is a prima facie 
case in favour of the plaintiff; (b) irreparable injury would be suffered by the plaintiff 
if the injunction is not granted; (c) the balance of convenience is in favour of the 
plaintiff; and (d) the public would not be harmed by the grant of injunction. The 
reason for these conditions, according to Basheer, is the protection of an IP owner 
against the ‘vicissitudes of a long trial, where the alleged infringer could flood the 
market with competing products and destroy the value of a time-sensitive IP rights.’225 
Thus, the court should scrutinise the plaintiff’s application to ensure that the pre-
requisites are present before an injunction is granted.  
 
There is growing evidence to show that foreign MNCs are pre-emptively using 
injunctions against local generic players to protect the market of patented drugs and 
delay the entry of low-cost generic medicines.226 Courts are also granting these ex 
parte injunctions prima facie. That is, the courts are granting restraining orders 
without hearing from the defendants (usually generic firms) or making sure that the 
pre-requisites apply. The Economic Times, for example, reported that the number of 
ex parte injunctions has grown from six in 2012, to 10 in 2013, and over 15 in 
2014.227 Table 2 below provides a snapshot of recent cases: 
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Year Plaintiff Defendants Products Decision 
2009 Bristol-Myers Squibb 
(BMS) 
Dr. BPS Reddy, 
HeteroDrugs, BDR 
Pharmaceuticals, Shilpa 
Medicare and Natco 
Dasatinib Interim injunctions 
against all of them 
except Shilpa 
Medicare 
2011 Vifor (International) AG Symed Laboratories Indian patent 
number 
221536228 
Ex parte interim 
injunction 
2012 Pfizer and Sugen 
Pharmaceuticals 
Cipla, Natco Sunitinib Ex parte interim 
injunction 
2014 Novartis Ranbaxy Laboratories, 
Wockhardt Ltd, Biocon, 
Alembic 
Pharmaceuticals, 
Glenmark Generics, 
Cadila Healthcare and 
Bajaj Healthcare 
Vildagliptin Permanent injunction 
against Bajaj 
Healthcare and interim 
injunction to the rest 
2015 Novartis Cipla Indacaterol Ex parte injunction 
Table 2: Snapshot of Recent Pharmaceutical Patent Injunction Cases  
 
Several scholars and health activists have expressed concerns regarding the negative 
impact of such interim restraining orders to the public and patent law in India. In their 
extensive analysis of ex parte injunctions in Indian courts, Basheer et al. note that 
these injunctions have a ‘draconian’ effect on competitors, who are forced to desist 
from manufacturing and selling the allegedly infringing good, as well as on 
consumers, who are denied access to cheaper goods.229 In an interview about the use 
of injunctions as strategy, Leena Meenghaney, Regional Head (South Asia) at the 
Access Campaign at MSF, commented on the effect: 
 
It is not surprising injunctions are new tactics employed by foreign 
MNCs in post-TRIPS India to not only limit market access of 
competitor but also to control the access of cheaper generic versions. 
This impacts everyday lives of people as generic firms are forced to 
withdraw these products from the market while the fears of financial 
damage discourages investment of new product development and 
launch.230 
 
Similarly, Justice Sridevan Prabha points out that granting ex parte injunction causes 
irreparable hardship to the public who are denied access to important medicines. As 
                                                                  
228 Process for preparation of water soluble iron carbohydrate complex of a particular weight. 
229 Basheer, Sanklecha, and Gowda (n 224) 605. 
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damage to health cannot be compensated, the court therefore should not only think of 
the two adversaries before it but also the effect on the public.231  
 
The rise of injunctions points to a deeper and potentially more troubling trend among 
pharmaceutical MNCs and a departure from their earlier strategy of launching patent 
infringement suits only after a generic firm has rolled out a competing drug in the 
market. The use of ex parte injunctions not only has an adverse impact on access to 
medicines, as it affects the rights of patients to access cheaper generic versions of 
drugs, but also helps foreign pharmaceuticals maximise their monopoly and increase 
their profits.  
 
Pre- or Post-Patent Opposition 
As mentioned earlier, Section 25 of IPA allows for both pre- and post-grant 
oppositions. Patent opposition allows interested parties to file an opposition at any 
time before or after grant of a patent. Indian civil society groups have always been 
cognizant of the dangers posed by IP to access to medicines. As a result, these groups 
have been able to employ opposition clauses against what they see as frivolous patent 
applications or applications deemed injurious to public health.  
 
Recent years have seen a spike in patent opposition. For example, in 2013, Natco and 
a group of civil society and patient groups comprising of I-Mak, Sankalp 
Rehabilitation Trust, and DNP+ successfully filed a pre-grant patent opposition 
against Gilead’s Sovaldi (generic name sofosbuvir).232 The application sought to 
prevent Gilead or Pharmasset from gaining a patent in India on sofosbuvir – a drug for 
Hepatitis C. In the opposition filings, I-MAK argued that the technologies comprising 
these patent applications are known (old science), while the patent document 
describing the invention is not sufficient, and therefore does not fully comply with 
patent law requirements.233 Natco’s opposition was also based on the grounds that the 
patent for sofosbuvir is not inventive, and thus does not meet the standards for patent 
protection in India. Sankalp Rehabilitation Trust and DNP+ presented their argument 
on grounds of access, citing the high cost of the drug, which retails at USD80,000 (or 
USD1,000 per pill).234 This, they argued, makes the drug out of reach for the 
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estimated 12 million Indians who are chronically infected with Hepatitis C.235 In 
2015, the patent was rejected, which Gilead appealed. In 2016, the Deputy Controller 
handed down a clear victory to Gilead, dismissing the contentions raised in the 
various oppositions that had been filed against the patent application. 
 
In the same vein, the Indian Network of Positive People and the Positive Women 
Network successfully filed a pre-grant patent opposition in 2008 against Boehringer 
Ingelheim’s patent application for nevirapine (a pediatric ARV). Indeed, the practice 
of patent opposition has seen civil society groups and generic pharmaceutical 
companies being on the same side against foreign pharmaceuticals.  
 
According to D. G. Shah, there is an increase in the number of patent oppositions 
filed by Indian generic companies, and the Indian Pharmaceutical Alliance files 20 to 
25 patent oppositions per month.236 For instance, in 2012, Cipla successfully filed a 
post-grant opposition against Pfizer/Sugen’s patent on the drug Sutent (generic name 
sunitinib malate), a liver and kidney cancer drug.237 Pfizer and Sugen were granted the 
patent for the cancer drug in 2007. The following year, Cipla opposed the patent grant 
on the following grounds: (a) the claimed invention was publicly used in India before 
the priority date of claim;238 (b) the invention as claimed is obvious and did not 
include an inventive step;239 and (c) the patentee failed to disclose information as 
required under Section 8 of the IPA.240  
 
In analysing the Sugent patent case, Rajiv Choudhry notes that the lack of 
inventiveness was the main thrust of the opposition as the claimed compound is prima 
facie obvious, which is based on the concept of ‘structural obviousness’.241 Thus, in a 
case of prima facie obviousness, the patentee should demonstrate that ‘there are actual 
differences between the claimed compound and the prior art such that the invention as 
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a whole is non-obvious.’242 Though Pfizer/Sugen sought to distinguish the claims 
from the cited prior art document, they could not prove actual difference between the 
claimed compound and the cited prior art document. As a result, the Controller 
annulled the patent. In deciding the case, the Controller held that ‘the invention that is 
claimed in the patent does not involve any inventive step...and hence not patentable 
under section 2 (1) j of the Indian Patents Act.’243  
 
The opposition system provides a unique opportunity for Indian civil society groups 
to build their capacity on matters relating to patents. It also brought networks of 
patient groups together with other CSOs and generic drug manufacturers to rally for 
the cause of access to medicines. Of course, the partnership of CSOs and generic 
pharmaceutical companies does not mean that both groups are always in agreement. It 
shows how networks can successfully promote the idea that patents equates to denial 
of access to people desperately in need. It is a good example of Peter Drahos’ general 
point on how socially mediated acts of nodal interpretation and mobilisation have 
influenced collective action in the IP regime.  
 
It is important to mention at this point that in these patent opposition cases, civil 
society groups often invoke the human right to life argument. This is unlike in Brazil 
where treatment activism is based on the human right to health. This is because the 
Indian Constitution does not formally recognise the right to health as a fundamental 
right. As a result, in most pharmaceutical patent opposition cases, CSOs invoke the 
right to life, which is recognised by the Indian Constitution. With the use of right to 
life in patent litigations, Leena Meenghaney notes: 
 
Not too many people go to court based on right to health. So the whole 
idea that we should provide universal access to medicines is not very 
well established in the government, and if you look at the recent press 
reports, it is very interesting when they say free medicines. And it is 
almost as if they’re offering charity to the citizens. It is not like, [the 
State] recognises your right to health and within that, provides you 
access to medicines. In India, access is always about charity. It is the 
government saying we’re doing it as a favour to you, and in that sense, 
I think the government and the Ministry of Health doesn’t recognise it 
as strongly. Their main contention in sort of moving away from the 
rights-based approach is simply that that we don’t want to be 
responsible before providing all these expensive drugs and treatments 
                                                                  
242 ibid. 
243 ibid. 
 176 
to patients. Which is very different from Brazil, but then the courts sort 
of say, you just have to provide it. It is the courts that have been 
interpreting right to life to also mean right to health.244 
 
Therefore, in mooring the treatment access activism on the right to life, CSOs in India 
have been able to reinterpret and even strike down IP laws that impede access to 
medications. In fact, in the F Hoffmann-LA Roche AG v Cipla Ltd case,245 the court 
based its decision on the right to life, which it interpreted as the right to health. In this 
case, the plaintiff Roche sought an interim injunction to restrain Cipla from 
manufacturing and selling the generic version of the cancer drug Erlotinib (sold under 
the brand name Tarceva), for which the plaintiff holds a patent. In his decision, the 
judge ruled that the right to life will be denied if the general public is denied access to 
life-saving drugs and the effect of such denial is un-compensable. In this regard, in 
granting the injunction, the ‘Court would in effect be stifling Article 21 [which 
protects the right to life] so far as those [who] would have or could have access to 
Erloticip are concerned.’246 Based on this, the court dismissed the injunction.   
 
Voluntary Licence  
A VL is where an ‘innovator pharmaceutical company of a patented product offers, 
on his own accord, a licence to a third party (usually a generic producer) to produce, 
vend and distribute the patented product.’247 In exchange, the generic producer(s) 
‘pays royalty to the innovator company on the net sales made by the licensee.’248 
 
Since India harmonised its law with TRIPS standards, there has been a gradual 
increase in the number of VLs between Indian generic companies and foreign MNCs. 
Indian companies such as Dr. Reddy’s, Aurobindo, Cadila Healthcare, and Torrent 
have entered into supply agreements with MNCs such as GSK, Astrazeneca, and 
Abbott. For example, when Gilead’s patent for HIV drug Viread was rejected in 2006, 
it signed voluntary non-exclusive licences with 11 Indian generic companies for the 
manufacturing and sale of the drug while awaiting the decision on its appeal.249 It also 
                                                                  
244 Fieldwork interview with Menghaney (n 230). 
245 F Hoffmann-LA Roche AG v Cipla Ltd (2008) IA 642/2008 IN CS (OS) 89/2008, IA 642/2008 IN CS (OS) 89 
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signed further licences that included patents on the product Emtricitabine (FTC), sold 
under the trade name Emtriva, and combinations of Tenofivir disoproxil fumarate  
(TDF) and FTC, sold under the trade name Truvada, or the once-a-day triple 
combination product TDF+FTC+Efavirenz (EFV), sold under the trade name 
Atripla.250 The licensees in India include Emcure Pharmaceuticals, Hetero Drugs, 
Strides Arcolab, Alkem Laboratories, Aurobindo Pharma, FDC Ltd., J.B. Chemicals 
& Pharmaceuticals, Matrix Laboratories, Medchem International, Ranbaxy 
Laboratories, and Shasun Chemicals & Drugs, and the licence covers 99 countries. In 
addition, Gilead reportedly required companies seeking VLs to withdraw patent 
oppositions.251  
 
Many scholars and health activists view the latest wave of VLs as unconscionable and 
objectionable. As Gilead does not have patents for two of the FTC or combinations 
involving FTC in India while the patent decision for TDF is still pending, Gilead is 
able to control the Indian competition by signing an agreement with potential 
competitors whilst undermining India’s progressive patent laws. According to MSF, 
this leads to ‘restricted competition.’252 The significance of the agreement is that it 
neutralises competition from generic companies, which would have otherwise filed 
patent oppositions and/or CLs to manufacture the drugs.  
 
In 2014, Gilead also issued another set of VLs to 11 Indian companies to manufacture 
and sell Sovaldi, a patented Hepatitis C drug in several low- and middle-income 
countries.253 The deals entitle the licensees to full technology transfer of the Gilead 
manufacturing process to enable them to boost production, and the licensees are free 
to fix their own prices for their versions against a seven per cent royalty payment on 
low generic sales to Gilead.254 In addition, the geographical scope of the agreements 
excludes certain middle-income countries with high rates of Hepatitis C, such as 
Brazil and Ukraine. The deals have generated a lot of division among health activists 
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within and outside India as many see it as a move by Gilead to tightly control 
competition. This type of tie-ups, activists assert, will mean fewer patent 
challenges.255 Tahir Amir contends that ‘Gilead’s action is a strategic move to 
leverage its relevant drugs’ potential and save its patent protection.’256 According to 
James Love, the highly restrictive licencing ‘falls short of ensuring widespread 
affordable access to these new drugs in middle-income countries, where over 70 [per 
cent] of people with hepatitis C live today.’257 However, other actors do not see this as 
an issue. D. G. Shah believes that this will promote competition and further drive 
down prices.258  
 
Regardless, it is clear that a VL, in the manner being pursued by Gilead and others, 
limits the option of full use of flexibilities such as CLs and patent oppositions. This is 
not surprising as big Indian generics, in collaboration with foreign MNCs, will be 
reluctant to file CL applications because it would be seen as a direct affront to the 
MNCs. Besides, collaboration with foreign MNCs via VL tie-ups means that the 
Indian counterparts have better chances of tapping those markets. Further, the 
growing number of VLs between foreign MNCs and foreign generic companies has 
led to schism between parts of the generic industry and parts of civil society, 
according to Shamnad Basheer.259 This is because the collaboration between foreign 
MNCs and local generic companies diminishes the propensity of local generics to 
team up with civil society groups on patent challenges.  
 
Mergers and Acquisitions  
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) within the Indian pharmaceutical industry is not a 
new phenomenon. What is new in the post-TRIPS situation is the drive with which 
MNCs are trying to expand not only in the patented markets, but also in the generic 
markets.260 In recent years, the share of MNCs in the domestic formulations market 
has dramatically increased from less than 20 per cent in March 2008 to 28 per cent in 
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December 2010.261 Notable takeovers include the takeover of Ranbaxy by Daiichi 
Sankyo in June 2008, Orchid by Hospira USA, Piramal by Abbott (US), Shantha by 
Sanofi Aventis, Matrix by Mylan (US), and Para by Reckitt Benkiser, to mention a 
few.  
 
Also, most of these acquisitions are brown field in nature, which is when a company 
purchases or leases existing production facilities to launch a new production activity. 
While various factors point to the reason for these M&As, what should be worrying is 
the position and independence of indigenous firms to push forward counter-
hegemonic norms on patent law. It also raises the question of India’s self-sufficiency 
and health security as key indigenous firms are now in foreign hands. It also affects 
manufacturing as most of the foreign firms are interested in importation instead of 
local manufacturing. According to Gopakumar of the TWN, M&As are akin to India 
‘giving away its prime companies, and raises question on of Indian ability to 
independently use the flexibilities in [its] patent law.’262 MSF Coordinator Leena 
Menghaney further adds: ‘Today Indian [pharma] industries no longer an Indian 
industry. What we have are big pharma’s little mini-GSKs. It would be stupid to say 
that [we] have Indian generic industry, which is independent, and takes on 
challenges.’263 Other key actors do not see this as a problem. According to 
Gopakumar Nair, president of IDMA, M&As are a good opportunity for medium-
sized Indian companies to take over the mantle of leadership and fill the vacuum left 
by big generics.264  
 
 
4.5 Summarising the Indian Context 
This chapter has shown the sophisticated space in which law, in this case patent law, 
interacts with actors in the local spaces. It has also been shown that there is a 
hegemonic order and counter-hegemonic contestation co-existing in the Indian IP 
sphere.  
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Adopting a twailian lens in the form of a historiographical mapping of the patent 
regime in India provides complementary insights into the specific ‘rationalities’ 
setting the parameters of colonial patent law. Specifically, it revealed how MNCs 
exercised their patent rights and prevented Indian companies from undertaking basic 
drug manufacturing. This not only stunted the growth of the sector but made essential 
medicines in India one of the most expensive at that time. By introducing the IPA, 
which abolished product patent protection in pharmaceuticals, the post-colonial 
Indian state developed a regime to suit its own distinctive set of concerns. This led to 
the growth of a globally competitive domestic industry. This signifies, from a twailian 
lens, a pertinent example of a dynamic subaltern resistance and reform – a capacity to 
revolt effectively against misappropriations of the formal norms and institutions of 
international law.265 Adoption of Section 3(d) marked a turning point for health and 
development policy in India. Instituting a stricter standard of non-obviousness and 
novelty for obtaining a patent reaffirmed India’s primary commitment to protecting its 
citizens’ lives and health.  
 
Using nodal governance theory, it can be seen how the expansion of IP law among 
non-state actors responded not just to material interests, but also to acts of framing 
that allowed these actors to interpret their interests, build alliances, and persuade the 
court and the state to support their cause. The IPAA and subsequent use of flexibility 
clauses enshrined within the law exemplifies how civil society groups and generic 
manufacturers have both used the language of human right to life and the need for 
pharmaceutical autonomy in political action to promote public policy change. In fact, 
the activism of CSOs in invoking the opposition clauses provides a rich account of the 
new politics of IP and the way nodal mobilisation has co-evolved in the shadow of 
law.  
 
Thus far, Indian scholars, health activists, and pharmaceutical companies (both 
foreign and generic) continue to disagree on the overall best patent policy fit for India. 
Some argue in favour of higher and tighter thresholds to prevent ever-greening and 
ensure access. Others are against this, suggesting that patents would limit the 
innovation and R&D required for developing new drugs. Admittedly, India’s patent 
law contains provisions targeting industry development and enabling transfer of 
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technology by ensuring local manufacturing and preventing frivolous patents that 
could jeopardise access. This contestation has also spilled out into other areas; key 
actors are working within both the legal and market spaces to carve out counter-
norms, thereby expanding the aperture on discourse on medicine access and patent 
law. This will undoubtedly shape how Indian patent law will be construed in the 
future. Nonetheless, the prosaic events happening within India has shown the move to 
local jurisdictions as the foci of legal development.   
 
Lastly, the Indian government’s position with IP policy in recent years has been a 
confusing one, with the government seemingly trying to placate the US, while also 
trying to placate civil society, thus having contrary positions. With respect to the 
latter, the government recently set up an IP think tank to develop a national IPR 
policy that will lay the future roadmap for IP in India. Recommendations from the 
think tank include the setting up of a National Institute of Excellence on IPRs to 
enhance awareness of IPRs among all stakeholders, expedited patent examination, an 
IP exchange, and the encouragement of Corporate Social Responsibility funds into 
open innovation. It remains to be seen if these will be implemented by the 
government.  
 
The next chapter will demonstrate how the post-colonial patent regime in Nigeria, in 
contrast to Brazil and India, was introduced without regard to economic realities or as 
a matter of deliberate industrial policy. As a result, there is a sense in which lack of 
patent policy should be underscored as a critical part of the Nigerian patent law 
history. As will be seen, the failure of law reform is a corollary to the discourse of 
(failed) economic reforms as it affects patenting and the patent regime in Nigeria.  
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5.    Nigeria  
Introduction 
As observed in the last chapter, India insisted on adapting its patent regime to suit its local 
need for affordable high-quality drugs and to foster the development of a robust 
pharmaceutical sector. Accordingly, the country implemented a patent regime that spurred the 
development of its drugs sector. This push for a custom patent regime was also reflected in 
India’s efforts towards the inclusion of flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement during the 
Uruguay Round negotiations and the subsequent legislative implementation of innovative 
flexibilities. In so doing, the country was not only able to carve out a policy space within the 
seemingly restrictive TRIPS space but also protected its subsector from ever-greening 
practices.  In post-TRIPS India, however, private sector and civil society groups involved in 
the intersection of pharmaceuticals and health continue to expand the aperture on norms 
governing patent laws, and highlighting in the process the tension a developing country faces 
between policy requirements and political pressures on one hand, and between incentivising 
the creation of new medicines and ensuring maximum possible access to medicines on the 
other.  
 
In this chapter, the focus is on Nigeria – the second largest economy in Africa, with a growing 
population and expanding industrial sector. Apart from being the researcher’s country, the 
choice of Nigeria as a case study on the intersection between patent law, development, and 
access to medicine discourse is informed by two factors. First, Nigeria currently has the 
second largest economy and is the most populous country in Africa. This prominent position 
affords the country the power to influence and set policy agenda on norms governing patent 
law and public policy discourse in sub-Saharan Africa. Second, the country has always been a 
significant interlocutor for Africa and the Global South at various international forums. At the 
onset and in the course of the Uruguay Round negotiations that established the WTO, 
especially during the TRIPS Agreement negotiations, Nigeria was outspoken in its objection 
to the inclusion of an IP regime within the multilateral trade framework. Nevertheless, there is 
a sharp disconnect between government rhetoric at international forums and government 
actions at the local level. This is in stark contrast to the prevailing situation in traditional 
‘TRIPS opponent’ countries such as Brazil and India, whose stance at international forums is 
usually reflective of their IP policies at home.  
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Three main issues are discussed in this chapter. First, the conceptualisation of patent by the 
state, i.e. in law and by policymakers. Second, the interpretation of this understanding of 
patent into law and policy vis-à-vis the TRIPS Agreement; that is, how ideas circulate, the 
particular way in which policy options are constructed – and, as an extension, how others are 
extinguished. Third, how non-state actors – private sector and civil society groups – challenge 
and/or influence this understanding and conceptualisation of patent into law and policy.  
 
In investigating these three issues, the thesis has found a deficit in the engagement and 
conceptualisation of the patent regime by both the state and non-state actors because patent is 
not seen as a useful tool in policy or a problem to be solved in the first place. Further, patent 
stakeholders such as the private sector and civil society groups, which have played (and 
continues to play) a foundational role in the cognitive shaping and production of knowledge 
on patents in Brazil and India, are absent in Nigeria. This is because the country lacks the 
presence of these key influencers who would have been traditionally involved in the 
problematizing of patent discourse. As a result, patent regime has never been significant in the 
Nigerian context and does not work the way it does in Brazil and India. 
 
The rest of the chapter is divided as follows: Part I provides a detailed evolution of patent law 
in Nigeria in order to contextualise and unpack the Nigerian encounter with patent law. While 
this exercise shows a legal and historical disconnect caused by the absence of interaction 
between foreign patent law and local actors or institutions, resulting in little direct benefit to 
the country, the hasty implementation of a post-colonial patent law by the military 
government also laid a shaky ground for rewriting patent law that is reflective of the country’s 
socio-economic reality and of benefit to the Nigerian people. With focus on key aspects of the 
law, Part II situates the current Nigerian Patent Act vis-à-vis the TRIPS Agreement to show 
how the latter interacts with laws, institutions, and actors at the domestic level. In this section, 
the role of courts in deciding the substantive issue of patent law is also discussed. Part III 
captures the attitude of the Nigerian state towards patents by reflecting on the ‘official’ use of 
patents provided in the Patents and Designs Act of 1990 (PDA) as an effective mechanism for 
achieving the cardinal goals of public health care and economic development. In essence, the 
thesis looks at how the language of patent is employed and deployed by the National Office 
for Technology Acquisition and Promotion (NOTAP) and among policymakers. In so doing, 
the thesis maps how ideas circulate – the particular way in which policy options are selected 
and others rejected. Part IV examines the dynamics of patent discourse by probing into how 
the private sector and civil society groups engage, if at all, with patent discourse. This chapter 
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also shows how the implementation of select Nigerian government policies such as the 
Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree, the ISI policy, and the IMF/World Bank SAP 
eviscerated pharmaceutical manufacturing companies while years of military regime 
corrupted civil society psyche, thus blunting activism. In juxtaposing these actors and 
conceptual sites, the thesis shows how these policies advertently disembowelled the 
pharmaceutical sector, weakened civil society groups, and incapacitated regulatory 
institutions from active engagement with patent regime. Part V concludes this chapter by 
summarising the Nigerian context. 
 
The findings in this chapter show how seemingly unrelated factors affect the way patent is 
conceptualised in law and policy vis-à-vis public health and development. In contextualising 
the law, policies, and local socio-economic events, this chapter shows that any developmental 
and legal inquiry that favours a mechanical harmonisation with the TRIPS Agreement to the 
whims of foreign interests or institutions, or transplanting the experiences of other subaltern 
countries, is unsuitable for Nigeria. Instead, any future discourse, legal reform, and policy 
recommendation on patent law should be cognizant of not only the country’s past failures and 
its unique environment, but also the structural and governance gaps that have hindered the 
development of a progressive patent regime in Nigeria.  
 
 
5.1 Historical Evolution of the Patent Regime in Nigeria  
Colonial Encounters 
As a former British colony, patent law was first introduced to the Lagos colony and the 
Southern Protectorate1 in 1900 through the Patent Ordinance2 and the Patent Proclamation.3 
Two years later, the Patent Proclamation of 1902 introduced patent law and protection to the 
Northern Protectorate.4 Each of these enactments contained full-scale provisions for the 
recognition, grant, and control of patents in Nigeria and were comparable to the English law 
on the subject at that time. Applications for patents were made to the patent office, appeals 
from the decisions of the Registrar were brought before the Attorney General who had the 
power to consider such appeals, and patents were granted to a successful applicant by the 
                                                                  
1 The Southern Protectorate consisted mainly of Lagos and the Southwest region of Nigeria. The British annexed Lagos in 
1861. 
2 Patent Ordinance No 27 (1900). See Bankole AA Sodipo, ‘Piracy and Counterfeiting: The Freedom to Copy vs Intellectual 
Property Rights’ (PhD thesis, Queen Mary, University of London 1995) 41. 
3 Patent Ordinance No 17 (1900). 
4 The Northern Protectorate consisted of the North Central, Northeast, and Northwest of modern Nigeria. 
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High Commissioner in the name of the Crown.5  
 
In 1914, the Southern and Northern protectorates were amalgamated to create modern-day 
Nigeria. In 1916, a new patent law – the Patent Ordinance of 1916 – repealed previous patent 
ordinances and made the new ordinance applicable throughout the newly formed country. The 
UK Patent Ordinance of 1925 was subsequently introduced in Nigeria, replacing the Patent 
Ordinance of 1916. Titled the Registration of UK Patent Ordinance,6 it disallowed patent 
application in Nigeria and instead provided for the registration in Nigeria of patents already 
granted in the UK as long as the application for registration was made within three years from 
the date of issue of the patent.7 This law established a dependent patent regime8 in which 
patent application could no longer be made in Nigeria while only patents granted in the UK 
can be registered in Nigeria. It also conferred rights and privileges in Nigeria to the extent that 
these were granted by the UK law. In other words, the Patent Ordinance of 1925 only allowed 
for and recognised British patents.  
 
Furthermore, the Patent Ordinance of 1925 also excluded patents granted in other countries 
from registration in Nigeria – a ploy employed to maintain a British monopoly of the Nigerian 
market.9 For example, a seminal study by Owen Adekibi on the Nigerian patent system 
between 1949 to 1970 found that out of the 2,250 patents registered between 1949 to 1970, 
about 64 per cent were owned by UK citizens or enterprises and the rest by citizens of other 
countries.10 This shows bias for patents based in the UK. Furthermore, about 90 per cent of 
this figure was registered during the decade following Nigeria’s independence from Britain in 
1960. This scramble for patent protection, according to Adekibi, suggests the ‘apprehension 
of foreigners, mainly British, about the change in government and the possibility of increased 
competition in the industrial capabilities in the Nigerian market.’11 Importantly, it shows that 
the colonial patent regime, which lasted over five decades, was not only created from the 
perspective and for the benefit of colonial powers but also for the protection of colonial 
territorial rights and privileges acquired under a patent granted in the metropolitan country.12 
An analysis of the Patent Ordinance of 1925 in Nigeria and Act VI of 1856, Act V of 1859, 
and subsequent laws enacted by the British during the colonial rule in India – which were 
                                                                  
5 Gaius Ezejiofor, ‘The Law of Patents in Nigeria: A Review’ (1973) 39 African Legal Studies 40.  
6 Patent Ordinance No 6 (1925). 
7 Ezejiofor (n 5). 
8 Edith Penrose, ‘International Patenting and the Less-Developed Countries’ (1973) 83 The Economic Journal 770. 
9 Owen T Adikibi, ‘The Multinational Corporation and Monopoly of Patents in Nigeria’ (1988) 16 World Development 512. 
10 ibid 512. 
11 ibid 517. 
12 Ezejiofor (n 5). 
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discussed in the previous chapter – shows their marked similarity. These laws were 
introduced by Britain and instituted dependent patent regimes in the respective colonies. This 
is not surprising; neither is it a strictly British endeavour. Colonial metropolis such as France, 
Belgium, and Portugal often applied legal rule from the centre to the colonies. Indeed, the 
Paris Convention allowed patent laws of the colonial metropolis to regulate issues of patent in 
the various colonies.13 The consequence of this is Nigeria’s adoption of both the strength and 
weakness of the English system without regard for prevailing local circumstances such as 
economic and infrastructural underdevelopment, high poverty and illiteracy rates, and other 
compelling factors bothering on security and otherwise.  
 
The institutionalisation of English patent laws in Nigeria have been critiqued as unnecessary 
and irrelevant to the local population by many scholars because it did not take into account 
already existing indigenous laws and customs for recognising and rewarding creative 
inventions. Specifically, critics contend that the introduction of a patent regime when 
industrialisation was still at a nascent stage in Nigeria was not only regressive, but also 
reflects the reality that the introduction of a patent regime in Nigeria by colonial powers was 
for the exploitation of local resources and market instead of the encouragement of local 
innovation.14 This is because patents registered in foreign countries are not taken for the 
interests of the economy granting the patents or with a view to manufacture there, but with the 
main objective of protecting an export market from rival manufacturers, particularly those in 
other parts of the world. According to Adebambo Adewopo, the patent regime in existence at 
that time was not based on one of the justifications for patents, which is to reward the 
inventor for his/her invention, thereby encouraging creativity. Rather, it was put in place for 
the interest of the imperial powers.15 Echoing the same sentiment, George Sipa-Adjah Yankey 
opines: 
 
[The colonial patent regime] was never meant to encourage either indigenous 
inventive activity, local research and development, innovation or to 
accomplish an effective transfer of technology. It was geared rather towards 
the protection of property rights in machinery technology relevant for the 
exploitation of gold and other mineral and human resources in the colonies.16 
                                                                  
13 See GHC Bodenhausen, Guide to the Application of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (as 
Revised at Stockholm in 1967) ((Colombettes 32) United International Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual Property 
1968) 18.  
14 See Okechukwu Timothy Umahi, 'Access to Medicines: The Colonial Impacts on Patent Law of Nigeria' 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1975928> accessed 15 March 2015. 
15 Adebambo Adewopo, ‘Public Health, Access to Medicines and Role of Patent System in Nigeria’ (2011) Nigerian Journal 
of Intellectual Property Law 169 (‘Public Health, Access to Medicines and Role of Patent System in Nigeria’). 
16  George Sipa-Adjah Yankey, ‘The Role of International Patent System in the Transfer of Technology to West Africa: Case 
Studies of Ghana and Nigeria’ (PhD, University of Warwick 1987) 106. 
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This is certainly true in the case of colonial patent law in Nigeria. According to Adekibi, of 
the 2,250 patents granted between 1949 to 1970, 67 per cent of patented processes were 
standardised and widely available, 22 per cent were obsolete, while 11 per cent were 
considered worthy for the grant of a patent.17 In this vein, the system was calculated to benefit 
British patent owners and exploit the local population. Much of the funds accumulated went 
into reserve in Britain to serve the metropole’s post-war needs.18  
 
Further, most of the patents granted were not locally worked or utilised in Nigeria. That is, the 
patented items were not produced in the patent-granting developing country but were 
imported. This distorted market forces and enabled foreign patent holders to charge prices 
higher than they could expect under more competitive conditions in the absence of patents. 
This underscored the points put forward by Vaitsos and Penrose that the introduction of a 
patent regime in a least developed country – which Nigeria and India were at that time – 
negates the industrialisation objectives of those countries because the system encourages 
foreign monopolies.19 These patents, Penrose specifically notes, did not assist in 
industrialisation, benefit local industry, encourage foreign investment, nor stimulate local 
manufacturing by local businessmen. This is because these patents were sought primarily to 
enhance the monopoly position of the foreign patentees in the local market.20 As a result, the 
patent system stifled the growth of indigenous technological capacities and innovation which 
could have developed through imitation and adaptation.  
 
Looking back, Nigeria adopted a patent system at a nascent industrialisation stage. Even when 
a patent system was put in place, none of the patents granted were exploited by patent owners 
or even licenced to local producers. Since it had very few inventions worth patenting in 
developed countries, the country did not receive the ‘expected reciprocal advantages from 
granting patents to foreigners on inventions worked in those countries.’21 Consequently, 
instead of achieving its stated objectives such as contributing to research, development, and 
transfer for technology, the colonial patent regime achieved the contrary. The system instead 
allowed patent owners, mostly foreigners, monopoly control of local market, stifling local 
development and restricting the transfer of technology as a result.  
 
                                                                  
17 Adikibi (n 9) 517. 
18 Bill Freund, ‘Oil Boom and Crisis in Contemporary Nigeria’ (1978) 5 Review of African Political Economy 91, 92.  
19 See Constantine Vaitsos, ‘Patents Revisited: Their Function in Developing Countries’ (1972) 9 The Journal of 
Development Studies; Penrose (n 8) 785. 
20 Penrose (n 8) 785. 
21 ibid. 
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Post-Colonial Spectacle 
On 1 October 1960, Nigeria obtained its independence from Great Britain. However, it was 
not until Rhone - SA Poulenc and May & Baker v Lodeka Pharmacy (Rhone-Poulenc case)22 – 
which tested the applicability of colonial patent laws – that the first patent case was heard.  
 
In the Rhone-Poulenc case, the parties were importers of chemical products and other 
pharmaceutical preparations. The claimants, Rhone - SA Poulenc and May & Baker, took out 
a UK patent for chlorpromazine in 1951, which they subsequently registered in Nigeria in 
1957 under the Patent Ordinance of 1925 as Patent Number 367. In 1964, the Federal 
Ministry of Health placed a supply order for the patented product chlorpromazine under the 
market name Largactil. The defendant, an indigenous pharmaceutical company called Lodeka 
Pharmacy, supplied large quantities of the patented product to the Federal Ministry of Health. 
Additionally, the defendant displayed the drug at a National Trade Fair that same year.  
 
The claimants sued Lodeka Pharmacey, alleging that the latter infringed on their patent by 
selling, storing, and offering for sale the patented product. During trial, the defendant 
acknowledged the patent right of the claimants, but argued that the importation of the 
patented product was no infringement as the product was imported under the request of the 
Federal Ministry of Health on behalf of the Nigerian government for public use. The 
defendant relied on Section 46(1) of the UK Patents Act of 1949, which stated that 
‘notwithstanding anything in this Act, any Government department, and any person 
authorized in writing by a Government department, may make, use and exercise any patented 
invention for the service of the Crown in accordance with the provisions of this section.’23  
 
The judge issued an interim injunction against Lodeka Pharmacy to prevent further 
infringement pending the determination of the case. In deciding the case, the judge ruled that 
the patent law did not apply to the Nigerian government in its totality as the Patent Ordinance 
of 1925 as well as Section 46 of the UK Patents Act of 1949 do not permit the Nigerian 
government to exercise the prerogative of the British Crown.24 In his ruling, Justice Ikepeazu 
specifically held that: 
 
[The] only significant effect the 1949 Act had in Nigeria was in respect of the 
                                                                  
22 (1965) LLR 9. 
23 Umahi (n 14) 10-11. 
24 Ezejiofor (n 5). 
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rights and privileges that ensued from the issuance of a certificate of 
registration after the registration of a United Kingdom patent in Nigeria as 
provided by s. 6 of 1925 ordinance. Therefore, the re-registration law does not 
permit the Nigerian government to exercise the Crown prerogative under the 
Act to supply patented drug.25 
 
Consequently, His Lordship gave judgment in favour of the applicant and issued a permanent 
injunction against the defendant.  
 
The negative ruling of the Rhone-Poulenc case prompted the then Federal Military 
Government to repeal the Patent Act of 1925 in 1968 and introduce the Patents (Limitation) 
Decree of 1968.26 This new decree allowed the government to purchase patented 
pharmaceutical products (under the Government Use clause). Specifically, Section 15 of the 
Patents (Limitation) Decree empowered the Health Commissioner to authorise any person, 
including government departments, to purchase, make, use, and vend any patented articles for 
the services of a government agency in the Federation if he was satisfied it is in the public 
interest to do so.27 The Decree also exempted the government from infringement of a patent 
granted with respect to the articles concerned or the liability to pay royalties or compensation 
to the patentee.28 Further, the Decree authorised the Permanent Secretary of the concerned 
Ministry to give the patentee such information as he pleased concerning the extent of use.29 
Finally, special provision was made for the use of these powers in times of national 
emergency such as war, for the service of the war and the maintenance of the economy. 
According to Yankey, the Decree was modelled after the BIRPI30 Model Law for developing 
countries31 because of Nigeria’s active participation as the Acting Registrar of Patents in the 
various proceedings that eventually resulted in the birth of the BIRPI Model Law.32 The 
BIRPI Model has often been criticised as unreflective of the specificities of different socio-
economic realities and aspirations of developing countries.33 Thus, it is not surprising that the 
essence of the policy behind the patent system still remains elusive in the face of a public 
health and development crisis in Nigeria.34  
 
The Patents (Limitation) Decree was a reaction to the Rhone-Poulenc case, and was created to 
                                                                  
25 Ezejiofor (n 5). See also Umahi (n 14) 10 -11; Sodipo (n 2) 46-47. 
26 Patents (Limitation) Decree No 8 (1968). 
27 ibid, s 15. 
28 ibid, s 1(3). 
29  ibid, s 1. 
30 BIRPI stands for Bureaux Internationaux Reunis pour la Protection de la Propiete Intellectuelle (United International 
Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual Property). It was the predecessor of the WIPO, the global governing body for IP-
related issues. 
31 Yankey (n 16) 213. 
32 ibid. 
33 Ulf Anderfelt, International Patent-Legislation and Developing Countries (Martinus Nijhoff 1971) 210.  
34 Umahi (n 14) 6. 
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essentially limit the powers of the patentee and protect the government from infringement. It 
was introduced at a time when Nigeria had no robust national technological or industrial base. 
In this respect, the law was not enacted to positively encourage domestic inventiveness, 
support the local industrial base to harness economic development objectives, or address a 
particular policy need. This was unlike the situation in Brazil35 and India36 where extensive 
studies were carried out to understand the utility of a patent regime for development. Those 
studies found that patents not only encouraged monopoly practices but also stunted 
technological development. It was based on the findings on the impact of patents that the 
Indian Patent Act of 1972 and Brazil’s Law Number 5.772/71 of 1971 – which respectively 
prohibited the patentability of processes for food, chemical, and medicines – were enacted. In 
both countries, the new patent laws were developed to ensure that patents were more 
conducive to and worked for national development interests.  
 
This was not the case in Nigeria as the post-independent patent law was a knee-jerk reaction 
to the decision of the Rhone-Poulenc case. It was a serious counter-movement against the 
strengthening and modernisation of the patent regime to make it favourable to economic 
development. If anything, it shows an acute lack of understanding of the linkages between law 
and development and at worst, made a spectacle of the whole legislative process. This law 
was not crafted to encourage indigenous inventive activity and continues to be a handicap to 
various sectors and national development. It is important to note that this was the time of the 
first military junta following the 1966 counter-coup that overthrew a civilian government. The 
military era was known by arbitrary decrees and the flagrant disregard of established legal 
rules and system, to mention a few. Historical studies of Nigeria’s military regime have 
observed that several socio-economic, political, and legal policies implemented during that 
period had little or no positive impact on the socio-economic development of the country.37  
As will be seen, the lack of evidence-based patent law making (and development policy in 
general) was insidiously felt a couple of years later when Nigeria could not effectively 
marshal the windfall of high oil prices to develop an indigenous manufacturing base.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                  
35 Ch 3, s 3.1. 
36 Ch 4, s 4.1. 
37 Ajibola A Abdulrahman, ‘The Impact of Military Rule on Nigeria’s Nation Building, 1966-1979’ (2014) 15 Historical 
Research Letter; Patrick Oluseun Bamgboye, ‘The Military and Socio-Economic Development in Nigeria (1983-1999) A 
Critical Appraisal’ (2014) 5 Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences; Max Siollun, Nigeria’s Military Coup Culture: From 
Major Nzeogwu to LT-Colonel Dimka (1966-1976) (2009). 
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Global Struggle 
Nigeria was among the Group of Ten countries,38 led by Brazil and India, that initially 
opposed the inclusion of IP rules within the global trade framework. The Nigerian delegate at 
the Brussels Ministerial Meeting, for example, argued that: 
 
 
GATT should confine itself to only trade-related issues and not the regime of 
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights as the latter would 
impose an unbearable burden on us [Nigeria] and stifle [the country’s] 
aspirations towards access to technology.39 
 
Thus, Nigeria saw the whole process of TRIPS as an imposition by the developed countries 
from its inception. However, it is interesting to note that while Nigeria contested the inclusion 
of IP rules at the GATT negotiations, arguing that the inclusion of such a regime will force 
the country to make legal adjustments inconsistent with its level of development, the country 
had already locally implemented what could be seen as a maximalist IP regime detrimental to 
its development. This showed a sharp disconnect between the government’s rhetoric at 
international forums and its policies at home. Thus for Nigeria, there is a significant 
divergence between its stance at the Uruguay Round and the reality in its domestic turf.  
 
As part of the Single Undertaking package, Nigeria signed up to and accepted the TRIPS 
Agreement when it acceded to the WTO. Being a developing country, Nigeria was given a 
10-year transition period to phase into the TRIPS Agreement. However, even though the 
country was supposed to change its IP laws to be TRIPS-compliant in 2005, it has yet to do 
so. In fact, efforts by several foreign organisations such as the USTR, the WIPO, and the 
WHO to help the country bring its patent law into compliance with the TRIPS Agreement by 
2005 were futile. A WHO official who worked closely on the issue shared that: 
 
It was really difficult to get the law passed. Between 2002 and 2004, we 
conducted extensive seminars and sensitization classes with both law makers 
and civil society groups but nothing happened. The lawmakers were not 
interested and the civil society groups were simply interested in basic service 
delivery and access to donor funds. Also at the end of the electoral term, the 
old lawmakers were replaced with new ones, which meant we had to start the 
training all over again. It was really tiring and disheartening. The IP Bill has 
been on the floor of the [House of Assembly] for years and nothing has 
happened. After a while I stopped following up.40 
                                                                  
38 Known as the Group of Ten, these countries were Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Egypt, India, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Peru, 
Tanzania, and Yugoslavia. 
39 Senas J Ukpanah, ‘Statement at the Ministerial Level Meeting in Brussels (MTN.TNC/MIN (90)/ST/34, Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, Uruguay Rounds)’ (1990).  
40 Fieldwork interview with WHO official (Abuja, October 2014) (transcript on file with author). 
  192 
 
In a similar vein, an official at the Federal Ministry of Health concedes that the ‘bill has not 
been passed but when it does come into law, it will be progressive because the West African 
Health Organization (WAHO)41 provided the guideline for the drafting of the bill.’42 
According to him, the guidelines provide for a harmonised TRIPS implementation across 
ECOWAS member states and strengthen the maximum utilisation of the TRIPS flexibilities 
and safeguards.  
 
Despite not amending its patent law in light of its TRIPS commitments, Nigeria has not yet 
been subject to full WTO dispute settlement procedures (DSP) or US Section 301 sanctions. 
The last WTO Trade Policy Review of Nigeria published in 2011 notes not only that the 
national law on IP remains unchanged, but also that the country has a weak enforcement and 
management system.43 Similarly, the 2016 USTR Special 301 Report found the country to 
have ineffective or inadequate IPR protection systems and is an ‘entry point […] into Africa 
for counterfeit and pirated goods—often threatening health and safety.’44 This raises the 
important question of why the country has not undergone DSP. As will be seen, the answer 
lies in the absence of countervailing forces in the form of a strong pharmaceutical sector to 
move the country towards compliance. At the time of writing, Nigeria has not yet updated its 
laws to comply with the TRIPS Agreement even though aspects of its legal regime conforms 
to relevant provisions of the TRIPS Agreement.45 
 
5.2 Unpacking the Patents and Designs Act of 1990 
The patent regime currently in force in Nigeria stems from the Patent Ordinance Decree 
promulgated by the military after the decision in the Rhone-Poulenc case. In 1970, the Patent 
Ordinance Decree was changed into the PDA of 1970.46 The PDA was updated in 1990 and is 
still in force to date.  
 
                                                                  
41 The WAHO is the regional Agency of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and is charged with 
the responsibility of safeguarding the health of the peoples in the sub-region. ECOWAS members include Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. 
42 Fieldwork interview with Tile Tano, Deputy Director, Food and Drugs Services, Ministry of Health (Abuja, November 
2014) (transcript on file with author). 
43 World Trade Organization, ‘Trade Policy Review: Nigeria’ (WTO 2011) 39. 
44 Office of the US Trade Representative, ‘The 2016 Special 301 Report’ (USTR 2016) 16 
<https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/USTR-2016-Special-301-Report.pdf> accessed 3 May 2016.  
45 Nigeria has been a member of the Paris Convention since 1963, a member of the WTO since 1995, and a member of the 
Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) since 2005. 
46 Patents and Designs Act (1990), Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, ch 344 <http://www.nigeria-
law.org/Patents%20and%20Designs%20Act.htm> accessed 2 April 2014 (PDA). 
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This section specifically focuses on five areas – patentable subject matters (i.e. what can and 
cannot be patented as well as the criterion for patentability), rights granted by the PDA, and 
flexibilities within the PDA (such as compulsory licence provisions and government use). 
Focusing on these sections allows for a critique and analysis of the PDA to show how it 
interacts with laws, institutions, and actors in Nigeria. The analysis from this section shows 
that although flexibilities and safeguards exist in Nigerian patent law, such law can still be 
exploited for health purposes. The section concludes by arguing that the mantle falls not only 
on the courts but also on the legislative arm of the government (House of Assembly) to 
marshal and approve progressive patent legislation, the civil society to educate the legislators 
on existing progressive alternatives elsewhere, and the regulatory agencies to enforce the 
modus operandi of IPRs. At this juncture, it is important to note there exists a new, yet to be 
approved IP Bill47 pending before the Nigerian House of Assembly, however, the analysis in 
this section will focus on the current PDA. 
 
a) Patentable Subject Matters 
According to the PDA, an invention is patentable if it falls under two categories: (a) if it is 
new, results from inventive activity, and is capable of industrial application;48 and (b) if it 
constitutes an improvement upon a patented invention.49 The PDA defines a ‘new’ invention 
to be that which does not form part of the state of the art,50 while an invention is deemed to 
result from ‘inventive activity’ when it does not obviously follow from the state of the art, 
either as to the method, application, combination of methods, or product which it concerns, or 
as to the industrial result it produces.51 Finally, an invention is capable of industrial 
application if it ‘can be manufactured or used in any kind of industry, including agriculture.’52 
The PDA defines ‘state of the art’ as everything concerning that art or field of knowledge 
which has been made available to the public anywhere and at any time through any means 
(i.e. a written or oral description, by use, or in any other way).53 
 
                                                                  
47 This Bill – known as An Act to Provide for the Protection and Administration of Intellectual Property Rights and for Other 
Related Matters – provides for the establishment of an Intellectual Property Commission of Nigeria responsible for all 
matters relating to IPR administration and enforcement, as well as the creation of the Intellectual Property Appeal Board 
responsible for hearing and determining all IP matters. The Bill also codifies existing diverse legislation regarding the 
different categories of IP in Nigeria (such as the Copyright Act (2011), Trademarks Act (1990), and the PDA into a single 
document and provides for new legislation regarding utility models, layout designs, and the protection of traditional 
knowledge and expressions of folklore.  
48 PDA, s 1(1)(a). 
49 ibid, s 1(1)(b). 
50 ibid, s 2(a). 
51 ibid, s 2(b). 
52 ibid, s 2(c). 
53 ibid, s 3. 
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A close reading of Section 1(1)(b) reveals one of the many lacunae present in the PDA. 
Section 1(1)(b) could be deemed to refer to utility models or petty patents although there is no 
specific references to such in the PDA. According to the WIPO, a petty patent or utility 
innovation is an ‘exclusive right granted for an invention, which allows the right holder to 
prevent others from commercially using the protected invention, without his authorization, for 
a limited period of time.’54 Unlike patents, utility models are much cheaper to obtain, with 
less stringent requirements and for a shorter term – usually between seven to 10 years. 
Further, protection for utility models is often sought for innovations of a rather incremental 
character which may not meet the patentability criteria.55 In fact, while the requirement of 
‘novelty’ should be met for utility models, the requirement for ‘inventive step’ or ‘non-
obviousness’ may be much lower or altogether absent. This may lead to ever-greening or 
patent thickets – the latter described as a dense network of overlapping patents that slows 
down the commercialisation of new inventions.  
 
For an emerging economy like Nigeria with excruciating health burdens, patent application 
(and IP registration of any kind) should require a stringent examination procedure to prevent 
abuse of the system and protect public interest. When juxtaposed against the larger of goal of 
harnessing the IP regime for innovation and economic development and considering the fact 
there is no examination of either novelty or inventive activity, the PDA creates a loophole that 
could be exploited at the expense of the country and public interest. As such, any specific or 
vague reference to utility models in the PDA needs to be excluded. 
 
b) Exceptions to Patentability  
Under the PDA, non-patentable inventions include those that contravene public order or 
morality, plant or animal varieties or biological processes for the production of plants or 
animals,56 as well as principles and discoveries of a scientific nature. Unlike the Brazilian57 
and Indian Patent Acts, which include a broad list of non-patentable subject matters, the 
limited list in the PDA leaves the option open to all sorts of inventions and indeed, 
interpretations.  
 
Moreover, the inclusion of ‘principles and discoveries of scientific nature’ raises the pertinent 
question of whether pharmaceutical products and processes are patentable as there is no 
                                                                  
54  World Intellectual Property Organization, ‘Protecting Innovations by Utility Models’ 
<http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/ip_business/utility_models/utility_models.htm> accessed 3 March 2015.  
55 ibid.  
56 PDA, ss 1(4)(a), 1(4)(b), and 1(5). 
57 While the list of non-patentable matters is not explicitly codified in the Brazilian Patent Act, the Brazilian INPI Guidelines 
for the Examination of Patent Filings in the areas of Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals as well as the ANVISA subject 
matter guideline on what is held patentable in Brazil provide the parameter for patentable objects. See chapter 3. 
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guideline on what can be classified as discoveries of scientific nature. This lacuna creates a 
particular conundrum as pharmaceuticals and petrochemicals are the most patented inventions 
in Nigeria.58 According to the Patent Registrar, seven out of 10 patent applications received 
by the Patent Office are for pharmaceutical products and are mostly filed by foreign 
applicants.  
 
In fact, this issue of non-patentability of principles and discoveries of nature was raised in the 
case of Beijing Cotec New Technology Corp. & Churchbell Pharmaceutical v Greenlife 
Pharmaceuticals Co. Ltd. & Ors.59 Here, the plaintiffs Beijing Cotec New Technology Corp. 
(a foreign company) and Churchbell Pharmaceuticals (its Nigerian affiliate) filed an ex parte 
injunction and Anton Pillar order against the defendant Nigerian company Greenlife 
Pharmaceuticals. According to the plaintiffs, their patent for dihydroartemisinin – an 
antimalarial drug registered in Nigeria as Patent Number 13566 and sold under the brand 
name Cotecxin – was infringed upon when Greenlife Pharmaceuticals imported and marketed 
the patented article without their permission.60 In this light, the plaintiffs contended that they 
had the sole right to import, sell, and market anti-malaria drugs containing dihydroartemisinin 
in Nigeria. Subsequent to the suit, an action was also brought against the national drug 
regulatory body, the National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control 
(NAFDAC), whose role is akin to the US Food and Drug Administration in approving the 
sale of Alaxin, the generic version marketed by Greenlife Pharmaceuticals. 
 
Based on prima facie evidence and the fact that the defendant did not file a counter-affidavit, 
Justice C. P. N. Senlong ruled that the plaintiffs/applicants were indeed the owners of 
registered Patent Number 13566 and issued an ex parte order restraining Greenlife 
Pharmaceuticals and its agents from making, importing, or selling the anti-malaria drug 
Alaxin pending the determination of the Motion of Notice for Interlocutory Injunction.61  
 
However, in a later countersuit, Greenlife Pharmaceuticals and its agents applied for a motion 
to discharge the ex parte order on the ground that Beijing Cotec New Technology Corp. and 
Churchbell Pharmaceuticals concealed, suppressed, and misrepresented facts when they 
applied for the ex parte injunction. They further averred that the alleged patent is not 
patentable as ‘Artemesinin is a generic compound from which Dihydroartemsinin was derived 
                                                                  
58 Interview with Aisha Salim, Patent Examiner, Commercial Law Department, Ministry of Trade, Commerce and Investment 
(Abuja, February 2015) (transcript on file with author). 
59 (2003) FHC/L/CS/718/03 (Federal High Court Lagos Division). 
60 Beijing Cotec New Technology Corp & Anor v Greenlife Pharmaceuticals Co Ltd & Ors (n 59) 499. 
61 ibid. 
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and that even though Dihydroartemsinin constitutes an improvement, Artemisinin itself is not 
an invention or a patented invention but mere principles and discoveries of scientific 
nature.’62  
 
Furthermore, Greenlife Pharmaceuticals also argued that because Dihydroartemsinin is a 
derivative of Artemisinin, it follows that it cannot be patented as the latter forms part of state 
of the art, having been known and used in China for over 2,000 years.63 Greenlife 
Pharmaceuticals also claimed that the specification for Dihydroartemsinin, did not ‘give the 
description of relevant invention with any appropriate plans and drawings but simply a 
process of producing a drug called Cotecxin, which according to section 9(1)(b) is not 
registrable.’64 As such, the invention did not comply with the appropriate registration 
procedure under the PDA and therefore should not be granted patent protection.  
 
In deciding the countersuit, Justice Mohammed Shuaibu ruled that even though the patent 
right does not confer to the plaintiff absolute right, it does confer to the plaintiff some 
recognizable right that should be protected by the court. However, based on the evidence 
before the court, which included (a) NAFDAC’s prior letter to the plaintiff requesting for 
letter of patent (b) an 18-month delay by the plaintiffs in providing the said letter, which 
shifted the balance of convenience to the defendants; and (c) the inability of the plaintiffs to 
prove that they will suffer irreparable damage, with an order of injunction being the only 
adequate remedy, Justice Shuaibu vacated the ex parte injunction against Greenlife 
Pharmaceuticals. The issue of patentability of ‘principles and discoveries of scientific nature’ 
was left undecided. In failing to tackle this, the court missed an opportunity to not only clarify 
the law but also to advance patent jurisprudence in Nigeria.  
 
c) Rights Conferred 
The PDA does not allow for substantive examination of a patent application. Unlike in Brazil 
where ANVISA thoroughly examines a pharmaceutical patent application,65 and in India 
where Section 3(d) of the IPA provides the lens through which patents are examined,66 the 
                                                                  
62 ibid, paras 7(a)-(o) (emphasis added). 
63 ibid. 
64 ibid, para 37; Section 9(1)(b) stipulates that ‘[s]ubject to this section, on the application of any person (including a public 
officer acting in the exercise of his functions) the court shall declare a patent null and void - (b) if the description of the 
invention or the claim does not conform with section 3(2) of this Act and section 3(2) states every patent application shall 
disclose the relevant invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for the invention to be put into effect by a person 
skilled in the art or field of knowledge to which the invention relates; and the claim or claims referred to in subsection 
(1)(a)(iii) of this section shall define the protection sought and shall not go beyond the limits of the said description.’ 
65 Ch 3, s 3.2. 
66 Ch 4, s 4.3. 
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PDA allows only for a simple formal examination of applications, i.e. checking whether 
required documents are in order.   
 
Specifically, Section 4(1) of the PDA requires the Registrar to examine every patent 
application as to its conformity with Sections 3(1), (3), and (4), which deal with written 
declarations showing the name of the application, its specifications, and its claims. If the 
Registrar is satisfied, the patent is then granted ‘without further examination.’67 In fact 
Section 4(2) explicitly forbids asking the following questions: (1) ‘whether the subject of the 
application is patentable under section 1’,68 i.e. if it is new, results from inventive activity, and 
is capable of industrial application; and (2) whether the ‘description and claims satisfy the 
requirements of section 3(2) on claims’, i.e. if the relevant invention is disclosed in a clear 
and complete way for the invention to be put into effect by a person skilled in the art or field 
of knowledge69 and on prior application.70 Thus, while the PDA stipulates that only new 
inventions that result from an inventive step and are capable of industrial application, or are 
improvements from an earlier patented invention are to be granted patent rights, it does not 
scrutinise such patent applications to see if they conform to the stated criteria. In an interview, 
patent examiner Aisha Salim explains:  
 
We don’t substantially examine patents. The law does not even allow it. What 
is we do here is just to check if the application is in order. So we check if the 
application form is properly filled out, all the attachments such as the 
specification claims and PCT documents are clearly and eligibly written out. 
Once all the required documents are place, the Registry usually issues patent 
certificates. In fact, we hardly ever reject an application. In cases where an 
application is incomplete, we keep them in view pending when the applicant 
brings the complete document.71  
 
 
When probed further on the capacity of the Patent Office to examine patents, she clarifies: 
 
[Nigerian] patent laws do not provide for the substantive examination, so it 
starts from the laws. Since our laws don’t even provide for substantive 
examination, the manpower is not even something that has been considered 
yet.72 
 
Of course, there are many problems, especially from a public interest perspective, that could 
arise due to the lack of substantive examination, such as granting patents to unqualified 
inventions, i.e. inventions that are not new, do not result from inventive activity, and are 
                                                                  
67 PDA, s 4(2). 
68 ibid, s 4(2)(a).  
69 ibid, s 4(2)(b). 
70 ibid, s 4(2)(c). 
71 Fieldwork interview with Salim (n 58). 
72 ibid. 
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incapable of industrial application. This is especially pertinent considering the various health 
crises in the country such as malaria, HIV/AIDS, and tuberculosis, to mention a few.  
 
Some legal practitioners73 contend that the registration system for patents is suitable for 
Nigeria where there is a dearth of expert patent examiners and limited resources for the due 
diligence required in conducting substantive examinations. Therefore, the registration system 
not only saves government funds but also reduces long delays usually prevalent in 
jurisdictions that allow for substantive examination. While it may be argued in some cases 
that substantive examination leads to delays, Nigeria does not have a high volume of patent 
application when compared to those in other emerging economies like Brazil, China, or India. 
In fact, data collected from the Nigerian Patent Registry shows that the country receives less 
than 1,000 patent applications in a year (see Table 3). This voids the argument regarding 
undue delays and volumes in relation to Nigeria.  
 
Year Indigenous 
Applicants 
Foreign Applicants Total 
2000 40 403 443 
2001 31 472 503 
2002 35 461 496 
2003 60 454 514 
2004 74 448 522 
2005 81 297 378 
2006 98 248 346 
2007 93 562 655 
2008 92 711 803 
2009 83 631 714 
2010 75 855 930 
2011 64 747 811 
2012 42 676 718 
2013 50 869 919 
Table 3: Patent Application in Nigeria from 2000 – 2013. According to the patent office,  60 per 
cent of the registered patents are for pharmaceuticals.  
 
Where a patent is granted, the PDA accords patent rights solely to a statutory inventor,74 
defined as ‘the person who, whether or not he is the true inventor, is the first to file, or validly 
to claim a foreign priority for, a patent application in respect of the invention.’75 However, in 
situations where the statutory inventor is not the true inventor, i.e. when the primary inventor 
licences the right to a third party for furtherance of research, Section 2(2) allows for the 
primary inventor to be named in the application.  
 
                                                                  
73 Allen and Ogunkeye cited in Onyeka Uche Ofili, Intellectual Property Rights Protection and Economic Development: The 
Case of Nigeria (1st edn, European Scientific Institute 2014) 
<http://eujournal.org/files/journals/1/books/OnyekaUcheOfili.pdf> accessed 11 March 2015.  
74 PDA, s 2(1). 
75 ibid. 
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The PDA allows for protection for 20 years from date of filing, provided that annual fees are 
duly paid,76 although a six-month grace period is given in situations of late payment. Once a 
patent is granted, Section 6 of the PDA accords the patentee the right to preclude any other 
person from making, importing, selling, or using the product, or stocking it for the purpose of 
sale or use.77 The same applies where the patent has been granted in respect of a process.78  
 
The High Court exercises jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court on matters of 
infringement.79 While there is no explicit clause allowing for post-grant opposition, patent 
rights can still be challenged once granted. Section 4(4) of the PDA specifically stipulates that 
‘patents are granted at the risk of the patentee and without guarantee of their validity.’80 In this 
view, the courts do not recognise a presumption of validity for issued patents. This means that 
an ownership of a patent in Nigeria does not mean that the patent is valid, and when the 
validity of the patent is challenged, the onus is on the patentee to prove such validity.  
 
While a patent application can be filed only for one invention, it may include, in connection 
with that invention, claims ‘for any number of products or for any number of manufacturing 
processes for those products, and for any number of applications of those products.’81 In 
addition, an application may include claims for ‘any number of processes, and for the means 
of working those processes, for the resulting product or products and for the application of 
those products.’82 While claims infringement lawsuits (or even patent cases, for that matter) 
are neither prominent nor popular in Nigeria, two cases in recent past are worth noting. The 
first case, Pfizer Incorporated v Polyking Pharmaceutical Limited and Anor,83 highlights the 
question of claims where the defendants question the validity of a plaintiff’s patent right since 
it registered for patent on the product and not the process. In this case, plaintiff/applicant 
Pfizer sued the defendants for infringing on its Patent Number RP 9708, which covers the 
chemical compound with the generic name Piroxicam. Piroxicam is used in treating fever, 
pain, and inflammation in the body. According to Pfizer, the defendants were importing, 
selling, and stocking for sale the patented article under the generic name Rossiden without its 
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permission. Consequently, Pfizer sought for an ex parte injunction and Anton Piller order 
against the class sued84 until further court orders.  
 
In its defence, Polyking Pharmaceuticals asserted that the patent in question is null and void 
as the specification claim used by Pfizer in its Nigerian patent application is derived from its 
UK patent application, and thus does not represent specification claim under Nigerian law. 
Further, the defendant averred that Patent Number RP 9708 held by Pfizer has not been 
infringed upon because, according to Nigerian law, one can either claim for a product patent 
or a process patent. Explicating on this, the defendant argued that the process used in the 
manufacturing of Proxicam is not the same as the process used in manufacturing the Rossiden 
capsules. Therefore, since Pfizer registered a claim for the product Patent Number RP 9708 
and not the process patent, its patent has not been infringed upon in the importation and sale 
of the Rossiden capsules as the manufacture of the latter, even though it contains the said 
patented article, was arrived at using a different process.  
 
Pfizer countered that the assertion that one can only claim for either a product patent or a 
process patent but not for both is erroneous. As the PDA allows for an application to be made 
for only one invention, a patentee can – in connection with that invention – include claims for 
any number of products or manufacturing processes for those products, and for any number of 
applications of those products.85 Moreover, with the onus of proving the validity of the patent, 
the plaintiff called an expert witness who disagreed with the view of the defendant and 
averred that ‘regardless of the possibility of producing any chemical product by different 
processes, so long as the products of different processes were the same compound, they 
cannot differ in potency.’86  
 
Finding for the plaintiff, the judge ruled that the Rossiden capsules stocked and sold by the 
defendants is the same organic compound contained in the plaintiff’s patent and as such, the 
defendants have infringed the plaintiff’s Patent Number RP 9708. 
 
Another case of patent infringement in which the court found the patent to be valid and 
infringed upon is that of Pfizer Limited v Tyonex Nigeria Limited and Ebamic Pharmacy 
Limited.87 In this case, Pfizer filed an injunction against two pharmaceutical companies 
Tyonex Nigeria Limited and Ebamic Pharmacy Limited for importing, stocking, and selling 
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in Nigeria a generic version of Norvasc (the generic name is Amlovas), which contained the 
patented article amlodipine besylate and used in treating hypertension. According to Pfizer, 
the active ingredient contained in Amlovas was amlodipine besylate, which was invented by 
Pfizer and patented in Nigeria under Patent Number RP 9970. In deciding the case, the judge 
ruled that the defendants infringed on Pfizer’s patent by importing, stocking, and selling an 
item containing a patented product without the permission of the right holder. The court 
subsequently granted an injunction and awarded damages in favour of Pfizer.  
 
d) Compulsory Licence  
Section I of the First Schedule to the PDA allows for the grant of a CL and defines the 
conditions for its use in Nigeria. The PDA allows for the grant of two classes of CLs – (a) 
court-sanctioned CL (i.e. a judicial order) and (b) Minister-sanctioned CL.  
 
Court-Sanctioned Order 
A court can issue an order for CL at any time after the expiration of a period of four years 
after the filing of a patent application or three years after the grant of a patent. An application 
for a CL through the courts is allowed in four instances: (a) when ‘the patented invention, 
being capable of being worked in Nigeria, has not been so worked’;88 (b) when the working of 
the patented invention does not reasonably meet the demand for the product;89 (c) the refusal 
of the patentee to grant licences on reasonable terms or the grant of a licence that unfairly and 
substantially prejudices the establishment or development of industrial or commercial 
activities in Nigeria;90 and (d) if an invention protected by a patent in Nigeria cannot be 
worked without infringing rights derived from a patent granted on an earlier application or 
benefiting from an earlier foreign priority. In the case of the latter, a CL may be granted to the 
patentee of the later patent to the extent necessary for the working of his invention.91  
 
In applying for a CL, the applicant should prove to the court that he has attempted to obtain a 
contractual licence from the patentee within a reasonable time and under reasonable terms but 
has been unable to do so.92 In addition, he should guarantee to the court to work the relevant 
invention sufficiently to remedy the deficiencies that gave rise to his application.93 However, a 
CL will not be granted if the patentee satisfies the court that his actions in relation to the 
patented invention are justifiable in the circumstances and not merely shows that the patented 
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article is freely available for importation.94 A CL is transferable with the consent of the court95 
and the court can cancel a CL if the licensee fails to comply with the terms or conditions of 
the licence.96 The court may also vary the terms of the CL if new facts justify such variation 
or if the patentee has granted contractual licences on more favourable terms.97  
 
The court-sanctioned CL raises various points of possible contention. First, the local working 
requirement of the PDA highlights germane questions of compatibility with the TRIPS 
Agreement. Section 14 of the First Schedule of the PDA explains ‘working of patented 
invention’ to mean either ‘the manufacture of a patented article,’98 ‘the application of a 
patented process,’99 or ‘the use in manufacture of a patented machine by an effective and 
serious establishment existing in Nigeria on a scale which is adequate and reasonable in the 
circumstances.’100 Importantly, Section 6 explicitly forbids the importation of a patented 
article in the utilisation of a CL.  
 
On the other hand, Article 27(1) of the TRIPS Agreement requires patents to be ‘available and 
patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of 
technology and whether products are imported or locally produced’.101 Of course, it could be 
argued that local working that requires manufacturing in the locality of the patent protection 
fulfils the ethos of Article 7, which ensures IP protection contribute to the promotion of 
technological innovation, transfer, and dissemination of technology to the mutual advantage 
of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and 
economic welfare.102 In this vein, all three requirements of Article 7 – technological 
innovation, transfer and dissemination of technology, and use of technological knowledge – 
fit into the justification of local working. However, since the PDA does not allow importation 
while TRIPS recognises importation leads to legal uncertainty. Also, the fact that the position 
of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body on the issue of local working remains unclear further 
creates undue friction.  
 
Another possible point of contention is the fact the PDA does not define what would amount 
to ‘reasonable terms’ or ‘reasonable time’ in the context of which a CL should be granted by 
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the patentee to a third party. However, it has been argued that the incidence of reasonability in 
all cases would have to be determined by the courts in all circumstances, and each case has to 
be determined on its own merits.103 Nevertheless, the fact that the courts need to approve CL 
applications can itself be confusing, time-consuming, and prone to undue delays. With 
Nigerian courts known to be slower than molasses in January, this judicial provision clearly 
favours transnational corporations who are majority patent holders over local producers or the 
public interest. Moreover, the prerogative of the patentee to approach the court to establish his 
actions in relation to the patent are justifiable could give rise to the withholding of a CL if the 
patent holder presents legitimate reasons.  
 
Minister-Sanctioned Order 
Section 13 of the First Schedule allows a Minister, by order in the Federal Gazette, to approve 
a CL for certain patented products and processes declared by the order to be of vital 
importance for defence, economic, or public health purposes.104 Within this context, a CL can 
be sanctioned before the expiration of the period mentioned in Section 1 of the First Schedule, 
i.e. before the expiration of the four-year period after the filing of a patent application or the 
three-year period after the grant of a patent while importation is also permitted. A CL under 
this instance falls within the ambit of public health purposes of the Doha Declaration. 
According to Adewopo, a Minister-sanctioned CL is a practical justification for the supply of 
drugs by way of production, importation, or necessary measures to procure supplies of drugs 
and other treatment during dire times without weakening or undermining the patents on those 
medicines.105 The government of Nigeria, through the Minister, is yet to issue a CL for health 
purposes despite the various health epidemics experienced in Nigeria in recent times, such as 
the polio and meningitis outbreaks and the current HIV/AIDS crisis. As will be discussed 
below, factors such as the absence of a patent regime framework, and the strong influence of 
donor presence in the delivery of medicines explains why this this clause has not been 
invoked by the state.  
 
e) Government Use 
Section 20 of the PDA allows a Minister, who is satisfied that it is in the public interest to do 
so, to authorise any person to purchase, make, exercise, or vend any patented article or 
invention for the service of a government agency in the Federal Republic.106 This ministerial 
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authorisation may be exercised before or after the relevant patent has been granted and to any 
person, whether or not he is authorised directly or indirectly by the patentee to make, use, 
exercise, or vend the relevant article or invention.107 The PDA defines a ‘Minister’ to mean a 
Minister of the Federation, including a State Commissioner, and exempts him as well as any 
person authorised by the government from liability for the infringement of any patent relating 
to the relevant article or invention, and from liability to make any payment to the patentee by 
way of royalty or otherwise.108 Although the TRIPS Agreement does not specifically refer to 
government use of patents, it recognises such use in its references to the concept of public 
non-commercial use and of patents ‘used by or for the government.’109 The government use 
clause has only been invoked once when the Federal Ministry of Health placed a supply order 
for the patented product chlorpromazine in 1964. This led to the first patent case in Nigeria – 
the Rhone-Poulenc case. 
 
Government use as specified in the PDA is prone to misuse in many ways. It does not, for 
example, define nor provide a guideline on what would amount to an exercise ‘in the public 
interest.’ Moreover, the definition for ‘Minister’ is too broad and poses a problem of 
consistency. Although the PDA technically allows a State Commissioner to invoke 
government use of patented article, in reality, a State Commissioner does not have the power 
to do so as patents and designs are under the Exclusive Legislative List. The Exclusive 
Legislative List deals with specific items which only the National Assembly has the sole 
prerogative to legislate on, to the exclusion of the state and local governments. Thus, it is only 
the Minister of Health, with explicit approval from the National Assembly, who can invoke 
the government use clause. Also, the PDA gives the Minister the choice of whether or not to 
inform the patent holder of the government use of the patented object ‘if it is clear to the 
Minister such information is not contrary to the public interest to do so.’110 This is in fact 
incompatible with the TRIPS Agreement, which mandates the government or contractor to 
inform the right holder.111 
 
Finally, even if the PDA allows for the grant of a CL in Nigeria, it may not work because the 
country currently does not have the manufacturing capability to engage in such, as will be 
discussed infra.  Nevertheless, it should be included under safeguards for future use.  
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In sum, although the PDA incorporates certain aspects of the TRIPS Agreement, it is still 
lacking in key respects, particularly on patentable subject matters as well as relevant TRIPS 
flexibilities to ensure maximum health safeguards. For example, both the Bolar exceptions 
and parallel importing are not included in the PDA. Bolar exceptions allow a company 
(usually generic) to conduct research on a patented drug in order to have it ready for the 
market as soon as the patented drug version goes off patent. Due to the long-term nature of 
pharmaceutical research, Bolar exceptions ensure that the patented drug is available 
immediately after the expiration of patent. Parallel importing, on the other hand, allows a 
country to ‘shop around’ for the lowest price of the same product wherever it may be 
distributed. This is based on the principle that one’s patent right is exhausted once the 
patented invention is released into the market. The TRIPS Agreement allows for national, 
regional, and global parallel importation. Inclusion of these flexibilities is also in line with the 
Doha Declaration, which recognises the gravity of the public health problems afflicting many 
developing and least developed countries and therefore recommends the implementation of 
the TRIPS Agreement in a ‘manner supportive of WTO members’ right to protect public 
health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.’112 However, the high 
incidence of counterfeit drugs in Nigeria could prevent the use of this clause. According to the 
NAFDAC, 48 per cent of drugs available in Nigeria are fake or below standard.113 
Nevertheless, it could be argued that the language of the PDA shows that the Nigerian state 
has an understanding of the patent regime. The next section will examine how this is 
employed in policy frameworks and for what purposes.  
 
 
5.3 State Regulatory Agencies and Patent Regime 
This section attempts to capture the attitude of the Nigerian state towards patents by reflecting 
on the ‘official’ use of patents provided in the PDA as an effective mechanism for achieving 
the cardinal goals of public health care and economic development. By ‘official’, the research 
refers to state actors created to deal with patents or those whose oversight duties interfaces 
with the patent regime. Thus, the focus here is how the language of patent is employed and 
deployed by governmental bodies in the monitoring, approval, and audit of pharmaceutical-
related and industrial development in Nigeria. Thus, the notion of how ideas circulate among 
these actors and the manner in which particular policy options are crafted – and, as an 
extension, how others are extinguished – is explored.  
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Over the years, Nigerian policymakers at the federal and state levels have created various 
regulatory and monitoring agencies concerning all activities in relation to pharmaceutical 
manufacturing and technology transfer. The agencies whose work intersect on the issue of 
patents for development and public health purposes are NOTAP and NAFDAC. These 
agencies ensure the establishment of coordination mechanisms among various agencies to 
improve detection, investigation, and prosecution of cases of counterfeit medical products and 
the commercialisation of technology transfer, respectively. In looking into the circulation of 
ideas, the thesis has found that there is little understanding of the patent regime within these 
agencies in terms of its relationship to their mandate. Thus, despite the content of the PDA, 
patents are of limited impact in development and public health frameworks as it pertains to 
these organisations.  
 
NOTAP was initially created as the National Office of Industrial Promotion by Decree 70 of 
1979. Its current acronym was introduced in 1992 by virtue of Decree 82 of 1992.114 NOTAP 
is tasked with the acquisition, promotion, and development of technology, as well as the 
commercialisation of foreign technology brought into the country.115 Within this remit, 
NOTAP assists in the patenting of all inventions and innovations carried out by government-
funded research institutes and others in the private sector. According to NOTAP’s Director of 
Technology Transfer and Research Lucky Nwosa, the agency is supposed to commercialise 
all R&D results and inventions brought into the country by liaising with local research 
institutes for the adaptation of such imported technology, promoting locally generated 
technologies in the process.116 Furthermore, NOTAP helps inventors by linking them with 
patent offices worldwide and by assisting the inventor in drafting patent applications.  
 
However, in reality, the commercialisation of such processes is non-existent. As stated by Mr. 
Nwosa: 
 
We do not get notified of most of the technology that come into this country. 
Most government ministries work in silos and the lack of communications 
among departments affect our ability to do any tangible, meaningful work. 
There have been situations were patents have been registered here but the 
Ministry of Trade responsible for that did not inform us. How can we 
commercialise technology when we don’t even know what comes in? The 
telecoms sector, held Nigeria for ransom for many years because people with 
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network license refused to commercialise it. Remember, we had less 500,000 
telephone lines in the for the whole nation of or something million people. So 
it was only until during the Obasanjo administration that they were now able 
to licence these networks. How can we commercialise technology when we 
don’t even know what comes in? We know what patent is and we can help 
Nigeria utilise but the systems is disorganised that no one knows exactly what 
is happening.117 
 
This suggests that although NOTAP is aware of its regulatory role and has the capacity to 
fulfil its functions, institutional bottlenecks prevent it from doing so. However, Mr. Nwosa 
notes that in many occasions, foreigners seeking to commercialise their technology in Nigeria 
are put off by the contract terms, which requires the sharing of technological information with 
NOTAP.118 In other instances, contractual agreements between the Nigerian government and 
foreign entities are usually unfavourable to the country, which further hinders the transfer of 
technology.  
 
Besides the issue of non-notification of foreign technology, the communication between 
government ministries responsible for patent issuance is generally almost non-existent. For 
example, the patent registry is located in the Ministry of Trade and Investment, which deals 
with foreign trade, investment, and all other commercial activities. On the other hand, 
NOTAP, which deals with patent registration and technology transfer, is located in the 
Ministry of Science and Technology. Also, the WTO Department is under the Trade 
Department at the Ministry of Trade and Investment while the patent registry is under the 
Commercial Law Department, which is under the Legal Department. According to the 
principal trade officer at the WTO Department, Onyejekwu Simeon, there is a tug of power 
between the Commercial Law Department and the Trade Department, where each department 
feels threatened by the other and any interaction is seen as an intrusion into the other’s turf.119 
This sentiment is echoed by other interviewees at the Ministry of Trade.120 This has led to the 
lack of synergy and fragmentation of IPR administration under different agencies, 
departments, and ministries, which has not worked effectively for the development of IP.121  
 
Another important player to take into consideration is NAFDAC, which was created to tackle 
the issue of fake and pirated drugs. Pirated products began to emerge in the Nigerian market 
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in the early 1980s due to the oil bust, affecting government expenditure and causing the 
scarcity of essential goods. In response, the government decided to award import licences, 
although these licences were awarded on the basis of political patronage. Many people who 
were unqualified to import drugs started importing drugs and flooding the market with 
substandard and counterfeit drugs.  
 
The situation was further exacerbated by the implementation of the SAPs (discussed infra), 
which mandated an end to government-subsidised health programmes. Because the state was 
massively downsized, regulatory bodies were incapacitated to do the work of the law.122 Thus, 
Nigeria had become a dumping ground for fake and counterfeit medicines by the early 1990s. 
For instance, 109 children died in 1990 after ingesting paracetamol syrup that contained toxic 
diethylene glycol solvent instead of propylene glycol.123 In 1995, Nigeria donated 88,000 
doses of meningitis vaccine to its neighbour Niger, but before the authorities realized that 
these vaccines were fake, about 60,000 people had already been ‘inoculated.’124 These 
incidents prompted the government to create a regulatory agency tasked with ensuring the 
safety of food and drugs in Nigeria.  
 
Created in 1993, NAFDAC is responsible for the regulation and control of the importation, 
exportation, manufacture, advertisement, distribution, sale, and use of food and drugs.125 In 
addition to this, the agency also conducts appropriate tests to ensure that the quality of these 
items is up to the standard specified and approved by the Governing Council. It also 
investigates production premises, investigates imported drugs, and compiles standard 
specification guidelines for the production, importation, exportation, sale, and distribution of 
drugs.  
 
The duties of NAFDAC place it in the role of ensuring effective and efficacious medicines in 
Nigeria. Specifically, the fact that it should also approve the importation and distribution of 
medicines means that it engages with patents one way or the other. In fact, the Beijing Cotec 
New Technology Corp. & Churchbell Pharmaceutical v Greenlife Pharmaceuticals case 
discussed above is a pertinent example of how this was applied. However, there is no mention 
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of patents in the NAFDAC Act. An interview with a NAFDAC official is even more 
revealing: 
 
We understand patent. It is something is required by protect an intellectual 
work. But we don’t really use in our line of work. Our focus is on counterfeit 
and fake drugs, not patents. We are here to protect Nigerians from the fake, 
substandard and counterfeit drugs.126 
 
This legal indeterminacy creates a system where contradiction and incoherence thrives. 
Instead of a single cohesive strategy and an effective enforcement mechanism, an arbitrary 
system is created where even authoritative regulatory agencies permit conflicting outcomes 
with devastating consequences.  
 
5.4 Engagement of Non-State Actors with Patent Law 
This section looks into how non-state actors participate in and engage with patent discourse, if 
at all. Specifically, the thesis examines how these actors – private sector and civil society 
groups – challenge and/or influence the understanding and conceptualisation of patent into 
law and policy. For the purpose of this analysis, pharmaceutical manufacturers comprise of 
both indigenous and foreign companies, while civil society refers to a combination of local 
patient groups, social movements and health society groups, professional associations, and 
others.  
 
Pharmaceutical Sector 
Analyses from previous chapters underscored the role of pharmaceutical firms in patent law 
making. From successfully including the IP regime in global trade rules in international 
forums such as the WTO to embedding significant procedural protections and substantive 
limits in the new Indian Patent Act, these actors have exploited law’s gravitational pull in 
framing processes to formulate demand and persuade the state to strengthen patent law in 
order to protect their investments in pharmaceutical research and development. With this in 
mind, the thesis turned to the Nigerian pharmaceutical sector to explore how this particular 
actor engages with patent law.   
 
In spite of the size of the sector, currently estimated at USD1.28127 billion and anticipated to 
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more than double to USD1.3 trillion by 2020,128 there appears to be an ongoing deficiency in 
its engagement with patent law. This is because there is very few original research being 
carried out by companies in Nigeria to warrant monopoly protection provided by patents. Of 
the five pharmaceutical company executives interviewed for this thesis (coming from three 
local firms and two foreign affiliates), none of their companies conduct original 
pharmaceutical research and development of drugs. The industry, according to these 
executives, does not need patents to operate because these are not important in what they do.  
For example, Yetunde Ali, who works for a foreign affiliated company, reflected on the drug 
companies and their engagement with the patent regime in Nigeria:  
 
[Our company] in Nigeria has not produced any new chemical entity that 
requires us to apply for patent. I don’t think any company in Nigeria engages 
in such research. However, our parent company abroad has registered patents 
in Nigeria but the molecule that was patented was discovered and produced 
outside Nigeria even though we had to undertake clinical trials when the 
chemical entity was introduced to the Nigerian market. So we just register 
those produced abroad here. We were not involved in the research. Even when 
our parent company patents a product, the products still gets copied under 2-3 
years. Patent are not respected here.129 
 
Commenting on this, Abraham Okeke explains the situation: 
 
[The company] does not engage in any original research and development of 
drugs here in Nigeria. These countries you mentioned [India and Brazil] have 
the structural facilities like electricity, the infrastructure and even educated 
population that can undertake such intensive research. We don’t have such in 
Nigeria. We only do basic packaging and formulation of elementary items like 
vitamins, analgesics and paracetamol. Just basic items, nothing innovative. 
Nothing is manufactured locally here. That is why patent is not our focus. We 
have nothing to protect, really.130 
 
 
Similarly, Mike Ajufo comments further:  
 
The situation is different in Nigeria in that every single pharmaceutical 
company currently operating in the country, both foreign and local, are not 
doing any substantive research. We are not developing new drugs; we are not 
even in the process of developing new drugs. It is very expensive to engage in 
such here. The pharmaceutical companies here are involved in tertiary 
manufacturing – the manufacturing of finished goods without any research 
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input. We make basic items that do not require patents. We are not into 
original research and development yet.131  
 
 
Similarly, an interviewee from the PMG-MAN, an umbrella organisation for manufacturers of 
pharmaceuticals and allied products in Nigeria, concurs. According to him, the organisation 
does not engage with Nigerian policymakers on patent issues as the group is more concerned 
with ensuring government assistance. He clarifies: 
 
Patents are not our focus right now. Maybe they will be in the future but not 
currently. We are instead engaging with the government on other issues. We 
are engaging the Executive who gives out the contract for drug procurement. 
We are also engaging with the Legislature who will put it in the law that 
[drug] companies need to be encouraged if they are making efforts to produce 
locally and the quality is top notch. So we are pushing hard in both directions 
and we asking both the Executive and the Legislature to patronise local drug 
manufacturers. So we are working hard to make sure jobs stay in Nigeria; we 
are also working hard to make sure that Nigerian medicines are of the highest 
international quality. This is why we are not focusing on patents.132 
    
In this context, the sector does not need to engage with in the patent discourse either to 
theorise its interests, build alliances, or mobilise government support for a particular type of 
patent regime. Consequently, the ongoing legal innovations and contestations found in local 
spaces in Brazil and India is non-existent in Nigeria because the patent regime – as a legal 
phenomenon, a constructed knowledge, and a policy tool – is largely seen as irrelevant and 
inapplicable.  
 
The Nigerian situation echoes the principles of nodal governance, which emphasises the role 
of nodes in governance especially in the way nodal networks link up to create concentrations 
of power for purposes of exercising governance. For nodes to be able to influence 
governance, they should have four essential characteristics: first, a node should have a way of 
thinking (mentalities) that cognitively shapes how individuals and organisations see the world 
and act accordingly, technologies for applying and exercising influence over the course of 
events at issue, resources to support and mobilise the operation of the node and fuel its 
influence, and the existence of institutions that enable the directed mobilisation of resources, 
mentalities, and technologies over time.133 How then does the nodal governance theory apply 
to Nigerian pharmaceutical actors? Going by the interview excerpts, the pharmaceutical actors 
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in Nigeria do not have the mentality, i.e. the attitude towards and engagement with patent law. 
They do not see patents as valuable because they are not engaging in original research that 
deserves monopoly protection. Due to this lack of engagement, there is no need to seek state 
compliance on patent issues. While they do have technologies for applying and exercising 
influence as well as resources to fuel mobilisation because of the size of the sector, the 
institution (effective patent regime) does not exist. This ties back to the law in place as well as 
the ability of state institutions to enforce protection, i.e. prevent copying. Since the patent 
regime is predicated on the development of innovative products, it means that the patent 
regime will also be absent in contexts where development of innovative drugs is absent. 
Conversely, since the country lacks widespread patent infrastructure, industry actors cannot 
challenge and/or influence the conceptualisation of patent into law and policy.  
 
This is in stark contrast to Brazil and India which have large generic manufacturing sectors 
with the technological capabilities to not only reproduce patented drugs, but to also undertake 
original research and development of new drugs. In those jurisdictions, both the brand name 
and generic companies have a vested interest in an effective and enforceable patent regime. In 
other words, because the drug companies in those countries have the ability to undertake the 
development of new pharmaceutical entities, they are able to activate their nodal networks to 
mobilise government compliance on patent regimes because the existence and enforcement of 
such a regime ensures market-segmented monopoly that allows them to recoup the financial 
expenses associated with pharmaceutical research. It also explains why foreign MNCs adopt 
various tactics to restrict competition from Indian generics either through legal tie-ins of VLs 
or outright purchase of generic competitors. This is because for brand-name companies, 
indigenous drug manufactures pose a considerable threat due to their capacity to formulate 
and manufacture more advanced patented drugs, thereby reducing their market profit. It is the 
existence of a fair market structure in Brazil134 and India135 in the form of a strong generic 
industry as well as the ability of patent law to affect monopoly and market access which 
explain the strong use of patent language in policy and legal decisions and in public debates 
in those countries.  
 
Investigating the extent of the engagement of Nigerian drug manufacturers with patent law 
raises the question of why is there no original research being undertaken in the sector. What 
are the issues that prevent the sector from developing the technical and technological capacity 
required for pharmaceuticals, and consequently improve sectoral participation in patent 
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discourse? In order to arrive at a position that allows for a more integrated insight, this section 
will also examine a tangle of historical, political, and economic events that influenced and 
reshaped Nigeria’s drug sector. Specifically, it explains how government policies such as the 
Indigenisation Decree, ISI policy, and the SAP – the latter triggered by the oil boom and bust 
of the 1970s and the 1980s – eviscerated the pharmaceutical manufacturing companies, in 
turn weakening the ability of the pharmaceutical manufacturing sector to engage in domestic 
inventiveness.  
 
Since Nigeria became independent in 1960, achieving economic development through rapid 
industrialisation has remained a major challenge. Nigeria started exporting oil in 1957, 
however, it was the oil boom of the 1970s due to the two price hikes orchestrated by the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1973–74 and 1979–80 that 
triggered a substantial windfall for the country and resulted in a large transfer of wealth to the 
state’s coffers.136 In the wake of the oil boom, the country suddenly became wealthy, 
completely restructuring the economy from agrarian-based to oil-exporting. This sudden large 
increase in income subsequently led to a general decline of national production in other 
sectors – or what is known as Dutch Disease – which had serious repercussions on important 
segments of the country’s economy. For example, the oil sector accounted for less than three 
per cent of GDP and a modest USD370 million in exports in 1969 but by 1980, the oil sector 
had come to account for nearly 30 per cent of GDP and oil exports totalled USD25 billion.137 
It also accounted for 90 per cent of foreign exchange earnings and 70 per cent of budgetary 
revenues.138 The country also saw a decline in agricultural exports (cash crops such as 
groundnut, cotton, and palm oil), which formed the main non-oil tradable sector and source of 
GDP prior to the export of oil. Moreover, the oil boom also led a significant shift in emphasis 
from planning for industry to primary product export and possibly deindustrialisation. 
According to Bill Freund, the oil boom increased the importation of luxury consumer goods 
which poured into the country on an unprecedented scale to the detriment of Nigerian exports. 
In 1974, Nigerian imports were worth NGN1.737 million; by 1976, they reached NGN5.140 
million and in 1977, NGN7.297million. By mid-1978, they were running at an annual rate of 
NGN8.76 million.139 Importation of items such as cars, electronics, and other finished goods 
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increased exponentially. According to Freund, car importation surpassed the 10,000 mark 
such that Nigerian roads were increasingly clogged by fleets of motorised two-wheeled 
vehicles.140  
 
In the drugs sector, the attendant increase in oil export earnings led to three structural 
changes. First, it led to an increase in the number of brand-name pharmaceutical companies 
setting up manufacturing plants in Nigeria, which expanded pharmaceutical manufacturing in 
the country at that time.141 Previously, companies such as Beecham, May and Baker, Pfizer, 
and Glaxo had distribution and trading outlets in the 1940s and 1950s while others such as 
Bayer, Wellcome, Roche, Hoerst, and Boots arrived later in the 1960s. In fact, although the 
first production plant was registered in Nigeria in 1942, actual production activities did not 
start until the late 1960s.142 By 1970, these companies had already scaled up their presence by 
building manufacturing plants or expanding distribution plants to be able to distribute to other 
parts of West Africa. In so doing, these companies took advantage of the lucrative oil market 
and the emergent middle class. With the success of these pharmaceutical companies, Nigeria 
metamorphosed into a regional hub for the export of pharmaceuticals into other parts of West 
Africa.143  
 
Second – and as a corollary – the oil boom increased the presence and relative wealth of the 
Nigerian middle class at that time. This resulted in an expanded income, thereby touching off 
new waves of consumerism and creating a growing demand for finished and imported goods. 
According to Kristin Peterson, the members of the emergent middle class were able to ‘afford 
luxury goods and with sensibilities oriented toward the high symbolic value associated with 
brand name drugs.’144 This emergent middle class, flush with new wealth, became not only 
the marketing focus of these companies but also spent heavily in purchases. In addition, 
increased rent from oil export led to the introduction of subsidised health programmes such as 
free drugs in government hospitals, which also added to the sales output for pharmaceutical 
companies. In fact, data from industry earnings were estimated at around USD48 million in 
1973, and by 1980 earnings increased to about USD200 million and the employment of nearly 
10,000 Nigerians.145 Between 1977 and 1981, the pharmaceutical subsector grew by 110 per 
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cent.146  
 
Third, the increased presence of pharmaceutical manufacturers triggered by the profitable oil 
boom led to an increase in the number of pharmacists, especially those who worked as 
marketers for brand-name pharmaceutical companies.147 The new crop of pharmacists did not 
only receive marketing training by attending conferences and seminars abroad – all sponsored 
by pharmaceutical companies – but were also given credit lines and bulk discounts on drug 
purchases. These pharmacists, not traders, dominated the drug supply and marketing chain. At 
the same time, new pharmacy schools at major universities were opening up to meet demands 
for local pharmacists, which at the time of independence were only three.  
 
With the above in mind, certain questions arise – did the substantial presence of foreign drug 
producers result in increased participation of the sector in patent law and jurisprudence? Was 
any local value added in terms of organising and reshaping the politics of patent law and 
governance in Nigeria, either through transfer of technology to local producers or pushing 
forward reformist patent law similar to the engagement of Indian generics at during same 
period? The answers lie in the structure and organisational frame of the foreign 
pharmaceutical companies operating in Nigeria in that period as well as the policy 
instruments introduced to reconfigure the economy following the oil crisis of the 1980s.  
 
In the period leading up to the 1970s, indigenous pharmaceutical manufacturing companies 
were almost non-existent while foreign drug companies were not engaged in original research 
and development. It has been argued that the research intensity of the global pharmaceutical 
industry was not replicated in Nigerian pharmaceutical affiliates due to the high cost of 
maintaining facilities and the slim chance of major discoveries due to lack of local facilities 
and technical know-how.148 Most of the raw materials and heavy duty machines required to 
produce the drugs were imported. Simple items such as spare parts for machines were also 
imported; in the event of breakdown, machines were shipped outside the country for repair. 
This made the cost of local manufacturing exorbitant. In addition to this, the country also 
lacked the skilled labour force able to engage in intensive pharmaceutical research. Therefore, 
even though these companies opened manufacturing plants, they all engaged in basic 
formulation of drugs. Even the Nigerians working in these plants were not placed in 
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managerial and research positions due to the lack of professional and technical experience in 
pharmaceutical and allied research. The few Nigerians engaged in the production value chain 
were mostly limited to quality control positions. However, Terisa Turner contends that the 
lack of local expertise were excuses given by foreign companies to retain control and 
dominance of their companies.149 
 
Nonetheless, the boomerang effect of this was the failure to locally capture know-how and 
know-why of pharmaceutical manufacture. That is, imported technology was not adapted to 
the local situation and therefore did not lead to any significant transfer of technology, which 
would have led to local industrialisation. Thus, because the subsector lacked any meaningful 
integration and linkage with the Nigerian economy, it created a knowledge gap that made 
technological transfer impossible, perpetuating a regime of technological dependency as a 
result. Unfortunately, evidence from the fieldwork in Nigeria, as discussed earlier, shows this 
knowledge gap still plagues the subsector till this day. The implication of this structure of 
production is that the country is perennially trapped in knowledge dependence mode and 
restricted innovation growth. If no new research is being undertaken, then there is no need to 
apply for patents to protect newly developed pharmaceutical entities as patent monopoly acts 
as a mechanism for generating high earnings needed to cope with the extreme financial 
endeavour of pharmaceutical research. In fact, looking at this from a TWAIL perspective, the 
reluctance to adapt technology to local context so as to encourage domestic inventiveness can 
be seen as a vestige of colonial exchanges. That is, it perpetuates a structure wherein the 
Global North continues to be the privileged centre of knowledge and technological 
advancement to the exclusion and detriment of the subaltern. This continues the ownership 
and concentration of technology in the Global North, forestalling the development of and 
continuing the technology dependency of developing countries. However, it can also be 
argued that responsibility lie with the Nigerian government that did not take deliberate steps 
to ensure the development of local technological knowledge. This is unlike India where the 
government, in addition to changing its patent law, also invested in education especially in the 
area of chemistry, pharmaceutical research, and biotechnology, and built sophisticated 
research institutions.150 In a similar vein, the Brazilian government also created the Central 
Medicines Agency (CEME) in order to develop the country’s pharmaceutical technology 
base.151 
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Furthermore, even though foreign drug companies were engaged in pharmaceutical 
manufacturing, they were not financially equipped nor ideologically engaged to participate in 
cognitive shaping and expertise production in relation to patent governance. That is, many of 
the local affiliates of foreign companies were concerned with repatriating profits to the parent 
company, usually located in Europe or North America.152 For example, 50per cent of 
Nigeria’s foreign exchange outlay on imported drugs at that time, Ebohon states, went to 
Britain where most of the companies producing drugs in Nigeria have their headquarters.153 
This is still being practiced by the subsector. Commenting on this, Abraham Okeke notes that 
‘once his company [Swiss Pharmaceuticals] achieves its financial target, the money is 
immediately wired abroad.’154 It can be suggested, therefore, that foreign subsidiaries in 
operation at the time were not involved in active participation or engagement with domestic 
patent regime introduced five years prior.   
 
Thus, even though the Nigerian economy was growing during that period thanks to the oil 
boom, this growth was largely ephemeral, i.e. characterised largely by foreign-owned and 
foreign-managed industries, often dependent on imported raw materials and engaged in 
aggressive transfer pricing and money laundering schemes where profits are shifted from the 
country where they are in business into locations where they are often not in business. This 
structural contradiction in the pharmaceutical industry became obvious when the oil boom 
began to decline. To reconfigure the dominance of foreigners in the economy, which was also 
apparent in other sectors, the government introduced the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion 
Decree of 1972 – often referred to as the Indigenisation Decree.155  
 
The Indigenisation Decree was a series of private sector-focused policy instruments 
introduced by the federal military government to prevent continued foreign monopoly of the 
vital productive sectors of the country’s economy.156 Through this Decree, the government 
sought to reserve certain categories of industrial activity for Nigerian citizens by compelling 
foreign businesses in a large number of specified activities to transfer their ownership wholly 
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or partly to private Nigerian investors and businessmen.  
 
The aim of the policy was three-pronged. First, to encourage more involvement of Nigerian 
citizens in the ownership, management, and control of productive enterprises in the country.157 
Second, to reduce profit repatriations and ensure greater retention of profits accruing from the 
economic sector.158 Third, to enhance industrial development by substantially encouraging 
transfer of technology from foreign investment in intermediate and capital goods 
production.159  
 
The Decree was introduced in two phases. The first phase of the Decree in 1972 promulgated 
that Nigerians had to hold at least 40 per cent equity shares in certain industries, while the 
second phase in 1977 mandated that 60 per cent of transnational corporate assets be sold to 
Nigerian indigenes.160 It was the 1977 Decree which targeted industries with local 
manufacturing and production presence that affected the pharmaceutical subsector.  
 
The Indigenisation Decree was predicated on a strong feeling of political and economic 
nationalism and not based on the actual existing capability or readiness of Nigerian indigenes 
to perform higher functions in the productive sector of the economy. Of course, this new 
nationalistic thinking did not happen in a vacuum. It grew out of two factors. First, the 
experience of the Nigerian civil war, which changed the country’s attitude towards foreign 
capital. According to Ebohon, the refusal of Britain and America –  Nigeria’s traditional allies 
– to come to the aid of the federal government in nipping the secessionist agenda reversed the 
country’s official thinking against the open-door policy towards Western capital.161 Second, 
the emergence of ideas regarding the development of a New Economic Order further 
propelled the enactment of the Decree. Like Brazil and India, there was growing discontent –
circulation of ideas of some sort – within the Nigerian government regarding the unequal 
exchange and exploitation between developed and developing nations. For Nigeria, this 
deepening shift and perspective on global economic systems manifested in its readiness to 
canvass for a new international economic system where developing countries would attain 
economic parity. Thus, it is not surprising that the emerging intellectual discourse and politics 
reflected – at the time – the suspicion of Nigerian policymakers of private foreign investors 
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and the emergent concern against colonial and neo-colonial structures anywhere in Africa. By 
promulgating the Indigenisation Decree, the government hoped to achieve an exclusion or 
complete elimination of foreign personnel from commercial and industrial activities.  
 
The Indigenisation Decree succeeded in transferring a significant percentage of transnational 
assets into local hands. For example, in the pharmaceutical sector and prior to the 
Indigenisation Decree, foreign pharmaceutical companies were private with 100 per cent 
foreign equity capital.162 By 1974, two years after the implementation of the first phase, 
thestake of indigenous stakeholders in the subsector increased. According to Ebohon, 
bythis period, seven of the 13 foreign plants operating in the country divested at least 40 per 
cent of their equity holdings for purchase by Nigerian investors, while theremaining 60 per 
cent were still retained by the parent companies.163 By 1979, two years after the second phase 
was enacted, 12 out of the 13 foreign drug plants were completely indigenised.164 This, in 
turn, led to an unprecedented growth of local entrepreneurs and succeeded in including 
Nigerians in this key sector.  
 
However, some commentators take the view that the Decree also fostered the growth of a 
comprador class – members of a national business class of senior corporate managers who 
derive their position and status from connection to foreign corporations of developed 
nations.165 In his analysis of the Indigenisation Decree, Ogbuagu argues that the comprador 
class lacked the ‘capital, skilled managerial and technical knowledge in manufacturing to 
effectively and meaningfully replace the foreigners in the industries reserved for them by 
law.’166 In fact, Ebohon mentions that most of the new equity holders in the pharmaceutical 
companies were retired army officers, traditional rulers, and local businessmen who had little 
or no knowledge on how to run technology- and research-intensive pharmaceutical 
companies. Not only that, most of these indigenous investors were able to buy their 
pharmaceutical equity due to their connection to the government or foreign executives.167 This 
view is supported by Andrew Apter, who notes that the equity shares from the indigenisation 
policy ‘were privately distributed to connected partners who would tow management line 
with their dividends and as a result, led to less active involvement of Nigerians in the 
management and more the rise of a newly connected elite who formed a tight circle of 
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comprador cronies around foreign capital.’168 Other scholars such as Iwuagwu further reports 
that the Decree hardly changed company control or relationships with parent companies, but 
instead changed the leadership (e.g. chairman of the Board).169 As a result, the Nigerians were 
mostly figureheads without any serious executive or administrative responsibilities 
bequeathed to them, while foreign owners continued to occupy almost all strategic positions. 
This often led to cases of indigenous managers colluding with foreign companies.170 The 
negative effect of this cronyism, Thomas Biersteker goes on to report, was that dividends of 
shares were not productively invested back into the business but favoured patterns of 
conspicuous consumption.171 Subsequently, the indigenous managerial class which the Decree 
sought to construct became effectively ‘denationalized since it acted as a peripheral 
managerial class to foster the growth of global accumulation.’172  
 
In essence, although the Indigenisation Decree reduced the presence of foreign participation, 
it did not really lead to positive structural change in the subsector. The fact that foreign 
pharmaceutical companies were engaged in elementary formulation and packaging activities 
in the first place meant that new Nigerian managers were not privy to advanced technological 
information that could have been adapted locally. In fact, Ebohon states that despite the 
rudimentary production activities in these plants, expatriates still controlled their daily 
management.173 These expatriates were in collaboration with their headquarters abroad which 
made critical corporate decisions while Nigerian managers only rubber-stamped decisions 
already taken outside the country. Thus, though the Decree indigenised equity, it did not 
indigenise technology nor facilitate technology acquisition that would have enabled original 
drug production.  
 
The Indigenisation Decree was not the only policy implemented by the Nigerian government 
in its attempt to facilitate technology transfer and subsequently attain industrialisation. Like 
most other post-colonial states at that time, Nigeria also introduced and implemented the ISI 
policy.174 As previously discussed (see Chapter 3 on Brazil), the ISI strategy sought to 
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mobilise national economic resources in order to establish domestic production facilities for 
manufacturing goods which were formerly imported. The same ethos underpinned the ISI 
policy instruments introduced in Nigeria in the early ‘60s and continued till the ‘80s. 
Precisely, the government hoped that in eliminating importation, it would kick-start domestic 
production and initiate local industrialisation. Industrialisation would subsequently produce 
much needed dynamic change in the economic structure of the country, with attendant 
substantial benefits trickling down to the people. 
 
It has been argued that economic performance in the decades after the implementation of the 
ISI strategy was unimpressive. Instead of reducing the country’s over-dependence on 
imported goods, it intensified Nigeria’s external dependence since the country relied on 
imported raw materials, foreign technology, and even skilled manpower.175 In the 
pharmaceutical sector, the ISI policy proved to be antithetical to growth and was a highly 
ineffective strategy for development. This is due to the sector’s heavy reliance on imported 
raw materials, foreign technology, and skilled manpower. For example, estimates show that 
80 to 90 per cent of raw materials required by foreign companies with manufacturing bases in 
Nigeria in the 1970s and early 1980s were imported.176 The situation has not changed to any 
great extent in recent decades, with a 2011 report by the UN Industrial Development 
Organization stating that Nigerian drug manufacturers still imported all their active 
pharmaceutical ingredients and virtually all their inactive pharmaceutical ingredients such as 
adhesives, syrups, etc.177 Evidence from the fieldwork interviews for this thesis further 
corroborates this. All pharmaceutical executives that were interviewed mentioned that they 
wholly import the items used in their factories.178 One executive explained the situation: 
 
We import all our products even packaging. Everything is imported in this 
country including our packing such as cartons and outer packing including 
paper. The only thing we do not import is water, however, the ingredient we 
use in purifying the water are all imported. No pharmaceutical raw material is 
manufactured in Nigeria. None.179 
 
Like the Indigenisation Decree, the government ignored many of the factors needed for 
                                                                                                                                                                                                              
Policy’ (2014) 34 Rev Econ Polit; LN Chete and others, ‘Industrial Development and Growth in Nigeria: Lessons and 
Challenges’ (The Brookings Institute 2012) <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2014/11/learning-to-
compete/L2C_WP8_Chete-et-al.pdf?la=en> accessed 11 May 2014. 
175 Mendes, Bertella, and Teixeira ‘Industrialization in Sub-Saharan Africa and Import Substitution Policy’ (n 174) 121; 
Chete and others, ‘Industrial Development and Growth in Nigeria’ (n 174) 2. 
176 Ebohon, ‘Conflict and Accommodation in a Post-Imperial Order’ (n 161) 27. 
177 Charles Wambebe and Nelson Ochekpe, ‘Pharmaceutical Sector Profile: Nigeria’ (United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization (UNIDO) 2011) 35 
<https://www.unido.org/fileadmin/user_media/Services/PSD/BEP/Nigeria_Pharma%20Sector%20Profile_032011_Ebook.pd
f> accessed 2 August 2015. 
178 Fieldwork interviews with senior pharmaceutical company executives (Lagos, July 2016) (transcript on file with author).  
179 Fieldwork interview with Ajufo (n 131). 
  222 
overseeing the emergent industrial sector such as the management of technologies transferred 
or acquired. Chete et al., in their analysis of the ISI programmes, note that it was the need to 
rectify the shallow nature of Nigeria’s technological capacity, among other factors, which 
fuelled the implementation of the Indigenisation Decree.180 However, as the analysis above 
has shown, the unsuccessful indigenisation of technical and technological capabilities 
required for initiating, executing, and managing pharmaceutical projects subsequently limited 
implementation. Consequently, there is a near complete absence of indigenous R&D in 
Nigeria’s drug sector. Balance of payments problems also affected imports and other 
resources required for industrial production, thereby imposing additional obstacles to 
industrial development.181 The end of the oil boom in the 1980s and the SAP further 
exacerbated the obstacles.  
 
The oil bust of the early 1980s left the country fiscally and structurally exposed. This led to a 
deterioration of public finances, a balance of payments crisis, foreign exchange shortage, and 
a debt crisis. To rectify this, the World Bank and IMF recommended a series of fiscal and 
economic policy reforms which the Nigerian government accepted and implemented in 1986. 
These included the devaluation of the Nigerian naira, removal of subsidies and grants on food, 
agricultural, and petroleum products, the curtailment of loans to state government, and the 
privatisation of public enterprises.182 The SAP policies aimed at realigning domestic 
expenditure and production patterns so as to reduce dependence on imports, enhance the non-
oil export base, and put the economy on the path of steady and balanced growth.183 
 
The effects of the SAP policies have been diverse in Nigeria. While the microeconomic 
reforms have yielded little result, the negative social ramifications were immense. The 
devaluation of the currency led to price inflation and massive job loss, plummeting many into 
below the poverty line. The privatisation of health care also led to the introduction of user 
fees and increased domestic expenses, while the removal of the subsidy on fuel and 
agricultural goods increased hardship and household poverty incidence, especially for 
Nigeria’s middle class and poor who depend on government-subsidised programmes.  
 
Of all the policies introduced, the devaluation of the Nigerian currency had the most negative 
impact on the pharmaceutical sector. Devaluation decreased earnings and increased the prices 
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of food and other basic necessities, which in turn caused a sharp deterioration in the living 
standards of the majority of the people. Per capita income declined from USD949.4 in 1985 to 
USD280.7 in 1987 and fluctuated between USD240 and USD361 between 1988 and 2000.184 
Consequently, the population living below the poverty line rose from 34.7 per cent (75.0 
million) in 1985 to 67.1 per cent (102.3 million) in 1996.185 A general decline in per capita 
income meant that the previously relatively affluent middle class could no longer indulge in 
luxury goods and expensive brand-name drugs, which affected the sales output and turnover 
of drug companies. Peterson asserts that drug companies which had previously occupied a 
major chunk of the Nigerian market could no longer operate in the country because the naira 
was rapidly losing value, leading to a general decline in sales.186 As a result, ‘the brand-name 
companies in operation at that time either completely ended their product lines and 
manufacturing or attempted to move their activities to other existing markets.’187 
 
Furthermore, devaluation also increased the cost of imports as these companies mostly 
imported the APIs needed in drug manufacturing. The market effect was increased price of 
drug manufacturing but poor sales, as consumers could no longer afford the now expensive 
products. The situation further worsened as the government scaled back on financing and 
providing essential health services. Consequently, the brand-name parent companies ended 
credit extensions to local marketers cum pharmacists and when the pharmacists could not pay 
off their debts, their businesses folded. With high financial and market loss, the brand-name 
companies divested from their Nigerian businesses – or what Peterson termed as market 
abandonment188 – which generated a massive shortage of drugs. Within 10 years of the 
implementation of the SAP in 1986, the majority of pharmaceutical companies ceased 
production.189  
 
The above analysis of select Nigerian industrial policies shows how these policies 
incapacitated the ability of the pharmaceutical sector from developing. Also, in not engaging 
in adaptive research on patented drugs, foreign drug companies blocked the transfer of 
technology to the host country, Nigeria. Since the research intensity of the foreign 
pharmaceutical industry was not replicated in the Nigerian affiliates beyond basic formulation 
and minor quality control activities, this severely limited the prospect for local technological 
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development. Consequently, due to the absence of indigenous R&D in the subsector, the 
attendant regime of patents necessary to protect and reward the development of innovative 
products will be lacking. In this scenario, there will be no need for local pharmaceutical 
companies to engage and mobilise the government on patent issues. This explains the absence 
of the pharmaceutical private sector in the patent regime and discourse in Nigeria.   
 
Civil Society Organisations  
As shown in previous chapters, the mobilisation of civil society groups in Brazil and India is 
rapidly changing the prosaic materialisation and architecture of domestic legal regimes 
governing patents. Couching their activism on the constitutional right to health (as in Brazil) 
and access to medicines (as in India), civil society groups have – in the last decade or so – 
enhanced their scope to include in their advocacy issues relating to IP law, specifically the 
impact of patent protection on public health. That is, they have managed to problematize the 
patent regime as a barrier to access to life-saving drugs because of the monopolistic power of 
patents to push up prices of drugs beyond the reach of those who desperately need it. By 
problematizing patent laws as espoused in TRIPS Agreement as antithetical to access, 
Brazilian and Indian civil society groups did not only establish causation but connected facts 
in ways that helped determine responsible parties (brand-name pharmaceutical companies and 
unfavourable local laws) as well as ways to remedy the situation.  
 
The consequential effect of this framing is the rise in civic activism on patent-related 
litigation, notably public action to issue CLs, the filing of amicus curiae briefs in patent-
related cases, and in using domestic legal processes such as pre- or post-grant oppositions and 
the constitutional right to health to challenge patent grants. This has led to dramatic policy 
resolutions, radical legal decisions, and the transformation of rights-based activism and relief 
work. Importantly, civil society groups have helped in the mainstreaming and cognitive 
shaping of public discourse on IP and patents – a subject area that has previously been an 
exclusive preserve of jurists, academics, and scientists. This is in direct contrast to civil 
society workings in Nigeria.  
 
Nigeria’s CSOs are complex and have a highly varied socio-economic history and taxonomy. 
Their activism is marked by their proliferation and fragmentation, which has subsequently 
impacted the ideation of civil society participation. Up until the early 1980s, civil society 
activism was neither popular nor mainstream and civil disobedience in the form of trade union 
strikes was mainly organised in reference to issues of marginalisation and dissatisfaction with 
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government policies.190 During this period, most CSOs appeared to be ‘immersed solely with 
exalting and defending the distinctive interests of their members, especially in the area of 
private practice in various professional occupations or along ethnic/tribal lines.’191 It was not 
until the oil boom and the attendant rise in educational standards that the language of human 
rights gained currency in Nigeria and was co-opted by these groups in the framing and 
contestation of advocacy issues. Since then, groups such as trade unions, religious 
institutions, student unions, and professional associations such as the Nigerian Bar 
Association and Nigeria Labour Congress – the latter being an umbrella organisation for trade 
unions in Nigeria – dominate the civic engagement space. 
 
Using the language of human rights, these groups campaigned for specific economic and 
social demands such as improved conditions for the masses, environmental rights, and 
resistance against state corruption. For example, when the SAP was implemented, student-led 
riots and trade union strikes, which ground the country to a halt, were framed on social and 
economic rights to education, health, and social safety nets which the programme destroyed. 
Likewise, when the military regime annulled the 1993 election that was widely seen by many 
as free and fair, civil society activity was further galvanised to assume a pointed 
organisational focus on the civil and political right to vote. These groups were able to 
organise massive protests that pushed General Babangida – the then military dictator – from 
office in 1993 when his long transition programme finally proved fraudulent. In fact, 
according to Kew and Oshikoya, CSO activism ‘spearheaded by human rights organizations, 
joined forces with trade unions, the Bar, student unions, and most importantly, the leading 
political opposition party to force Babangida to hand power to a transitional government 
offering to hold new elections.’192  
 
The return to democratic rule in 1999 increased the number and variety of civil society 
activism in the public space to include patient groups, foreign donor-funded organisations, 
and even foreign NGOs working on various issues such as election monitoring, lesbian and 
gay issues, religious rights, and public health implementation programmes. In a study 
conducted by Ogbogu and Idogho, it was shown that CSOs comprising of community 
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development associations, support groups for PLWHA, and other health groups played 
important roles in the earlier phase of Nigeria’s response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic.193 
Today, these CSOs are significant actors in the implementation of the public health 
programme on malaria, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and infant or maternal care, to mention a 
few, with these programmes ranging from prevention to care and support. This new 
generation of public health CSOs is more cosmopolitan and has ties with international 
organisations such as the UN, the WHO, and the GFATM. They attend international 
conferences, receive funds from foreign governments and donor organisations, and are party 
to a global discourse on public health management, especially regarding diseases that plague 
Nigeria.  
 
In spite of this, there is paucity in Nigerian CSO engagement and activism around IP-related 
issues and their impact on public health. This raises the question of why have these 
organisations not gone beyond basic implementation programmes and service delivery roles 
to a substantial role bordering on the problematizing of institutional frameworks that create 
barriers to access and treatment. That is, why is civil society activism in Nigeria not targeting 
structural issues such as fixing patent laws in Nigeria to ensure medicine access and 
sustainable public health management? The answers to this question is three-pronged.  
 
First, the psychological effect of military dictatorship adversely affected civil society psyche 
and blunted the once dynamic civil society activism. Since independence from Britain in 
1960, Nigeria has experienced civilian rule (1960-66, 1979-83, and 1999 onwards) and 
military rule (1966-79 and 1983-99). The period of military regime stands out clearly as the 
architect of collective disenchantment in civil society engagement.  
  
Due to the austerity measures introduced by the military government at the onset of the oil 
bust, many civil society groups participated in acts of civil disobedience such as public 
demonstrations and strikes as a way to inform the government of their displeasure with the 
austerity measures. In response, the military government proscribed several CSOs, mostly 
labour unions and professional associations, that dared to criticise its policies or which 
embarked on public demonstrations and strikes. Key figures were arrested, detained, and 
sometimes tortured without recourse to legal processes. As Remi Aiyede has pointed out, the 
military regime introduced decrees that not only allowed for persons to be detained for a 
period of three months without trial for any act prejudicial to state security but also placed the 
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government above the law by protecting the military government against court proceedings by 
public sector workers.194 
 
In addition to overt repression, which created an extremely oppressive climate, the military 
government bought out political and civil actors through bribery and material inducement, 
thereby co-opting the civil society movement and corrupting its moral foundations. Kew and 
Oshikoya, for example, observed the devastating effect of the SAP, which gutted public 
infrastructure and social safety nets and increased government largesse which proved 
increasingly irresistible to political leaders and some civil society actors.195 This worsened 
economic situation made it easy for some activists to be easily influenced. Likewise, Peter 
Lewis states that the government ‘diversified its strategies of control to include political 
manipulation, populist side-payments, elite dispensations, expansion of the parallel economy 
and political patronage.’196 The regime bankrolled many several groups to openly canvass for 
the prolonging of military rule and countering of democratisation pressures, subsuming the 
rest under various government ministries, undermining their effectiveness and affecting their 
focus.197 By co-opting CSO activism, the government was able to quell their influence.  
 
Even the coming of General Sani Abacha into power in 1993, who continued the military 
dictatorship in Nigeria, did not abate the repression of civilian and democratic activism. If 
anything, the Abacha regime intensified the climate of fear and authoritarian control. 
Particularly, the hanging of the environmental rights activist Ken Saro-Wiwa along with eight 
others in 1995 created a collective feeling of despair, despondency, and powerlessness among 
key activist groups. Even though the return to civilian rule in 1999 added a new lease on life 
to CSO advocacy in Nigeria as the various groups recovered their strength and bargained 
major reforms with the democratic government, the state continues to use, in certain 
occasions, intimidation techniques. The overall impact of this on the national psyche is the 
pacification of even the most ardent of groups and a reduced influence of civil society sway. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that CSOs working on public health continue to demonstrate 
this weakened position, especially with their inability to foment policy-deepening coalitions.  
 
Second, the overwhelming presence of donor funding in the provision of health services also 
explains why Nigerian public health-focused CSOs have not directed their gaze towards 
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patents. This is largely due to the fact that most of the essential medicines for diseases such as 
HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis dispensed in hospitals are provided by donor 
organisations. In an interview, the Assistant Director for Policy and Strategy of the National 
Agency for the Control of AIDS (NACA) mentioned that majority of drugs used in the 
treatment of HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis are donated to the Nigerian government. 
She explains further: 
 
Majority of the drugs we dispense are given to us by international 
organizations such as Global Funds, the US President’s Emergency Plan for 
AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), United Nations AIDS Program (UNAIDS). Domestic 
HIV funding has been very low and unstable, and that is why we largely 
depend on international funding sources.198  
 
Similarly, the Director of the Saving One Million Lives Initiative, Dr. Kelechi Ohiri, states: 
 
Majority of the NGOs here receive donor funding which they use to procure 
the drugs. In this environment, there will be no need to look at patent issue as 
patent is not seen a problem or hindrance to medicines access.199 
 
In fact, the President’s Comprehensive Response Plan for HIV/AIDS in Nigeria states that 
74.65 per cent of the HIV/AIDS fund is donor-sourced while the remaining 25 per cent is 
from the Nigerian government.200 In contrast, 100 per cent of Brazil’s HIV/AIDS programmes 
are funded by the Brazilian state (federal, state, and municipal governments)201 while the 
Indian government provides 90 per cent of the funds for its AIDS programmes.202 In another 
report, the 2014 National HIV/AIDS Epidemiological and Impact Analysis, which provides 
scientific insight into the nature of Nigeria’s HIV/AIDS epidemic and the impact of 
government efforts, provides that international funding steadily increased to USD445.2 
million in 2012 from USD317.2 million in 2009 (35 per cent of this was spent on treatment 
and care).203 It follows, therefore, that the overwhelming presence of donor funds has a 
noticeably disempowering effect on CSO engagement on patent issues in Nigeria. Since 
majority of funds for medicine purchase are internationally sourced, then patents – which are 
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problematized in Brazil and India as the reason for high drug prices and encumbrance to 
medicine access – are eliminated. In other words, patents are not seen as a problem. This 
means that there is less tendency for CSO groups to engage the state on patent law reform or 
to insist on the use of TRIPS flexibilities to ensure availability of and access to medicines.  
 
Third, there is a general lack of patent knowledge or awareness on patent issues. While 
Nigeria is active at the international level, often championing the cause of the African 
Group,204 local awareness of the IP regime is deficient. For example, a health activist who was 
interviewed stated: 
 
I don’t know intellectual property because it is not an issue for us in Nigeria. 
Our problem is corruption and the mismanagement of donor funds. Patent is 
not the issue here, corruption is. There is the GAVI problem that is heating up 
the Ministry of Health right now. It is issues like these that we focus on. There 
is also the bureaucracy problem that causes drugs stock-outs. We have 
instances where ARVs worth thousands of dollars have been destroyed 
because they were unused and some even expired, yet if you go to Garki 
[Government hospital] they tell you they don’t have drugs. But the money is 
there, the drug is there so what happened to them? 205 
 
Correspondingly, Kelechi Ohiri elucidates: 
 
Patent is a non-issue here and there are many reasons for that. There is no 
strong policy space to trigger the kind of discussions and activisms you have 
in Brazil and India. Donors provide the funds for procurement and for many 
of these CSOs, procurement is opportunity for graft. Also, donor organisations 
are not really interested in setting up frameworks on IP and access related 
issues mainly because result and monitoring is ambiguous. Add to the fact that 
these organisations are looking for value for their money.206 
 
In fact, a report by a local newspaper showed how significant government and donor funding 
in the HIV/AIDS campaign failed to translate to good numbers due to corruption. According 
to the report, Nigeria spent more than USD4.4 billion between 2008 and 2012 on HIV/AIDS 
treatment, yet the number of people living with HIV/AIDS in Nigeria rose from 2.98 million 
to 3.5 million; AIDS-linked deaths climbed from 192,000 to 217,000; and new infections 
increased from 336,000 to 388,000 during that same period.207 These statistics provide glaring 
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evidence to support the argument that huge amounts of money donated to fight HIV/AIDS are 
being siphoned away. Therefore, when faced with issues of corruption, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that the legal consciousness about the possibilities of patents is absent among 
CSO circles in Nigeria. For these actors, treatment activism is about ensuring availability of 
drugs and vaccines donated by foreign organisations as well as ensuring that there are 
effective systems to deliver these to all who need them. In this context, priority is given to the 
development of stronger, sustainable, and efficient health systems and not on the reform of 
patent law as the latter is not seen as problematic.  
 
Furthermore, in Nigeria, patent law is not part of life. That is, it is not living law. It also does 
not help that that law as it stands is old. As discussed in the previous section, the current 
patent law was passed 45 years ago in 1970 and though it was modified in 1990, the 
modifications are minor and not up to date. This, coupled with the problem of insufficient 
legal knowledge on patent issues, explains why many CSOs do not engage with it. As a result, 
there is also little or no understanding in NGO circles of how international regimes such as 
the TRIPS Agreement affect access to drugs. This points to the need for the law to adapt to 
changing social needs. In the analyses of the Brazil and Indian patent regimes, the ‘living law’ 
of patents was observed. In those jurisdictions, law in action208 was evident – in policy tools, 
in commerce, and engaged with by many associations, not only by those that the law has 
recognised (inventors) but also by those that it has overlooked or passed by (patient groups, 
the sick, and health activists). In these jurisdictions, patent law is seen as an instrument which 
could be used to solve social problems, i.e. to protect and incentivise invention, while also 
used to resolve social issues, e.g. access to medicines. In engaging in claims and counter-
claims put forward and bargained over by these competing groups, patent norms are expanded 
and amplified.  
 
If anything, the analysis in this section has underscored an omission prevalent in the literature 
on access to medicines – the importance of local actors patent discourses. Particularly, it 
advances existing knowledge on how the use of legal and regulatory tools of patents is linked 
to the practices of different actors, such as inventors (in this case, brand-name or generic 
pharmaceutical manufacturers) and civil society groups, that underpin the regime.  
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5.5 Summarising the Nigerian Context 
This chapter has critically discussed the patent regime in Nigeria. Specifically, its origins, the 
main sections governing patent rights, and how it interacts with the TRIPS Agreement. It also 
highlighted the ways in which regulatory agencies and non-state actors engage with patent 
law.  
 
As mentioned in previous chapters, pharmaceutical patents operate under the notion that an 
inventor should disclose the invention to facilitate development and for public consumption 
of the patented invention. In turn, the inventor is given the exclusive right to price and sell the 
invention for a limited time in a competition-free environment in order to recoup the 
investment for developing said invention. Thus, the patent system is a social institution 
created to facilitate this exchange.  
 
Underlying this notion of exchange between inventors versus the state or consumer is the 
assumption of fair market; that is, an equitable just structure that allows buyers (in this case, 
the state or consumers) and sellers (in this case, inventors) to exchange any type of good 
(patented invention). However, how the market should work to facilitate this fair exchange is 
not defined in patent law even though actions such as CLs exist as corrective measures 
against market failures. This structure of patents raises the crucial question of what happens 
when the market does not exist, as was the case in Nigeria when brand-name companies 
pulled out of the country and indigenous manufacturers were unable to fill the vacuum.  
 
Importantly, this structure also raises the question of what is the actual purpose of patent law 
when key actors (inventors or in this case, pharmaceutical companies) that underpin the fair 
exchange are absent? In the case of Nigeria where widespread pharmaceutical manufacturing 
infrastructure is absent, patent regime is inconsequential. The concomitant effect is that actors 
(pharmaceutical industry stakeholders) that normally push for a robust patent regime in 
policymaking circles and in influencing government decisions cannot do so. This is unlike in 
India where the patent regime was hugely influenced by the existence of a strong 
pharmaceutical sector. It would not be unreasonable to presume that the level of interest in the 
various epochs of Indian patent regime development – from the 1970s when the country 
changed its colonial law to the 2000s when it transitioned into the TRIPS regime – is 
proportionate to the size of the Indian market and of the entities interested in accessing it. 
Further, the existence of a fair market structure in India in the form of a strong generic 
industry as well as the ability of patent law to affect monopoly and market access explain the 
  232 
strong patent language in policy and legal decisions and in public debates. The Nigerian 
pharmaceutical market discontinuity and ensuing lacuna in the patent regime evokes the 
question of the impact of patent policy and regime on prospects of development. 
 
Moreover, the inability of local civil society actors to engage with patent law also explains the 
absence of an organised pressure group, determined to makethe government reformulate a 
richer patent policy in such a way that it can enhance the indigenous pharmaceutical sector 
while simultaneously protecting public interest. This relates back to the concerted effort of 
civil society activism in Brazil and India, especially the active role which civil society played 
in reshaping patent laws in these countries’ laws. The civil society groups in these countries 
were able to instigate, promote, and legitimise ideas regarding patent law and its effect on 
sectoral development and health. It is their engagement with law that changed the national 
architecture, discourse, and strategies on patent regime. This underscores the nodal 
governance literature which emphasises that strong nodes have strong purposes, can formulate 
demands, and can create concentrations of power for purposes of influencing governance.209 
Conversely, weak nodes are unable to formulate these demands or work together, thus are 
incapable of influencing governance. Nigeria, having a weak pharmaceutical sector and CSO 
without the capacity to mobilise the government, has proven this. 
 
The lesson from this chapter is that laws and policies alone are not enough in the multi-scalar 
and longitudinal understanding of the issues arising from patent governance as regards socio-
economic development. Rather, the strong presence of relevant interest groups is also required 
to not only elevate discourse but also to produce expertise and govern knowledge in related 
issue areas. It is hoped that analyses from this thesis contribute to the understanding of the 
importance of local actors and strong institutions in the creation of national patent law and its 
relationship with economic development and the protection of public interests. 
                                                                  
209 Peter Drahos, ‘Intellectual Property and Pharmaceutical Markets: A Nodal Governance Approach’ (2004) 77 Temple Law 
Review 404.  
  233 
 
 
6.    Conclusion 
 
This empirical thesis explored Third World attempts to use the patent regime as set out in the 
TRIPS Agreement to effect certain development and public health goals. It also discovered 
the ways these countries are challenging global norms in pharmaceutical patent protection. To 
explicate Third World attempts, the thesis used the different examples of Brazil, India, and 
Nigeria and told the story of patent law making within each of them. It also investigated how 
non-state actors in these countries influence the conceptualisation and implementation of 
patent law making, thereby creating narratives and counter-narratives in patent law making as 
it relates to access to medicines. 
Theoretically, the thesis adopted a TWAIL perspective, a critical legal approach generating a 
vibrant on-going debate around questions of colonial history, power, identity, and difference, 
and what these mean for international law.1 As mentioned in Part 1 of Chapter 2, TWAIL 
seeks to promote and include the voices and experiences of the countries and peoples of the 
developing world in opposition to an unjust global order.2 As applied to this thesis, TWAIL 
played three important roles. First, it provided the historical perspective for mapping the 
origins of patent regime in the countries under study. Specifically, the thesis showed that 
patent law was introduced in the countries under study through colonial acts when IP 
standards were transplanted directly from the imperial metropolis to the colonial territories.3 
More so in India and Nigeria than in Brazil, the colonial patent laws revealed the forces of 
empire at work in the sense that the patent law enforced at the time favoured the colonial 
countries at the expense of the colonies.  
Second, TWAIL helped in unpacking the TRIPS regime and provided the context for 
understanding Third World engagement within it. Specifically, the harmonising nature of the 
TRIPS Agreement is reminiscent of the European colonial expansion and foregrounds a 
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fundamental issue: the imposition on different contexts and realities of Eurocentric ‘ideals.’4 
The exclusive proprietary interests enshrined within the TRIPS Agreement, according to 
TWAIL, perpetuate development asymmetries between the Global North and South. This is 
because insisting on a global harmonised patent regime, no matter how minimal, robs many 
Third World countries of the opportunity to grow and develop technological capabilities 
through copying and mimicry. As analyses in Chapters 1 and 2 showed, many developed 
countries did not allow patents on chemical and pharmaceutical substances, which afforded 
them the opportunity to develop their technological and industrial sectors.5 The transplanting 
of Western legal regimes into countries in the Global South not only robbed them of 
opportunities which Western countries had, but also hampers access to the information, 
knowledge, and technology needed for competitiveness, internal growth, and development.6  
Third, as TWAIL preaches the reform of international law to make it more equitable and 
inclusive,7 TWAIL scholars such as Sundhya Pahuja and Luis Eslava have suggested a re-
direction of gaze from the international to the local to capture the various forms of resistance 
and reform of international law occurring daily in local forms of the Third World.8 These 
actions, they argued, may appear unrelated to the international but in actuality is.9 It is in 
taking up this call to focus on the resistance and reforms occurring in Third World forums 
that underscored the analyses and understanding of pharmaceutical patent regime law making 
in the local forums of Brazil and India – and by extension, its absence in Nigeria. In this 
regard, TWAIL imbued meaning in these acts of Third World patent law making as not only 
reformist, because these law making projects are expanding the aperture on various 
international rules and norms governing pharmaceutical patents and medicines access 
discourse, but are also counter-hegemonic because they are providing an alternative – a 
counter-narrative of sorts – to current understanding of the international patent regime.   
However, the thesis criticised TWAIL as insufficient because it ignores the asymmetries 
within Third World states. These asymmetries, the thesis argued, demarcates which Third 
World state engages in reform and resistance vis-à-vis international law and scholarship, and 
who is excluded. As a result, the thesis adopted, in Part II of Chapter 2, the nodal governance 
                                                                  
4 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Histories of International Law: Dealing with Eurocentrism’ (Inaugural lecture delivered on 16 
November 2011 on the occasion of accepting the Treaty of Utrecht Chair at Utrecht University, Utrecht University 2011). 
5 Surendra J Patel, ‘Intellectual Property Rights in the Uruguay Round: A Disaster for the South?’ (1989) 24 Economic and 
Political Weekly 980. 
6 Okediji (n 3). 
7 Muthua (n 2). 
8 Luis Eslava and Sundhya Pahuja, ‘Between Resistance and Reform: TWAIL and the Universality of International Law’ 
(2011) 3 Trade, Law and Development (‘Between Resistance and Reform’); Luis Eslava and Sundhya Pahuja, ‘Beyond the 
(Post)Colonial: TWAIL and the Everyday Life of International Law’ (2012) 45(2), Journal of Law and Politics in Africa, 
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9 Pahuja and Eslava, ‘Between Resistance and Reform’ (n 8) 103. 
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theory as a supplementary theoretical framework.10  
The thesis drew from Peter Drahos’ theory of nodal governance to understand how complex 
systems construct order, produce knowledge, and influence governance systems that mimic or 
complement the ordering work of systems themselves.11 Nodal governance proved useful for 
this thesis in two ways. First, it illuminated the asymmetries within Third World states by 
highlighting the presence and capacity of actors (nodes). In so doing, it showed how actors in 
the Third World forums employed and deployed knowledge in ways that promoted their 
respective agendas while strengthening their collective capital. As a result, nodal governance 
theory illuminated actors’ mentalities, methods used for exerting and mobilising influence, 
modes of governance employed, their structure, as well as the dialectic relationships between 
and among actors.12  
 
Second, nodal governance showed the way non-state actors (nodes) organise themselves 
around key issues in a particular way. In doing so, it facilitated the understanding of the nuts 
and bolts of patent ecosystems in local forums that produce general outcomes by identifying 
actors involved in processes such as knowledge creation, capacity building, and resource 
mobilisation to manage a course of events.13 By illuminating the intricacies of patent law 
making, it explained why pharmaceutical patents are relevant and used in legal and policy 
discourse in the local forums of Brazil and India but are absent in Nigeria. Thus, in combining 
TWAIL and nodal governance theory, the thesis identified the complexities, workings, and 
actors engaged – and by extension, absent – in the use of the patent regime set out in the 
TRIPS Agreement to effect certain development and public health goals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                  
10 Scott Burris, Peter Drahos, and Clifford Shearing, ‘Nodal Governance’ (2005) 30 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 
31.  
11 Peter Drahos, ‘Intellectual Property and Pharmaceutical Markets: A Nodal Governance Approach’ (2004) 77 Temple Law 
Review (‘IP Nodal Governance Approach’); Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who Owns the 
Knowledge Economy? (2002); John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, Global Business Regulation (1st edn, 2000). 
12 Burris, Drahos, and Shearing (n 10) 34. 
13 ibid 37. 
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6.1 Major Findings 
At the onset, this thesis asked three research questions: 
1) How are patents conceptualised into law and policy vis-à-vis the TRIPS Agreement in 
Brazil, India, and Nigeria?  
In broad terms, the thesis found that patent law is conceptualised and implemented differently 
within Brazil, India, and Nigeria due to the confluence of various actors involved in patent 
law making as well as several domestic and international socio-political processes that 
unfolded over time. 
Prior to the TRIPS Agreement, a patent was understood and conceptualised in Brazil as a 
deliberate industrial policy to encourage transfer of technology and industrial development. 
With these goals in mind, Brazil implemented a patent regime in 1971 that did not grant 
protection to pharmaceutical products and processes to allow for transfer of technology. Due 
to external pressure from the US and panels at the WTO, the country quickly implemented the 
TRIPS Agreement. This led to the Brazilian Congress’ introduction and approval of Industrial 
Property Law 9.279/96 in 1996 – much earlier than the WTO deadline of 2005 for middle 
income countries.14 However, as analyses in Chapter 3 has shown, Brazil also passed Law 
9313 (also known as the Sarney Law) to provide free access to ARVs due to internal 
circumstances such as the HIV/AIDS crisis and widespread social mobilisation and activism 
waged by health CSOs.  
 
Because Brazil had already phased into the TRIPS Agreement, thereby making it difficult to 
locally produce ARV drugs patented elsewhere, the cost of free ARV drugs ballooned, 
threatening the AIDS programme. The combination of budgetary constraints, inflating health 
costs, and the government’s constitutional obligation to provide health care for all Brazilians 
spurred the government to introduce Law 9787/99, known as the Law of Generic Medicines, 
in 1999. The law required all purchasing contracts under the government system to be 
generic, while all prescriptions are to be written using the generic name, essentially 
introducing generics into the Brazilian market.15 The Law of Generic Medicines also made the 
use of CLs more flexible and simpler, while regulatory reforms were introduced to accelerate 
                                                                  
14 Amy Nunn, The Politics and History of AIDS Treatment in Brazil (Springer 2008) 3. 
15 Matthew Brian Flynn, ‘Pharmaceutical Governance in Brazil: Globalization, Institutions and AIDS’ (PhD thesis, 
University of Texas at Austin 2010) 58; Gabriela Chavez and Renata Reis, ‘Health, Intellectual Property and Innovation: A 
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the market entry of generics after the expiration of its on-patent version. Brazil also amended 
its patent policy to adopt a human rights approach wherein a patent application is examined 
vis-à-vis its impact on public health. Thus, Law 10196/2001 was added as Article 299c to 
Brazil’s IP legislation, which instituted the ‘prior consent’ (Anuência Prévia) mechanism.16 
This empowered ANVISA to grant patents for pharmaceutical products and processes on 
public health grounds. In other words, ANVISA examines pharmaceutical patent applications 
to make sure the grant of patents will not negatively affect public health. It is therefore fair to 
say that the threat to the country’s policy of universal access to AIDS medicines due to the 
high cost of patented medicines and the social mobilisation of health activism shifted Brazil’s 
understanding and conceptualisation of patents from a strictly industrial policy to pro-human 
rights in its articulation. 
  
India, from the onset, conceptualised and implemented patent law based on its socio-
economic realities and development goals of pharmaceutical autonomy or self-sufficiency. As 
such, patents are seen as an instrument of industrial policy and patent laws were implemented 
in ways to preserve and enhance the competitiveness of the local pharmaceutical industry.17 
The quest for pharmaceutical autonomy continued in the post-TRIPS era as the government 
availed itself of the transitional period and interpreted the TRIPS Agreement in ways that 
ensured the use of flexibilities. Specifically, Section 3(d) considers derivative forms of known 
substances, i.e. salts, esters, ethers, and polymorphs, to be the same substance, unless it is 
shown that the new derivative improved efficacy of the known substance.18 Thus, as Chapter 
4 argued, the Indian Patent Act appears to be a successful attempt at striking a balance 
between protecting IPRs and promoting local innovation.  
 
Nigeria, however, does not seem to have a concise conceptualisation of patent law. Unlike 
Brazil and India where the post-colonial patent regime was a deliberate act of the government 
bearing in mind the needs and realities of the country, the reverse was the case in Nigeria. In 
Nigeria, post-colonial patent law – Patent Rights Limitation Decree (1968)19 – was 
implemented as a response to the court ruling of the first patent case in Nigeria, which the 
military government found offensive to its powers to issue orders in pursuance of the 
government use clause under the patent law. This showed that patents were not 
conceptualised in the first place by the Nigerian state either as a matter of deliberate industrial 
                                                                  
16 Monica Steffen Guise Rosina, Daniel Wang, and Thana Cristina De Campos, ‘Access to Medicines: Pharmaceutical 
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policy or as part of its development pursuits. As Nigeria has not fully phased into the TRIPS 
Agreement, the 1968 patent law – though renamed and slightly updated in 1990 – has 
continued to this day. This shows, if anything, a lack of deliberate patent conceptualisation in 
law and policy, which has underscored the government’s general movement towards a patent 
regime even in the post-TRIPS era.  
 
2) How do ideas regarding patents circulate? That is, what influences the way in which 
particular policy options get constructed – and, as an extension, how others get extinguished 
with regard to patent law and policy in the aforementioned countries? 
 
In general terms, the thesis found that various key factors that unfolded overtime influenced 
the circulation of ideas regarding patents, thereby leading to the emergence of narratives and 
counter-narratives on patent regime discourse. These factors include colonial experience, 
development aspirations, and the confluence of local politics (which could be either political 
or socio-economic in nature).  
 
Colonialism was one of the factors that influenced ideas on patents. The colonial patent 
regime in India, for instance, encouraged abuse of patent monopoly which led to high drug 
prices, non-working patented articles that stifled transfer of technology, and often delayed the 
introduction and production of essential drugs and stifled industrial development.20 This led to 
the emergence of a general movement towards reforming the colonial patent regime seen by 
many, especially indigenous drug manufacturers, as an encumbrance to the development of a 
robust pharmaceutical sector and achievement of pharmaceutical autonomy. In response, 
India amended its patent law in 1970 and removed product patents on medicines and agro-
chemicals. It also limited the protection term for processes to seven years. The Indian patent 
reform, it has been argued, was an icon of the thinking that prevailed in terms of patent 
reform.21  
 
Brazil, though one of the original members of the Paris Convention, was dissatisfied with the 
Convention due to the rampant abuses of patent monopolies by foreign pharmaceutical 
companies.22 As a result, the country demanded for a patent system both at home and at the 
UN that is favourable to its economic development, including proper controls against abuse, 
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thereby putting ‘development’ issues and ‘public interest concerns’ on the international IP 
agenda.23 Whilst the country was not successful in pushing forward this counter-hegemonic 
stance at the UN, it succeeded at home in revising the Brazilian patent law in 1971 and 
removed patent protection for both pharmaceutical products and processes. The Brazilian and 
Indian examples provide attempts by Third World countries to make modern technology more 
freely accessible for commercial development within their respective countries. Abolishing 
patent protection in the case of Brazil and severely limiting the patent framework in the case 
of India represent a radical departure from the traditional concept that patent ownership rights 
should be afforded the highest degree of protection.24  
 
Whilst Nigeria also experienced high incidents of monopoly abuse,25 the first post-colonial 
patent law was a response to the Rhone - SA Poulenc and May & Baker v Lodeka Pharmacy 
case.26 The then military government implemented the first post-colonial patent law to allow 
the Nigerian government to purchase patented pharmaceutical products and to also exempt the 
government from infringement of a patent granted with respect to the articles concerned or the 
liability to pay royalties or compensation to the patentee.27 In this regard, the PDA did not 
take into account the country’s development level at the time, leading to an absence of 
relevant underlying policy for using the patent regime to attain certain development purposes.  
 
Another significant piece that fomented the circulation and emergence of counter-hegemonic 
narratives on IP systems is associated with the general disillusionment of the many newly 
colonized states of the Third World with the international system of the UN. This is 
particularly so with the failure of the NIEO. The NIEO reflected efforts by developing 
countries to assert greater control over technology transfer, multinational enterprises, and 
other economic activities related to economic development.28 The failure to achieve the 
objectives of the NIEO as well as the unsuccessful Brazilian attempt to introduce a 
Development Agenda in the WIPO forced both Brazil and India to look inwards and adjust 
their IP laws to suit their national interests.  
 
Meanwhile in Nigeria, the discovery of oil in commercial quantities, especially the oil boom 
of the 1970s, drastically changed the structure of the economy.29 Specifically, it increased the 
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importation of finished goods, which severely weakened the industrial sector. Thus, while 
Brazil and India had to look inwards to develop policies that would encourage technology 
transfer and industrial development, Nigeria relied on the windfall from oil to grow its 
economy and did not implement a strategic and deliberate development policy towards 
ensuring the transfer and development of technological capacities.  
 
Moreover, the influx of foreign drug companies to Nigeria30 – a by-product of the oil boom – 
created an illusion of industrial growth and expansion. Analyses in Chapter 5 showed that the 
growth was largely ephemeral as it was largely characterised by foreign-owned and foreign-
managed industries, often dependent on imported raw materials and engaged in aggressive 
transfer pricing and money laundering schemes.31 This became obvious when the oil boom 
ended and the introduction of austerity measures, which negatively affected purchasing power 
of Nigerians, forced foreign pharmaceutical companies to divest from the country.  
 
The thesis therefore argued that the oil windfall robbed the Nigerian state of an opportunity to 
develop a fine-tuned IPR system and to successfully build domestic capabilities in the highly 
competitive pharmaceutical industry. Thus, while the 1970s witnessed a wave of legal 
reforms in Brazil and India that created a counter-narrative on patents that translated into 
important changes in IP-related legislations, the counter-hegemonic movement was absent in 
Nigeria because of the windfall from oil, preventing the state from seriously engaging in 
patent reform or using patents to effect development. 
 
3) How do non-state actors – private sector and civil society groups – challenge and/or 
influence this understanding and conceptualisation of patents into law and policy?  
 
This thesis has shown how counter-hegemonic campaigns and activism by non-state actors, 
referred to in this thesis to mean the private sector and civil society groups, achieved a reform 
of patent laws in Brazil and India.  
As mentioned earlier, Brazil phased into the TRIPS Agreement early without using the 
transition period accorded to developing countries. It also implemented standards which many 
believed to be higher than what is required by the TRIPS Agreement. However, the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic amplified the engagement of civil society groups that couched their 
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activism on the terms of the constitutional right to health.32 These groups played a key role in 
producing knowledge, expertise, and awareness regarding the impact of patents on access to 
ARV drugs. To effect the required change and response, these groups adopted several tactics 
such as policy advocacy, HIV/AIDS de-stigmatization campaigns, and legal suits against 
government policies that negate the government’s health care responsibilities. This led to the 
introduction of Law 9313/96 (Sarney Law), which guarantees free access to ARVs for AIDS 
treatment for all people in Brazil living with HIV/AIDS.33 
It can be argued that the legal battle waged by civil society groups, especially in relation to 
the right to health as codified in the Brazilian Constitution, was decisive behind the change in 
Brazil’s patent law. If anything, it led to a more structured and organised response by the 
government. In fact, the policy of universal ARV access was initially undermined by the early 
implementation of the TRIPS Agreement as it meant the country cannot copy drugs patented 
elsewhere and should therefore purchase the required ARV drugs at full price. By expressing 
the threat to the AIDS programme during campaigns and protests as a patent issue due to the 
price of expansive patented drugs, civil society movements forced the government to break 
patents and issue a CL for the ARV medicine Efavirenz.34 
In India, the primacy of local industry vis-à-vis the patent law has seen indigenous drug 
manufacturers play an active role in the initial post-colonial patent amendment as well as in 
the post-TRIPS Agreement era. The country’s unique position as a supplier of generic drugs 
to the world was achieved as a result of the changes to its patent law in 1970. The post-TRIPS 
era deepened popular activism of Indian civil society groups, which became dominant prior to 
the final amendment of India’s patent law in 2005 to comply with its TRIPS obligation. Since 
the final amendment of the IPA in 2005, new social movements, radical legal decisions, and 
business partnerships have led to the development of novel conceptions of patents advanced 
by the different actors. For example, CSO groups are actively pushing forward a rights-based 
patent regime that enables the provision of drugs at affordable prices to the people of India.35 
They have adopted patent opposition strategies against what they see as frivolous patent 
applications or applications deemed injurious to public health. The courts have also become 
the battleground in the development and expansion of patent law and policies. The private 
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sector is also employing various tactics to increase its space within post-TRIPS India. In 
seeking out favourable rules via pre-emptive injunctions and legal tie-ups through VLs and 
outright purchase of competitor firms, MNCs are gaining control of generic markets and are 
pursuing capitalist goals that are contrary to CSO and, sometimes, state objectives. 
 
However, the thesis finds that the non-state actors’ contestation and engagement in Brazil and 
India are absent in Nigeria. This is due to various factors including the legal indeterminacies, 
market failure, and poor economic policies affecting Nigeria’s drug sector in terms of growth 
and presence of sectorial actors in the pharmaceutical industry. 36 Moreover, years under a 
military regime blunted CSO activism, while the presence of donor organisations further 
weakened the ability of CSOs to participate in patent law making. As a result, these actors 
that normatively would have played an important role in the cognitive shaping of and 
knowledge production on patent law are not doing so.  
Specifically, the thesis showed that pharmaceutical technology imported by foreign drug 
makers operating in Nigeria in the early 1960s and 1970s was not adapted to the local 
situation and therefore did not lead to any significant transfer of technology, which would 
have led to local industrialisation. However, government policies such as the Indigenisation 
Decree – instituted to reconfigure the dominance of the foreign nationals in the Nigerian 
economy – failed to increase technology transfer. This is because the Indigenisation Decree 
was improperly implemented and instead encouraged the transfer of company ownership to 
individuals connected to the ruling class but who had no prior experience in running a drug 
manufacturing plant. Furthermore, the ISI policy enforced at the time made the importation of 
raw materials expensive and made local production unsustainable. This forced the drug 
manufacturers to resort to importing finished goods instead of engaging in local 
manufacturing. On the other hand, the SAP – introduced to curtail fiscal mismanagement 
triggered by the oil boom and bust of the 1970s and the 1980s – eviscerated the 
pharmaceutical manufacturing companies, in turn weakening the ability of the pharmaceutical 
manufacturing sector to engage in domestic inventiveness. 
The inability of local civil society actors to engage with patent law also explains the absence 
of an organised pressure group, determined to makethe government reformulate patent 
policy in such a way that it can enhance the indigenous pharmaceutical sector while 
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simultaneously protecting public interest. This relates back to the concerted effort of civil 
society activism in Brazil and India, especially the active role which civil society played in 
reshaping these countries’ IP laws. 
 
 
6.2 Contribution to Research  
The thesis has revealed a previously unknown factor on the patent regime in Nigeria – the 
effect of the absence of a local pharmaceutical manufacturing sector and civil society 
organisations in patent law making and structural reform. The expansive comparative 
coverage given to patent jurisprudence of selected jurisdictions and juxtaposing it to the 
Nigerian situation clearly epitomizes the lacuna. Thus, while certain scholars have argued that 
the impact of the TRIPS Agreement on medicine access in Nigeria is negligent,37 this thesis 
adds to the discourse by revealing how this happens. Why is this important? The analyses of 
American MNCs in Chapter 2, the Brazilian context in Chapter 3, and the Indian setting in 
Chapter 4 showed how actors successfully embedded themselves in the making and reform of 
patent law in those jurisdictions. Conversely, the absence of patent in Nigerian law and 
development policies underscores the instrumental role of these non-state actors in structural 
patent reform. Such analyses provide insight and better understanding regarding the 
importance of these actors to patent law making, the transformation of the discourse, and the 
discourse they oppose.   
 
The primary aim of this study was to discover whether Nigeria could learn from Brazil and/or 
India on how to create and implement an IP framework, especially a patent regime that 
encourages, instead of hinders, development and public health management. The analyses 
demonstrate how Nigerian patent law can particularly benefit from India and Brazil’s 
approach of promoting their IP frameworks. This is a great contribution to scholarship in this 
area and would contribute immensely to the reform and growth of Nigerian patent law and 
practice.  
 
Furthermore, in exclusively focusing on law making in the Third World, this thesis unmasks a 
competing narrative – a counter-narrative of sorts – to the current understanding of the 
international IP regime. Particularly, in successfully articulating and impelling a local 
counter-hegemonic discourse of global patent rules, the thesis showed how patent law making 
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in Brazil and India are expanding the aperture on norms governing pharmaceutical patent 
regimes and discourses on access to essential medicines. This provides ways for governments 
of other Third World countries to exploit the residual flexibilities within the TRIPS 
Agreement.  
 
Theoretically, the thesis has argued that TWAIL alone cannot explain how and why actors 
mobilise in a particular locality and not in others. The thesis showed that while Brazil, India, 
and Nigeria opposed the inclusion of an IP regime in the global trade framework at the 
Uruguay Round, only Brazil and India had gone ahead to local implement ‘alternative’ IP 
laws. Thus, this shows that TWAIL cannot uncover all the aspects of the Global South voice 
without the addition of nodal governance. Equally, the limitation of nodal governance lies in 
its inability to probe the structure, history, and processes of the (global) legal system within 
which it exists. Nodal governance needs TWAIL to ensure that the colonialism underpinning 
much of international law (and international IP law) is exposed in the interactions between the 
various nodes/actors. Thus, in combining TWAIL and nodal governance theory to illuminate 
the materialisation of the international in the local, the thesis showed the gamut of legal, 
historical, political, and economic forces that bring about the internationalisation of 
pharmaceutical patent law in the local forums of Brazil, India, and Nigeria. 
 
6.3 Commonalities and Differences  
Studying the patent regimes in Brazil, India, and Nigeria brought to the fore striking 
similarities between the three countries. First, these countries actively opposed the inclusion 
of IP in the international trade rules, with Brazil and India more so than Nigeria. Nevertheless, 
these countries were aware of the power of patents to affect development and the daily lives 
of their citizens. This is because these countries are regional powerhouses, which places 
greater demands on them in terms of competitive development in the knowledge-based 
economy and in upholding human rights obligations.  
 
Compared to Nigeria, Brazil and India have local pharmaceutical companies, and have 
incorporated the TRIPS Agreement into local legislation as a result of being under constant 
pressure from the US. However, unlike in India where indigenous manufacturers were active 
from the onset, this was absent in Brazil. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that Brazilian 
drug makers are beginning to take their place in national discourses on patents, drug 
manufacturing, and medicine access.  
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Another surprising factor was the limited influence of corruption in the patent discourse in 
these countries as corruption was not seen as an issue. This is different from the notion, 
usually from the Global North, of the endemic nature of corruption in these countries. This 
could be from the fact that corruption manifests differently than what is generally perceived 
as ‘corrupt’ by analysts in the West. For instance, the transfer of ownership from foreign 
owners to Nigerians connected to ruling elites is seen more as crony politics at work than 
corruption.  
 
6.4  Recommendations for Nigeria  
As this thesis has shown, both Brazil and India provide a comprehensive legal framework for 
IPR protection. Each of the countries implemented the TRIPS Agreement in a different 
manner and time. Each country had a different set of challenges, and a different strategy or 
model of protection. Both Brazil and India have opened their markets to foreign investments 
and competition, aiming to become part of the globalised prosperity envisaged with the 
creation of the WTO. In this regard, Nigeria has something to learn from these countries.  
 
First, the lesson from the Brazilian and Indian IP law regime has shown that patent law and 
policy cannot be implemented in a vacuum and independent of the cultural, political, and 
economic lives of the country. It has many other components going far beyond the IPR 
regime. Brazil framed and marketed its patent regime as part of its health policy, whereas 
India mainly promoted its patent regime as an industrial tool and later on as a health policy. 
Nigeria should adopt a patent law bearing in mind its economic and social circumstances, 
technological capabilities, and industry profile. The thesis therefore recommends developing a 
patent regime framed as a health policy tool due to the various health challenges faced by 
Nigeria, especially with HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis. Adopting a right to health 
frame, as Brazil did, will not only allow the country to invest in health care but to also 
collaborate with foreign MNCs through PPP agreements to locally develop and manufacture 
drugs in the country. Doing so would encourage technology transfer whilst developing the 
manufacturing sector.  
Second, in terms of patents and access to medicines, Brazil and India have shown the way that   
policy makers have tailored the implementation of TRIPS obligations to fit their particular 
circumstances. This was absent in the first post-colonial patent law in Nigeria. As Nigeria is 
yet to fully implement the TRIPS Agreement, the thesis suggests framing a patent regime 
cognizant of Nigeria’s health challenges and needs as well as its development aspirations. 
Specifically, the thesis recommends that patent protection for pharmaceutical products and 
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processes be explicitly included in the list of patentable inventions in Section 1(4) of the 
PDA, and such right be enjoyable with discrimination as stipulated by Article 27 (1) of the 
TRIPS Agreement. In addition, the new policy should not be too restrictive to hinder 
innovation nor too wide to engender abuse. If anything, the TRIPS Agreement still allows 
some degree of flexibility for countries to determine how the criteria for patentability should 
be applied.38 In this regard, Nigeria could borrow from India to exclude new uses of known 
products or processes in order to promote access to medicines and to ensure that only 
inventions which are new, involving an inventive step, and are capable of industrial 
application can be patented. This would also prevent ever-greening.  
Third, the analyses of Nigerian patent law show that certain flexibilities afforded by the 
TRIPS Agreement, such as parallel importation, are omitted. In this regard, the thesis 
recommends the inclusion of a parallel importation clause. Particularly, it suggests the 
inclusion of a global parallel importation regime as national and regional parallel importation 
guidelines would be restrictive because they limit access to the same drugs distributed within 
the country and region. Global parallel importation, on the other hand, allows for shopping 
around for drug products and provides opportunities to purchase cheaper pharmaceuticals.  
Fourth, the current patent law in Nigeria does not allow for substantive examination of 
patents. This thesis suggests an amendment of the patent law to include a substantial 
examination clause. This is to ensure that only inventions that meet patentability standards are 
approved. In addition, Nigeria should also borrow from Brazil and allow the participation of 
the health sector in the examination and analysis of pharmaceutical patents. This would 
ensure that a patent application is examined in light of its impact on public health. This is also 
in line with Article 8 of the TRIPS Agreement, which permits members to adopt measures 
necessary to protect public health when formulating domestic laws.  
Finally, the thesis revealed the gap in communication among government regulatory agencies, 
which has created a system where contradiction and incoherence thrive. The thesis therefore 
recommends the institution of a committee similar to the Brazilian GIPI. This committee 
should consist of agencies and government departments whose oversight duties interface with 
the patent regime and should be required to meet on a monthly basis to ensure that each 
department or agency is well-informed of the workings and activities of the other. This will 
not only reduce fragmentation and policy contradiction but would also encourage the 
development of a cohesive patent regulatory strategy and effective enforcement mechanisms.  
                                                                  
38 TRIPS Agreement, art 27. 
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6.5 Suggestion for Future Research 
While Chapter 5 on Nigeria revealed new insights for the research such as the influence of 
donor organisations on CSO engagement in patent law making, the research did not go into a 
deeper analysis of this donor presence due to the limited space in and scope of this thesis. In 
light of current discourse on aid,39  the influence of donor organisations on patent law making 
becomes even more pertinent.  
 
This thesis therefore recommends that further research be done in this regard. Particularly, 
examining how donor organisations currently engage patents and access to medicines in the 
countries under study would be illuminating. Furthermore, future studies could examine the 
role of these organisations in fostering competitive generic markets via patent pools. The 
finding could be compelling in understanding the broader effects these organisations have on 
international trade law and patent judicialization. 
                                                                  
39 Dambisa Moyo, Dead Aid (Farrar, Straus, and Giroux 2009). 
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Appendix 1: List of Interviewees (Brazil) 
 
 
Interviewee Name of Organization and Professional 
Title 
Date 
Interviewed 
Prof. Richard Parker President, Brazil Interdisciplinary AIDS 
Association (ABIA), Rio de Janeiro 
3 June 2014 
Felipe Carvalho 
 
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), Rio de 
Janeiro 
20 May 2014 
Jose Carlos Cavalcanti CAMEX (Foreign Trade Chamber, IP 
Negotiations Department), Brasilia 
28 May 2014 
Pedro Paranagua 
 
Advisor to the ruling Workers Party, Chamber 
of Deputies, Brasilia 
27 May 2014 
Pedro Villardi 
 
Working Group on Intellectual Property of the 
Brazilian Network for the Integration of 
People (GTPI), Rio de Janeiro 
18 May 2014 
Murilo Lubambo  Trade Policy Coordinator, Ministry of Finance  27 May 2014 
Pedro Barbosa 
 
Attorney, Denis Borges Barbosa Advogados, 
Rio de Janeiro 
5 June, 2014 
Dr. Monica Caetano 
 
National Agency for Sanitary Surveillance 
(ANVISA) 
 
5 June 2014  
Gabriela Chaves 
 
FIOCruz Foundation, Rio de Janeiro 13 June 2014 
Fabio Mesquita Director, Department of STDs, AIDS and 
Viral Hepatitis, Ministry of Health, Brasilia 
29 May 2014 
Marcela Viera Country Coordinator, REBRIP, Rio de Janeiro 4 June 2014 
Marcia Maria Nunes de 
Barros 
Federal District Judge, Rio de Janeiro 11 June 2014 
Mayara Santos Deputy Head, Intellectual Property Division, 
Ministry of External Relations 
25 May 2014 
Reinaldo Guimarães Vice President, Associação Brasileira das 
Indústrias de Química Fina, Biotecnologia e 
Suas Especialidades (ABIFINA), Rio de 
Janeiro 
4 June 2014 
Renata Reis Independent researcher and activist 13 June 2014 
Juliana Gomes Social Issues Division, Ministry of External 
Relations 
28 May 2014 
Jorge Avila Director, National Institute for Industrial 
Property (INPI) 
Denied 
Regina Lucia P. Cohen Director, Movement National Das Cidadas 
Positive, Brasilia 
27 May 2014 
Prof. Maria Inês Toledo School of Health Sciences, University of 
Brasilia  
28 May 2014 
Prof. Veriano Terto  
 
Instituto de Estudos em Saúde Coletiva - 
IESC/UFRJ 
5 June 2014 
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Appendix 2: List of Interviewees (India) 
 
Interviewee Name of Organization and Professional Title Date Interviewed 
T. C. James President, NIPO, Delhi 26 August  2014 
D. G. Shah Indian Pharmaceutical Alliance, Mumbai 26 September 2014 
Leena Menghaney Médecins Sans Frontières, Delhi 25 August 2014 
Prof. Shamnad Basheer Spicy IP, Kolkota 26 August 2014 
Dr. K. S. Kardam Senior Joint Controller of Patents and Designs, 
Indian Patent Office, Delhi 
Denied 
Prof. Biswajit Dhar  Center for Economic Studies and Planning, JNU, 
Delhi 
11 September 2014 
Vikas Ahuja   Delhi Network of Positive People, Delhi 29 August 2014 
Shri Anshu Prakash   Joint Secretary, Ministry of Health Cancelled 
Chandni Raina Department of Commerce, Ministry of Trade and 
Commerce 
Denied 
Gopakumar Nair Indian Drug Manufacturers’ Association, Mumbai 24 September 2014 
Rajana Smectask Director General, Organization of Pharmaceutical 
Producers in India, Mumbai 
24 September 2014 
Amit Sen Gupta National Working Group Patent Law, Delhi 3 September 2014 
K. M. Gopakumar   Third World Network, Delhi 15 September 2014 
Colins Gonzales Human Rights Law Network, Delhi 19 September 2014 
Zakir Thomas Council of Scientific and Industrial Research 
(CSIR) 
16 September 2014 
B. S. Chimni Professor, Centre for International Legal Studies, 
School of International Studies, JNU, Delhi 
26 August 2014 
Dr. Shakthivel Selvaraj 
 
Public Health Foundation of India (PHFI), Delhi 9 September 2014 
Prof. Raghuram   IP University, Delhi 01 September 2014 
Justice Prabha Sridevan   Madras High Court, Chennai 17 September 2014 
Dinesh Abrol Indian Institute of Science and Technology, Delhi 8 September 2014 
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Appendix 3 - List of Interviewees (Nigeria) 
 
Interviewee Name of Organization and Professional Title Date Interviewed 
Dr. Bravo Otohabru Procurement Officer, National Agency for the 
Control of AIDS (NACA) 
3 December 2014 
Ope Abegunde Assistant Director, Policy and Strategy, National 
Agency for the Control of AIDS (NACA) 
4 February 2015 
Tile Tano Deputy Director, Ministry of Health 25 November 2014 
Ruth Okoye TRIPS Division, Ministry of Trade and Investment 5 December 2014 
Onyejekwu Simeon Principal Trade Officer, WTO Department, 
Ministry of Trade and Investment 
5 December 2014 
Ezikpe Egbuta Kalu. Trade Policy and Former Trade Negotiator, 
Ministry of Trade and Investment 
21 December 2014 
Aisha Salim Patent Examiner, Patent Office  29 January 2015 
Barrister Salman Mann Director, Commercial Law (Trademarks and 
Patents) 
5 December 2014 
Ali Ibrahim Deputy Director, i/c Pharmacovigilance/Post 
Marketing Surveillance, National Agency for Food 
and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC)  
11 March 2015 
Barrister Shafiu Adamu 
Yauri 
Registrar (Trademarks and Patents) 26 November 2014 
Corinna Heineke GIZ Nigeria 17 February 2015 
Engr. Nwosa Lucky Director, Technology Transfer and Research 
(TAR), National Office for Technology 
Acquisition and Promotion (NOTAP), Abuja 
22 January 2015 
Interviewee A WHO official 18 November 2014 
Interviewee B Health activist 29 January 2015 
Prof. Adebambo Adewapo Director, Intellectual Property Law, Institute of 
Advanced Legal Studies 
3 February 2015 
Dr. Kelechi Ohiri Director, Saving One Million Lives Initiative 27 January 2015 
Mr. Oloyole National AIDS and STI Control Program 
(NESCOP) 
5 February 2015 
Prof. Chidi Odinkalu Chairperson, National Human Rights Commission 
(NHRC) 
26 June 2015 
Yetunde Ali BIOFEM Pharmaceutical Company, Lagos 12 July 2016 
Mike Ajufor Evans Pharmaceutical Plc 13 July 2016 
Abraham Okeke Swisspharma Plc 15 July 2016 
Interviewee C Official,  Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Group of 
Manufacturers Association of Nigeria 
14 July 2016 
 
 
 
  251 
 
Fieldwork Interview Questions 
 
Aim: This brief interview seeks to excavate deeper insights into 4 main areas: understanding 
and conceptualization of patent, understanding of TRIPS Agreement, and influence local 
politics and participant. 
 
Stakeholders/Respondents: Local CSOs, relevant government agencies, private sector 
(foreign and local pharmaceutical companies), judiciary (attorneys, judges). 
 
Duration: 30-45 minutes 
 
Questions 
 
1. What is your understanding of the global machinery of intellectual property regime, 
specifically the TRIPS Agreement? Has this understanding changed over time? If so, 
why (or why not)? 
 
2. How is this understanding implemented into law (government agencies only)?  
 
3. What social capacities and institutions were instantiated with the A2M debate? 
 
4. Does your organization intervene in and frame policy debates and processes regarding 
A2M and patents? If so, what ways? If not, why not? (PS and CSOs only) 
 
5. How does your organization influence the public knowledge about patent?  
 
6. How is the relationship between Government (and its agencies) and local 
CSOs/private sector?  
 
7. Are you aware of how other countries, say, India and Brazil are dealing with the 
patent issue in relation to development and health? Why is/isn’t Nigeria following 
that path? (Nigeria only)  
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Participant identification number where applicable:              
 
 
Consent Form 
 
 
Tentative Project Title: Emerging Third World Jurisprudence in Legislating Increased    
                                       Access to Medicines 
 
 
Name of Researcher: Amaka Vanni 
(To be completed by participant) 
 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet for the above 
study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions 
and have had these answered satisfactorily.  ☐ Yes ☐ No 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at 
any time, without giving any reason. ☐Yes   ☐No 
 
3. I understand that any information given by me may be used in future reports, 
articles or presentations by the researcher. ☐ Yes   ☐No 
 
4. I understand that my information will be held and processed confidentially. ☐ 
Yes   ☐No 
 
5. I agree to take part in the above study and allow the interview to be audiotaped. 
☐Yes   ☐No 
 
6. I understand that data from the interviews will be kept in a secure storage and 
accessible to the researcher. ☐Yes   ☐No 
 
 
 
 
_________________  _____________  ___________________ 
Name of Participant  Date    Signature 
 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________ _____________  ____________________ 
Researcher   Date    Signature 
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